# THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

EDMUND HUSSERL

COLLECTED WORKS

EDITOR:
RUDOLF BERNET

VOLUME XII

# THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

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TRANSLATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES (LEUVEN)

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# EDMUND HUSSERL

## THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911

From the German "Aus den Vorlesungen, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Wintersemester 1910/1911" in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, *Husserliana XIII*, edited by Iso Kern

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Springer

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN-10 1-4020-3788-0 (PB)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3788-7 (PB)
ISBN-10 1-4020-3787-2 (HB)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3787-0 (HB)
ISBN-10 1-4020-3789-9 (e-book)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3789-4 (e-book)

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Published by Springer,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

*www.springer.com*

*Printed on acid-free paper*



Printed in the Netherlands

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# TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

## I. *Historical place and content of this text*

Iso Kern, in the *Editor's Introduction* of *Husserliana* Vol. XIII (pp. XXXIII–XL), shows us how important for Husserl were the lectures, officially titled, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910–1911)*, along with the 1910 *Preparatory Notes* (given here as Appendix I). Kern documents his claim that, apart from various references in Husserl's published works, in his *Nachlass* "he probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one." He refers to it by various ways besides its official title as "Lecture on Intersubjectivity," "Lecture on Empathy and Expanded Reduction," "On the Phenomenological Reduction and Transcendental Theory of Empathy," or simply "Empathy." Although the formulations of these themes were of decisive importance for launching the direction of Husserl's reflections, they are not treated in these lectures with the amplitude they eventually received. Kern reports that what is here translated (Number 6 in *Husserliana XIII,* along with related appendices) does not give in its entirety the two-hour per week lectures held during the semester, but only the first part. After Christmas, Husserl began intensively preparing for *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* that was published in *Logos* in 1911. The second part of the course, the contents of which we do not know, took the form of class discussions. This *Translators' Preface* will supplement Kern's excellent introductory remarks.

By reason of its scope and size, these lectures are one of the best introductions to Husserl's phenomenology. We must await the publication of all the *Nachlass* to decide which one of the many "introductions" is the best for beginners. Husserl himself used parts of these lectures for courses he entitled *Introduction to Phenomenology*.

Here, in a brief space, the classical touchstones of Husserl's philosophy are presented, some for the very first time: the eidetic and phenomenological analysis and how eidetic analysis is not yet phenomenological analysis; the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude; the phenomenological reduction; the intersubjective reduction; the distinction between nature or being in itself and nature or being displayed; empty and filled intentions; the interplay of presence and absence; the interplay of transcendence and immanence; manifestation through intentionality and the non-intentional pre-reflexive manifestation; the various senses of "I" depending on the position of the phenomenological observer; the "halo" or horizon of experience; world as the full concrete positivity of experience; the incommensurability of the properties of mind and display with the properties of displayed physical objects; body-thing versus lived body; knowledge of other minds through empathy; the unique intentionality of empathy; the phenomenology of communicative acts; temporality and time-consciousness; the consciousness of the time-consciousness of others; universal monadology; the nature of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy vis-à-vis science and other forms of philosophy, etc.

These lectures also are a good source for getting clear on how transcendental phenomenology is different from "pure psychology," "eidetic psychology," "eidetics of the spirit," etc., and in what respects transcendental psychology is transcendental phenomenology. What is crucial, of course, for determining transcendental phenomenology is whether the transcendental reduction is in play. But in order that the reader is not misled, it must be said that, as is typical with Husserl, little consideration is given to the fact that most of the young university listeners were novices. Nevertheless, because the issues are emerging for Husserl with an original freshness, they often make what is at stake more accessible than, e.g., the very dense *Cartesian Meditations*. Moreover, in some respects, these lectures speak to the novice better in part because they cast a wider net in regard to both readers and themes than do the texts comprising *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Clearly, the lectures are aimed at bright novices as well as the more seasoned students of phenomenology, who, at that time, included some of the gifted young people who later were to be called "The Göttingen-Munich"

or "realist" phenomenologists. The lectures were given two years before the programmatic *Ideas I*, and at least 10 years after Husserl discovered the correlation between being and manifestation, or, more precisely, between what appears, its appearings, and the acts by which the appearings of what appears appear. And they occur about three years after the decisive discovery of the "reduction" (if one assumes that occurred around 1907) as the way to secure the philosophical attitude that opens up the field for philosophy as the field of what appears in its appearings correlated to the agency and agent of manifestation.

It must be stressed that the Appendices and most of the footnotes are integral to the text. These texts, which stem mostly from the 1920s, are further intriguing because they enable the reader to enter into dialogue with Husserl in a lively way by permitting the reader to be a witness to Husserl's responses to the puzzlement of students or his own dialogue with himself. Furthermore, although the Appendices re-present and work over discussions in the body of the text, they are, by no means, mere repetitions because they bring clarification, new developments, and new insights. Moreover, throughout the footnotes and Appendices, there are fine pithy formulations that give the gist of complex issues.

## II. *The problem of absolute being*

In these lectures as elsewhere, Descartes is heralded as the forerunner of the reduction. Husserl here (§16) uses the phrase that also characterizes the famous second section of *Ideas I,* "the fundamental consideration," to point to Descartes' *cogito* as what "inaugurates the entire course of development of modern philosophy (. . . ), the beginning of all authentic scientific philosophy, and the point of origin of all genuine philosophical problems" which is nothing other than "the staging of a phenomenological reduction." Yet Descartes suffered shipwreck because he did not grasp the sense of an absolute science. Nevertheless, his discovery of a sphere in which doubt made no sense, indeed, of a realm which cannot be put into brackets and which must be affirmed absolutely, is celebrated. In this connection, Husserl here is busy with the senses, on the one hand, of the being of what is objective or what is for absolute consciousness and from which we can doxastically disengage and, on the other

hand, absolute consciousness itself as that from which we *cannot* doxastically disengage. A few years later in *Ideas I* he called the former relative being and the latter absolute being. In later writings, he was to refer to the latter as *meon* (non-being) and the opposite (*Gegenstück*) of all being. (See *Husserliana XXIII*, 277–278 and *Nachlass* MSS C 2 1, 1 ff.) Here in §32, as well as elsewhere in Husserl's writings, in discussions that adumbrate recent emphases in phenomenology spurred by Michel Henry, the absolute being is named something apart from "nature" or "world" because it is neither itself-appearing (in a filled intention), nor does it have a share in such being through an indirect co-positing of nature. And of its core, the phenomenological present, we hear that it "is not appearing presence (*Gegenwart*), but self-presence in an absolute sense." Here, we have what is manifest not as an appearing of . . . , a "genitive of appearing," but the self-appearing of that to which what appears appears, i.e., the self-appearing of the "dative of appearing." This dative itself is self-present but not through an appearing of itself to itself, not an appearing of .. . . to. In Appendix III (XXII) (the second set of roman numerals refer to the original designation in *Husserliana XIII*), Husserl touches upon this basic difficulty of a pre-reflective, non-intentional, non-objective form of manifestation when he asks whether and in what sense there is to be found in that which is found as an object the consciousness with its I that finds the object.

Surely of great interest today, as it was then, is the mind–body relationship. In §13, Husserl speaks of this as *The Distinctio Phaenomenologica*. Here, he not only offers arguments against any kind of reductionism or eliminativism, but also shows the constructive, speculative, and non-eidetic status of any theory of panpsychism. Of great interest here also is the kind of phenomenological parallelism that Husserl presents between the mental and physical or rather, and inseparably, the distinction and relationship between the phenomenological realm and the world as described by the natural sciences. This theme runs throughout the beginning lectures and is picked up again in Appendix I (No. 5), Appendix VI (XXV), and Appendix XII (XVII of No. 5), where it focuses the basic tension within the modern university, i.e., the nature of the relationship between the humanities and the natural sciences. A pressing question at the beginning of the 21st century,

whether and in what sense knowledge of nature is itself a fact of nature, is nicely addressed by Husserl.

### III. *Propositional reflection versus transcendental-phenomenological reduction*

Of special interest also is Husserl's attempt, in §17, at making explicit a distinction overlooked by some interpreters, but one that Robert Sokolowski has insisted on the last 25 years, i.e., between propositional reflection and phenomenological reflection, between reflection on propositions and the phenomenological reduction.[1] A way of thinking about the reduction is to think of how we might entertain a claim or proposition without prejudice and on its own merits, and thereby disengage our own immediate doxastic inclinations or allegiances. This unprejudiced reflection on a proposition is related to, but not identical with, the reduction. The reflection on the merits of a claim, on the supposed as supposed, is no longer a naïve assertion of the objective state of affairs, nor is it a turn within to our judgment as if it were waiting to be reflected on. Rather it is taking the state of affairs with which we were formerly engaged in a naïve way *as proposed*. This beginning concern with the truth of what is being asserted is coincident with the opening up of the apophantic realm. Yet it is not a move into the transcendental dimension; it does not yet entertain the whole comprising the acts of manifestation along with the manifested; rather the propositional reflection is still bound doxastically to what is being claimed and has not taken an interest in the acts through which it appears the way it does. This is because propositional reflection still takes the supposed state of affairs as real and does not yet disengage this doxastic allegiance because its *telos* is the truth of what is being asserted. Phenomenology's *telos* is not the truth of what we experience, judge, and declare to be true, the truth of the appearing being, but the truthfulness of being, being in

[1] There are other places where Husserl makes this distinction. See, e.g., his *Inaugural Freiburg Lecture* in *Husserliana XXV*, 76; trans. in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press), 15. See also *Formal and Transcendental Logic (Husserliana XVII),* Section 44a-$\beta$. In §69 of *Experience and Judgment* propositional reflection is briefly discussed and it is clear that it is *not* to be identified with the phenomenological reflection.

its appearing, in its display, and therefore truth as it is inseparable from the revealing life of consciousness. It presupposes the work of the truth of experience and judgment in the natural attitude; it presupposes the uncovering of the apophantic by way of reflection on the given state of affairs as supposed; and it, in turn, focuses on the display by experience and judgment of this truth, of the difference between the naïvely given state of affairs and the emergence of this state of affairs when taken as supposed, i.e., as a proposition, and the way the state of affairs again appears when it is confirmed in a filled intention and not merely as supposed and not merely as naïvely given.

### IV. *The apodicticity of the field of phenomenological philosophy*

Aspects of this theme are continued in Appendix IV (XXIII). According to Husserl, in the reduction I have "positive" truth, i.e., straightforwardly and naïvely posited truth, precisely as it is had by the positively directed I. The *epoché* enables the thematization of the positing along with the posited or its proposition, as something so positively posited. This is not contradicted by Husserl's remark that for phenomenology the positive truth as such is never a theme. In the natural attitude, the positivity as such remains hidden. (For the unreflective and naïve attitude, what is given is not given as posited in a naïve straightforward, non-reflective, way; seeing the natural attitude as such is not integral to the natural attitude.) In the transcendental reflection on the natural attitude's obliviousness to its positivity, we can say that "positive truth as such" is the equivalent of: without disengagement of doxastic allegiance. Only the *epoché* enables the overcoming of this naiveté, and, in this different sense, the disclosure of "the positive truth as such."

In Appendix IV (XXIII), there also is an especially good discussion of the problematic relationships between the realms of positivity (which are equated with the ontic) and the transcendental, e.g., in terms of the logical dependence or independence of one on the other, the nature of the synthesis of the two realms by the one same I, the nature of the transition from the naïve enworldment to the transcendental engagement and back again. One clear conclusion is that the truth or falsity of the ontic, positive realm, e.g., the truth about the states of affairs of science or common sense, does not affect the truth or falsity

of the phenomenological realm, being the realm that displays the presentation by common sense and science of the ontic or positive realms. Further, the truth as such of the positive and ontic realm, its being made manifest as such, is dependent on and inconceivable without the phenomenological truth that brings this display to light, even though the truths that are uncovered in the positive, ontic realm are never as such a theme for phenomenology. Thus, e.g., phenomenology is not interested in the truth or falsity of NASA's claim that there is ice on Mars or a sociologist's claim that America's quest for empire is due to the influence of the Christian Right; but both these claims as ways of articulating the truth of the world are of interest to phenomenology.

Toward the end of Appendix IV (XXIII), Husserl then discusses the possibility of a transcendental theoretical habitus that has validity even though the I ineluctably must attend to the demands of the world and its positivities. Thus, the transcendental phenomenologist in her engagement in the exigencies of life does not simply revert to naiveté but necessarily has a second-naiveté or a transformed positivity. Husserl does not here address whether this second-naiveté or retained detachment is possible for the phenomenological philosopher with regard to all of life's exigencies and importunities. In any case, we have reason to believe, from the later writings, that this "transformed positivity" was to be an enrichment of subsequent ethical-cultural life.

Husserl notes at §23, the beginning of Chapter IV, that here the idea of an "apodictic critique of phenomenological experience" makes its first entrance. In §24, he wrestles with basic issues in such a way that shows the inseparability of the appearings of things from acts. A recurrent question Husserl's phenomenology faces is in what sense acts are indeed "given" in their disclosure of beings through aspects, or in what sense the acts are phenomena themselves. Some philosophers have denied that acts are phenomena, i.e., are given in any way. Rather only the phenomena or aspects, profiles, perspectives, etc., of intentional objects are given, but the acts are inferred as the non-experienced source of the agency that is responsible for the phenomena or aspects of things. In these lectures, without always being perfectly clear, Husserl works with the conviction not only that phenomena as aspects are inseparable from acts, but also that acts themselves may be given, indeed he calls them, not without causing some

difficulties of interpretation for the student, empirical givennesses. "Empirical" in these sections seems to refer to what is available to perception *or* reflection apart from the reduction. The same perception therefore can appear as "empirical" and then as "phenomenological," i.e., reduced by reason of the disengaging of the doxastic allegiance.

In a fresh manner, as if Husserl were thinking out loud, the lectures raise difficult questions about the extent to which the reduction is a realm of apodicticity of pure immanence. To this end he nicely spells out senses of "immanence" and "transcendence." (See §§29–30.) For example, Husserl argues that the phenomenological philosopher is compelled to acknowledge that a reduction to absolutely pure immanence is impossible because the transcendence of retention (and what it retains) necessarily remains within the apodictic immanent realm of the reduction; if we do not acknowledge this transcendence in immanence, we have to *per impossibile* get rid of the absolute Now itself because it is always a retention of a just-past Now, as well as a protention of a not-yet Now.

Further, if it is necessary that retentions be part of the reduced realm, and if they necessarily transcend the absolute Now, does phenomenology require a commitment to the infallibility of retention and memory? (See §25.) To what extent does the transcendence that necessarily is within the absolute sphere threaten its claims to apodicticity? How can a science be absolute when only the ephemeral pre-reflexive realm of the Now is absolutely given? In this connection, it is interesting to note that Husserl (at the beginning of Appendix XI (XXX)) speaks of a primal or original right to trust the givens of memory and the being of past transcendental consciousness.

What Husserl later would call "the phenomenology of phenomenology" is already an adumbrated theme in these discussions here. Of special interest is the effort (at §32 ff.) to separate the properly phenomenological data (the text uses the Latinized German word *Data* but also "givenness" (*Gegebenheit*)) and to show in what sense the phenomenological reflective viewing is separable from the reduced object's appearing. Is the absolute phenomenon the reduced phenomenological object, or is it the neutralized phenomenological act, or is it the phenomenological viewing of the neutralized act and its

reduced object? Is it all three? Is it the reduced "stream" of *cogitata* and the "stream" of *cogitationes*, or is it the "stream" of the phenomenological viewing or *cogitatio* that brings the first-order, enworlded, *cogitatio* to light?

## V. *World and ontology*

In §9, Husserl gives a broad intriguing sketch of eidetic disciplines within the context of a discussion of the natural sciences, i.e., the sciences of factual existence. Iso Kern informs us that Husserl struck out these pages. I think we may assume that this was done not because he disagreed with the doctrine here discussed but because the presentation was repetitious and lacked some precision. Here, he argues that the ideas or regional frameworks that make up natural science may be studied purely, i.e., apart from the doxastic allegiance that characterizes our spontaneous relation to nature. Thus, the essential, eidetic study of the ideas of space, time, motion, thing, etc., would make up an ontology of nature. The natural sciences make use of these *a priori* ideas and necessities, but in an unthematic way.

Furthermore, there are other eidetic disciplines that the natural sciences make use of but do not thematically attend to, e.g., pure arithmetic, pure number, and pure probability. Likewise, there is the discipline of formal logic that has to do with not merely the number *one* of arithmetic but anything whatsoever, insofar as it becomes part of a proposition, which is its articulation through syntax, quantification, etc. Formal logic studies the necessary and contingent relations of propositions to one another. Ontology is related to formal logic because it is the formal eidetic science that studies the thought of being as such.

We may here also call attention to brief but tantalizing remarks on the ontology of the individuality of I-monads (which are also called "essentialities" and "substances"); this is followed with a meditation on a theme that accompanies Husserl to his last days, namely whether a plurality of I's is essentially necessary or whether there is a sense in which there can be only *one* I. In any case, the actual plurality of these essentially and radically distinct individuals or monads found the possible communalization through empathy and this plurality cannot

be dissolved in any higher-order communalization, however, profound it might be. (See Appendix XI (XXX))

These lectures adumbrate later discussions of the "life-world" and the ontology of world. In §10, Husserl points out how there is a sense of the surrounding or world as the intentional correlate of the indubitable phenomenological field, found always already in advance of the natural and eidetic sciences. Here, a sense of being is given which serves as the basis for what the various ontologies that comprise the eidetic pure disciplines yield. This consideration is inseparable from the discovery of the fundamental sense of experience or the "natural-world thesis," i.e., the target of the basic doxastic allegiance of the natural attitude. This basic sense of ontology he calls "ontology of the real" or "real ontology."

He then shows how nothing that may change within culture, history, nature, human development, etc., i.e., nothing that changes in the world, can affect the essential sense of the world because these facts make no sense without the presupposition of this basic sense of the world or being of the real. These early adumbrations of the "life-world" are one of the places for thinking about Husserl's contribution to the contemporary discussions of "possible worlds."

## VI. *Avenarius' positivism and realontology*

In §10 and Appendix III (XXII), Husserl enters into a tantalizing conversation with Richard Avenarius and perhaps also, to a lesser extent, with Ernst Mach.[2] This "world of pure experience" (a theme also of the later William James) is what is *vorgefunden*, given, found, but also given or found in advance, in the natural attitude. It, as the *concretum* that comes to light in the natural attitude, gets broken up into parts (object, object-horizon, act, egological bearer of the act, etc.) through the reflection inaugurated by the reduction.

It is almost certain that among the gifted students who visited these lectures was Hedwig Conrad-Martius. On the basis of her work

[2] For an excellent discussion of Mach and Avenarius within the context of Husserlian phenomenology, see Manfred Sommer, *Husserl und der frühe Positivismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985); for Mach alone see also his *Evidenz im Augenblick: eine Phänomenologie der reinen Empfindung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987).

with Husserl, she completed, in 1912, a fundamental treatise, *The Epistemological Bases of Positivism.*[3] This work delighted Husserl and was awarded a university prize, but she did not receive a doctorate for the work because Göttingen did not confer doctorates on women. It would be instructive to compare the lectures translated in this volume with this work as well as its enlarged reworking, *On the Ontology and Theory of Appearing of the Real External World: Together with a Critique of Positivist Theories*[4] not only in terms of the obvious connection with the empiricist–positivist tradition of Avenarius, Mach *et alii*, but also for the other themes of great interest to Husserl, e.g., the distinctive forms of self-presentation of what is touched, smelled, heard, and seen, as well as the precise sense of the "given" and in what sense the *Umgebungsbewusstsein* (the awareness of the surrounding) belongs to the "given."

Of special interest also is that Husserl uses a formulation that captures a theme in Conrad-Martius' "realontology" (*Realontologie*)[5] and ontology of appearing, i.e., that for the phenomenologist the being of the phenomenon shows itself to be "self-presenting outwards as self-present" (§32). Husserl himself touches upon this theme of "realontology" in §10. At issue here are such matters as: What makes for the real as real? What is the most obvious taken-for-granted that is the target of the primal theses of the world or "nature?" How is it to be distinguished from ideal, fictional objects, etc., not merely in terms of the different kinds of intentionality, e.g., signitive or perceptual, empty or filled, but in terms of the thing's "in the flesh" (*leibhaftig*) self-presentation as having "itselfness" or "self-presence?" Husserl brushes against these issues here, perhaps enough to provoke Conrad-Martius to undertake a noematic eidetics or ontology of the real and really real. Typically for Husserl (see Appendix IV (XXIII)) the really real is discussed in terms of the universal accord of my/our experience,

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[3] *Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus* (Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller, 1920).

[4] *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt. Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1916) in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, III, 345–542.

[5] See Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Realontologie,* in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, VI (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923).

and the necessity of the harmony of the manifolds of experience. Yet, we also know that for Husserl (see, e.g., §30 and §32) the deeper ontological issue is the unique mode of self-presentation of absolute consciousness that exemplarily presents itself as in-itself and as having a self-rooted self-ness or ipseity. This stands in contrast to the *Leibhaftigkeit* of objects given in a filled intention. For example, the sense of what it is of which one is aware in the self-awareness of an I, whether one's own in the first-person or that of another in the second- or third-person, is that which "is in itself and for itself and what is conceived through its own essence." (See Appendix XI (XXX) and our discussion above of absolute being.) Consider also the well-known formulation from *Husserliana VIII,* 412: "The being of the I is continuously being-for-itself, is continuously being and being-for-itself through self-manifestation, through absolute manifestation wherein what is manifested necessarily is." These are the kind of formulations that Conrad-Martius uses as a springboard for her eidetics of "the real" and "the really real."

### VII. *Is the life-world opinion-laden or theory-laden?*

In these lectures, Husserl, perhaps under Avenarius' influence, often uses forms of the verb *vorfinden*. What is this *Vorfinden* before, in advance of, or prior to? Sometimes the term seems to refer to the great fund of implicit awareness in the natural attitude prior to reflection and explicit categorial and syntactical thematization. In Appendix III (XXII), its sense is placed explicitly in connection with the concept of the world as developed by Richard Avenarius. Avenarius discovered the world and the correlation to the I's as what were found in advance, but he did not appreciate the difference it makes when this finding-in-advance is approached from the phenomenological attitude.

What is found in advance is what is prior to theory and, of course, what is prior to theory may be thick with what is unthematic and implicit. World here approximates what Husserl later will call the "life-world" wherein we are confronted with an original sense and immediate givenness prior to all "theory." It seems that *das Vorgefundene*, which is found in advance, is not for Husserl "theory-laden" as one says today, but "opinion-laden." Of course, this claim makes

sense only if we reserve a special sense to theory because surely the world comes to us in advance saturated with religious, metaphysical, scientific, etc., opinions and/or "theories." Some of the opinions were once someone's, perhaps our own, theory, but they are not functioning now strictly speaking as theory proper, i.e., as my articulation of what is given in advance.

What precisely is the difference between opinion and theory here for Husserl? (See Appendix III (XXII).) Proper theory is the work of *thoughtful* experiencing (*Erfahrungsdenken*) that builds on and explicates "that experience which is found (in advance)," which surely is soaked with opinions, many of which might well have been the result of acts of theory. But it would seem that here Husserl excludes a certain kind of theory from *das Vorgefundene* as well as from the actual thoughtful experiencing, namely the theory which would make impossible phenomenology as the ultimate and fundamental philosophical science or discipline. Thus, there would be excluded from the actuality of that which is found (in advance) or the life-world any theory that would *a priori* deny any ontological sense to what appears. Such would be the theory of, e.g., forms of scientific realism, naturalism, eliminativism, and psychologism. It would exclude any theory, as he has it in the *Prolegomena* to the *Logical Investigations* (§32), that makes theory, especially the *theorein* of phenomenological viewing, impossible. The obstinacy of such theories poses an enormous but now familiar challenge for teachers attempting an introduction to phenomenology. The basic pedagogical move is to *show* that these theories must deny what they ineluctably presuppose, i.e., the appearing of what appears. For example, they deny the appearing of lived experience in favor of the physical reality, e.g., in favor of the stimulated neural fibers, as if this consideration could dispense with the lived experiencing of the appearing stimulated neural fibers.

Thus, what is "already found (in advance)," as an immediate and original givenness of sense, is what can and must be described. But a true and acceptable theory, true thoughtful experiencing, is such that it does not injure the general sense of the original givenness. Thus, a criterion of this acceptable theory seems to be that it is manifestly a continuation of this original givenness. Yet it is not simply identical with the description of the original given sense because it

is also "a broader encompassing description." (Appendix III (XXII)) There must be a kind of identity synthesis between what is found and the theory's broader encompassing description. Beyond this there is nothing for philosophy to do: "To seek for more has no meaning." This basic "positivism" and "immanentism" of phenomenology means that all theory is tied to what appears and all transcendence is tucked within, immanent to, this world that is always there prior to theories about this world that are discontinuous with it as it is lived.

### VIII. *Empathy and the intersubjective reduction*

The frequently appearing *Einfühlung* we have simply translated as "empathy." Husserl's technical meaning, i.e., the act by which we presence another and therefore another self-awareness on the basis of its bodily presence-in-the world, is as foreign to the German sense of the word as it is to the English. (See Appendix XI (XXX) where Husserl confesses that "empathy" is a poor choice and that "empathizing perception" would be better.)

For Husserl, "empathy" is a unique kind of intentionality that discloses the "other" I. What is manifest is a being that is conscious and possibly a who. When such a being appears as a human, empathy makes present a being that is self-aware, enjoying a first-person perspective, and is capable of referring to herself as "I." Thus, empathy reveals for essential reasons what forever eludes me because I can make the other person present as you, she or he, never as "I," as she is "I" for herself only. In empathy, the "self," being immediately present to the other in her first-person experience, is made present at a distance and in a comparatively empty way.

Further, in the reduction, the other person, like everything else, becomes an "index" in the sense that what is made present, points in an empty way (which may or may not be filled in by phenomenological reflection and analysis) to the network comprised of the manifold intentional achievements of the one phenomenologizing.

Husserl teaches that we can also perform the *epoché* with regard to the empathized other consciousness. When this happens, reality or nature is not only an index for *my* system of possible experiences, but it is also at the same time an index for corresponding systems

of experience of certain relevant other I's or possibly all other I's (i.e., being is now displayed as being "for us all," i.e., the monadic community). (See §39 and also Appendix IX (XXVIII)) This does not mean, *per impossibile*, that I act on your behalf and disconnect your doxastic allegiance, but rather in addition to the phenomenon of the world as what appears to me, and in addition to you or all the others as appearing to me, there now is effected: the world as-it-appears-for-you, and/or for the others, and the world-as-for-us-all. World is now reduced for me to an index pointing to the manifold temporal strands of the background of my and the other streams of consciousness.

There is no direct channel leading from my empathizing stream of consciousness to the stream of consciousness of the others. Thus, the reduction of the others' world to the others' streams of consciousness or streaming presencing (through this second reduction) cannot mean that the others' streams of presencing belong to mine or mine to theirs. Nevertheless, there is a coincidence of Now in my empathizing and the empathized given Now of the others' stream of consciousness, even though the empathized Now is not the lived Now of my empathizing. What remains after this reduction is that the world in its publicity, being the same for us all, appears to me as an index for the indefinite manifold of streams of consciousness of mine and all the others with whom I stand connected through their being present explicitly or implicitly in my presencing of things in the world. This consideration enables Husserl to say: "Considered absolutely there is only the ego and its life (. . . ). Considered absolutely there is nothing besides mind and there is no other bond than that of mind." (Appendix XI (XXX)) (See also Appendices VII–IX, which contain rich discussions of the time-consciousness of empathy and the senses in which there is and is not a temporal unity of the empathizing stream of consciousness with the empathized stream of consciousness.) In §40, Husserl cautions that he has not said that, having exercised the epoché, "nature is nothing but" this interaction and constitution of monads. Nature, after all, has been merely bracketed; its being posited and displayed is presupposed by transcendental reflection. Yet it still is a fact that the complete philosophy of transcendental phenomenology is a monadology and the interaction and bonding of monads is philosophically more basic than notions of nature and natural relations derived from the natural attitude.

## IX. *Lived body and mind*

In the later writings, it seems that Husserl makes a clear distinction between *Leib*, which we have usually translated as "lived body," and *Körper*, which we have usually translated as "body," "physical body," or "body-thing." However, in the texts presented in this volume, Husserl sometimes uses *Leib* for one's objective physical body and not for the lived zero-point of orientation wherein one's sensations, feelings, kinaestheses, and volitions manifestly function. (See, e.g., §§12–14 and the first paragraphs of Appendix X (XXIX).) This leads to the anomaly of the possibility of there being a bodiless I (*leibloses Ich*) for whom the perceptual world is the same as for the embodied I. Because for Husserl the perception of physical objects in space essentially requires the correlative functioning of the kinaestheses, etc., of the lived body, of *Leib* in this sense, there seems to be a contradiction in Husserl's discussions. In Appendix X (XXIX), second paragraph, Husserl makes a clear distinction between *Leib* as physical body and Leib in the proper sense of *Erlebnisse* or lived experiences of effort, kinaestheses, will, etc. Husserl believes that, as such, these latter lived experiences, even though they are the experiences of the *Leib*, as the zero-point of orientation and the lived non-objective system of affections or lived experiences that correlate with the world of bodies in motion, are conceivable without a physical body. The reason is that an *Erlebnis* has the kind of being whose integrity would hold even if all spatial–temporal things, e.g., bodies in space, proved to be "a meaningless phantasy." (See §14.) Yet when Husserl entertains the possibility of perceiving the world in the same way as the embodied person, even though this time the I is without *Leib*, he is clearly referring to *Leib* as some physical thing in space and time, even though this experiencing of the world would not be possible without *Leib* as the lived correlative system of kinaesthesis, sense of effort, will, etc. Because of these problems in the translation we have let the contexts determine the translation of both *Leib* and *Körper*.

In this same Appendix X, Husserl raises the question of the possibility of an agreement in the perception of the world between a bodiless ghostly spirit or mind and one embodied, even though this agreement could only be *communicated* if there were embodied minds. That is to say, in some way mind must have its "outside" or it must be able to externalize itself or disclose itself in a medium participated in by

others; otherwise empathy, which is the basis for communication, because it achieves the indication of the presence of other minds, is not possible. Husserl returns to this topic in a more elaborate way in *Husserliana XIV*, 324–340.

In §§13–14 as well as in Appendix VI (XXV), we have a provocative discussion of the relation of spirit or mind to body-thing or matter. The result of phenomenological eidetics is the dualism of mind and physical bodiliness. The properties of the one are not commensurate with the properties of the other. It is not only the case that it is not necessary that a bodily thing be a feeling or conscious thing, but furthermore (§13) it belongs to the essence of the life of the mind, the life of feeling, perceiving, desiring, questioning, etc., that there not be an essential real connection to a physical, material thing in the world. There is surely a connection, but it is a factual contingent one. (As we have just seen, if, however, there is to be actual communication between monads or minds, it is a matter of necessity that there be this connection.)

Husserl further holds that there is possible an eidetic knowledge of the psycho-physical, i.e., the realm wherein the mind and material (or non-mental) meet, without the investigating mind necessarily standing in an essential dependence on the physical. Even in the third-person Husserl sees only factual necessities of correlation, not eidetic ones. But here Husserl does not seem to be saying, as some thinkers today propose, that in principle the relation of mind with "C," his term for the psycho-physical connection or "where" consciousness is bound to the physical realm (cf. *Ideen II*, p. 29, *Husserliana IV*; see also §63 of the same volume for more on "psycho-physics"), cannot be known. For such contemporary thinkers, the relation of consciousness to C remains *essentially* elusive or recessive and the human investigator is consigned necessarily to ignorance on this matter. Husserl, rather, emphasizes that the actual relation is a non-necessary one. In this sense, the psycho-physical is not necessary for the knowledge of the psycho-physical.

A clear reason for why Husserl cannot be characterized as holding a mentalist monist view is that the deliverances of the natural attitude are never denied absolutely; rather they are maintained as indexes for the transcendental attitude's display of being. Indeed, the natural attitude is the point of departure and also in some sense the *telos* of the transcendental attitude. In one respect, the transcendental

I is an abstract moment of the *concretum* of our being monads with windows, i.e., persons in the world with others. Thus, it is utterly misguided to think that Husserl would say that transcendent being itself is merely an index for transcendental agency of manifestation! Nevertheless for Husserl there is a privileging of the mental realm and much depends on how we understand this. A challenge to dualism or monism of either a mental or material kind is to be found in the phenomenological description of intentionality. On the one hand, intentionality, intentional acts, and the "I," etc., do not show themselves to have properties that objective physical things have. On the other hand, in the full description of intentional agency, e.g., in the forms of empathy or perception, or in volition, there is *necessarily* included a relation to the material, physical world by the essentially distinct intending mind. The very sense of perception, empathy, or the *fiat* of the decision, e.g., to "write the letter," involves the inclusion of the physical-material world.

But for Husserl the matter does not simply rest here. One may recall his older teaching that intentionality essentially is a relation that is not existence-dependent on what it is related to. Here, in this 1910–1911 text, the emphasis is that, of course, for the eidetic reflection or even empirical reflection there is necessarily connected to the sense of the intentional act the apperceived real physical thing. In addition, there is necessarily connected to it the physical bodiliness of the lived body, which serves as the foundation of my empathic perception of you; similarly, the apperception of my own physical bodiliness is connected to any and every act of self-reference. But can I not disengage the doxastic allegiance of these apperceptions? And does this not give to me a field of mind or experience "in itself" such that there is evident an integrity of this realm even if the apperceived posited real world — being integral to the sense of this intentionality prior to the reduction — were in fact to be annihilated, e.g., by a geological catastrophe?

The basic issue then is in what sense the features of "absolute being" opened up by the reduction can be introduced into the resolution of the regional-ontological as well as larger metaphysical questions regarding the ultimate status of spirit, nature, materiality, monads, and their relations. On occasion for Husserl, it seems that the features of absolute being were decisive because of the *ontological* privileging

(cf. §14) of the realm of the I's own self-experience or self-awareness over that which is manifest in the world. Everything depends for Husserl on how we define this advantage. Clearly, it is epistemological; but is it only or merely that? Upon the answer to this question hangs the ultimate merit of transcendental-phenomenological idealism. In any case, even if "mind" (*Geist*) is for Husserl the privileged "category," it is not mind understood simply as a category or region of being, e.g., juxtaposed to "nature" or "soul" or "animalia" or "physical thing." The transcendental-phenomenological sense of mind, although surely standing in an identity synthesis with the regional-ontological notion of mind, is not simply the equivalent of it. The sense of mind as ultimate transcendental I, e.g., would not be described simply as a being disclosed and individuated in space and time, begun and ending, embodied, an act-center, etc.; and the ontological regional "mind," e.g., would not be described simply and as such as the transcendental I is, e.g., as *meon* or the opposite to anything posited (as, e.g., in *Husserliana XXIII,* 275–278), that is, as the agent and dative of being's display, etc.

### X. *Phenomenological sociology and theology*

What we have presented as Appendices I (No. 5) and XII (XVII) partially develop Husserl's phenomenological sociology and social philosophy. The here translated texts are but a taste of these issues that Husserl develops throughout *Husserliana XIII–XV* and elsewhere, and perhaps talked about in a free way in the actual spoken lectures of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910–1911).* Appendix XII (XVII) is of special interest for presenting a strong case for the *Geisteswissenschaften*, which can be translated both as "sciences of spirit" as well as "humanities" (in contrast to the natural or "hard" sciences), as a distinctive research field. Inseparable from these sciences of spirit or humanities is the central concept of "motivation." In this volume, motivation as the distinctive sense of "causality" within the transcendental egological and intersubjective realm is nicely sketched. For Husserl, phenomenological sociology and indeed all of the humanities study the unique causality of motivation, as it is born by groups and individuals both as unique single individuals as well as individuals as members of groups. Thus, Appendix XII concisely indicates some of

the basic features of intersubjective dynamics and shows how monads "work upon" or "effect" one another. A key form of interaction is "social-communicative acts" that are often presented under the rubric of "the I–You relation." Husserl's analysis of "social" or "communicative" acts (cf. also the work of Husserl's student, Adolf Reinach, on social acts) has affinities with later notions of "speech acts" (as found in, e.g., John Austin and John Searle). In particular in the late 20th century, the work of Paul Grice on "utterer's intention" invites the drawing of parallels.[6]

Finally, what we have translated as Appendix XIII (which is Appendix IV to the *Number 1* of *Husserliana XIII*) is a 1908 text very much connected with the basic theme of the unity of consciousness that pervades the lectures, particularly in §37. Recall that Husserl found himself compelled to claim that: "Considered absolutely there is only the ego and its life." (Appendix XI (XXX)) This theme is enriched and complicated by the introduction of intersubjectivity, a transcendental monadology, and then by a theological meditation on a possible divine "I" that knows the world through a synthesis and transcendence of the radically individual, distinct, and potentially conflicting absolute I's which it somehow bears within its ownmost sphere.

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## XI. *Final notes on the translation*

All the numbered section titles have been provided by the Editor, not Husserl. We have placed the original pagination in the margins.

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[6] Paul Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 86 ff. See the nice analysis in *Husserliana XIV,* 166 ff. that enriches the thin sketch in this volume in Appendix XII. See also the rich development in Adolf Reinach, *Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts* (Munich: Kösel, 1953/1916), 37 ff. This aspect of Husserl's thought has spawned a contemporary wing of phenomenology with which one may associate the names of Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, Karl Schuhmann *et alii*.

Usually, we have not attempted to render Husserl in gender-neutral language. For the sake of convenience and probable historical accuracy, we have generally used the older English conventions, which favor the masculine form. What follows is an account of translation choices we have made in regard to some key terms, most often with a sense of trepidation and dissatisfaction.

One of Husserl's key terms, perhaps developed in response to Avenarius' theory of the "world" that we *find before* all theory, is the verb *vorfinden* and various nominalizations of it, such as *das Vorgefundene*, *die Vorgefundenheiten*, *die Vorfindlichkeiten*, etc. To translate *vorfinden* as "to find" is too weak and bland, for the German term denotes a spatial or temporal *dimension* in which things are found, as things being found *around*, *before*, or *ahead* of ourselves. The things that I find before or around me are already there; they are pre-given. Accordingly, we have translated *vorfinden* by using phrases such as "to find before oneself," etc. Depending on context, we have translated *das Vorgefundene* or *die Vorfindlichkeit* by "that which is found around us" or "things found in advance," etc.

For the German noun *Erscheinung*, we have sometimes avoided the common rendering with "appearance" because of the baggage of "mere appearance" in contrast to the matter's veridical display. Instead, we have used the gerund "appearing" which seems less burdened with this baggage. Generally, however, "appearance" does not ever mean "mere appearance."

For the frequent word *Zusammenhang* and its modifications in the plural, as well as its adjectival forms, etc., we have generally used "context" or "cohesion," or "connection" and their modifications, depending on the context. Sometimes the context seems to require one of these, but other times it seems to require all of the senses at once. In §28, Husserl himself thematizes the rich senses of *Zusammenhang*.

For *Vergegenwärtigung*, Husserl's general term for an intention of what is not immediately present in a filling way and therefore not present as an immediate perceptual given, being rather a rendering present of what is in some respect perceptually absent, we have reluctantly, for the most part, stayed with the canonical American barbarism, "presentification." In the text, Husserl frequently makes clear how this term is to be understood.

For *Erlebnis*, we have also followed the American tradition and have rendered it as "lived experience," except in some cases where it seemed the more general "experience" served better.

For *Vollzug*, *Vollziehen*, etc., we have usually translated "performance," as it has to do with the bringing about and actuation of the life of the mind through, especially, intentional acts. The obvious shortcoming is that in English there is a deliberateness and publicity attached to "performance;" the actuation of the life of the mind through acts is often neither deliberate nor public. Yet, we find occasion to speak of, e.g., the non-public and non-deliberative performance of a machine, racehorse, or athlete: it or she is performing well or badly, e.g., running or playing well or poorly. On occasion, we have used "achievement," the chief disadvantage of which is that it sounds as if the act has special qualities of excellence meriting recognition and applause. Such connotations, of course, mislead.

For *Vorstellung*, we have tried to avoid the Humean baggage of "idea" or "notion." Similarly, "representation" also conjures up something in between what the mind presents and the presented. Thus most often we simply used "presentation" or, depending on the context, "making present."

For the most part, we have stuck to the convention of translating *Wiedererinnerung* as "recollection" or "recollecting" and *Erinnerung* as "memory" or "remembering."

Since Husserl puts so much emphasis on the "experiential" aspects of the "experiential sciences," we have translated his term *Erfahrungswissenschaften* by the term "experiential sciences," rather than by the commonly used term "empirical sciences." For Husserl's concern is not so much directed at the methodological exactitude in the sciences in question than their saturation in experience. However, we have used the standard translation "natural sciences" for Husserl's term *Naturwissenschaften*, although his concept does not merely refer to the exact natural sciences, as we understand them today. Rather, for Husserl they include all sciences that thematize nature as nature.

For *schlechthin*, we have generally used the Latin expression *simpliciter*. However, "pure and simple" and "absolutely" would also be accurate. In particular, judgments *simpliciter* are typically judgements of positivity that occur in the natural attitude where the positing is taken up with the posited as absolute, i.e., not correlated with the

positing. The posited is, in this sense, regarded "dogmatically." For transcendental phenomenology, judgments *simpliciter* are legitimate only in the reduced ("pure") sphere of consciousness.

For *Geisteswissenschaften*, we have used the modern English translation "the humanities," although it must be kept in mind that for Husserl they fall under the theoretical and hence scientific disciplines in general, i.e., they belong to the corpus of *Wissenschaften* or sciences in the broad sense. *Geist* and *geistig* we translated as "mind" and "of the mind," respectively, although on some occasions we did use the term "intellectual" for the latter. There simply are no good equivalents for the terms *Geist* and *geistig* in English. *Spirit* and *spiritual* have too much metaphysical baggage, whereas *intellect* and *intellectual* seem to miss the philosophical and transcendental significance altogether that Husserl sees in *Geist*. Under these circumstances, it usually seems best to translate *Geist* and *geistig* as "mind" and "of the mind," respectively, provided one keeps at bay all reductionist connotations which neglect intentionality and take "the mental" as a brain state, etc. The German expression "*Leben der Seele*" we have translated as "inner life."

In general, we have translated *Wissenschaften* as "sciences" or "scientific disciplines," taking these terms in the broad sense where they denote any systematic, theoretical endeavor to articulate truths about a given subject matter. In this sense, mathematics, linguistics, physics, and history are all examples of *Wissenschaften* or sciences.

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Except for the added Appendix XIII, this edition gives the reader the same material that one may find in the German edition, published by Meiner as *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1910–1911)* that merely excerpts from *Husserliana XIII*, and in the French translation by Jacques English, and in the Spanish translation by Xavier San Martin. We have benefited from the work of these translators and thank them for their prior labors. We especially wish to thank Professor San Martin for sending a copy of his translation. We also wish to thank Dr. Robin Rollinger at the Husserl Archives for looking at an earlier draft of the translation. We have incorporated many of his

insightful suggestions. Many thanks go to Professor Ullrich Melle for helpful comments on the *Translators' Preface*. In addition, we wish to thank Ingrid Lombaerts of the Husserl Archives for the kindness of checking the text, Elizabeth Behnke for helping with a couple of difficult passages, and Brian Burkhart for reading an early translation of the text out loud to James Hart. Last but not least, we wish to thank Kristia Kesler for her expert advice on some difficult passages.