MORALITY AND ADVANTAGE

I

Hume asks, rhetorically, "what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual?" But there are many to whom this question does not seem rhetorical. Why, they ask, do we speak the language of morality, impressing upon our fellows their duties and obligations, urging them with appeals to what is right and good, if we could speak to the same effect in the language of prudence, appealing to considerations of interest and advantage? When the poet, Ogden Nash, is moved by the muse to cry out:

O Duty,
Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or a cutie?

we do not anticipate the reply:

O Poet,
I really am a cutie and I think you ought to know it.

The belief that duty cannot be reduced to interest, or that morality may require the agent to subordinate all considerations of advantage, is one which has withstood the assaults of contrary-minded philosophers from Plato to the present. Indeed, were it not for the conviction that only interest and advantage can motivate human actions, it would be difficult to understand philosophers contending so vigorously for the identity, or at least compatibility, of morality with prudence.

Yet if morality is not true prudence it would be wrong to suppose that those philosophers who have sought some connection between morality and advantage have been merely misguided. For it is a truism that we should all expect to be worse off if men were to substitute prudence, even of the most enlightened

1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sec. ix, pt. ii.
2 Ogden Nash, "Kind of an Ode to Duty."
kind, for morality in all of their deliberations. And this truism demands not only some connection between morality and advantage, but a seemingly paradoxical connection. For if we should all expect to suffer, were men to be prudent instead of moral, then morality must contribute to advantage in a unique way, a way in which prudence—following reasons of advantage—cannot.

Thomas Hobbes is perhaps the first philosopher who tried to develop this seemingly paradoxical connection between morality and advantage. But since he could not admit that a man might ever reasonably subordinate considerations of advantage to the dictates of obligation, he was led to deny the possibility of real conflict between morality and prudence. So his argument fails to clarify the distinction between the view that claims of obligation reduce to considerations of interest and the view that claims of obligation promote advantage in a way in which considerations of interest cannot.

More recently, Kurt Baier has argued that "being moral is following rules designed to overrule self-interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should set aside his interest." Since prudence is following rules of (enlightened) self-interest, Baier is arguing that morality is designed to overrule prudence when it is to everyone’s advantage that it do so—or, in other words, that morality contributes to advantage in a way in which prudence cannot.

Baier does not actually demonstrate that morality contributes to advantage in this unique and seemingly paradoxical way. Indeed, he does not ask how it is possible that morality should do this. It is this possibility which I propose to demonstrate.

II

Let us examine the following proposition, which will be referred to as “the thesis”: Morality is a system of principles such that it is

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4 That this, and only this, is what he is entitled to claim may not be clear to Baier, for he supposes his account of morality to answer the question “Why should we be moral?,” interpreting “we” distributively. This, as I shall argue in Sec. IV, is quite mistaken.
advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts.\(^5\)

What I wish to show is that this thesis could be true, that morality could possess those characteristics attributed to it by the thesis. I shall not try to show that the thesis is true—indeed, I shall argue in Section V that it presents at best an inadequate conception of morality. But it is plausible to suppose that a modified form of the thesis states a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for a moral system.

Two phrases in the thesis require elucidation. The first is “advantageous for everyone.” I use this phrase to mean that each person will do better if the system is accepted and acted on than if either no system is accepted and acted on or a system is accepted and acted on which is similar, save that it never requires any person to perform disadvantageous acts.

Clearly, then, the claim that it is advantageous for everyone to accept and act on the system is a very strong one; it may be so strong that no system of principles which might be generally adopted could meet it. But I shall consider in Section V one among the possible ways of weakening the claim.

The second phrase requiring elucidation is “disadvantageous acts.” I use this phrase to refer to acts which, in the context of their performance, would be less advantageous to the performer than some other act open to him in the same context. The phrase does not refer to acts which merely impose on the performer some short-term disadvantage that is recouped or outweighed in the long run. Rather it refers to acts which impose a disadvantage that is never recouped. It follows that the performer may say to himself, when confronted with the requirement to perform such an act, that it would be better for him not to perform it.

It is essential to note that the thesis, as elucidated, does not maintain that morality is advantageous for everyone in the sense that each person will do best if the system of principles is accepted

\(^5\) The thesis is not intended to state Baier’s view of morality. I shall suggest in Sec. V that Baier’s view would require substituting “everyone can expect to benefit” for “it is advantageous to everyone.” The thesis is stronger and easier to discuss.
and acted on. Each person will do better than if no system is adopted, or than if the one particular alternative mentioned above is adopted, but not than if any alternative is adopted.

Indeed, for each person required by the system to perform some disadvantageous act, it is easy to specify a better alternative—namely, the system modified so that it does not require him to perform any act disadvantageous to himself. Of course, there is no reason to expect such an alternative to be better than the moral system for everyone, or in fact for anyone other than the person granted the special exemption.

A second point to note is that each person must gain more from the disadvantageous acts performed by others than he loses from the disadvantageous acts performed by himself. If this were not the case, then some person would do better if a system were adopted exactly like the moral system save that it never requires any person to perform disadvantageous acts. This is ruled out by the force of “advantageous for everyone.”

This point may be clarified by an example. Suppose that the system contains exactly one principle. Everyone is always to tell the truth. It follows from the thesis that each person gains more from those occasions on which others tell the truth, even though it is disadvantageous to them to do so, than he loses from those occasions on which he tells the truth even though it is disadvantageous to him to do so.

Now this is not to say that each person gains by telling others the truth in order to ensure that in return they tell him the truth. Such gains would merely be the result of accepting certain short-term disadvantages (those associated with truth-telling) in order to reap long-term benefits (those associated with being told the truth). Rather, what is required by the thesis is that those disadvantages which a person incurs in telling the truth, when he can expect neither short-term nor long-term benefits to accrue to him from truth-telling, are outweighed by those advantages he receives when others tell him the truth when they can expect no benefits to accrue to them from truth-telling.

The principle enjoins truth-telling in those cases in which whether one tells the truth or not will have no effect on whether others tell the truth. Such cases include those in which others
have no way of knowing whether or not they are being told the truth. The thesis requires that the disadvantages one incurs in telling the truth in these cases are less than the advantages one receives in being told the truth by others in parallel cases; and the thesis requires that this holds for everyone.

Thus we see that although the disadvantages imposed by the system on any person are less than the advantages secured him through the imposition of disadvantages on others, yet the disadvantages are real in that incurring them is unrelated to receiving the advantages. The argument of long-term prudence, that I ought to incur some immediate disadvantage so that I shall receive compensating advantages later on, is entirely inapplicable here.

III

It will be useful to examine in some detail an example of a system which possesses those characteristics ascribed by the thesis to morality. This example, abstracted from the field of international relations, will enable us more clearly to distinguish, first, conduct based on immediate interest; second, conduct which is truly prudent; and third, conduct which promotes mutual advantage but is not prudent.

A and B are two nations with substantially opposed interests, who find themselves engaged in an arms race against each other. Both possess the latest in weaponry, so that each recognizes that the actual outbreak of full-scale war between them would be mutually disastrous. This recognition leads A and B to agree that each would be better off if they were mutually disarming instead of mutually arming. For mutual disarming would preserve the balance of power between them while reducing the risk of war.

Hence A and B enter into a disarmament pact. The pact is advantageous for both if both accept and act on it, although clearly it is not advantageous for either to act on it if the other does not.

Let A be considering whether or not to adhere to the pact in some particular situation, whether or not actually to perform some act of disarming. A will quite likely consider the act to have disadvantageous consequences. A expects to benefit, not by
its own acts of disarmament, but by B's acts. Hence if A were to reason simply in terms of immediate interest, A might well decide to violate the pact.

But A's decision need be neither prudent nor reasonable. For suppose first that B is able to determine whether or not A adheres to the pact. If A violates, then B will detect the violation and will then consider what to do in the light of A's behavior. It is not to B's advantage to disarm alone; B expects to gain, not by its own acts of disarmament, but by A's acts. Hence A's violation, if known to B, leads naturally to B's counter-violation. If this continues, the effect of the pact is entirely undone, and A and B return to their mutually disadvantageous arms race. A, foreseeing this when considering whether or not to adhere to the pact in the given situation, must therefore conclude that the truly prudent course of action is to adhere.

Now suppose that B is unable to determine whether or not A adheres to the pact in the particular situation under consideration. If A judges adherence to be in itself disadvantageous, then it will decide, both on the basis of immediate interest and on the basis of prudence, to violate the pact. Since A's decision is unknown to B, it cannot affect whether or not B adheres to the pact, and so the advantage gained by A's violation is not outweighed by any consequent loss.

Therefore if A and B are prudent they will adhere to their disarmament pact whenever violation would be detectable by the other, and violate the pact whenever violation would not be detectable by the other. In other words, they will adhere openly and violate secretly. The disarmament pact between A and B thus possesses two of the characteristics ascribed by the thesis to morality. First, accepting the pact and acting on it is more advantageous for each than making no pact at all. Second, in so far as the pact stipulates that each must disarm even when disarming is undetectable by the other, it requires each to perform disadvantageous acts—acts which run counter to considerations of prudence.

One further condition must be met if the disarmament pact is to possess those characteristics ascribed by the thesis to a system of morality. It must be the case that the requirement that each
party perform disadvantageous acts be essential to the advantage conferred by the pact; or, to put the matter in the way in which we expressed it earlier, both A and B must do better to adhere to this pact than to a pact which is similar save that it requires no disadvantageous acts. In terms of the example, A and B must do better to adhere to the pact than to a pact which stipulates that each must disarm only when disarming is detectable by the other.

We may plausibly suppose this condition to be met. Although A will gain by secretly retaining arms itself, it will lose by B’s similar acts, and its losses may well outweigh its gains. B may equally lose more by A’s secret violations than it gains by its own. So, despite the fact that prudence requires each to violate secretly, each may well do better if both adhere secretly than if both violate secretly. Supposing this to be the case, the disarmament pact is formally analogous to a moral system, as characterized by the thesis. That is, acceptance of and adherence to the pact by A and B is more advantageous for each, either than making no pact at all or than acceptance of and adherence to a pact requiring only open disarmament, and the pact requires each to perform acts of secret disarmament which are disadvantageous.

Some elementary notation, adapted for our purposes from the mathematical theory of games, may make the example even more perspicuous. Given a disarmament pact between A and B, each may pursue two pure strategies—adherence and violation. There are, then, four possible combinations of strategies, each determining a particular outcome. These outcomes can be ranked preferentially for each nation; we shall let the numerals 1 to 4 represent the ranking from first to fourth preference. Thus we construct a simple matrix, in which A’s preferences are stated first:

\[\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 \\
A\text{ adherence} & & & \\
B\text{ adherence} & & & \\
A\text{ violation} & & & \\
B\text{ violation} & & & \\
\end{array}\]

6 Those familiar with the theory of games will recognize the matrix as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In a more formal treatment, it would be appropriate to develop the relation between morality and advantage by reference to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This would require reconstructing the disarmament pact and the moral system as proper games. Here I wish only to suggest the bearing of game theory on our enterprise.
The matrix does not itself show that agreement is advantageous to both, for it gives only the rankings of outcomes given the agreement. But it is plausible to assume that A and B would rank mutual violation on a par with no agreement. If we assume this, we can then indicate the value to each of making and adhering to the pact by reference to the matrix.

The matrix shows immediately that adherence to the pact is not the most advantageous possibility for either, since each prefers the outcome, if it alone violates, to the outcome of mutual adherence. It shows also that each gains less from its own violations than it loses from the other's, since each ranks mutual adherence above mutual violation.

Let us now use the matrix to show that, as we argued previously, public adherence to the pact is prudent and mutually advantageous, whereas private adherence is not prudent although mutually advantageous. Consider first the case when adherence—and so violation—are open and public.

If adherence and violation are open, then each knows the strategy chosen by the other, and can adjust its own strategy in the light of this knowledge—or, in other words, the strategies are interdependent. Suppose that each initially chooses the strategy of adherence. A notices that if it switches to violation it gains—moving from 2 to 1 in terms of preference ranking. Hence immediate interest dictates such a switch. But it notices further that if it switches, then B can also be expected to switch—moving from 4 to 3 on its preference scale. The eventual outcome would be stable, in that neither could benefit from switching from violation back to adherence. But the eventual outcome would represent not a gain for A but a loss—moving from 2 to 3 on its preference scale. Hence prudence dictates no change from the strategy of adherence. This adherence is mutually advantageous; A and B are in precisely similar positions in terms of their pact.
Consider now the case when adherence and violation are secret and private. Neither nation knows the strategy chosen by the other, so the two strategies are independent. Suppose $A$ is trying to decide which strategy to follow. It does not know $B$'s choice. But it notices that if $B$ adheres, then it pays $A$ to violate, attaining 1 rather than 2 in terms of preference ranking. If $B$ violates, then again it pays $A$ to violate, attaining 3 rather than 4 on its preference scale. Hence, no matter which strategy $B$ chooses, $A$ will do better to violate, and so prudence dictates violation.

$B$ of course reasons in just the same way. Hence each is moved by considerations of prudence to violate the pact, and the outcome assigns each rank 3 on its preference scale. This outcome is mutually disadvantageous to $A$ and $B$, since mutual adherence would assign each rank 2 on its preference scale.

If $A$ and $B$ are both capable only of rational prudence, they find themselves at an impasse. The advantage of mutual adherence to the agreement when violations would be secret is not available to them, since neither can find it in his own over-all interest not to violate secretly. Hence, strictly prudent nations cannot reap the maximum advantage possible from a pact of the type under examination.

Of course, what $A$ and $B$ will no doubt endeavor to do is eliminate the possibility of secret violations of their pact. Indeed, barring additional complications, each must find it to his advantage to make it possible for the other to detect his own violations. In other words, each must find it advantageous to ensure that their choice of strategies is interdependent, so that the pact will always be prudent for each to keep. But it may not be possible for them to ensure this, and to the extent that they cannot, prudence will prevent them from maximizing mutual advantage.

IV

We may now return to the connection of morality with advantage. Morality, if it is a system of principles of the type characterized in the thesis, requires that some persons perform acts genuinely disadvantageous to themselves, as a means to greater mutual advantage. Our example shows sufficiently that
such a system is possible, and indicates more precisely its char-
acter. In particular, by an argument strictly parallel to that which
we have pursued, we may show that men who are merely prudent
will not perform the required disadvantageous acts. But in so
violating the principles of morality, they will disadvantage them-
selves. Each will lose more by the violations of others than he
will gain by his own violations.

Now this conclusion would be unsurprising if it were only that
no man can gain if he alone is moral rather than prudent. Obvi-
ously such a man loses, for he adheres to moral principles
to his own disadvantage, while others violate them also to his
disadvantage. The benefit of the moral system is not one which
any individual can secure for himself, since each man gains from
the sacrifices of others.

What is surprising in our conclusion is that no man can ever
gain if he is moral. Not only does he not gain by being moral
if others are prudent, but he also does not gain by being moral
if others are moral. For although he now receives the advantage
of others’ adherence to moral principles, he reaps the disad-
vantage of his own adherence. As long as his own adherence to
morality is independent of what others do (and this is required
to distinguish morality from prudence), he must do better to be
prudent.

If all men are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent.
But any one man will always do better if he is prudent than if
he is moral. There is no real paradox in supposing that morality
is advantageous, even though it requires the performance of
disadvantageous acts.

On the supposition that morality has the characteristics as-
cribed to it by the thesis, is it possible to answer the question
“Why should we be moral?” where “we” is taken distributively,
so that the question is a compendious way of asking, for each
person, “Why should I be moral?” More simply, is it possible
to answer the question “Why should I be moral?”

I take it that this question, if asked seriously, demands a reason
for being moral other than moral reasons themselves. It demands
that moral reasons be shown to be reasons for acting by a
noncircular argument. Those who would answer it, like Baier,
endeavor to do so by the introduction of considerations of advantage.

Two such considerations have emerged from our discussion. The first is that if all are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent. This will serve to answer the question "Why should we be moral?" if this question is interpreted rather as "Why should we all be moral—rather than all being something else?" If we must all be the same, then each person has a reason—a prudential reason—to prefer that we all be moral.

But, so interpreted, "Why should we be moral?" is not a compendious way of asking, for each person, "Why should I be moral?" Of course, if everyone is to be whatever I am, then I should be moral. But a general answer to the question "Why should I be moral?" cannot presuppose this.

The second consideration is that any individual always does better to be prudent rather than moral, provided his choice does not determine other choices. But in so far as this answers the question "Why should I be moral?" it leads to the conclusion "I should not be moral." One feels that this is not the answer which is wanted.

We may put the matter otherwise. The individual who needs a reason for being moral which is not itself a moral reason cannot have it. There is nothing surprising about this; it would be much more surprising if such reasons could be found. For it is more than apparently paradoxical to suppose that considerations of advantage could ever of themselves justify accepting a real disadvantage.

V

I suggested in Section II that the thesis, in modified form, might provide a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for a moral system. I want now to consider how one might characterize the man who would qualify as moral according to the thesis—I shall call him the "moral" man—and then ask what would be lacking from this characterization, in terms of some of our commonplace moral views.

The rationally prudent man is incapable of moral behavior,
in even the limited sense defined by the thesis. What difference must there be between the prudent man and the "moral" man? Most simply, the "moral" man is the prudent but trustworthy man. I treat trustworthiness as the capacity which enables its possessor to adhere, and to judge that he ought to adhere, to a commitment which he has made, without regard to considerations of advantage.

The prudent but trustworthy man does not possess this capacity completely. He is capable of trustworthy behavior only in so far as he regards his commitment as advantageous. Thus he differs from the prudent man just in the relevant respect; he accepts arguments of the form "If it is advantageous for me to agree\(^7\) to do \(x\), and I do agree to do \(x\), then I ought to do \(x\), whether or not it then proves advantageous for me to do \(x\)."

Suppose that \(A\) and \(B\), the parties to the disarmament pact, are prudent but trustworthy. \(A\), considering whether or not secretly to violate the agreement, reasons that its advantage in making and keeping the agreement, provided \(B\) does so as well, is greater than its advantage in not making it. If it can assume that \(B\) reasons in the same way, then it is in a position to conclude that it ought not to violate the pact. Although violation would be advantageous, consideration of this advantage is ruled out by \(A\)'s trustworthiness, given the advantage in agreeing to the pact.

The prudent but trustworthy man meets the requirements implicitly imposed by the thesis for the "moral" man. But how far does this "moral" man display two characteristics commonly associated with morality—first, a willingness to make sacrifices, and second, a concern with fairness?

Whenever a man ignores his own advantage for reasons other

\(^7\) The word "agree" requires elucidation. It is essential not to confuse an advantage in agreeing to do \(x\) with an advantage in saying that one will do \(x\). If it is advantageous for me to agree to do \(x\), then there is some set of actions open to me which includes both saying that I will do \(x\) and doing \(x\), and which is more advantageous to me than any set of actions open to me which does not include saying that I will do \(x\). On the other hand, if it is advantageous for me to say that I will do \(x\), then there is some set of actions open to me which includes saying that I will do \(x\), and which is more advantageous to me than any set which does not include saying that I will do \(x\). But this set need not include doing \(x\).
than those of greater advantage, he may be said to make some sacrifice. The "moral" man, in being trustworthy, is thus required to make certain sacrifices. But these are extremely limited. And—not surprisingly, given the general direction of our argument—it is quite possible that they limit the advantages which the "moral" man can secure.

Once more let us turn to our example. A and B have entered into a disarmament agreement and, being prudent but trustworthy, are faithfully carrying it out. The government of A is now informed by its scientists, however, that they have developed an effective missile defense, which will render A invulnerable to attack by any of the weapons actually or potentially at B's disposal, barring unforeseen technological developments. Furthermore, this defense can be installed secretly. The government is now called upon to decide whether to violate its agreement with B, install the new defense, and, with the arms it has retained through its violation, establish its dominance over B.

A is in a type of situation quite different from that previously considered. For it is not just that A will do better by secretly violating its agreement. A reasons not only that it will do better to violate no matter what B does, but that it will do better if both violate than if both continue to adhere to the pact. A is now in a position to gain from abandoning the agreement; it no longer finds mutual adherence advantageous.

We may represent this new situation in another matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>adheres</th>
<th>violates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adheres</td>
<td>3, 2</td>
<td>4, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violates</td>
<td>1, 4</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We assume again that the ranking of mutual violation is the same as that of no agreement. Now had this situation obtained at the outset, no agreement would have been made, for A would have had no reason to enter into a disarmament pact. And of course had A expected this situation to come about, no agreement—or only a temporary agreement—would have been made; A would no doubt have risked the short-term dangers of the continuing
arms race in the hope of securing the long-run benefit of pre-
dominance over B once its missile defense was completed. On
the contrary, A expected to benefit from the agreement, but now
finds that, because of its unexpected development of a missile
defense, the agreement is not in fact advantageous to it.

The prudent but trustworthy man is willing to carry out his
agreements, and judges that he ought to carry them out, in so
far as he considers them advantageous. A is prudent but trust-
worthy. But is A willing to carry out its agreement to disarm,
now that it no longer considers the agreement advantageous?

If A adheres to its agreement in this situation, it makes a
sacrifice greater than any advantage it receives from the similar
sacrifices of others. It makes a sacrifice greater in kind than
any which can be required by a mutually advantageous agree-
ment. It must, then, possess a capacity for trustworthy behavior
greater than that ascribed to the merely prudent but trustworthy
man (or nation). This capacity need not be unlimited; it need
not extend to a willingness to adhere to any commitment no
matter what sacrifice is involved. But it must involve a willingness
to adhere to a commitment made in the expectation of advantage,
should that expectation be disappointed.

I shall call the man (or nation) who is willing to adhere, and
judges that he ought to adhere, to his prudentially undertaken
agreements even if they prove disadvantageous to him, the trust-
worthy man. It is likely that there are advantages available to
trustworthy men which are not available to merely prudent but
trustworthy men. For there may be situations in which men can
make agreements which each expects to be advantageous to him,
provided he can count on the others’ adhering to it whether or
not their expectation of advantage is realized. But each can count
on this only if all have the capacity to adhere to commitments
regardless of whether the commitment actually proves advan-
tageous. Hence, only trustworthy men who know each other to
be such will be able rationally to enter into, and so to benefit
from, such agreements.

Baier’s view of morality departs from that stated in the thesis
in that it requires trustworthy, and not merely prudent but
trustworthy, men. Baier admits that “a person might do better
for himself by following enlightened self-interest rather than morality.”

This admission seems to require that morality be a system of principles which each person may expect, initially, to be advantageous to him, if adopted and adhered to by everyone, but not a system which actually is advantageous to everyone.

Our commonplace moral views do, I think, support the view that the moral man must be trustworthy. Hence, we have established one modification required in the thesis, if it is to provide a more adequate set of conditions for a moral system.

But there is a much more basic respect in which the “moral” man falls short of our expectations. He is willing to temper his single-minded pursuit of advantage only by accepting the obligation to adhere to prudentially undertaken commitments. He has no real concern for the advantage of others, which would lead him to modify his pursuit of advantage when it conflicted with the similar pursuits of others. Unless he expects to gain, he is unwilling to accept restrictions on the pursuit of advantage which are intended to equalize the opportunities open to all. In other words, he has no concern with fairness.

We tend to think of the moral man as one who does not seek his own well-being by means which would deny equal well-being to his fellows. This marks him off clearly from the “moral” man, who differs from the prudent man only in that he can overcome the apparent paradox of prudence and obtain those advantages which are available only to those who can display real restraint in their pursuit of advantage.

Thus a system of principles might meet the conditions laid down in the thesis without taking any account of considerations of fairness. Such a system would contain principles for ensuring increased advantage (or expectation of advantage) to everyone, but no further principle need be present to determine the distribution of this increase.

It is possible that there are systems of principles which, if adopted and adhered to, provide advantages which strictly prudent men, however rational, cannot attain. These advantages are

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8 Baier, op. cit., p. 314.
a function of the sacrifices which the principles impose on their adherents.

Morality may be such a system. If it is, this would explain our expectation that we should all be worse off were we to substitute prudence for morality in our deliberations. But to characterize morality as a system of principles advantageous to all is not to answer the question “Why should I be moral?” nor is it to provide for those considerations of fairness which are equally essential to our moral understanding.

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