Chapter 1

THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AND THE “NATURAL CONCEPT OF THE WORLD”

§1. The I in the natural attitude

In this semester we want to busy ourselves with the basic problems of a general phenomenology of consciousness. We want to study the basic constitution of consciousness as such in its chief features.

The investigations that we want to conduct require a completely different attitude than the natural one within which natural-scientific and psychological knowledge is attained. Phenomenology is by no

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1 What we have here are only pages of the lectures of the first weeks (October, November in 1910), which were followed by discussions. Later I lectured without any notes.

Table of Contents: Starting from the natural concept of world. The natural concept of world as starting point of a theory of knowledge. The possibility of a phenomenology. “Phenomenology” is here not from the outset regarded as a phenomenological theory concerned with essence but rather the attempt is made to consider whether an experiential phenomenology is possible, which is not a theory concerned with essence.

The evidence of the ego cogito in respect to the evidence of the unity of the stream of consciousness, hence the givenness of the phenomenological field. The transcendence in immanence and the different concepts of transcendence. The legitimacy of the transcendent positing in immanence. The right of remembering and expectation. Especially important is the right of intentional relations, of the intentions of expectations, which yield the transformation of an empirical transcendent positing into systematic connections of consciousness. Objectivity as index for transcendental subjectivity and the right of “empirical” knowledge within the sphere of consciousness. The phenomenological (not eidetic) reduction thereby yields the possibility, within the subjective (transcendental-subjective) sphere, to go beyond what is actually impressional. The same position is applied to empathy. The initial considerations about this theme. Transcendental reduction (the disengagement of physical nature) yields in addition to the ego the other ego as well and its stream. The theory of monads. The bonding of monads. Recollection actually gives (gibt) the itself! Empathic presentation (einfühlende Vergegenwärtigung), remembering of a present (Gegenwartserinnerung) does not actually give (gibt nicht) the itself.

Especially important: essence of the unified phenomenological I: how my stream of consciousness is closed off phenomenologically from every other one. Principle of Unity. — Husserl’s note.
means psychology. It is found in a new dimension and demands an essentially different attitude from that of psychology as well as of any science of spatial–temporal existence. In order to show this, an introduction is necessary.

I begin with a description of the different attitudes in which experience and knowledge can occur. First of all, there is the natural attitude, in which we all live and from which we thus start when we bring about the philosophical transformation of our viewpoint. We do this by describing in a general fashion what this attitude finds before itself as pre-given things (Vorfindlichkeiten).

Each of us says “I” and knows himself speaking in this way as an I. It is as such that he finds himself, and he finds himself at all times as a center of a surrounding (Umgebung). “I” signifies for each of us something different, for each a very determinate person who has a definite proper name, who experiences his perceptions, memories, expectations, phantasies, feelings, wishes, and volitions, who is in various states, who achieves his acts, and who further has his dispositions, innate propensities, his acquired capabilities and skills, etc. Of these things, each I has his own, and there belongs, of course, to this field the very finding itself, in which the respective I finds this and that, which is what is under discussion here in a general way.

The same holds for statements. On the basis of an immediate finding of the so-called experience and on the basis of convictions, opinions, and suppositions, which, regardless of their origin, are lived experiences for the I, the I asserts that he is the person designated in such and such a way, the one who has these personal properties, such and such actual experiences, opinions, aims, etc. The having varies here in each case in accordance with what is had: a pain is suffered, a judgment is made, the ability to cope with life, loyalty, and integrity are had as “personal” properties, etc.

Although the I finds itself as the one having, in various ways, all those stated predicates, the I does not find itself as of the same kind as that which is had. The I itself is not an experience, but the one experiencing, not an act but that which performs the act, not a character-trait but the one having the character-trait as a property, etc. Further, the I finds itself and its I-experiences and dispositions in time. And thereby it knows itself, not only as a being at the present time which has this and that, but also as having memories, and it finds itself in remembering as the same one which “just before” and at an earlier time
had such and such determinate experiences. Everything had and what had been had as well occupies its temporal place, and the I itself is something identical in time and has a determinate place in time.²

§2. The lived body and the spatial–temporal surrounding

Let us now look at the body (*Leib*) and at the spatial–temporal dimension enveloping the lived body. Every I finds itself as having an organic lived body. The body, for its part, is not an I, but rather a spatial–temporal “thing,” around which is arranged a surrounding of things that reaches outward without limits. In each case, the I has a limited spatial–temporal surrounding, which it immediately perceives, or, as the case may be, which it remembers in immediate, retentional memory. But each I “knows,” is certain, that the surrounding that is posited as existing in the manner of immediate intuition is only the intuited piece of a total surrounding and that things continue on further in endless (Euclidian)³ space. Likewise, the I knows that the currently remembered temporal piece of what exists is only a piece of the endless chain of what exists; a chain that stretches back into the endless past and reaches out into the endless future as well. The I knows both that the things exist not merely when they are being perceived and that they existed not merely when they were being perceived. Things that are there exist in themselves, and were in themselves, and will be in themselves, even if they are not directly present in the actual experiential surrounding, and were not and will not be in it through remembering. And that holds of things with respect to all their thing-properties, with respect to their rest and motion, their qualitatively changed and unchanged situations, etc.

We are describing, as should be noted, only what each I as such finds around itself, what it directly sees or what it indirectly intends with certainty, where this certainty is to be such that each I can transform

²The claim that the I is something identical and determinate in time requires that we assume that here Husserl is referring in the natural attitude to the “empirical I” or to oneself as a person. See discussions below, e.g., §15, where it is clear that in the phenomenological reduction the I is not taken as something in space and objective time; cf. also §12. — Translators’ note.
³“(Euclidian)” later deleted. — Editor’s note.
it into absolute\textsuperscript{4} evidence. Each I knows that it can err in each single case; whereas the general meaning, as expressed in statements of the aforementioned kind, is evident to it or can become so. We ourselves, as the ones making the description, do not take the trouble to determine the definitive truth of all this. On the other hand, this is anything but an expression of doubt about these matters.

To be strictly accurate, preceding this, I should have mentioned the following: Each I not only perceives, has not only experiences that posit intuitive existence, but also it has a more or less clear or confused knowledge; it thinks, it predicates and, as a scientific person, each I does science. Thereby, the I knows itself as one which sometimes judges correctly, one which sometimes falls into error, as one which occasionally succumbs to doubts and confusions, and also as one which occasionally presses on to clear conviction. But the I knows also, or is certain, in spite of all this, that the world is and that it, the I itself, is in the middle of this world, etc., just as we have thoroughly described it earlier.

Furthermore, one might elaborate the matter in this way. The thing which each I comes upon as “its body” is precisely distinguished from all other things as the lived body it owns. It is always and ineluctably there in the actual sphere of perceptions. And it is perceived in its own manner, which we can describe with greater detail, and it is the central member of the apprehension of the thingly surrounding. Everything, which is not lived body, appears to be related to this lived body. And further, everything that is not the lived body has, in relation to the lived body, a certain spatial orientation for the I of which the I is constantly conscious: as right and left, in front or in back, etc. Similarly in regard to the temporal orientation: as now, earlier, later, etc.

§3. The localization of lived experiences in the lived body

In addition, everyone relates his I-experiences and, in general, his specific I-possessions to the lived body. Thus, he localizes them \textsuperscript{[115]} in the body, sometimes on the basis of direct\textsuperscript{5} “experience,” in an

\textsuperscript{4}“Absolute” later deleted. — Editor’s note.
\textsuperscript{5}In 1924 or later added: “psycho-physical.” — Editor’s note.
immediate\textsuperscript{6} intuition, sometimes in the mode of an indirect experiential or analogizing knowing. This localization is completely \textit{sui generis}; it is completely different from that kind of localization that intuitively given parts and moments of a thing have with respect to that thing, whether it be a case of sense-intuitive or theoretical physical determinations. Joy and sorrow are not in the heart as blood is in the heart. Sensations of touch are not in the skin as pieces of organic tissue are. Thus it is according to the original meaning-giving presentation of localization of the psychical, that is, according to what direct or indirect experience teaches about these matters. This does not preclude that once in a while the original sense is disregarded. But we need not dwell on this here.

We further maintain that, on the basis of experiences (which every I has and which determines its judgment), the I-experiences are recognized as being to a certain, not more precisely, determined extent dependent on the body, its bodily states, and processes.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{§4. Empathy and the other I}

Every I finds in its surrounding, and more often in its surrounding of immediate interest, things which it regards as lived bodies but which it sharply contrasts to its “own” lived body as \textit{other lived bodies}. It does this in such a way that to each such lived body there belongs again an I, but a different, other I. (It regards the lived bodies as “bearers” of I-subjects. But it “sees” the other I’s not in the sense that it sees itself or experientially finds itself. Rather it posits them in the manner of “empathy”;\textsuperscript{8} hence other lived experiences and other character dispositions are “found” too; but they are not given or had in the sense of one’s own.) Thus, the I finds an I that likewise has its “soul,”\textsuperscript{9} its actual
consciousness, its dispositions, its character traits, and which likewise
comes upon its own thingly surrounding, including its own body as its
own. And the surrounding found by the other I, who stands vis-à-vis
us in a quasi-perceptual presentation, would be, for the most part,
the same as our surrounding; and the lived body, which we apprehend
in our surrounding as his body, would be the same as that which the
other I apprehends in his surrounding as his own body. And what holds
for the actual surroundings of the I’s, who reciprocally find themselves
as present and reciprocally arrange themselves in their surroundings,
holds also for the entire world. All I’s apprehend themselves as rela-
tive middle points of one and the same spatial–temporal world that
in its indeterminate infinity is the total surrounding of each I. For
each I the other I’s are not the middle points but surrounding points.
They have relative to their lived bodies a distinctive spatial place and
temporal place in one and the same universal-space (Allraum), or in
one and the same world-time (Weltzeit).

§5. The phenomenon of space and the correspondence of
the appearances for diverse subjects in their normal state

Each I finds itself as a middle point, so to speak a zero-point
of a system of coordinates, in reference to which the I considers,
aranges, and cognizes all things of the world, the already known or
the unknown. But each I apprehends this middle point as something
relative. For example, the I changes bodily its place in space, and
while it continues to say “here” it knows that “here” in each case is

10“Would be” in 1924 or later changed and expanded to “is in the sense of the
perception of the other.” — Editor’s note.
11“Would be” in 1924 or later changed to “is.” — Editor’s note.
12“Middle points” in 1924 or later supplemented with “middle points of orienta-
tion.” — Editor’s note.
13“For each I the other I’s are not middle points but surrounding points” changed
in 1924 or later to: “for each I the other I’s are not originatingly (originär) given as
middle points, but as surrounding points.” — Editor’s note.
14In 1924 or later “originatingly” (originär) added. — Editor’s note.
15In 1924 or later added: “(it is the primal-system of coordinates through which all
systems of coordinates receive their sense).” — Editor’s note.
spatially different. Each I distinguishes objective space as a system of objective spatial locations (places) from the phenomenon of space as the kind of space that appears with “here and there,” “in front and in back,” “right and left.” Similarly, when we think of time.

5 The same holds for things. Each person has around himself the same world and perhaps several see the same thing, the same segment of the world. But each has his thing-appearence: The same thing appears for each in a different way in accordance with the different place in space. The thing has its front and back, above and below. And what is my front of the thing is for the other perhaps its back, and so on. But it is the same thing with the same properties.

Each thing can switch its momentary spatial location (its place) with every other one in the infinite objective space, but only through continuous locomotion. Different things cannot occupy the same spatial location, nor can different parts do this; but they can exchange with one another their different spatial locations through continuous locomotion.

That holds true also for the lived body. When a lived body switches its objective spatial spot with another, the appearings that the relevant I's have of their experienced things change continuously. And this is done in such a way that, in an ideal case, subsequent to the lived bodies switching their places, their respective appearings have been switched around too. There prevails here a certain ideal possibility under the rubric of a (merely ideal) normality. This means that if two normal individuals change places or imagine their places changed, and if their lived bodies are in an ideal normal state, then each individual will find the same appearings in his consciousness that were earlier realized in the other's consciousness. If I and the other have “normal” eyes, then we see the same, provided the same unchanged things present themselves to us at the same objective spatial spot which we can occupy one after another. And each of us would have had the same appearings if he had looked from the same spot as the other; and, further, each would have had the same appearings if not only all spatial relations of the eye positions were the same but also the eyes and the whole body were in a similar “normal condition.” This is all talk about ideal matters. In general, each person assumes an approximate correspondence of his appearings with those had by others and treats
deviations under the title of illness and the like; and thus, he regards [118] these as an exception, but in any case as possible.

And the I’s come to an understanding about this or, as we say, among themselves, humans come to an understanding of such matters. Each has his experiences in relation to things that sometimes appear this way and sometimes that way; and each passes judgment on the basis of these appearings and exchanges these judgments with others in the course of mutual understanding. When he does not have occasion to reflect on the appearings, when in experience he is straight away turned to the object, then he does not judge about the appearings but about the things. If he describes a thing, then the thing is for him one and the same, as it were, the unchanged thing endowed with unchanging qualities. And he makes statements about it as such, whereas the whole time he is moving his head and body in space, and thereby has continuously different appearances, at one time an appearance of distance, then one of proximity; at one time the appearance of the front, and then of the back, etc.

§6. Recapitulation of the preceding discussions

In the last lecture, we began describing the natural attitude and we did this in such a way that we tried to describe in a general way what, being in the natural attitude, we find around us as pre-given things. It would be good here to recapitulate all this thoroughly.

Each of us knows himself as an I. Now, being in that attitude where each of us finds himself present as an I, what does each of us find present in himself and in connection with himself? We began thus with a description of the kind that everyone had to say “I,” and it was to this that everything else was tied. It is best to speak here in the singular first person and to continue thus: I posit[16] myself as being and as being this here, as being with this and that determinate content. I posit me as experiencing this and that; I have such and such dispositions and acts. But I do not posit me[17] as a disposition or an act; I do not come upon me as a disposition or an act.

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[16] In 1924 or later “posit” changed to “find . . . present.” — Editor’s note.
[17] In 1924 or later “do not posit me” deleted. — Editor’s note.
Further, I posit me and find me not only present as an experiencing subject but also as a subject of personal properties, as a person with a certain character, as having certain intellectual and moral dispositions, etc. This I find to be present, of course, in a completely different way than I find my experiences to be present. [119]

Further, I find me and what is mine as having duration in time, as changing or not changing during their duration, and I distinguish the flowing Now and the still given “just past” in retention. Further, in recollection I come upon myself as being the very same one who existed earlier, as still perduing now, as the one who perdued earlier on, who experienced such and such things in succession, etc.

Further, I have, as I find this, a lived body; and the lived body is a thing among other things that I likewise come upon. I also find this in time: In the Now, the existing lived body as my body; in the just past, the lived body which has just been; in recollection, the recollected body — the lived body belongs to me at all times.

And at every temporal moment, which I come upon as my time, as the time belonging to me, I find some kind of changing thingly surrounding or other. Partly, it is an immediate surrounding, namely that which is given and was given by an immediately positing intuition; and partly, it is a mediated surrounding, namely being co-posited together with the genuinely intuited immediate surrounding prior to any inferential thinking. In the fashion of what is co-posited, the surrounding is a so-called infinite one; it is an indeterminately posited world of things (Dinglichkeit) in the endlessly continuing space and in the endlessly continuing time. Such a co-positing I make clear for myself by way of symbolic and analogizing intuition, and I myself posit it analogically (so long as it does not lead to a remembered surrounding), namely, as a continuing, indeterminate, possible surrounding of things (dingliche Umgebung), according to the maxim: “Roughly in this manner it is going to go on and on.”

We then suggested the beginnings of a description of the things of the surroundings as things, according to the general sense that in each case they are to be found in the surrounding of our I’s. And similarly, we described the distinction in kind that that which at all times shows itself as “my lived body” has in contrast to all other things.

Further, we described the sense of things we find under the rubric of other lived body, being bearers of other I’s, which, together with
their experiences and personal properties, are “found” in a completely different way from one’s own I, i.e., not through “self-perception” and “self-remembering,” but rather through empathy.

Similarly, we described distinctions in the perspective in which all things, also the lived body, appear to the I: How at each spatial place of the I, to which the current spatial place of the lived body belongs in a certain presentation, there belong thing-appearings in which the thing and the space of things present themselves in such and such a way from this particular subjective spatial spot. And similarly, we were able to speak of the difference between time and the appearing of time.

We also addressed that by way of empathy all that which we have here discussed can be attributed to other I’s; that under normal conditions the perspectives, which vary from one I to another I, stand in a certain correspondence, being in accordance with the necessarily different spatial spots, which the different I’s find as their respective places. Normally, the change of relative spatial places of the I’s also leads to the change of their perspectives and thus their thingly appearances. I called attention to the consideration that an idea underlies this way of grasping the matter, and with respect to which, under the rubric of “normal and anomalous perceiving,” deviations are possible. But this was connected to the different ways in which the lived body functions.

§7. The natural attitude as the attitude of experience. The problem of the evidence of judgments from experience

What was signified under the rubric of “finding” (vorfinden) and what is prior to all the inferential, let alone scientific, thinking is nothing other than what, in the pregnant sense of the word, is called experiencing (erfahren). The natural attitude is therefore the attitude of experience. The I experiences itself and has experience of things, of lived bodies, and of other I’s. This attitude of experience is the natural one, in as much as it is exclusively that of the animals and pre-scientific man.

Of course, when I describe what is experienced or simply found I make judgments. But these purely descriptive judgments are, as such,
mere expressions of the experiences, of what has been found, and are, as such, in a certain sense absolutely evident, namely, evident precisely as mere expressions, just as the description of a fiction, if it is faithful, clearly has this evidence. If the I describes that which is found or experienced in its particular determinateness or indefinite generality, then all this is posited as being, and, notwithstanding the evidence belonging to the correctness of the expression, which may be a perfect one, the judgment comes with the evidence of the thesis of experience, which, to be sure, is an evidence, but, speaking generally, is an imperfect evidence nevertheless. Everyone knows that “experience can deceive.” Everyone knows, indeed, everyone has the right, upon pursuing the evidence, to assert what is experienced. Nevertheless, everyone knows that what is experienced “may not really be the case.”

On the other hand, the statements that we have made in describing the givenness of the attitude of experience do make the claim to absolute evidence. It is undoubtedly true that we find such a thing. With indubitable, absolute truth I assert and understand that I find myself as the one having such and such things, as the one who is the center-point of a surrounding, etc. And that is undoubtedly true as much as when I state that, hic et nunc, I am experiencing this determinate thing, as when I, indefinitely and in all generality, state that I perceive and have perceived things in a surrounding of things, etc. One further evidence is that I am not only certain to come upon precisely such and such a thing but also that “I am” and that a world is, and that those pre-given matters of the sort already described are given according to their general type in connection with the I — even though doubt and error are possible with regard to a particular individual matter. Here, we do not wish to decide the nature of this evidence.

In general, we firmly maintain that experience has its legitimacy; more precisely, that the judgment in the natural attitude, “on the basis of experience,” has its legitimacy as a matter of course; namely, on the most basic level, the sheer descriptive judgment, and then also,

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18 “Or indefinite generality” later deleted. — Editor’s note.
19 Of course, but that is the evidence of the pure cogito with the pure I. — Husserl’s note.
20 “That a world is” later marked as questionable. — Editor’s note.
21 Clearly it is a matter of empirical evidence. — Husserl’s note.
on a higher level, the inductive scientific judgment in the descriptive sciences; and, finally, the judgment in the exact, objective sciences, which, in going beyond what is immediately experienced, arrives at conclusions about what is not experienced, but which, in doing just that, always relies on its ultimate legitimating ground, i.e., the immediate experiential givens.

§8. The experiential sciences (Die Erfahrungswissenschaften): [122]
Physical natural science and psychology. The natural concept of the world

Insofar as man not only describes what is experienced but also recognizes it scientifically, he is engaged in experiential science. This is the science of the natural attitude.

a) The scientific research into22 things, those special givens of the natural attitude, is the subject matter of physical natural science. Its objects are therefore things precisely in that sense in which they are givens of experience, and they are given to us as existing things in themselves, having their determinate place and extension in objective space, their determinate position and continuance in objective duration, and they either undergo change in such and such a way or they do not change, etc. Here, one should note that things (Dinge) are not appearances (Erscheinungen), but rather that which is the Identical (das Identische), i.e., that which appears to me or some other I’s in a manifold of appearances, now this way, now that way, in accordance with the subjective position of these I’s and their normal or non-normal bodily constitution, etc. The region of things (das Dingliche) comprises only a piece of the total givenness.

b) Human beings, we saw earlier, have experiences of themselves, of their fellow men, or of other experiencing organic beings that are designated as animals or else as other ensouled beings. Through empathy and empathic understanding of expressions human beings enter not only into practical reciprocity, but they also observe one another for the sake of gaining knowledge, and they attain so-called psychological knowledge, namely in the form of self-perception and

22In 1924 or later added: “merely physical.” — Editor’s note.
self-remembering, as well as in the form of empathic experience and the theorizing based upon it. And similarly, there is the knowledge of the psycho-physical kind, which has to do with the relations of the dependency of the psychical realm (one's own or others) on the body. Just as the natural sciences of the physical things describe and explain them in accordance with laws of causality (things with their objective properties, transformations, and states, which appear in the physical appearances, but not the physical appearings — the experiences — themselves), so psychology describes and explains in terms of laws of causality the human personalities with their changing states and acts and alternating dispositions (character tendencies, etc.), but not the appearings in which, under such and such varying forms, they appear to themselves and others, in which case, of course, the word appearing is to be understood in a fitting way.

Only that the matter at hand here is different, because in a certain sense all appearings, the physical appearings, as well as the self-appearings, and the other appearings of what pertains to the souls of others are included in the realm of psychology. For although the description, in each case, of the manner in which another person may appear to me, or how another person himself appears to me, or, finally, how I appear to myself is something different from the description of myself or the description of the other person himself, etc., nevertheless, the consciousness in which I am an object to myself, just as every consciousness, is an I-experience, just as the consciousness in which another person stands over against me is an I-experience. And again: The thing is not a thing-appearing. The thing is what it is, whether I perceive it or do not perceive it, i.e., whether I have the relevant perceptual appearance or not. The thing is something physical, not psychical. But the having of the perceptual appearing, just as the thinking about the thing founded on the perceptual appearing, is something falling within the framework of psychology. Even if it should turn out on closer examination that there is a distinction to be made between the having of the appearing of what appears, as in the

[123]

— Editor's note.

Preceding the beginning of this paragraph, the following was inserted later, probably in 1921: “one would like to say.” — Editor's note.

“— In which case, of course, the word appearing is to be understood in a fitting way” later deleted. — Editor's note.
form of the perception of the thing, and the appearing itself (which
is had in so-called consciousness), the appearing, insofar as it is an
appearing which is had, would nevertheless fall under the realm of
psychology; after all, the “having” distinguishes itself only through
this content.25

And all of this falls within the framework of psychology in the
sense that it is apprehended within the already described natural at-
titude’s manner of apprehending. The psychological I belongs to ob-
jective time, the same time to which the spatial world belongs, to the
time that is measured by clocks and other chronometers. And this
I is connected to, in a spatial–temporal way, the lived body, upon
whose functioning the psychical states and acts (which, once again, [124]
are ordered within objective time) are dependent, dependent in their
objective, i.e., their spatial–temporal existence and condition (Dasein
und Sosein). Everything psychical26 is spatial–temporal. Even if one
holds it to be an absurdity, and perhaps justifiably27 so, that the psy-
chical I itself (along with its experiences) has extension and place,
it does have an existence in space, namely as the I of the respective
lived body, which has its objective place in space. And therefore each
person says naturally and rightly: I am now here and later there. And
the exact same thing holds for time. Perhaps, it is no less absurd to in-
tegrate the28 I and its experiences as such into the time which is made
determinate through the earth’s movement and which is measured by
means of some physical apparatus. But each person says naturally
and correctly: I am now, and in the same Now the earth has such and
such a position along its course, etc.

Accordingly, one can understand the designation of psychology
and psycho-physics, which latter is inextricably bound up with the
former (provided that we wish to mark a separation to begin with,
which, in any case, is at most a practical one), as natural sciences.29

Every science of factual existence in the one space and the one time

25 But see Logical Investigations, V, §14, where this seemingly Natorpian position is
criticized; also Husserliana VII, 110; for a rich discussion see Iso Kern, Husserl und
26 Inserted in 1924 or later: “in the natural sense.” — Editor’s note.
27 “And perhaps justifiably” later crossed out. — Editor’s note.
28 Added in 1924 or later: “purely psychic.” — Editor’s note.
29 Added later: “world sciences.” — Editor’s note.
is a natural science. And the unified quintessential concept is nature, or rather, as it becomes manifest on closer consideration, the law-governed unified whole of all spatial–temporal existence, hence of all that which has place and extension in the one space and which has position or duration in the one time. This whole we call the world or all-nature. In this world, there are not two separate worlds, called things and souls. Experience knows only one world, insofar as souls are souls of lived bodies, and insofar as the world is the world of experience, which, as such, refers back to I’s, which in turn, like all other I’s, experientially fit into the world.

Here, we break off. Clearly, these initial descriptions could be continued according to the given delineations and could be much enriched by new lines of thought. It also could be shown that philosophical interests of the highest dignity require a complete and encompassing description of the so-called natural concept of the world, i.e., that concept of the world of the natural attitude. On the other hand, it also could be shown that an exact and profound description of this kind is in no way something that can be accomplished easily but rather requires extraordinarily difficult reflections. However, here, we will not speak of such philosophical interests, even though our own project in these lectures is in tune with these same philosophical interests. For our immediate goals, these raw beginnings that we have given will suffice. We just wanted to indicate what the natural attitude is; and we described it through a general and brief characterization of what is found in advance by being in this attitude, i.e., the world in the natural sense. And we saw that the world is nothing other than that infinite object of the natural and psychological sciences, and, of course, of those sciences that pursue an exact description, as well as those that pursue theory, and those that engage in causal explanation.

§9. The empirical or natural attitude and the a priori attitude. 

Ontology of nature and formal ontology

What kind of new attitude is now possible with regard to the just described natural apprehension of the world where nature or world becomes a visible and knowable field? Does not nature encompass all real being (wirkliche Sein)? Certainly that is true, if we understand by
“real” that which exists in space and time. It is not true, however, if we consider that correct judging and insightful knowing aim at objects which have no such existence.

Thus, pure geometry speaks\textsuperscript{30} of geometric figures; pure arithmetic speaks of numbers, etc. The figures of pure geometry, as possible formations of pure space, the numbers of arithmetic, as the pure numbers of numerical series, are not things and are not in any sense facts of nature.\textsuperscript{31}

Accordingly, one may say: In contraposition to nature, to the world of factual spatial–temporal existence, to the “empirical” world, there are, as one says, \textit{ideal} worlds, worlds of ideas, which are non-spacial, non-temporal, and unreal. And yet, they exist indeed, as for example, numbers in a series exist. Moreover, they are the subject matter of valid scientific statements, just as much as the things of nature are.

One must consequently distinguish, on the one hand, between the natural or empirical attitude and, on the other hand, the nonempirical, \textit{a priori} attitude. In the one attitude, objectivities of existence (\textit{Daseinsgegenständlichkeiten}) come to givenness, in the other, objectivities of essence (\textit{Wesensgegenständlichkeiten}); in the one, nature comes to givenness, in the other, ideas.

Surely, there is nothing to object here. It clearly is a different attitude when, on the one hand, we have given to us, through perception or memory, a color as a moment of a thing and \textit{take} the color in this \textit{meaning}, in the perceiving or remembering, and when, on the other hand, we apply ourselves differently, as it were, and grasp only the idea of this color, the corresponding species of the color as a pure givenness. It is one thing to perceive a single note of the quality \(c\), as the note of the violin just now beginning to sound, and another thing to form, in a changed attitude, yet on the basis of the appearing of this exemplary note, the \textit{idea} of the quality \(c\), which is \textit{sui generis} within the ideal and singular scale of tone qualities. Likewise, it is one thing to look at four dashes, and it is quite another thing, while seeing the four dashes, not to pay attention to them, but rather to focus on the idea alone, the number 4, which here is instantiated in an intuition in an exemplary fashion, etc.

\textsuperscript{30}What follows until the end of §9 later crossed out. — Editor’s note.

\textsuperscript{31}Eidetic attitude. — Husserl’s note.
Such ideas now function as objects and, at the same time, they facilitate statements with the character of unconditional universality about particular things thought in indeterminate generality, being merely thought and not posited as existing. Such are, for example, the statements of arithmetic. After all, every idea, as such, has the property that there corresponds to it a so-called extension, which, however, is a pure extension of particulars; particulars in relation to which no positing of existence is performed. Accordingly, pure arithmetic, pure geometry, pure phoronomy, and pure harmonics, etc.

To be sure, another step or a resolve is required in order to see and take hold of the purity of the a priori, which consists in its freedom from existence. Natural scientists and mathematicians take delight in giving mathematical propositions an empirical sense. However, if they judge and justify these propositions in light of the idea that the units of counting, being kept indeterminate, represent actually existing realities, existing things, existing processes, etc., albeit in terms of that indeterminate generality of thought, which encompasses any empirical existence whatsoever, then mathematics, nota bene, as they advocate it, belongs from the start to the sphere of nature (as is true for every similarly taken science). For the natural empirical attitude, it would be the last thing to even consider the notion of a pure idea and, what is connected with this, the notion of a pure, completely unconditional universality. What is needed in opposition to such an interpretation of the mathematical, is, first of all, the excision of any, including the unspecified, positing of existence, in order to grasp the a priori and the ideal beings, purified of existence, and thus to grasp the trans-empirical, non-spatial and non-temporal idea.

But this is actually an imprecise way of putting it. Whoever has looked at the ideal realm in its purity, whoever has made judgments in “rigorous” universality does not need the starting point from the empirical universality and a special act of excision of empirical existence. One grasps the idea and the pure universality precisely in an attitude of its own, in a separate, differently directed looking and

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32 Phoronomy: study of the laws of motion; kinematics. — Translators’ note.
intending. On the other hand, one must also note that it is one thing
to have, to grasp, and to intend the \textit{a priori}, and another thing subse-
quentlly to reflect on the sense of that which is grasped and stated, and
correctly to interpret it, to take it as it presents itself. The mathemati-
cian can and will very well make judgments in strict universality; and
yet afterward empiricist prejudices lead him to interpret that which
was grasped in its purity in an empirical way. To conclude, by our
being in the \textit{a priori} attitude, we grasp ideas, essences.

This includes the idea of space and the ideas of spatial figures, as
well as the ideas \textit{about} spatialities, which ideas themselves are not
spatial. In real space, in nature, there is no idea of space, no idea of
a triangle, etc. And likewise, in real time there is no idea of “time,”
which itself is rather a non-temporal being, that is, precisely an idea.
The essence-attitude, ultimately that of \textit{intuitive} ideation, brings a
new \textit{existence-free} sphere to givenness; and in a certain sense it may
indeed be characterized as the philosophical attitude.

Surely, the transition from the impure \textit{a priori} of the narrow, empiri-
cally minded mathematics to the strict \textit{a priori} of pure mathematics is
of great philosophical significance and an indispensable step toward
establishing genuine philosophy. He who has not made this step can
never climb to the heights of true philosophy.

However, if the matter came to rest with this new attitude, we would
have no more than, on the one hand, the natural sciences and, on the
other hand, the mathematical and other \textit{a priori} sciences apprehended
in their purity, or rather only those \textit{a priori} sciences, which the starting
point from the natural sciences would call for, and which initially con-
stitute themselves only as instruments of natural-scientific research.
We can organize them in this way: nature as Fact we contrast to nature
as Idea. The natural sciences, in the usual empirical sense, are related
to nature as Fact; the pure natural sciences are related to nature as
Idea. This yields the sciences of the ideas, which are constitutive of
the idea of nature: geometry, pure theory of time, pure theory of mo-
tions and possible deformations of what is of the nature of things (\textit{im
Dinglichen}) as such — this latter would correspond to Kant’s idea of
pure natural science. Let us classify these disciplines that correspond
to the idea of nature under the title of \textit{ontology of nature}.

There is another group of \textit{a priori} disciplines that has a completely
different character. Oftentimes, the natural sciences have to make use
of the truths of these disciplines. Here, I am referring to the pure logic
of propositions, the pure theory of probability, pure arithmetic, and,
finally, the pure theory of manifolds. These sciences do not belong to
the idea of nature; they do not expound the a priori, which constitutes
the idea of nature. Arithmetic’s freedom from existence includes not
only any actual positing of real existence but also every positing of
the idea of nature, every employment of the idea of things, of prop-
erties, etc. The one (die Eins) in arithmetic is something whatever in
general, and under this does not merely fall the thingly (Dingliches),
the spatial–temporal (Räumlich-Zeitliches), but, rather, precisely the
something whatsoever in general (Etwas überhaupt), be it an idea, be
it even a number itself. To the extent that formal logic addresses the
truth of propositions, the very idea of a proposition, taken in its un-
conditional universality, contains not only any propositions you like,
which have a natural-scientific thought-content, but also propositions
that have any thought-content whatever, for instance, pure arithmetic.
And it can be shown that the designated group of disciplines can also
be interpreted as a universal, a priori ontology, an ontology that refers
to intended being in general. 

The pure science of nature or, to put it better, the ontology of
nature would then be a title for all disciplines that belong to the idea
of nature or to the ideas that are constitutive of the idea of nature.
Here are relevant the ideas of space and time, i.e., pure theory of
space (geometry), pure theory of time, pure kinetics, and the pure
disciplines of the possible deformations of the spatial formations.
Moreover, connected to the idea of the thing, which not only has its
duration and its geometric shape, but which also has real properties,
real changed situations, which stand in causal connections, there are
a priori laws, which, however, do not relate to the facticity of existing
things but, rather, pertain to the idea of thingliness as such. Here, we
come upon the Kantian “pure science of nature” which, as is well
known, is distinguished by him from geometry, pure chronometry,
and the previously mentioned disciplines.

However, in respect to this discipline, it must be said that, as a
matter of fact, it did not realize the functions that one was to expect.

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35 The following paragraphs until §10 repeat more elaborately the preceding two
paragraphs. — Translators’ note.
Historically speaking, it was not developed and applied as an *a priori*
 auxiliary discipline (as it were, a mathematics of thingliness) of the
natural sciences. Actually, it has remained a *desideratum* and has
not advanced beyond rather paltry starts. Only isolated propositions
belonging to it have served the natural sciences, as they presently
exist, as for example, the proposition of the impenetrability of ma-
terial things, or that a thing can only change its position when it
moves, i.e., that it can change its place only by a continuous change
of places; further, the causal law according to which each change of a
property can proceed only in accord with empirical natural laws. Of
course, there is much debate about the latter principle and the other
principles as well; especially insofar as there is, on the one hand, an
inclination to speak of these principles (which would belong to the
Kantian pure science of nature) as empirical laws, which view, on the
other hand, is vigorously contested by others. Of course, if a person
has learned to submit to complete intellectual honesty and has once
comprehended what is seen in the essence-attitude and has learned,
through reflection, to assert this as givenness, even in the face of all
erroneous misunderstandings and fashionable theories, then he will,
in this case, react in just the same way as is appropriate in the matter
of the previously mentioned mathematical disciplines, which happen
to be related in an ideal manner to pure space, pure time, pure motion,
etc., and which must be recognized as so related.

Yet here, we must also note a group of disciplines of an essentially
different kind, being, in part, also designated as mathematical dis-
ciplines, and which in the past century, or, in full measure, in the most
recent times only, have blossomed and come into their genuine form,
and which have likewise played a part as instruments for the sciences
of what factually exists (*Daseinswissenschaften*). To begin with the
first, I have here in mind the pure and formal logic of assertoric propo-
sitions and the completely purely conceived theory of probabilities
or possibilities. As to the former discipline, this brief illustration will
have to suffice here, namely that a part of it is the entire theory of
syllogistics, which, under the guidance of mathematicians in recent
times, has likewise taken on a mathematical form. As to the pure
theory of probability, it remains tied up with existential restrictions;
very few today uphold the idea of a theory of probability completely
free of any existential positing. Further, I must not forget to mention
pure arithmetic and the pure theory of manifolds, which are closely related to syllogistic logic.

All of these disciplines, unlike geometry, do not inherently belong to the idea of nature; they do not affect at all what constitutes the idea of nature in its specific essence. Arithmetic’s freedom from existence, for example, does not only mean the abiding disengagement of any actual positing of real existence (whether it be physical or mental), but it also means that there is not even a hint of the specific essential content of the idea of nature, that is, no idea, even in an ideal manner, of the spatial, of the thingly, of the thingly property, etc.

The One (Eins) in arithmetic means something or other in general, and if there is still talk of yet another unity (Einheit), what is meant alone is precisely some other something in general, being thought of, in an indeterminate general way, as different from the first something in general. It makes no difference whether it has to do with some physical or mental existent, be it even in terms of pure generality, or whether it has to do with ideas. Every and each thing can be counted, for example, also numbers (which, of course, are not anything thingly), and space and time too, as when I say: They (space and time) are two pure forms of every possible nature in general, and so forth.

The matter stands similarly with formal logic in the narrow sense. In as much as it deals with propositions as such, the subject matter is not especially related to nature or to other propositions connected to nature.

All the disciplines of the present group in question are closely connected in such a way that they all can be grouped under the idea of a formal, absolutely universal ontology. In contrast to this group, we have the much more limited, by reason of its being materially determined, idea of the ontology of nature, as an ontology of the physical and psychical.

With this group of a priori disciplines we do not yet have, as we already intimated, the higher and more proper level of the philosophical problematic. We must proceed at first to the question whether the philosophical disciplines, which we have come upon, are the only a priori disciplines.\footnote{A later remark by Husserl: “The humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), the scientific disciplines of the ‘formations of the mind,’ were not taken into account; but}
§10. The a priori of nature, the natural world-concept, and the natural sciences. Avenarius’ “critique of pure experience”

Before we proceed further we want to undertake an instructive excursus. Here I am tempted to venture a principled critique of the positivism of the school of Avenarius, which envisages the task of a theory and critique of pure experience\(^3\) in terms of the elimination of all “metaphysical” traces in the world-concept and the restitution of the “natural” world-concept of pure experience.

Now, it is of interest with regard to this ontology of nature, which is conceived in the broadest scope and dimensions, to consider that description of the natural world-concept with which we began.

Our description was a general one and, to a certain extent, an evident one. On the other hand, it was very much a description, and as such it presupposed the existence of what was being described. According to this description, everyone of us says: “I am and find myself in a spatial–temporal surrounding, between things and other humans; I have the appearings of all of them and find these appearings related to the distinguished thing of ‘my lived-body,’” etc. These are facts, of course. Likewise, when I say on the basis of memory: “I was, and I was in a surrounding,” etc., and again when I say: “Other lived-bodies are bound up with I’s; they are related to the same surrounding as I am,” etc. Whether in each case these single facts, which I consider here, do exist in reality can, one might well say, be doubtful. Is there any evidence left, evidence that we indeed invoked in relation to the description? Let us consider this matter without, of course, being able to deal with it in full detail and with the required thoroughness. It is surely evident, within the limits of an easily determined qualification, that I can say, respectively: I have such and

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35 According to Husserl’s own pagination of the lecture manuscript there are missing here two pages, which the editor could not find in Husserl’s Nachlass. But one may compare with this paragraph Appendix III (XXII): Immanent Philosophy — Avenarius. — Editor’s note.
such perceptions, memories, convictions, etc.; I have self-perception and self-understanding of me as the person I know; I have perception of the surrounding, etc. And it is further evident that my judgments, provided that they, as we set them up, are pure expressions of the perceived as such, of the remembered as such, etc., will exclude any possible error, because they reflect then in the pure descriptive expressions the mere sense of the particular perceptions, memories, other experiential certitudes, etc. It may well be the case that I am deceived in thinking that the thing is there, but that I perceive, and that the perception is a perception of a thing with a spatial surrounding, etc., that is indubitable.\[133\\]

Now, we can further state: it is evident that if what in the natural attitude is posited does really exist, in other words, if the perceptions, memories, etc., are justifiable (that is, the objective sense, which they have, can be maintained in its objective validity), then what the sense as such and a priori requires must be objectively valid too. The general expressions, with which I, on the one hand, describe perception, memory, etc., as perception as such, memory as such, and correspondingly, on the other hand, the universal expressions which I use, in regard to what is perceived as such, etc., as when I speak of persons and things, experiences, dispositions, thing-properties, spatial extension, temporal duration, etc., signify a general sense to which any empirical truth is clearly bound. It may well be that occasionally I am deceived in believing that an object I think is vis-à-vis me is indeed there or exists in such a fashion as it appears to me. But it does appear, and before I entertain the question whether it truly is and how it is in reality, I know from the very outset that it can only be in accordance to the sense in which a thing with properties, etc., exists — for it is as this that it appears perceptually. And the question, whether what appears does really exist, becomes thus the definite question: does this thing exist?

We can put this idea also in this way: the fact gleaned from the description is that in general I am convinced not only that I apparently find this and that, and that I find myself in a spatial–temporal surrounding among other things and other psychic beings, but also that I am convinced that all this would be true, generally speaking,

\[36\\]The description is evident, as long as it truly expresses the objective sense of the relevant cogitationes. — Husserl’s note.
even though I might be deceived in a particular case in regard to details, which are assumed by me to exist within the world. For now, we leave undecided what questions of a philosophical character this thietic evidence, this general evidence of the fact of the world as such, poses to us. Nevertheless, evidence it is. If we consider now that in the framework of this evidence one operates with particular empirical theses and that sometimes the particular things of experience are thus posited and, on this basis, experientially judged, as this is already done in ordinary life and no less so in the natural sciences, then there is absolutely no doubt that in general cases and no less in particular ones all possible experiential knowledge is bound to the sense with which these theses are achieved. Natural science is nothing else — and wants to be nothing else — than the science of nature. Therefore, prior to any closer methodological treatment of what is given in experience, it presupposes as valid what is prescribed for it in terms of the general sense of nature as a datum of experience. Certainly, this finds its common expression in the words employed by the description of the natural attitude and its content, i.e., the natural world as such, i.e., the words: thing, property, change, cause, effect, space, time; but also the words: person, experience, act, appearing, disposition, etc.\textsuperscript{37}

But this means: every natural science, insofar as it presupposes the theses of the natural world-perspective and investigates Being in this framework and sense, is a priori bound up with the ontology of the real (reale Ontologie).\textsuperscript{38}

If it is true, as the positivists and particularly Avenarius have always maintained, that natural science, as it factually exists, is completely pervaded and distorted by lop-sided interpretations, which clash with the natural world-perspective; and if indeed natural science is permeated by auxiliary concepts, which, although they serve useful

\textsuperscript{37} What is missing here is the clarification of the sense in which a priori invariance is distinguished from empirical (typical, empirical type) invariance; also the reduction of empty intentions to full intentions of possible experience. — Husserl's note.

\textsuperscript{38} One must understand this correctly: the permanent thesis of experience with its abiding sense continues its course in the framework of the enduring agreement of experience, and the evidence of the thesis is continuously an evidence of experience, which holds provisionally and remains necessarily provisional. That the idea of nature can find application to a given nature presupposes indeed a given nature; but there is continuously the reservation regarding whether nature is really there, whether it exists in reality. — Husserl's note.
functions within the natural-scientific method, are actually so defined and interpreted as to contain a surplus of thoughts that clash with the basic schema of the natural world-perspective, then it is an important, indeed for the attainment of definitive knowledge of nature, an indispensable task to practice “critique.” And this critique may quite correctly be called a “Critique of Pure Experience.” Pure experience would then be that experience and knowledge of experience which, to remain within the jargon of positivism, excludes all “metaphysics.” From our perspective, which of course is not a positivist one, “metaphysics” here refers to nothing other than the suppositions that are not in accordance with the fundamental sense of the natural world-thesis or the sense of “experience.” “Experience” then means no more than the thesis of the natural attitude. Therefore, the task is to provide the much needed critique of the concepts of natural science. At the beginning, the task is to clearly analyze the general sense of the natural thesis, which underlies every natural science, in order to determine the normative measure of the critique. In this manner, and only in this manner, can a really consistent concrete world-concept be developed from out of the natural sciences; that is, only in this manner can actual natural science be transformed into a “pure” science of experience.

There is no doubt about any of this, provided that everything is understood in the way that we have made it clear here. The “ontology” of nature presents in its various disciplines the pure, formal–general sense of the natural thesis or the givenness of the natural attitude as such. At the same time, the question how a thesis of such a meaning is justified, just as the further particular question, how, in each case, the particular natural science is justified in advancing its particular thesis, lies outside the limits of this ontology.

It is important to note that talk of a natural world-concept does not and must not mean a world-concept that every human has strangely but factually brought into the world, for instance, as part of the legacy of the animal evolution over millions of years, as the result of the ever

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[39] What does “fundamental sense” of world-experience, of nature-experience, mean? All world-thinking, all thinking about the world, rests on “pure experience.” If we abstract from all thoughts, without questioning whether they are correct or incorrect, and keep to the world purely as experienced, then we can circumscribe originaliter in general concepts the pure sense of experience, etc. — Husserl’s note.

[40] Later added: “determinate.” — Editor’s note.
more perfect, ever more cognitive-economical (denkökonomischeneren) adjustment to the conditions of nature on the part of the animals and, finally, man. Nor does it mean a world-concept, which historical humanity or even individual humans have empirically developed, and which, under changed anthropological, historical, and cultural conditions, could have and must have evolved differently, in which case this latter world-concept would have been the authoritative one.

Of course, and this is the way we judge in the natural attitude, every experience and every group of experiences that any human of this world may have belong themselves to this world, having come into existence by empirical necessity under the given circumstances, and in accordance with certain empirical laws. But by whatever way the actual experiences, in which humans have the world-concept as a unified content, may have come into existence, as long as we are talking about a world in which humans exist, who have consciousness of the world, who have experiences, and among them existence-positing perceptions, experiences, etc., that is, as long as this kind of talk remains intelligible, so long and to this extent is the natural world-concept valid in an absolute and a priori sense. This a priori feature does not mean that a thesis other than that of the natural world is impossible in any sense; it does not mean that other perceptions of individual unities and other experiences as such, which we call experiences of things, experiences of humans, and things like that, are absolutely unthinkable; about such matters we here rather refrain from all judgment. Rather it means: If we proceed from the fact of the natural attitude and from the fact of the thesis of nature, as it is graspable and generally characterizable through this thesis, and if we proceed from the fact that this thesis has its indubitable legitimacy, then it is the case that every natural-scientific statement, as a statement which scientifically determines the particular content that is posited in this thesis, is meaningless, if it clashes with the sense of this thesis in terms of its general meaning and content.42

41 Later, perhaps in 1921, added: “with its concrete content tied to actual and possible series of perceptions, which can stretch out into infinite openness and can confirm themselves consistently in one another, thereby maintaining the uninterruptedness of the thesis.” — Editor’s note.

42 Contained in this talk of the fact is the implication that we can think of it as going on in infinitum, that by way of anticipation, we can postulate that the thesis which
And consequently, it is meaningless to speak of the possibility that humans in the course of their experiences or that higher animals in the course of their always more perfect adaptation to nature could have worked out for themselves, in a rational and justified way, another world-concept, as if for humans in nature or animals in nature the world-concept were something contingent, just like, for example, the particular and general facts of which the natural sciences deal in their textbooks. I hold that this is meaningless, for we have spoken of humans, and of nature, and of that which is possible in nature, that is, we have presupposed nature and humans, and thereby, presupposed what, in general, makes nature “possible,” i.e., we have presupposed the sense of nature, which is to say, we have precisely presupposed the natural world-concept. There cannot be something in the world that destroys (aufhebt) the sense of the talk about the world because it presupposes the sense as sense (as essence).

Consequently, it is quite wrong to grasp the problem as Avenarius does, if I have followed him correctly, or, in any case, as it was meant in his school, namely: We can very much describe the world-concept, which we all have prior to scientific knowledge or which humanity has had prior to the sciences and, then, we can further raise the question: Has man, if he engages in natural science, occasion, that is, experiential occasion, to relinquish this world-concept? Such a way of posing the question is incorrect because it portrays it as possible that through experiences occasions can be brought forth to modify, nota bene, rationally, the natural world-concept. But our analysis has taught us that this purported possibility is an absurdity in the sharpest sense of the word.43

Although it is44 nonsense to claim implicitly that a human being could find in the world rational justification for holding that another world than this world was the real world, it is, on the other hand,

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we already have achieved, in each case and each for himself, will further persist in the concordance of experiences. But this anticipation is justified by the feature of the unity of world-experience itself. — Husserl's note.

43It is also noteworthy that the natural world-concept is not that concept which humans have formed for themselves prior to science; rather, it is the world-concept that comprises the sense of the natural attitude both before and after science. However, this sense must first be worked out in the basic concepts of ontology. — Husserl's note.

44The following paragraph was later crossed out. — Editor's note.
not nonsense to claim that perhaps another world could exist, indeed, that there could exist another world, perhaps disconnected from this world, that is, the world of the natural attitude or experience, that perhaps there is still another world of a totally different kind, having no Euclidian space, etc.; *nota bene*, not nonsense! For then, we do not claim what constitutes the nonsense in the first place, i.e., that humans or beings endowed with essentially the same lived-body, etc., could come upon such a world and could scientifically come to know it, or that natural science, the science founded on the basis of the natural world-concept, the science which, with its first words, so to speak, posits things, space, time, etc., would be forced to relinquish the natural world-concept through experience.

Here, we cannot address the great problems arising from the aforementioned meaningful possibility of other worlds nor the ultimate question of the facticity of this world and its natural thesis. But we draw near to this sublime sphere if we now go back to the question about attitudes that deviate from, yet possibly also combine with, the natural attitude.