I

BEING AND TIME: INTRODUCTION

"We are too late for the gods
and too early for Being.
Being's poem, just begun, is man."
Heidegger had the Introduction to *Being and Time* on his desk throughout the period of the book's immediate gestation, 1926–27. At that time he still planned to write an entire second part to the treatise (see the outline on pp. 86–87); thus the Introduction introduces us also to something quite beyond the text we possess today as *Being and Time*. Like Hegel's Preface to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which came to serve as an introduction to Hegel's entire philosophy, Heidegger's Introduction opens a path to all the later work.

In this text, here printed complete, Heidegger recounts the need to reawaken the question of the meaning of Being. "Being" has long served metaphysics as its most universal and hence indiscernible concept. Its meaning is obvious but vacuous. Heidegger argues that interrogation of the meaning of Being requires a *fundamental ontology* whose point of departure is an analysis of existence. And not just any sort of existence. Only the being that exists in such a way that its Being is at issue for it, only the being that has an understanding of Being, however vague and amorphous, can raise the question of Being in the first place. Heidegger lets the name *Dasein* (derived historically from *Dass-sein*, the that-it-is of a being) stand for human being or existence in the emphatic sense (as *standing out*). In the first division of his treatise he intends to exhibit basic structures of the "average everydayness" of Dasein, i.e., of human being as it is predominantly and customarily. These concretely described structures are then to be grounded in an interpretation of time in the second division. Finally, this grounding should prepare the way for an answer to the question of the meaning of Being in general.

Of course we know that the third division of Part One, "Time and Being," where that response was to unfold, never appeared. (See the General Introduction, above.) Because the third division was in some undisclosed way to "turn" or "reverse" matters from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being," the problem of the incompleteness of *Being and Time* was soon touted as Heidegger's "departure" from that

work. In spite of the prevalence of this notion in the secondary literature we may resist any facile opinions concerning Heidegger's *Kehre*, or "turning," by studying carefully the introduction to *Being and Time* in conjunction with Readings III, V, and XI.

The projected second part of *Being and Time* was to pursue "the task of a deconstructing of the history of ontology." If in later years the problem of "the Temporality of Being" called forth Heidegger's most profound meditations, that of the deconstructing—which is to be understood literally as a deconstruction or painstaking dismantling—demanded the greatest amount of his time and energy. For the attempt to revitalize traditional formulas and concepts by tracing their history was a task by no means completed in the published part of *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger's efforts to recover and renew the question of Being, to free it from the encrustations of the metaphysical tradition, remained at the center of his purpose; it was a direct outgrowth of his passion for a concrete way of raising that question, a way founded in "original experiences" of existence. It is significant that this "deconstructing" begins with the giants of modern philosophy (specifically, Descartes and Kant) and proceeds toward the ancients (specifically, Aristotle).

Finally, the Introduction to *Being and Time* discusses the all-important matter of Heidegger's phenomenological method. Here he responds to the goals and methods promulgated by his teacher Husserl; here he offers a first glimpse of his own ideas of "phenomenon" and "logos." These in turn lay the foundation for the basic issue of truth as disclosure and unconcealment (see Readings III and XI). Heidegger's interpretations of "phenomenon," "logos," and "phenomenology" may therefore be viewed as paving the way for that "turn" presupposed in *Being and Time* from the analysis of Dasein to the question of the meaning of Being in general.

Before the Introduction to *Being and Time* Heidegger inserts a brief untitled and unnumbered section. It begins with a quotation from Plato's *Sophist* and then states the purpose of the book. The quotation is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, it comes immediately after that point in *Sophist* when Theaetetus and the Stranger from Elea realize that the shining forth (phainesthai) of "mere appearance" (to phainomenon) is completely mysterious to them: their *phenomenology* of appearances will have to become an inquiry into being (to on). Second, the quotation comes precisely at the point where the Stranger is confronting an entire tradition of
BEING AND TIME

INTRODUCTION
THE EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION
OF THE MEANING OF BEING

CHAPTER ONE
The Necessity, Structure, and Priority
of the Question of Being

1. The necessity of an explicit recovery
of the question of Being

This question has today been forgotten—although our time considers itself progressive in again affirming “metaphysics.” All the same, we believe that we are spared the exertion of rekindling a gigantomachia peri tēs ousias [“a Battle of Giants concerning Being,” Plato, Sophist 245c 6-246c 1]. But the question touched upon here is hardly an arbitrary one. It sustained the avid research of Plato and Aristotle but from then on ceased to be heard as a thematic question of actual investigation. What these two thinkers gained has been preserved in various distorted and “camouflaged” forms down to Hegel’s Logie. And what then was wrested from phenomena by the

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highest exerion of thinking, albeit in fragments and first begin-
nings, has long since been trivialized.

Not only that. On the foundation of the Greek point of departure
for the interpretation of Being a dogmatic attitude has taken shape
which not only declares the question of the meaning of Being to be
superfluous but sanctions its neglect. It is said that “Being” is the
most universal and the emptiest concept. As such it resists every
attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and thus unde-
finable concept need any definition. Everybody uses it constantly
and also already understands what they mean by it. Thus what
made ancient philosophizing uneasy and kept it so by virtue of its
obscure has become obvious, clear as day; and this to the point
that whoever pursues it is accused of an error of method.

At the beginning of this inquiry the prejudices that implant and
nurture ever anew the superfluousness of a questioning of Being
cannot be discussed in detail. They are rooted in ancient ontology
itself. That ontology in turn can only be interpreted adequately
under the guidance of the question of Being which has been clari-
fied and answered beforehand. One must proceed with regard to
the soil from which the fundamental ontological concepts grew and
with reference to the suitable demonstration of the categories and
their competences. We therefore wish to discuss these prejudices
only to the extent that the necessity of a recovery\footnote{Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} II, 1, Qu. 94, a. 2.} of the question of the meaning of Being becomes clear. There are three such
prejudices.

1. “Being” is the most “universal” concept: \textit{to on esti katholou
malista panton},\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics} III, 4, 1001a 21.} \textit{Illum quod primo cedit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaeamque quis apprehen-
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\textit{dit. “An understanding of Being is always already contained in
everything we apprehend in beings.”} But the “universality” of
“Being” is not that of \textit{genus}. “Being” does not delimit the highest
region of beings so far as they are conceptually articulated accord-
ing to genus and species: \textit{oute to on genos [“Being is not a genus”].}\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics} III, 7, 998b 22.}
The “universality” of Being “surpasses” the universality of genus.
According to the designation of medieval ontology, “Being” is a
\textit{transcendens}. Aristotle himself understood the unity of this trans-
cendental “universal,” as opposed to the manifold of the highest
generic concepts with material content, as the \textit{unity of analogy}.
Despite his dependence upon Plato’s ontological position, Aristotle
placed the problem of Being on a fundamentally new basis with this
discovery. To be sure, he too did not clarify the obscurity of these
categorial connections. Medieval ontology discussed this problem
in many ways, above all in the Thomist and Scotist schools, without
gaining fundamental clarity. And when Hegel finally defines
“Being” as the “indeterminate Immediate,” and makes this defin-
tion the foundation of all the further categorial explications of his
\textit{Logic}, he remains within the perspective of ancient ontology—
except that he does give up the problem, raised early on by Aristotle,
of the unity of Being in contrast to the manifold of “categories”
with material content. If one says accordingly that “Being” is the
most universal concept, that cannot mean that it is the clearest and
that it needs no further discussion. The concept of “Being” is rather
the most obscure of all.

2. The concept of “Being” is undefinable. This conclusion was
drawn from its highest universality.\footnote{See Pascal, \textit{Pensées et Opuscules} (ed. Brunschvicg), Paris: Hachette, 1912, p. 169:
“One cannot undertake to define \textit{being} without falling into this absurdity. For one
cannot define a word without beginning in this way: ‘It is . . . ’ This beginning may be
expressed or implied. Thus, in order to define \textit{being} one must say, ‘It is . . . ’ and
hence employ the word to be defined in its definition.”} And correctly so—if
\textit{definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam} [if “definition is

\begin{quote}
\textit{The German word \textit{Wiederholung} means literally “repetition.” Heidegger uses it not
in the sense of a mere repetition of what preceded, but rather in the sense of fetching
something back as a new beginning. Perhaps his use is close to the musical term
\textit{recapitulation}, which implies a new beginning incorporating and transforming what
preceded. Alternative translations might be “retrieval” or “reprise.”—Tr./Ed.}
\end{quote}
achieved through the nearest genus and the specific difference”). Indeed, “Being” cannot be understood as a being. *Enti non additur aliqua natura:* “Being” cannot be defined by attributing beings to it. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be represented by lower ones. But does it follow from this that “Being” can no longer constitute a problem? By no means. We can conclude only that “Being” is not something like a being. Thus the manner of definition of beings which has its justification within limits—the “definition” of traditional logic which is itself rooted in ancient ontology—cannot be applied to Being. The undefinability of Being does not dispense with the question of its meaning but compels that question.

3. “Being” is the self-evident concept. “Being” is used in all knowing and predicating, in every relation to beings and in every relation to oneself, and the expression is understandable “without further ado.” Everybody understands, “The sky is blue,” “I am happy,” and similar statements. But this average comprehensibility only demonstrates the incomprehensibility. It shows that an enigma lies *a priori* in every relation and being toward beings as beings. The fact that we live already in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is at the same time shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental necessity of recovering the question of the meaning of “Being.”

If what is “self-evident” and this alone—“the covert judgments of common reason” (Kant)—is to become and remain the explicit theme of our analysis (as “the business of philosophers”), then the appeal to self-evidence in the realm of basic philosophical concepts, and indeed with regard to the concept “Being,” is a dubious procedure.

But consideration of the prejudices has made it clear at the same time that not only is the answer to the question of Being lacking but even the question itself is obscure and without direction. Thus to recover the question of Being means first of all to develop adequately the formulation of the question.

2. The formal structure of the question of Being

The question of the meaning of Being must be formulated. If it is a—or even the—fundamental question, such questioning needs the suitable perspicuity. Thus we must briefly discuss what belongs to a question in general in order to be able to make clear that the question of Being is a distinctive one.

Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its direction beforehand from what is sought. Questioning is a knowing search for beings in their thatness and whatness. The knowing search can become an “investigation,” as the revealing determination of what the question aims at. As questioning about . . . questioning has what it asks. All asking about . . . is in some way an inquiring of . . . Besides what is asked, what is interrogated also belongs to questioning. What is questioned is to be defined and conceptualized in the investigative or specifically theoretical question. As what is really intended, what is to be ascertained lies in what is questioned; here questioning comes to its goal. As an attitude adopted by a being, the questioner, questioning has its own character of Being. Questioning can come about as mere “asking around” or as an explicitly formulated question. What is peculiar to the latter is the fact that questioning becomes lucid in advance with regard to all the above-named constitutive characteristics of the question.

The meaning of Being is the question to be formulated. Thus we are confronted with the necessity of explicating the question of Being with regard to the structural moments cited.

As a seeking, questioning needs previous guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of Being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way. We intimated that we are always already involved in an understanding of Being. From this grows the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency toward its concept. We do not know what “Being” means. But already when we ask, “What is ‘Being’?” we stand in an understanding of the “is” without being able to determine conceptually what the “is” means.
We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of Being is a fact.

No matter how much this understanding of Being wavers and fades and borders on mere verbal knowledge, this indefiniteness of the understanding of Being that is always already available is itself a positive phenomenon which needs elucidation. However, an investigation of the meaning of Being will not wish to provide this at the outset. The interpretation of the average understanding of Being attains its necessary guideline only with the developed concept of Being. From the clarity of that concept and the appropriate manner of its explicit understanding we shall be able to discern what the obscure or not yet elucidated understanding of Being means, what kinds of obscuration or hindrance of an explicit elucidation of the meaning of Being are possible and necessary.

Furthermore, the average, vague understanding of Being can be permeated by traditional theories and opinions about Being in such a way that these theories, as the sources of the prevailing understanding, remain hidden. What is sought in the question of Being is not something completely unfamiliar, although it is at first totally ungraspable.

What is asked about in the question to be elaborated is Being, that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have always been understood no matter how they are discussed. The Being of beings “is” itself not a being. The first philosophical step in understanding the problem of Being consists in avoiding the mython tina diēgeisthai, in not “telling a story,” i.e., not determining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origins to another being—as if Being had the character of a possible being. As what is asked about, Being thus requires its own kind of demonstration which is essentially different from discovery of beings. Hence what is to be ascertained, the meaning of Being, will require its own conceptualization, which again is essentially distinct from the concepts in which beings receive their meaningful determination.

Insofar as Being constitutes what is asked about, and insofar as Being means the Being of beings, beings themselves turn out to be what is interrogated in the question of Being. Beings are, so to speak, interrogated with regard to their Being. But if they are to exhibit the characteristics of their Being without falsification they must for their part have become accessible in advance as they are in themselves. The question of Being demands that the right access to beings be gained and secured in advance with regard to what it interrogates. But we call many things “in being” [seiend], and in different senses. Everything we talk about, mean, and are related to in such and such a way is in being. What and how we ourselves are is also in being. Being is found in thatness and whatness, reality, the being at hand of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence [Dasein], and in the “there is” [es gibt]. In which being is the meaning of Being to be found; from which being is the disclosure of Being to get its start? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does a certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of Being? Which is this exemplary being and in what sense does it have priority?

If the question of Being is to be explicitly formulated and brought to complete clarity concerning itself, then the elaboration of this question requires, in accord with what has been elucidated up to now, explication of the ways of regarding Being and of understanding and conceptually grasping its meaning, preparation of the possibility of the right choice of the exemplary being, and elaboration of the genuine mode of access to this being. Regarding, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining access to, are constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus themselves modes of being of a definite being, of the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are. Thus to work out the question of Being means to make a being— he who questions—spicuous in his Being. Asking this question, as a mode of being of a being, is itself essentially determined by what is asked about in it—Being. This being which we ourselves in each case

5. Plato, Sophist 242 c.
are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its Being we formulate terminologically as Dasein. The explicit and lucid formulation of the question of the meaning of Being requires a prior suitable explication of a being (Dasein) with regard to its Being.∗

But does not such an enterprise fall into an obvious circle? To have to determine beings in their Being beforehand and then on this foundation first ask the question of Being—what else is that but going around in circles? In working out the question do we not presuppose something that only the answer can provide? Formal objections such as the argument of “circular reasoning,” an argument that is always easily raised in the area of investigation of principles, are always sterile when one is weighing concrete ways of investigating. They do not offer anything to the understanding of the issue and they hinder penetration into the field of investigation.

But in fact there is no circle at all in the formulation of our question. Beings can be determined in their Being without the explicit concept of the meaning of Being having to be already available. If this were not so there could not have been as yet any ontological knowledge, and probably no one would deny the factual existence of such knowledge. It is true that “Being” is “presupposed”

∗Since the “rationalist school” of Christian Wolff (1679–1754), Dasein has been widely used in German philosophy to mean the “existence” (or Das-sein, “that it is”), as opposed to the “essence” (or Wes-sein, “what it is”) of a thing, state of affairs, person, or God. The word connotes especially the existence of living creatures—around 1860 Darwin’s “struggle for life” was translated as Kampf ums Dasein—and most notably of human beings. Heidegger thus stresses the word’s primary nuance: for him Dasein is that kind of existence that is always involved in an understanding of its Being. It must never be confused with the existence of things that lie before us and are on hand or at hand as natural or cultural objects (Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit). In order to stress the special meaning Dasein has for him, Heidegger often hyphenates the word (Da-sein), suggesting “there being,” which is to say, the openness to Being characteristic of human existence, which is “there” in the world. (The hyphenated form appears in chapter five of Being and Time and in many of the later writings; some of which are included in this volume.) We will follow tradition and let the German word Dasein or Da-sein stand, translating the former as “existence” or “human being” only when the usage seems to be nonterminological. Finally, in light of Heidegger’s interpretation of Being as presence, we note that Dasein originally (around 1700) meant nothing more or less than such presence, Anwesenheit.—Ed.

in all previous ontology, but not as an available concept—not as the sort of thing we are seeking. “Presupposing” Being has the character of taking a preliminary look at Being in such a way that on the basis of this look beings that are already given are tentatively articulated in their Being. This guiding look at Being grows out of the average understanding of Being in which we are always already involved and which ultimately belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself. Such “presupposing” has nothing to do with positing a principle from which a series of propositions is deduced. A “circle in reasoning” cannot possibly lie in the formulation of the question of the meaning of Being, because in answering this question it is not a matter of grounding in deduction but rather of laying bare and exhibiting the ground.

A “circle in reasoning” does not occur in the question of the meaning of Being. Rather, there is a notable “relatedness backward or forward” of what is asked about (Being) to asking as a mode of being of a being. The way what is questioned essentially engages our questioning belongs to the most proper meaning of the question of Being. But this only means that the being that has the character of Dasein has a relation to the question of Being itself, perhaps even a distinctive one. But have we not thereby demonstrated that a particular being has a priority with respect to Being and that the exemplary being that is to function as what is primarily interrogated is pregiven? In what we have discussed up to now neither has the priority of Dasein been demonstrated nor has anything been decided about its possible or even necessary function as the primary being to be interrogated. But indeed something like a priority of Dasein has announced itself.

3. The ontological priority of the question of Being

Under the guideline of the formal structure of the question as such, the characteristics of the question of Being have made it clear that this question is a unique one, in such a way that its elaboration and
indeed solution require a series of fundamental reflections. However, what is distinctive about the question of Being will fully come to light only when that question is sufficiently delineated with regard to its function, intention, and motives.

Up to now the necessity of a recovery of the question was motivated partly by the dignity of its origin but above all by the lack of a definite answer, even by the lack of any adequate formulation. But one can demand to know what purpose this question should serve. Does it remain solely, or is it at all, only a matter of free-floating speculation about the most general generalities—or is it the most basic and at the same time most concrete question?

Being is always the Being of a being. The totality of beings can, with respect to its various domains, become the field where definite areas of knowledge are exposed and delimited. These areas of knowledge—for example, history, nature, space, life, human being, language, and so on—can in their turn become thematic objects of scientific investigations. Scientific research demarcates and first establishes these areas of knowledge in a rough and ready fashion. The elaboration of the area in its fundamental structures is in a way already accomplished by prescientific experience and interpretation of the domain of Being to which the area of knowledge is itself confined. The resulting “fundamental concepts” comprise the guidelines for the first concrete disclosure of the area. Whether or not the importance of the research always lies in such establishment of concepts, its true progress comes about not so much in collecting results and storing them in “handbooks” as in being forced to ask questions about the basic constitution of each area, these questions being chiefly a reaction to increasing knowledge in each area.

The real “movement” of the sciences takes place in the revision of these basic concepts, a revision which is more or less radical and lucid with regard to itself. A science’s level of development is determined by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In these immanent crises of the sciences the relation of positive questioning to the matter in question becomes unstable.

Today tendencies to place research on new foundations have cropped up on all sides in the various disciplines.

The discipline which is seemingly the strictest and most securely structured, mathematics, has experienced a “crisis in its foundations.” The controversy between formalism and intuitionism centers on obtaining and securing primary access to what should be the proper object of this science. Relativity theory in physics grew out of the tendency to expose nature’s own coherence as it is “in itself.” As a theory of the conditions of access to nature itself it attempts to preserve the immutability of the laws of motion by defining all relativities; it is thus confronted by the question of the structure of its given area of knowledge, i.e., by the problem of matter. In biology the tendency has awakened to get behind the definitions mechanism and vitalism have given to “organism” and “life” and to define anew the kind of Being of living beings as such. In the historical and humanistic disciplines the drive toward historical actuality itself has been strengthened by the transmission and portrayal of tradition: the history of literature is to become the history of critical problems. Theology is searching for a more original interpretation of man’s being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith and remaining within it. Theology is slowly beginning to understand again Luther’s insight that its system of dogma rests on a “foundation” that does not stem from a questioning in which faith is primary and whose conceptual apparatus is not only insufficient for the range of problems in theology but rather covers them up and distorts them.

Fundamental concepts are determinations in which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attain an understanding that precedes and guides all positive investigation. Accordingly these concepts first receive their genuine evidence and “grounding” in a correspondingly preliminary research into the area of knowledge itself. But since each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, this preliminary research that creates the fundamental concepts amounts to nothing else than interpre-
ing these beings in terms of the basic constitution of their Being. This kind of investigation must precede the positive sciences—and it can do so. The work of Plato and Aristotle is proof of this. Laying the foundations of the sciences in this way is different in principle from “logic” limping along behind, investigating here and there the status of a science in terms of its “method.” Such laying of foundations is productive logic in the sense that it leaps ahead, so to speak, into a definite realm of Being, discloses it for the first time in its constitutive Being, and makes the acquired structures available to the positive sciences as lucid directives for inquiry. Thus, for example, what is philosophically primary is not a theory of concept-formation in historiology, nor the theory of historical knowledge, nor even the theory of history as the object of historiology; what is primary is rather the interpretation of properly historical beings with regard to their historicity. Similarly, the positive result of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason consists in its beginning to work out what belongs to any nature whatsoever, and not in a “theory” of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic of the realm of Being called nature.

But such inquiry—ontology taken in its broadest sense without reference to specific ontological directions and tendencies—itself still needs a guideline. It is true that ontological inquiry is more original than the ontic inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains naïve and opaque if its investigations into the Being of beings leave the meaning of Being in general undiscussed. And precisely the ontological task of a genealogy of the different possible ways of Being (which is not to be construed deductively) requires a preliminary understanding of “what we properly mean by this expression ‘Being.’”

The question of Being thus aims at an a priori condition of the possibility not only of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a type—and are thereby already involved in an understanding of Being; but it aims also at the condition of the possibility of the ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them.

All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its most proper intent if it has not previously clarified the meaning of Being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task.

Ontological research itself, correctly understood, gives the question of Being its ontological priority over and above merely resuming an honored tradition and making progress on a problem until now opaque. But this scholarly, scientific priority is not the only one.

4. The ontic* priority of the question of Being

Science in general can be defined as the totality of fundamentally coherent true propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it get at the meaning of science. As ways in which man behaves, sciences have this being’s (man’s) kind of Being. We are defining this being terminologically as Dasein. Scientific research is neither the sole nor the primary kind of possible Being of this being. Moreover, Dasein itself is distinctly different from other beings. We must make this distinct difference visible in a preliminary way. Here the discussion must anticipate subsequent analyses, which only later will become properly demonstrative.

Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its very Being. Thus it is constitutive of

*Throughout Being and Time Heidegger contrasts the “ontic” to the “ontological.” As we have seen, “ontological” refers to the Being of beings (ontos) or to any account (logos) of the same; hence it refers to a particular discipline (traditionally belonging to metaphysics) or to the content or method of this discipline. On the contrary, “ontic” refers to any manner of dealing with beings that does not raise the ontological question. Most disciplines and sciences remain “ontic” in their treatment of beings. What it means to speak of the “ontic priority” of the question of the meaning of Being—a paradox that should give us pause—the present section elucidates. Compare the parallel but not identical opposition of “existential” and “existential” in this same section, below.—Eu.
the Being of Dasein to have, in its very Being, a relation of Being to this Being. And this in turn means that Dasein understands itself in its Being in some way and with some explicitness. It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its Being. Understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein. The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.

To be ontological does not yet mean to develop ontology. Thus if we reserve the term ontology for the explicit, theoretical question of the meaning of beings, the intended ontological character of Dasein is to be designated as pre-ontological. That does not signify being simply ontical, but rather being in the manner of an understanding of Being.

We shall call the very Being to which Dasein can relate in one way or another, and somehow always does relate, existence [Existenz.] And because the essential definition of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a “what” that specifies its material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it has always to be its Being as its own, the term Dasein, as a pure expression of Being, has been chosen to designate this being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or already grown up in them. Existence is decided only by each Dasein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities. We come to terms with the question of existence always only through existence itself. We shall call this kind of understanding of itself existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an ontic “affair” of Dasein. For this the theoretical perspicuity of the ontological structure of existence is not necessary. The question of structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. We shall call the coherence of these structures existentiellity. Its analysis does not have the character of an existentiell understanding but rather an existential one. The task of an existential analysis of Dasein is prescribed with regard to its possibility and necessity in the ontic constitution of Dasein.

But since existence defines Dasein, the ontological analysis of this being always requires a previous glimpse of existentiellity. However, we understand existentiellity as the constitution-of-Being of the being that exists. But the idea of Being already lies in the idea of such a constitution of Being. And thus the possibility of carrying out the analysis of Dasein depends upon the prior elaboration of the question of the meaning of Being in general.

Sciences and disciplines are ways of being of Dasein in which Dasein relates also to beings that it need not itself be. But being in a world belongs essentially to Dasein. Thus the understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein just as originally implies the understanding of something like “world” and the understanding of the Being of beings accessible within the world. Ontologies that have beings unlike Dasein as their theme are accordingly founded and motivated in the ontic structure of Dasein itself. This structure includes in itself the determination of a pre-ontological understanding of Being.

Thus fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein.

Dasein accordingly takes priority in several ways over all other beings. The first priority is an ontic one: this being is defined in its Being by existence. The second priority is an ontological one: on the basis of its determination as existence Dasein is in itself “ontological.” But just as originally Dasein possesses—in a manner constitutive of its understanding of existence—an understanding of the Being of all beings unlike itself. Dasein therefore has its third priority as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all

*Heidegger coins the term existentiell (here translated as “existentiell”) to designate the way Dasein in any given case actually exists by realizing or ignoring its various possibilities—in other words, by living its life. One of those possibilities is to inquire into the structure of its life and possibilities; the kind of understanding thereby gained Heidegger calls existenzial (here translated as “existential”). The nexus of such structures he call Existentialität (here translated as “existentiellity”).—Ed.
ontologies. Dasein has proven to be what, before all other beings, is ontologically the primary being to be interrogated.

However, the roots of the existential analysis, for their part, are ultimately existentiell—they are ontic. Only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an existentiell way—as a possibility of being of each existing Dasein—does it become possible at all to disclose the existentiality of existence and therewith to get hold of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems. But with this the ontic priority of the question of Being as well has become clear.

The ontic-ontological priority of Dasein was already seen early on, without Dasein itself being grasped in its genuine ontological structure or even becoming a problem with such an aim. Aristotle says, he psychē ta onta pós estin.6 The soul (of man) is in a certain way beings. The “soul” which constitutes the Being of man discovers in its ways to be—aisthēsis and noēsis—all beings with regard to their thatness and whatness, that is to say, always also in their Being. Thomas Aquinas discussed this statement—which refers back to Parmenides’ ontological thesis—in a manner characteristic of him. Thomas is engaged in the task of deriving the “transcendentals,” i.e., the characteristics of Being that lie beyond every possible generic determination of a being in its material content, every modus specialis entis, and that are necessary attributes of every “something,” whatever it might be. For him the verum too is to be demonstrated as being such a transcendens. This is to be accomplished by appealing to a being which in conformity with its kind of Being is suited to “come together” with any being whatsoever. This distinctive being, the ens quod naturam est convenire cum omni ente [“the being whose nature it is to meet with all other beings”], is the soul (anima).7 The priority of Dasein over and above all other beings which emerges here without being ontologically clarified obviously has nothing in common with a vapid subjectivizing of the totality of beings.

The demonstration of the ontic-ontological distinctiveness of the question of Being is grounded in the preliminary indication of the ontic-ontological priority of Dasein. But the analysis of the structure of the question of Being as such (section 2) came up against the distinctive function of this being within the formulation of that very question. Dasein revealed itself to be that being which must first be elaborated in a sufficiently ontological manner if the inquiry is to become a lucid one. But now it has become evident that the ontological analysis of Dasein in general constitutes fundamental ontology, that Dasein consequently functions as the being that is to be interrogated fundamentally in advance with respect to its Being.

If the interpretation of the meaning of Being is to become a task, Dasein is not only the primary being to be interrogated; in addition to this it is the being that always already in its Being is related to what is sought in this question. But then the question of Being is nothing else than the radicalization of an essential tendency of Being that belongs to Dasein itself, namely, of the pre-ontological understanding of Being.

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6. De anima, III, 8, 431b 21; cf. ibid., III, 5, 430a 14ff. [The Teubner edition which Heidegger cites removes the panta from this famous phrase, which in most English editions reads, "The soul is in a certain way all beings."—Ed.]
7. Quaestiones de veritate, Qu. I, a. 1 c; cf. the occasionally stricter exposition, which deviates from what was cited, of a "deduction" of the transcendentals in the brief work De natura gentium.
this being is required. We discussed which being it is that takes over the major role within the question of Being. But how should this being, Dasein, become accessible and, so to speak, be envisaged in a perceptive interpretation?

The ontic-ontological priority that has been demonstrated for Dasein could lead to the mistaken opinion that this being would have to be what is primarily given also ontically-ontologically, not only in the sense that such a being could be grasped immediately but also that the prior givenness of its manner of being would be just as “immediate.” True, Dasein is ontically not only what is near or even nearest—we ourselves are it in each case. Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, it is ontologically what is farthest away. True, it belongs to its most proper Being to have an understanding of this Being and to sustain a certain interpretation of it. But this does not at all mean that the most readily available pre-ontological interpretation of its own Being could be adopted as an adequate guideline, as though this understanding of Being perfurcse stemmed from a thematic ontological reflection on the most proper constitution of its Being. Rather, in accordance with the manner of being belonging to it, Dasein tends to understand its own Being in terms of that being to which it is essentially, continually, and most closely related—the “world.” In Dasein itself and therewith in its own understanding of Being, as we shall show, the way the world is understood is ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of Dasein.

The ontic-ontological priority of Dasein is therefore the reason why the specific constitution of the Being of Dasein—understood in the sense of the “categorial” structure that belongs to it—remains hidden from it. Dasein is ontically “closest” to itself, while ontologically farthest away; but pre-ontologically it is surely not foreign to itself.

For the time being we have only indicated that an interpretation of this being is confronted with peculiar difficulties rooted in the mode of being of the thematic object and the way it is thematized. These difficulties do not result from some shortcoming of our pow-

ers of knowledge or lack of a suitable way of conceiving—a lack seemingly easy to remedy.

Not only does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this understanding also develops or decays according to the actual manner of being of Dasein at any given time; for this reason it has a wealth of interpretations at its disposal. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, “politics,” poetics, biography, and the discipline of history pursue in different ways and to varying extents the behavior, faculties, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes of Dasein. But the question remains whether these interpretations were carried out in as original an existential manner as their existential originality perhaps merited. The two do not necessarily go together, but they also do not exclude one another. Existential interpretation can require existential analysis, provided philosophical knowledge is understood in its possibility and necessity. Only when the fundamental structures of Dasein are adequately worked out with explicit orientation toward the problem of Being will the previous results of the interpretation of Dasein receive their existential justification.

Hence the first concern in the question of Being must be an analysis of Dasein. But then the problem of gaining and securing the access that leads to Dasein becomes really crucial. Expressed negatively, no arbitrary idea of Being and reality, no matter how “self-evident” it is, may be brought to bear on this being in a dogmatically constructed way; no “categories” prescribed by such ideas may be forced upon Dasein without ontological deliberation. The manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms. Furthermore, this manner should show that being as it is at first and for the most part—in its average everydayness. Not arbitrary and accidental structures but essential ones are to be demonstrated in this everydayness, structures that remain determinative in every mode of being of factual Dasein. By looking at the fundamental constitution of the everydayness of Dasein we shall bring out in a preparatory way the Being of this being.
The analysis of Dasein thus understood is wholly oriented toward the guiding task of working out the question of Being. Its limits are thereby determined. It cannot hope to provide a complete ontology of Dasein, which of course must be supplied if something like a "philosophical" anthropology is to rest on a philosophically adequate basis. With a view to a possible anthropology or its ontological foundation, the following interpretation will provide only a few "parts," although not unessential ones. However, the analysis of Dasein is not only incomplete but at first also preliminary. It only brings out the Being of this being, without interpreting its meaning. Its aim is rather to expose the horizon for the most original interpretation of Being. Once we have reached that horizon the preparatory analysis of Dasein requires recovery on a higher, properly ontological basis.

The meaning of the Being of that being we call Dasein proves to be temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. In order to demonstrate this we must recover our interpretation of those structures of Dasein that shall have been indicated in a preliminary way—this time as modes of temporality. While it is true that with this interpretation of Dasein as temporality the answer to the guiding question about the meaning of Being in general is not given as such, the soil from which we may reap it will nevertheless be prepared.

We intimated that a pre-ontological Being belongs to Dasein as its ontic constitution. Dasein is in such a way that, by being, it understands something like Being. Remembering this connection, we must show that time is that from which Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being at all. Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of Being. For this to become clear we need an original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of Being, in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein which understands Being. This task as a whole requires that the concept of time thus gained be distinguished from the common understanding of it. The latter has become explicit in an interpretation of time which reflects the traditional concept that has persisted since Aristotle and beyond Bergson. We must thereby make clear that and in what way this concept of time and the common understanding of time in general originate from temporality. In this way the common concept of time receives again its rightful autonomy—contrary to Bergson's thesis that time understood in the common way is really space.

For a long while, "time" has served as the ontological—or rather ontic—criterion for naively distinguishing the different regions of beings. "Temporal" beings (natural processes and historical events) are separated from "atemporal" beings (spatial and numerical relationships). We are accustomed to distinguishing the "timeless" meaning of propositions from the "temporal" course of propositional statements. Further, a "gap" between "temporal" being and "supratemporal" eternal being is found, and the attempt made to bridge the gap. "Temporal" here means as much as being "in time," an insecure enough definition to be sure. The fact remains that time in the sense of "being in time" serves as a criterion for separating the regions of Being. How time comes to have this distinctive ontological function, and even with what right precisely something like time serves as such a criterion, and most of all whether in this naive ontological application of time its genuinely possible ontological relevance is expressed, has neither been asked nor investigated up to now. "Time," especially on the horizon of the common understanding of it, has chanced to acquire this "obvious" ontological function "of itself," as it were, and has retained it to the present day.

In contrast we must show, on the basis of the question of the meaning of Being which shall have been worked out, that—and in what way—the central range of problems of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time correctly viewed and correctly explained.

If Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if the various modes and derivatives of Being, in their modifications and derivations, are in fact to become intelligible through consideration of
time, then Being itself—and not only beings that are “in time”—is made visible in its “temporal” ["zeitlich"] character. But then “temporal” can no longer mean only “being in time.” The “atemporal” and the “supratemporal” are also “temporal” with respect to their Being; this not only by way of privation when compared to “temporal” beings which are “in time,” but in a positive way which, of course, must first be clarified. Because the expression “temporal” belongs to both prephilosophical and philosophical usage, and because that expression will be used in a different sense in the following investigations, we shall call the original determination of the meaning of Being and its characters and modes which devolve from time its Temporal [temporale] determination. The fundamental ontological task of the interpretation of Being as such thus includes the elaboration of the Temporality of Being [Temporalität des Seins.] In the exposition of the problem of Temporality the concrete answer to the question of the meaning of Being is first given.

Because Being is comprehensible only on the basis of the consideration of time, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in an isolated and blind proposition. The answer is not grasped by repeating what is stated propositionally, especially when it is transmitted as a free-floating result, so that we merely take notice of a standpoint which perhaps deviates from the way the matter has been previously treated. Whether the answer is “new” is of no importance and remains extrinsic. What is positive about the answer must lie in the fact that it is old enough to enable us to learn to comprehend possibilities prepared by the “ancients.” In conformity to its most proper sense, the answer provides a directive for concrete ontological research, that is, a directive to begin its investigative inquiry within the horizon exhibited—and that is all it provides.

If the answer to the question of Being thus becomes the guiding directive for research, then it is sufficiently given only if the specific mode of being of previous ontology—the vicissitudes of its question-
This elemental historicity of Dasein can remain concealed from it. But it can also be discovered in a certain way and be properly cultivated. Dasein can discover, preserve, and explicitly pursue tradition. The discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it "transmits," and how it does this, can be undertaken as an independent task. In this way Dasein advances to the mode of being of historical inquiry and research. But the discipline of history—more precisely, the historicality underlying it—as the manner of being of inquiring Dasein, is possible only because Dasein is determined by historicity in the ground of its Being. If historicity remains concealed from Dasein, and so long as it does so, the possibility of historical inquiry and discovery of history is denied it. If the discipline of history is lacking, that is no evidence against the historicity of Dasein; rather it is evidence for this constitution of Being in a deficient mode. Only because it is "historic" in the first place can an age lack the discipline of history.

On the other hand, if Dasein has seized upon its inherent possibility not only of making its existence perspicuous but also of inquiring into the meaning of existeniality itself, that is to say, of provisionally inquiring into the meaning of Being in general; and if insight into the essential historicity of Dasein has opened up in such inquiry; then it is inevitable that inquiry into Being, which was designated with regard to its ontic-ontological necessity, is itself characterized by historicity. The elaboration of the question of Being must therefore receive its directive to inquire into its own history from the most proper ontological sense of the inquiry itself, as a historical one; that means to become historical in order to come to the positive appropriation of the past, to come into full possession of its most proper possibilities of inquiry. The question of the meaning of Being is led to understand itself as historical in accordance with its own way of proceeding, i.e., as the provisional explication of Dasein in its temporality and historicity.

However, the preparatory interpretation of the fundamental structures of Dasein with regard to its usual and average way of being—in which it is also first of all historical—will make the following clear: Dasein not only has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time Dasein is also ensnared in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps. This tradition deprives Dasein of its own leadership in questioning and choosing. This is especially true of that understanding (and its possible development) which is rooted in the most proper Being of Dasein—the ontological understanding.

The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it "transmits" so little accessible that at first and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been handed down it hands over to obviousness; it bars access to those original "wellsprings" out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether. Indeed it makes us wholly incapable of even understanding that such a return is necessary. The tradition uproots the historicity of Dasein to such a degree that it only takes an interest in the manifold forms of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophizing in the most remote and strangest cultures, and with this interest tries to veil its own lack of foundation. Consequently, in spite of all historical interest and zeal for a philologically "viable" interpretation, Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions which alone make a positive return to the past possible—in the sense of its productive appropriation.

At the outset (section 1) we showed that the question of the meaning of Being was not only unresolved, not only inadequately formulated, but in spite of all interest in "metaphysics" has even been forgotten. Greek ontology and its history, which through many twists and turns still determine the conceptual character of philosophy today, are proof of the fact that Dasein understands itself and Being in general in terms of the "world." The ontology that thus arises is ensnared by the tradition, which allows it to sink to the level of the obvious and become mere material for reworking (as it was for Hegel).
Greek ontology thus uprooted becomes a fixed body of doctrine in the Middle Ages. But its systematics is not at all a mere joining together of traditional elements into a single structure. Within the limits of its dogmatic adoption of the fundamental Greek interpretations of Being, this systematics contains a great deal of unpretentious work which does make advances. In its scholastic mold, Greek ontology makes the essential transition via the Disputationes metaphysicæ of Suarez into the “metaphysics” and transcendental philosophy of the modern period; it still determines the foundations and goals of Hegel’s Logic. Insofar as certain distinctive domains of Being become visible in the course of this history and henceforth chiefly dominate the range of problems (Descartes’s ego cogito, subject, the “I,” reason, spirit, person), the beings just cited remain unquestioned with respect to the Being and structure of their being, this corresponding to the thorough neglect of the question of Being. But the categorial content of traditional ontology is transferred to these beings with corresponding formalizations and purely negative restrictions, or else dialectic is called upon to help with an ontological interpretation of the substantiality of the subject.

If the question of Being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments produced by it are necessary. We understand this task as the destructuring of the traditional content of ancient ontology, which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of Being. This destructuring is based on the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of Being were gained.

This demonstration of the provenance of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the investigation that displays their “birth certificate,” has nothing to do with a pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. The destructuring has just as little the negative sense of disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition, and that always means to fix its boundaries. These are factually given with the specific formulation of the question and the prescribed demarcation of the possible field of investigation. The destructuring is not related negatively to the past; its criticism concerns “today” and the dominant way we treat the history of ontology, whether it be conceived as the history of opinions, ideas, or problems. However, the destructuring does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent. Its negative function remains tacit and indirect.

The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a formulation. Within the scope of this treatise, which has as its goal a fundamental elaboration of the question of Being, the destructuring can be carried out only with regard to the fundamentally decisive stages of that history.

In accord with the positive tendency of the destructuring, the question must first be asked whether and to what extent in the course of the history of ontology in general the interpretation of Being has been thematically connected with the phenomenon of time. We must also ask whether the range of problems concerning Temporality that necessarily belongs here was fundamentally worked out, or could have been. Kant is the first and only one who traversed a stretch of the path toward investigating the dimension of Temporality—or allowed himself to be driven there by the compelling force of the phenomena themselves. Only when the problem of Temporality is pinned down can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. Furthermore, in this way we can also show why this area had to remain closed to Kant in its proper dimensions and in its central ontological function. Kant himself knew that he was venturing forth into an obscure area: “This schematism of our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, the true devices of which are hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered before our eyes.” What it is that Kant shrinks back from here, as it were, must be brought to light

thematically and in principle if the expression “Being” is to have a demonstrable meaning. Ultimately the phenomena to be explicated in the following analysis under the rubric “Temporality” are precisely those that determine the most covert judgments of “common reason,” analysis of which Kant calls the “business of philosophers.”

In pursuing the task of deconstructing on the guideline of the problem of Temporality the following treatise will attempt to interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time developed there. At the same time we must show why Kant could never gain insight into the problem of Temporality. Two things prevented this insight. On the one hand, the neglect of the question of Being in general, and in connection with this, the lack of a thematic ontology of Descartes—in Kantian terms, the lack of a prior ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject. Instead, Kant dogmatically adopted Descartes’s position—notwithstanding all his essential advances. Despite his taking this phenomenon back into the subject, Kant’s analysis of time remained oriented toward the traditional, common understanding of it. It is this that finally prevented Kant from working out the phenomenon of a “transcendental determination of time” in its own structure and function. As a consequence of this double effect of the tradition, the decisive connection between time and the “I think” remained shrouded in complete obscurity. It did not even become a problem.

By taking over Descartes’s ontological position Kant neglects something essential: an ontology of Dasein. In terms of Descartes’s innermost tendency this omission is a decisive one. With the cogito sum Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure foundation for philosophy. But what he leaves undetermined in this “radical” beginning is the manner of being of the res cogitans, more precisely, the meaning of the Being of the “sum.” Working out the tacit ontological foundations of the cogito sum will constitute the second stage of our deconstructing of, and path back into, the history of ontology. The interpretation will demonstrate not only that Descartes had to neglect the question of Being altogether but also why he held the opinion that the absolute “certainty” of the cogito exempted him from the question of the meaning of the Being of this being.

However, with Descartes it is not just a matter of neglect and thus of a complete ontological indeterminateness of the res cogitans sive mens sive animus [“the thinking thing, whether it be mind or soul”]. Descartes carries out the fundamental reflections of his Meditations by applying medieval ontology to this being which he posits as the fundamentum inconscissum [“unshakable foundation”]. The res cogitans is ontologically determined as ens, and for medieval ontology the meaning of the Being of the ens is established in the understanding of it as ens creatum. As the ens infinitum God is the ens increatum. But createdness, in the broadest sense of something’s being produced, is an essential structural moment of the ancient concept of Being. The ostensibly new beginning of philosophizing betrays the imposition of a fatal prejudice. On the basis of this prejudice later times neglect a thematic ontological analysis of “the mind” [“Gemüt”] which would be guided by the question of Being; likewise they neglect a critical confrontation with the inherited ancient ontology.

Everyone familiar with the medieval period sees that Descartes is “dependent” upon medieval scholasticism and uses its terminology. But with this “discovery” nothing is gained philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent medieval ontology influences the way posterity determines or fails to determine ontologically the res cogitans. The full extent of this influence cannot be estimated until the meaning and limitations of ancient ontology have been shown by our orientation toward the question of Being. In other words, the deconstructing sees itself assigned the task of interpreting the very basis of ancient ontology in light of the problem of Temporality. Here it becomes evident that the ancient interpretation of the Being of beings is oriented toward the “world” or “nature” in the broadest sense and that it indeed gains its understanding of Being from “time.” The outward evidence of this—but of course only outward—is the determination of the meaning of
Being as \textit{parousia} or \textit{ousia}, which means ontologically and temporally “presence” [“\textit{Anwesenheit}”]. Beings are grasped in their \textit{Being} as “presence”; that is to say, they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time, the \textit{present}.

The problem of Greek ontology must, like that of any other, take its guideline from \textit{Dasein} itself. In the ordinary and also the philosophical “definition,” \textit{Dasein}, that is, the \textit{Being} of \textit{man}, is delineated as \textit{zoon logos echon}, that creature whose \textit{Being} is essentially determined by its being able to speak. \textit{Legein} (see section 7 B) is the guideline for arriving at the structures of \textit{Being} of the beings we encounter in discourse and discussion. That is why the ancient ontology developed by Plato becomes “dialektik.” The possibility of a more radical conception of the problem of \textit{Being} grows with the continuing development of the ontological guideline itself, i.e., of the “hermeneutics” of the \textit{logos}. “Dialektik,” which was a genuine philosophic embarrassment, becomes superfluous. Aristotle has “no understanding of it” for this reason, that he places it on a more radical foundation and transcends it. \textit{Legein} itself, or \textit{noein}—the simple apprehension of something at hand in its pure being at hand [\textit{Vorhandenheit}], which Parmenides already used as a guide for interpreting \textit{Being}—has the Temporal structure of a pure “making present” of something. Beings, which show themselves in and for this making present and which are understood as beings proper, are accordingly interpreted with regard to the present; that is to say, they are conceived as \textit{presence} (\textit{ousia}).

However, this Greek interpretation of \textit{Being} comes about without any explicit knowledge of the guideline functioning in it, without taking cognizance of or understanding the fundamental ontological function of time, without insight into the ground of the possibility of this function. On the contrary, time itself is taken to be one \textit{Being} among others. The attempt is made to grasp \textit{time} itself in the structure of its \textit{Being} on the horizon of an understanding of \textit{Being} which is oriented toward time in an inexplicit and naive way.

Within the framework of the following fundamental elaboration of the question of \textit{Being} we cannot offer a detailed Temporal interpretation of the foundations of ancient ontology—especially of its scientifically highest and purest stage, i.e., in Aristotle. Instead, we offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on time,\textsuperscript{2} which can be chosen as the way of discerning the basis and limits of the ancient science of \textit{Being}.

Aristotle’s treatise on time is the first detailed interpretation of this phenomenon that has come down to us. It essentially determined all the following interpretations, including that of Bergson. From our analysis of Aristotle’s concept of time it becomes retrospectively clear that the Kantian conception moves within the structures developed by Aristotle. This means that Kant’s fundamental ontological orientation—despite all the differences implicit in a new inquiry—remains the Greek one.

The question of \textit{Being} attains true concreteness only when we carry out the destructuring of the ontological tradition. By so doing we can thoroughly demonstrate the inescapability of the question of the meaning of \textit{Being} and so demonstrate the meaning of our talk about a “recovery” of the question.

In this field where “the matter itself is deeply veiled,”\textsuperscript{3} any investigation will avoid overestimating its results. For such inquiry is constantly forced to face the possibility of disclosing a still more original and more universal horizon from which it could draw the answer to the question “What does ‘\textit{Being}’ mean?” We can discuss such possibilities seriously and with a positive result only if the question of \textit{Being} has been reawakened and we have reached the point where we can come to terms with it in a controlled fashion.

7. The phenomenological method of the investigation

With the preliminary characterization of the thematic object of the investigation (the \textit{Being} of beings, or the meaning of \textit{Being} in general) its method would appear to be already prescribed. The task of


\textsuperscript{3} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B 121.
ontology is to set in relief the Being of beings and to explicate Being. And the method of ontology remains questionable in the highest degree as long as we wish merely to consult historically transmitted ontologies or similar efforts. Since the term “ontology” is used in a formally broad sense for this investigation, the approach of clarifying its method by pursuing the history of that method is automatically precluded.

In using the term “ontology” we do not specify any definite philosophical discipline standing in relation to others. It should not at all be our task to satisfy the demands of any established discipline. On the contrary, such a discipline can be developed only from the compelling necessity of definite questions and procedures demanded by the “things themselves.”

With the guiding question of the meaning of Being the investigation arrives at the fundamental question of philosophy in general. The treatment of this question is phenomenological. With this term the treatise dictates for itself neither a “standpoint” nor a “direction,” because phenomenology is neither of these and can never be as long as it understands itself. The expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the “what” of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content but the “how” of such research. The more genuinely effective a concept of method is and the more comprehensively it determines the fundamental conduct of a science, the more originally is it rooted in confrontation with the things themselves and the farther away it moves from what we call a technical device—of which there are many in the theoretical disciplines.

The term “phenomenology” expresses a maxim that can be formulated: “To the things themselves!” It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is also opposed to taking over concepts only seemingly demonstrated, and likewise to pseudo-questions which often are spread abroad as “problems” for generations. But one might object that this maxim is, after all, abundantly self-evident and, moreover, an expression of the principle of all scientific knowledge. It is not clear why this commonplace should be explicitly put in the title of our research. In fact we are dealing with “something self-evident” which we want to get closer to, insofar as that is important for clarification of the procedure in our treatise. We shall explicate only the preliminary concept of phenomenology.

The expression has two components, phenomenon and logos. These go back to the Greek terms phainomenon and logos. Viewed extrinsically, the word “phenomenology” is formed like the terms theology, biology, sociology, translated as the science of God, of life, of the community. Accordingly, phenomenology would be the science of phenomena. The preliminary concept of phenomenology is to be exhibited by characterizing what is meant by the two components, phenomenon and logos, and by establishing the meaning of the combined word. The history of the word itself, which originated presumably with the Wolffian school, is not important here.

A. The concept of phenomenon

The Greek expression phainomenon, from which the term “phenomenon” derives, comes from the verb phainesthai, meaning “to show itself.” Thus phainomenon means what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest. Phainesthai itself is a “middle voice” construction of phaino, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness. Phaino belongs to the root pha-, like phos, light or brightness, i.e., that within which something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus the meaning of the expression “phenomenon” is established as what shows itself in itself, what is manifest. The phainomena, “phenomena,” are thus the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light. Sometimes the Greeks simply identified this with ta onta (beings). Beings can show themselves from themselves in various ways, depending on the mode of access to them. The possibility even exists that they can show themselves as they are not in themselves. In this self-showing beings “look like. . . .” Such self-showing we call seeming [Scheinen]. And so the expres-
sion phainomenon, phenomenon, means in Greek: what looks like something, what "seems," "semblance." Phainomenon agathon means a good that looks like—but in reality is not what it gives itself out to be. It is extremely important for further understanding of the concept of phenomenon to see how what is named in both meanings of phainomenon ("phenomenon" as self-showing and "phenomenon" as semblance) are structurally connected. Only because something claims to show itself in accordance with its meaning at all, that is, claims to be a phenomenon, can it show itself as something it is not, or can it "only look like...." The original meaning (phenomenon, what is manifest) already contains and is the basis of phainomenon ("semblance"). We attribute to the term "phenomenon" the positive and original meaning of phainomenon terminologically, and separate the phenomenon of semblance from it as a privative modification. But what both terms express has at first nothing at all to do with what is called "appearance" or even "mere appearance."

One speaks of "appearances or symptoms of illness." What is meant by this are occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing as such: "indicate" something that does not show itself. When such occurrences emerge, their self-showing coincides with the being at hand [Vorhandensein] of disturbances that do not show themselves. Appearance, as the appearance "of something," thus precisely does not mean that something shows itself; rather, it means that something makes itself known which does not show itself. It makes itself known through something that does show itself. Appearing is a not showing itself. But this "not" must by no means be confused with the privative not which determines the structure of semblance. What does not show itself, in the manner of what appears, can also never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have the designated formal, fundamental structure of appearing, although they do differ among themselves.

Although "appearing" is never a self-showing in the sense of phenomenon, appearing is possible only on the basis of a self-showing of something. But this, the self-showing that makes appearing possible, is not appearing itself. Appearing is a making itself known through something that shows itself. If we then say that with the word "appearance" we are pointing to something in which something appears without itself being an appearance, then the concept of phenomenon is not thereby delimited but presupposed. However, this presupposition remains hidden because the expression "to appear" in this definition of "appearance" is used in an equivocal sense. That in which something "appears" means that in which something makes itself known, that is, does not show itself; in the expression "without itself being an 'appearance'" appearance means the self-showing. But this self-showing essentially belongs to the "whercin" in which something makes itself known. Accordingly, phenomena are never appearances, but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena. If we define phenomenon with the help of a concept of "appearance" that is still unclear, then everything is turned upside down, and a "critique" of phenomenology on this basis is surely a bizarre enterprise.

The expression "appearance" itself in turn can have a double meaning. First, appearing in the sense of making itself known as something that does not show itself and, second, in the sense of what does the making known—what in its self-showing indicates something that does not show itself. Finally, one can use appearing as the term for the genuine meaning of phenomenon as self-showing. If one designates these three different states of affairs as "appearance," confusion is inevitable.

However, this confusion is considerably increased by the fact that "appearance" can take on still another meaning. If one understands what does the making known—what in its self-showing indicates the nonmanifest—as what comes to the fore in the nonmanifest itself, and radiates from it in such a way that what is nonmanifest is thought of as what is essentially never manifest—if one understands the matter in this way, then appearance is tantamount to a bringing to the fore, or to what is brought to the fore. However, the latter
does not constitute the proper Being of what actually conducts something to the fore. Hence appearance has the sense of "mere appearance." That which makes known itself brought to the fore, indeed shows itself; but it does so in such a way that, as the emanation of what it makes known, it precisely and continually veils what it is in itself. But then again this not-showing which veils is not semblance. Kant uses the term "appearance" in this twofold way. On the one hand, appearances are for him the "objects of empirical intuition," what shows itself in intuition. This self-showing (phenomenon in the genuine, original sense) is, on the other hand, "appearance" as the emanation of something that makes itself known but conceals itself in the appearance.

Since a phenomenon is constitutive for "appearance" in the sense of making itself known through a self-showing, and since this phenomenon can turn into semblance in a privative way, appearance can also turn into mere semblance. Under a certain kind of light someone can look as if he were flushed. The redness that shows itself can be taken as making known the presence of fever; this in turn would indicate a disturbance in the organism.

Phenomenon—the self-showing in itself—means a distinctive way something can be encountered. On the other hand, appearance means a referential relation in beings themselves such that what does the referring (the making known) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself—only if it is a "phenomenon." Both appearance and semblance are themselves grounded in the phenomenon, albeit in different ways. The confusing multiplicity of "phenomena" designated by the terms phenomenon, semblance, appearance, mere appearance, can be unraveled only if the concept of phenomenon is understood from the very beginning as the self-showing in itself.

But if in the way we grasp the concept of phenomenon we leave undetermined which beings are to be addressed as phenomena, and if we leave altogether open whether the self-showing is actually a particular being or a characteristic of the Being of beings, then we are dealing solely with the formal concept of phenomenon. If by the self-showing we understand those beings that are accessible, for example, in Kant’s sense of empirical intuition, the formal concept of phenomenon can be applied legitimately. In this use phenomenon has the meaning of the common concept of phenomenon. But this common one is not the phenomenological concept of phenomenon. On the horizon of the Kantian problem what is understood phenomenologically by the term phenomenon (disregarding other differences) can be illustrated when we say that what already shows itself in appearances prior to and always accompanying what we commonly understand as phenomena, though unthetically, can be brought thematically to self-showing. This self-showing as such in itself ("the forms of intuition") are the phenomena of phenomenology. For clearly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way. They must be able to become phenomena if Kant claims to make a valid transcendental statement when he says that space is the a priori "wherein" of an order.

Now, if the phenomenological concept of phenomenon is to be understood at all (regardless of how the self-showing may be more closely determined), we must inevitably presuppose insight into the sense of the formal concept of phenomenon and the legitimate application of phenomenon in its ordinary meaning. However, before getting hold of the preliminary concept of phenomenology we must define the meaning of logos, in order to make clear in which sense phenomenology can be "a science of" phenomena at all.

B. The concept of logos

The concept of logos has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle, indeed in such a way that these meanings diverge, without a basic meaning positively taking the lead. This is in fact only an illusion which lasts so long as an interpretation is not able to grasp adequately the basic meaning in its primary content. If we say that the basic meaning of logos is speech, this literal translation becomes valid only when we define what speech itself means. The later his-
tory of the word logos, and especially the manifold and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent philosophy, conceal constantly the proper meaning of speech—which is manifest enough. Logos is "translated," and that always means interpreted, as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, relation. But how can "speech" be so susceptible of modification that logos means all the things mentioned, indeed in scholarly usage? Even if logos is understood in the sense of a statement, and statement as "judgment," this apparently correct translation can still miss the fundamental meaning—especially if judgment is understood in the sense of some contemporary "theory of judgment." Logos does not mean judgment, in any case not primarily, if by judgment we understand "connecting two things" or "taking a position" either by endorsing or rejecting.

Rather, logos as speech really means δηλοῦν, to make manifest "what is being talked about" in speech. Aristotle explicates this function of speech more precisely as ἀποφαίνονται. Logos lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what is being talked about, and indeed for the speaker (who serves as the medium) or for those who speak with each other. Speech "lets us see," from itself, ἀπο...what is being talked about. In speech (ἀποφάνσις), insofar as it is genuine, what is said should be derived from what is being talked about. In this way spoken communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about and thus makes it accessible to another. Such is the structure of logos as ἀποφάνσις. Not every "speech" suits this mode of making manifest, in the sense of letting something be seen by indicating it. For example, requesting (εὐχή) also makes something manifest, but in a different way.

When fully concrete, speech (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking or vocalization in words. Logos is φωνή, inde-

4. See De interpretatione, chaps. 1-6. See further, Metaphysics VII, 4 and Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI.

Only because the function of logos as apophansis lies in letting something be seen by indicating it can logos have the structure of synthesis. Here synthesis does not mean to connect and conjoin representations, to manipulate psychical occurrences, which then gives rise to the "problem" of how these connections, as internal, correspond to what is external and physical. The syn [of synthesis] here has a purely apophantical meaning: to let something be seen in its togetherness with something, to let something be seen as something.

Furthermore, because logos lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But everything depends on staying clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of "correspondence" or "accordance" (Übereinstimmung). This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of αληθεία. The "being true" of logos as αληθεύειν means: to take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed (αληθές); to discover them. Similarly "being false," πεισθαι, is tantamount to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something else (by way of letting it be seen) and thereby proffering it as something it is not.

But because "truth" has this meaning, and because logos is a specific mode of letting something be seen, logos simply may not be acclaimed as the primary "place" of truth. If one defines truth as what "properly" pertains to judgment, which is quite customary today, and if one invokes Aristotle in support of this thesis, such invocation is without justification and the Greek concept of truth thoroughly misunderstood. In the Greek sense what is "true"—indeed more originally true than the logos we have been discussing—is aisthēsis, the straightforward sensuous apprehending of something. To the extent that an aisthēsis aims at its idia [what is its own]—the beings genuinely accessible only through it and for it, for example, looking at colors—apprehending is always true. This
means that looking always discovers colors, hearing always discovers
tones. What is in the purest and most original sense “true”—that
is, what only discovers in such a way that it can never cover up
anything—is pure noein, straightforwardly observant apprehension
of the simplest determinations of the Being of beings as such. This
noein can never cover up, can never be false; at worst it can be a
nonapprehending, agnoein, not sufficing for straightforward, appro-
priate access.

What no longer takes the form of a pure letting be seen, but
rather in its indicating always has recourse to something else and
so always lets something be seen as something, acquires a structure
of synthesis and therewith the possibility of covering up. However,
“truth of judgment” is only the opposite of this covering up; it is a
multiply-founded phenomenon of truth. Realism and idealism alike
thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth from
which alone the possibility of something like a “theory of Ideas” can
be understood at all as philosophical knowledge. And because the
function of logos lies in letting something be seen straightforwardly,
in letting beings be apprehended, logos can mean reason. Moreover,
because logos is used in the sense not only of legein but also of
legomenon—what is pointed to as such; and because the latter is
nothing other than the hypokeimenon—what always already is at
hand at the basis of every discourse and discussion in progress; for
these reasons logos qua legomenon means ground, ratio. Finally,
because logos as legomenon can also mean what is addressed, as
something that has become visible in its relation to something else,
in its “relatedness,” logos acquires the meaning of a relationship
with and a relating to something.

This interpretation of “apophatic speech” may suffice to clarify
the primary function of logos.

C. The preliminary concept of phenomenology

When we bring to mind concretely what has been exhibited in
the interpretation of “phenomenon” and “logos” we are struck by
an inner relation between what is meant by these terms. The
expression “phenomenology” can be formulated in Greek as legein
ta phainomena. But legein means apophainesthai. Hence phenomen-
ology means: apophainesthai ta phainomena—to let what shows
itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is
the formal meaning of the type of research that calls itself “phe-
nomenology.” But this expresses nothing other than the maxim for-
mulated above: “To the things themselves!”

Accordingly, the term “phenomenology” differs in meaning from
such expressions as “theology” and the like. Such titles designate
the objects of the respective disciplines in terms of their content.
“Phenomenology” neither designates the object of its researches nor
is it a title that describes their content. The word only tells us some-
thing about the how of the demonstration and treatment of what
this discipline considers. Science “of” the phenomena means that
it grasps its objects in such a way that everything about them to be
discussed must be directly indicated and directly demonstrated. The
basically tautological expression “descriptive phenomenology” has
the same sense. Here description does not mean a procedure like
that of, say, botanical morphology. The term rather has the sense
of a prohibition, insisting that we avoid all nondemonstrative deter-
minations. The character of description itself, the specific sense of
the logos, can be established only from the “compelling nature”
[“Sacheit”] of what is “described,” i.e., of what is to be brought to
scientific determinateness in the way phenomena are encountered.
The meaning of the formal and common concepts of the phenom-
emon formally justifies our calling every way of indicating beings as
they show themselves in themselves “phenomenology.”

Now, what must be taken into account if the formal concept of
the phenomenon is to be deformedalized to the phenomenological
one, and how does this differ from the common concept? What is
it that phenomenology is to “let be seen”? What is it that is to be
called “phenomenon” in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its
very essence becomes the necessary theme when we indicate some-
thing explicitly? Manifestly it is something that does not show itself at first and for the most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what at first and for the most part does show itself. But at the same time it is something that essentially belongs to what at first and for the most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.

But what remains concealed in an exceptional sense, or what falls back and is covered up again, or shows itself only in a distorted way, is not this or that being but rather, as we have shown in our foregoing observations, the Being of beings. It can be covered up to such a degree that it is forgotten and the question about it and its meaning is in default. Thus what demands to become a phenomenon in a distinctive sense, in terms of its most proper content, phenomenology has taken into its "grasp" thematically as its object.

Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of determination of, what is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the Being of beings—its meaning, modifications, and derivatives. This self-showing is nothing arbitrary, nor is it something like an appearing. The Being of beings can least of all be something "behind which" something else stands, something that "does not appear."

Essentially, nothing else stands "behind" the phenomena of phenomenology. Nevertheless, what is to become a phenomenon can be concealed. And precisely because phenomena are at first and for the most part not given phenomenology is needed. Being covered up is the counterconcept to "phenomenon."

There are various ways phenomena can be covered up. In the first place, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it has not yet been discovered at all. There is neither knowledge nor lack of knowledge about it. In the second place, a phenomenon can be buried over. This means it was once discovered but then got covered up again. This covering up can be total, but more commonly, what was once discovered may still be visible, though only as semblance. However, where there is semblance there is "Being." This kind of covering up, "distortion," is the most frequent and the most dangerous kind because here the possibilities of being deceived and misled are especially pertinacious. Within a "system" the structures and concepts of Being that are available but concealed with respect to their autochthony may perhaps claim their rights. On the basis of their integrated structure in a system they present themselves as something "clear" which is in no need of further justification and which therefore can serve as a point of departure for a process of deduction.

The covering up itself, whether it be understood in the sense of concealment, being buried over, or distortion, has in turn a twofold possibility. There are accidental coverings and necessary ones, the latter grounded in the substantive nature of the discovered. It is possible for every phenomenological concept and proposition drawn from genuine origins to degenerate when communicated as a statement. It gets circulated in a vacuous fashion, loses its autochthony, and becomes a free-floating thesis. Even in the concrete work of phenomenology lurks possible inflexibility and the inability to grip what was originally "grasped." And the difficulty of this research consists precisely in making it self-critical in a positive sense.

The way of encountering Being and the structures of Being in the mode of phenomenon must first be won from the objects of phenomenology. Thus the point of departure of the analysis, the access to the phenomenon, and passage through the prevalent coverings must secure their own method. The idea of an "originary" and "intuitive" grasp and explication of phenomena must be opposed to the naïveté of an accidental, "immediate," and unreflective "behilding."

On the basis of the preliminary concept of phenomenology just delimited, the terms "phenomenal" and "phenomenological" can now be given fixed meanings. What is given and is explicable in the way we encounter the phenomenon is called "phenomenal." In this sense
we speak of phenomenal structures. Everything that belongs to the manner of indication and explication, and constitutes the conceptual tools this research requires, is called “phenomenological.”

Because phenomenon in the phenomenological understanding is always just what constitutes Being, and furthermore because Being is always the Being of beings, we must first of all bring beings themselves forward in the right way if we are to have any prospect of exposing Being. These beings must likewise show themselves in the way of access that genuinely belongs to them. Thus the common concept of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant. The preliminary task of a “phenomenological” securing of that being which is to serve as our example, as the point of departure for the analysis proper, is always already prescribed by the goal of this analysis.

As far as content goes, phenomenology is the science of the Being of beings—ontology. In our elucidation of the tasks of ontology the necessity arose of a fundamental ontology which would have as its theme that being which is ontologically and ontically distinctive, namely, Dasein. This must be done in such a way that our ontology confronts the cardinal problem, the question of the meaning of Being in general. From the investigation itself we shall see that the methodological meaning of phenomenological description is interpretation. The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of hermeneuein, through which the proper meaning of Being and the basic structures of the very Being of Dasein are made known to the understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein itself. Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics in the original significative of that word, which designates the work of interpretation. But since discovery of the meaning of Being and of the basic structures of Dasein in general exhibits the horizon for every further ontological research into beings unlike Dasein, the present hermeneutic is at the same time “hermeneutics” in the sense that it works out the conditions of the possibility of every ontological investigation. Finally, since Dasein has ontological priority over all other beings—as a being that has the possibility of existence [Existenz]—hermeneutics, as the interpretation of the Being of Dasein, receives a specific third and, philosophically understood, primary meaning of an analysis of the existentiality of existence. To the extent that this hermeneutic elaborates the historicity of Dasein ontologically as the ontic condition of the possibility of the discipline of history, it contains the roots of what can be called “hermeneutics” only in a derivative sense: the methodology of the historical humanistic disciplines.

As the fundamental theme of philosophy, Being is no sort of genus of beings; yet it pertains to every being. Its “universality” must be sought in a higher sphere. Being and its structure transcend every being and every determination of beings there might be. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. The transcendence of the Being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.

Ontology and phenomenology are not two different disciplines that among others belong to philosophy. Both terms characterize philosophy itself, its object and procedure. Philosophy is universal, phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which as an analysis of existence has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and to which it returns.

The following investigations would not have been possible without the foundation laid by Edmund Husserl; with his Logical Investigations phenomenology achieved a breakthrough. Our elucidations of the preliminary concept of phenomenology show that what is essential to it does not consist in its actuality as a philosophical “movement.” Higher than actuality stands possibility.
We can understand phenomenology solely by seizing upon it as a possibility.\(^5\)

With regard to the awkwardness and "inelegance" of expression in the following analyses we may remark that it is one thing to report narratively about beings and another to grasp beings in their Being. For the latter task not only most of the words are lacking but above all the "grammar." If we may allude to earlier and in their own right altogether incomparable researches on the analysis of Being, then we should compare the ontological sections in Plato's *Parmenides* or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* with a narrative passage from Thucydides. Then we would see the stunning character of the formulations by which their philosophers challenged the Greeks. Since our powers are essentially inferior, and also since the area of Being to be disclosed ontologically is far more difficult than that presented to the Greeks, the complexity of our concept-formation and the severity of our expression will increase.

8. The outline of the treatise

The question of the meaning of Being is the most universal and the emptiest. But at the same time the possibility inheres of its keenest particularization in every individual Dasein. If we are to gain the fundamental concept of "Being" and the prescription of the ontologically requisite conceptuality in all its necessary variations, we need a concrete guideline. The "special character" of the investigation does not belie the universality of the concept of Being. For we may advance to Being by way of a special interpretation of a particular being, Dasein, in which the horizon for an understanding and a possible interpretation of Being is to be won. But this being is in itself "historic," so that its most proper ontological illumination necessarily becomes a "historical" interpretation.

The elaboration of the question of Being is a two-pronged task; our treatise therefore has two parts.

*Part One:* The interpretation of Dasein with a view to temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.

*Part Two:* Basic features of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology on the guideline of the problem of Temporality.

The first part consists of three divisions:

1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein.
2. Dasein and temporality.
3. Time and Being.

The second part likewise has three divisions:

1. Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time, as the preliminary stage of a problem of Temporality.\(^*\)
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes's *cogito sum* and the incorporation of medieval ontology in the problem of the *res cogitans*.
3. Aristotle's treatise on time as a way of discerning the phenomenal basis and limits of ancient ontology.\(^†\)

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\(^*\) See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, section 19, for Heidegger's remarkable destructuring of the Aristotelian treatise on time.—Ed.