

The Mirror of the Self.

through the eyes into the soul, is a kind of copulation between separated bodies, and it is not far from physical sex" (C&L 1.9.4–5).³ This is the advice of the young Cleinias, offering consolation to his lovesick friend Clitophon: as if taking his cue from the *Alcibiades I*, Cleinias finds a path not to wisdom but to titillation from the reflection of one lover's eyes in the eyes of the other.⁴ But this Cleinias is not, as we might suspect, a propounder of idiosyncrasies or a heretic of romantic love. On the contrary, the notion of the erotic penetration of the body by corpuscular bodies entering in through the eyes proves a remarkably consistent ancient paradigm for the workings of the gaze upon the soul and, as we shall see, has a distinguished heritage long before the second century CE.

In this discourse of love, the mirrored gaze thus has a role to play beyond the philosophical. We have already seen something of the erotic force of the mirror as an instrument: owning a mirror or using one carried with it a set of associations and assumptions that were hardly gender-neutral, and the mirror itself was a thing of vanity and *voluptas*. But in reflecting the desiring gaze back at the viewer, the mirror—and the mirroring eye, and even the still surface of a pond—entered into an visual exchange that effected physical changes in the body itself. The discourse of eros thus participated in a symbiotic relationship with another field of discourse altogether, that of ancient optical theory. I do not propose to inquire into the “chicken and the egg” question of causality—whether cultural beliefs about the permeability of the eye as a pathway into the body influenced scientific explanations about the workings of vision, or vice versa. But a consideration of ancient optics should illuminate Cleinias' odd (for us) disquisition and should illustrate, in so doing, why we may well be wrong to feel recognition at the visual language of ancient lovers—and perhaps even of ancient philosophers.

ANCIENT OPTICS

Sight, as Hans Jonas (1982) suggested, seems to us the most neutral and the most detached of all the senses: innocent of causality, boundless in its scope,

3. μίξονα τῶν ἔργων ἔχει τὴν ἡδονήν. ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλοισι ἀντανακλώμενοι ἀπομάττουσιν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ εἶδωλα· ἢ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή, δι' αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν καταρρέουσα, ἔχει τινὰ μίξιν ἐν ἀποστάσει· καὶ ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων μίξεως.

4. As Denyer (2001, 229) comments of the relevant passage in the *Alcibiades*, “Glaringly absent . . . is explicit mention of how erotic are looks from, or into, someone's eyes.”

synchronous rather than diachronous in its workings. And yet this perspective has little to do with the understanding of the visual process in antiquity. Almost all the ancient schools of thought about optics, from the atomists to Plato, Euclid, and Ptolemy, put an emphasis on the tactile nature of sight, and several of them talk specifically in terms of penetration and touching in language that is literal, not metaphorical. For the purposes of this study, we can divide these major theories into five schools (intromission, extramission, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic), although such a grouping remains a slightly crude way of dealing with internal subdivisions and overlaps and with longstanding debates, both in antiquity and in the present, about the differences and similarities between the various schools of thought.⁵ Many ancient thinkers themselves chose to boil down the fine distinctions between these schools to a notion that vision simply involved a form of contact between the organ of sight and its object; as Galen would write of the two alternatives in the second century CE, “A body that is seen does one of two things: either it sends something from itself to us and thereby gives an indication of its peculiar character, or, if it does not itself send something, it waits for some sensory power to come to it from us.”⁶

These categories—the eye as active or passive participant in the process of seeing—shaped the debate about vision in general; the latter is associated with the ancient atomists and Epicurus, the former with a slew of theories extending into the Middle Ages. Intromission theory, at least in its explication by Epicurus and Lucretius, held that objects emit tiny particles (in Greek, *eidola*; in Latin, *simulacra*) in the form of a film that retains the shape of the object. These *simulacra* impress themselves on the surface of the eye and then (by some accounts) enter in through the eyes and strike the soul, resulting in “seeing.”⁷ The theory is associated with the thinking of the atomists Leucippus of Miletus

5. For general treatments of ancient theories of sight and their reception, see Lindberg 1976, Park 1997, Rakoczy 1996, Simon 1988, and van Hoorn 1972.

6. Lindberg (1976, 219n59), citing *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 7.5, trans. Philip De Lacy (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978–84), vol. 5, no. 4. See also Theophr., *De sensu* 7.6–10 on these alternatives, with emphasis on the media that make them possible. Galen rejected the intromissive option, citing the impossibility of thereby seeing a mountain, which would have to shrink in order to fit into the pupil, and which also could not be seen by several viewers at once.

7. On intromission theory, see Baldes 1975; Burkert 1977; Jonsson 1995, 49–50; Lindberg 1976, 2–3; Rakoczy 1996, 25–28; Simon 1987; Simon 1988, 36–41; van Hoorn 1972, 49–57; and von Fritz 1953.

and his student Democritus, of whose work only fragments survive, often in hostile accounts; later, intromission is famously explained by Lucretius in book 4 of the *De rerum natura* and forms an important part of his accounts of erotic stimulation during sleep as well.

Crucial to our purpose here is that these films, or *simulacra*, emitted by objects were conceived of as corpuscular. This is clear in Epicurus' concise summary, in the *Letter to Herodotus*, of the views attributed to Democritus:

For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. . . . We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of color and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same color and shape as the external things themselves. (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 10.48–49, trans. R. D. Hicks)

Even more explicitly, Aristotle criticizes Democritus for reducing all sensation to touch (*De sensu* 4.442a–b), while Lucretius would use a series of similes from nature to underscore the bodily character of these effluences:

In the open, many things
emit bodies [*mittunt corpora*]: some loosely diffused,
the way wood gives off smoke and fire heat,
and others more close-knit and condensed, as when
cicadas put down their smooth skins in the summer,
and when calves at birth discard the caul
from their bodies' surface, and also when the slippery serpent
sloughs off his skin among the thorns.
(Lucr. 4.54–61)

As van Hoorn (1972, 52) comments, “Simple as the theory may sound, it is entirely consistent with the basic principle of atomic materialism, namely, that all perception is due to direct physical contact between perceiver and object perceived.”

The atomist belief that these *simulacra* retained the shape of the original, as Epicurus notes, seems firmly established. When Lucretius invokes mirrors (4.98–109), he does so precisely to prove this theory, since the object’s shape in the mirror is identical to the original. Alexander of Aphrodisias writes that Leucippus and Democritus “attributed sight to certain images of the same shape as the object, which were continually streaming off from the objects of sight and impinging on the eye” (Diels-Kranz, Leucippus A29–30). The further issues of whether these *simulacra* actually penetrated the eye or stopped after impressing themselves on its surface had ancient adherents and critics on each side. Epicurus’ reference to things entering the eyes and mind supports a penetrative model, as does the account of Aetius (c. second century CE).⁸ In contrast, Theophrastus in *De sensu* 50–55 problematizes this representation of the Democritean position by attesting to a more complicated original view that seems to have focused on air-imprints (*deikela*) rather than *simulacra*; on this account, these imprints (*emphases*) derive their shape from the efflux off the object and also from light (whose effect is to condense the air as well as to transport it), and the eye receives their effect and passes it to the soul.⁹ This version in turn contradicts the account of Aristotle, *De An.* 419a, which treats air as an obstacle for atomist vision, while Theophrastus sees it as the enabler.¹⁰ Further, even this most passive of theories seems to have attributed some form

8. See Lindberg 1976, 2.

9. Theophrastus’ explanation of Democritus’ view is that “the visual image does not arise directly in the pupil, but the air between the eye and the object of sight is contracted and stamped by the object seen and the seer; for from everything there is always a sort of effluence proceeding. So this air, which is solid and variously colored, appears in the eye.” This, however, need not concern us too much; whatever Democritus really thought, it is the *reception* of Democritus’ views that will prove significant here, especially the influence of Epicurus’ version in the first and second centuries CE. For another second-century witness, see Bychkov (1999, 341) on Diogenes of Oenoanda, whose theories closely match those of Epicurus.

10. On the inconsistencies between Theophrastus’ account of Democritus and other testimonia, see Burkert 1977, 102–9. For an attempt to resolve these differences without positing that Democritus held two theories of vision, see Baldes 1975.

of activity to “that which sees.”¹¹ And in general, the obscurities of the atomist position caused several ancient critics to protest with worthy questions: why don’t we see the back of the object? And how could *simulacra* streaming off, say, a mountain, fit into my eye?¹²

Extransmission theory, which seems to have been held in some form by Hero (fl. 62 CE), Theon of Alexandria, and others, is similarly tactile, although here the issue is not one of the entrance of *simulacra* via the eyes, but rather of emanations *from* the eyes.¹³ This theory was undoubtedly influenced by the views of Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, who perceived the eye as an active agent that emitted rays or a visual current toward the object of perception.¹⁴ Euclid based his work on optics on this assumption; although mostly geometric in its emphasis, this science too allowed for a tactile understanding of the visual rays emitted by the eyes.¹⁵ As David Lindberg (1976, 14–15) notes, “Hero, like Euclid, could not avoid making statements with physical implications. . . . He revealed his belief in the material nature of visual rays in his account of the cause of reflection, pointing out that visual rays incident on unpolished mirrors enter the porosities of the bodies and are not reflected. However, ‘if these mirrors are polished by rubbing until the porosities are filled by a fine substance, then the rays incident upon the compact surface are reflected.’” Hero follows up with the analogy of a stone hurled against a wall or a soft body; in the former case it rebounds, in the latter not. More graphic still is Hipparchus’ comparison of vision to a hand: “Hipparchus says that the rays from each of the eyes, extended out to their limits as with the touch of the hands, grasp external bodies and return an apprehension of them to the sense of sight.”¹⁶ These “rays,”

11. Burkert (1977, 99) comments: “The third factor, some activity of ‘that which sees’ has seemed to be suspiciously close to Plato’s theory of the active eye; some tried to eliminate it by altering the text. But the alternative or receptiveness or activity of the eye is not treated by the Presocratics as strictly exclusive; Aristotle already blamed Empedocles for using ‘effluxes’ of the objects and still comparing the eye to a lantern. . . . And Democritus explained the fact that owls see at night by invoking the ‘fire’ in their eyes.” See Arist., *Sens.* 2.6.437b–438a on Empedocles (— Diels-Kranz B8.4); also Democritus (Diels-Kranz A157). Contra, however, see Baldes 1975.

12. See, e.g., Theophr., *Sens.* 53, Alexander, *Mantissa* 134–35.

13. See Jonsson 1995, 18–25; Lindberg 1976, 14–15; Simon 1988, 21–41, 57–82; van Hooft 1972, 43–48.

14. For Empedocles’ description of the eye as an emitter of light, see Diels-Kranz 13.8.4.

15. For a more detailed account of Euclid’s *Optics* and *Elements*, see Berryman 1998.

16. Ἰππαρχος δὲ φησὶν ἀκτῖνας ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀποτεινομένας τοῖς πέρασιν ἑαυτῶν καθάπερ χειρῶν ἐπαφῆς καθαρτοῦσας τοῖς ἐκτὸς σώμασι τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ ὄρατικὸν ἀναδίδοναι. Actius 4.13.8–12 in Diels 1965, 404. For bibliography on the nonmetaphorical character of Euclid’s tactile language, see Lindberg 1976, 220n81.

then, should not be confused with their modern counterparts; they are not light rays, but forms of an emission—despite the occasional image of lightning from the eye as responsible for the birth of eros (see, for example, Soph., Fr. 474 Radt).

As for the Platonic view, it seems that Plato too drew from the theories of Empedocles and the Pythagorean school.¹⁷ Like Empedocles, Plato offered a view that incorporated elements from both extramission and intromission, according to which a stream of light from the observer's eye combines with daylight and with an emanation from the object to produce "vision."¹⁸ The *Timaeus* offers the best summary of this process:

Now the pure fire inside us, cousin to that fire, [the gods] made to flow through the eyes: so they made the eyes—the eye as a whole but its middle in particular—close-textured, smooth and dense, to enable them to keep out all the other, coarser stuff, and let that kind of fire pass through pure by itself. Now whenever daylight surrounds the visual stream, like makes contact with like and coalesces with it to make up a single homogeneous body aligned with the direction of the eyes. This happens wherever the internal fire strikes and presses against an external object it has connected with. And because this body of fire has become uniform throughout and thus uniformly affected, it transmits the motions of whatever it comes in contact with as well as of whatever comes in contact with it, to and through the whole body until they reach the soul. This brings about the sensation we call "seeing." (*Ti.* 45b–d; trans. Donald J. Zeyl)

In this account too, tactile language is used to describe the temporary mingling of the internal fire from the eyes and the external daylight; these two form a body that touches (*ephaptetai*) objects at a distance. When the discussion of color enters the picture, it becomes clear that a kind of emanation from the

17. See Lindberg 1976, 3–6; and van Hoorn 1972, 43–48. On Platonic *aesthesis* as a noncognitive activity, see Silverman 1990.

18. On the confused account of Theophrastus (*De sensu* 26, Diels-Kranz A5), which may suggest that Alcmaeon of Croton incorporated emission theory into a theory of papillary images, see Lindberg 1976, 3–4. It also appears that Empedocles used the term *eidolon*, like Democritus, to describe a corpuscular emission from the object of vision, making both the eye and this object active participants in the process of viewing, but, unlike Plato, not stressing the role of daylight. For a good summary of the various views, with special attention to the skeptical critique of Euclid, see Berryman 1998.

object must play a part, since the color itself is described as a kind of fire and “an effluvium from shapes” (*Meno* 76d).¹⁹

Aristotle, in contrast, sometimes denies any analogy to touch. He identifies light as the medium between eye and object that bears the responsibility for enabling sight; because the pupil consists of water, and water and light share the quality of being a translucent medium, light can pass on its altered affect to the perceptive center within the eye (*Sens.* 2.438a–b).²⁰ Yet there are significant contradictions between these views expressed in *De anima* and *De sensu*, and several of Aristotle’s other works. In the *De insomnis* 2.459b–460a, for example, he defines seeing as not only experiencing something inflicted by air, but also acting on it, a point he illustrates with a famously peculiar explanation involving menstruation: “It is clear from [the case of mirrors] that just as the eyes are acted upon, so too they do something. For in very clear mirrors, whenever menstruating women look into the mirror, the surface of the mirror becomes like a bloody cloud. . . . The reason is that, as I have said, the eyes are not only acted upon in some respect by air, but they also do something and move it.”²¹ In the *Meteorologica*, Aristotle systematically uses the theory of the extramission of visual rays; we have already seen the example of the man whose visual rays are rebounded back toward him by the air, and other examples occur at *Mete.* 2.9.370a–374b.²² Accordingly, it seems mostly likely that, as Rakoczy (1996, 28–31) has argued, Aristotle simply fell back on traditional explanations of sight when he was not explicitly developing his own theories on the science of vision.²³

19. Ἔστιν γὰρ χροῖα ἀπορροή σχημάτων ὄψεσιν συμμετρῶς καὶ αἰσθητός. See similarly at *Thet.* 156d–e, and, on the role of light, *Resp.* 6.507d–508c.

20. In this process, color plays a crucial part: “There is thus a continuous medium, the transparent, from the visible object all the way to the interior of the eye. The color of the visible object moves the medium, and the medium, ‘being continuous, acts upon the sense organ’” (Lindberg 1976, 8). On the shared translucency of light and water, see similarly *De An.* 2.7.418b.

21. The elder Pliny voices a similar view in *HN* 7.64, saying that menstruating women dull mirrors. On this passage, see also Bettini 1999, 113–15.

22. All these observations rely on assumptions about the visual process that he has explicitly denied, and the ancient commentators themselves found cause to complain about his discrepancies, such as Alexander, *Mantissa* 136.30–138.2. On the apparent self-contradictions in Aristotle’s treatment, see Lindberg 1976, 217–18; Rakoczy 1996, 134–40; and Simon 1988, 48–52.

23. Aristotle’s novel views are taken up by his student Theophrastus, but otherwise seem to have had little influence during the classical period, especially compared with the powerful influence of the various forms of emissionist theory. For example, in Priscian’s summary of Theophrastus’ *De sensu*, we see the same treatment of the transparent as the crucial intra- and extra-ocular medium of vision (7.26–8.29), but we also see the same slippage into the language of activity and being-acted-upon, 5.21–6.16.

Where do the Stoics fit in all this? Are their views similarly tactile in nature? Our main sources are the peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (early third century CE) and Aetius (second century CE?), about whom little is known; their testimonia and others are collected in von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (1964, 2:863–72).²⁴ According to these accounts, the Stoics ascribed vision to the *synentasis* (a stretching and tautening; Latin *intentio*) of the spirit or *pneuma* emitted by the eyes.²⁵ This visual *pneuma* extends from the pupil of the eye in a cone-shaped form with its base at the object of vision and the apex at the eye itself. Sight occurs when the *pneuma* strikes the mind, with which it has internal contact from the eye inward; in a striking—perhaps I should say stunning—simile, Chalcidius (*ad Timaeum* 237, *SVF* 2.863) compares the entire experience to that of someone who has been paralyzed by the touch of the torpedo-fish, whose effect travels up the fishing pole and penetrates through the body to one innermost sense.²⁶ Such imagery of a stick or rod (*bacteria*) is invoked several times to describe the working of the external *pneuma* that makes contact with the object: as Alexander writes, “There are some who say that seeing takes place through the *synentasis* of the air. For the air touching the pupil, being impinged upon by vision, takes shape into a cone. When this cone has been as it were stamped on its base by the visible objects, perception occurs, just as it does via actual touch, by means of a rod” (*De anima libri mant.* 130.14–17 Bruns, *SVF* 2.864).²⁷ The visual *pneuma*, then, creates the *synentasis* by its action upon the air and makes a cone-shaped extension that is compared to a stick.²⁸ This tensed air, when illuminated by the sun, makes contact with the object.²⁹ It sends the information necessary for seeing back to the *hegemonikon* (the governing part of the soul in Stoic philosophy), from which

24. On the Stoic theories of vision, see Gourinat 1996, 37–45; Ingenkamp 1971; Lindberg 1976, 9–10; Rakoczy 1996, 31; Simon 1988, 33–34; Todd 1974; Voelke 1973, 41–42.

25. This process is prior to the formation of *phantasia* by a stamping of the image on the soul. On Stoic *phantasia*, see especially Sandbach 1971, Watson 1988 and 1994.

26. “Similisque eius passio est eorum, qui marini piscis contagione torpent, siquidem per linum et harundinem perque manus serpat virus illud penetratque intimum sensum.”

27. Εἰσὶν δὲ τινες, οἱ διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος συνεντάσεως τὸ ὄραον φασὶ γίνεσθαι. νυττομενον γάρ ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως τὸν συνάκτοντα τῆ κορῆ ἀέρα σχηματίζεσθαι εἰς κωνον. τούτου δὲ οἶον τυπομένου κατὰ τὴν βάσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ὄρατων τὴν αἴσθησιν γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ τῆ ἄφῃ διὰ βακτηρίας.

28. Mentioned in three separate sources: Diog. Laert., *Lives*; Galen, *Plac. Hipp. et Plat.*; Alex. Aphr., *De an. libri mant.*

29. The role given to sunlight in the *synentasis* of the *pneuma* is treated by none of these sources; see Todd 1974 for details.

it has its physical origin.³⁰ Such is the view attributed to Chrysippus himself by, among others, Aetius (*SVF* 2.866): “Chrysippus says that we see via the *synentasis* of the air between [us and the object]; which air, being impinged upon by the optic *pneuma* (which extends from the *hegemonikon* up to the pupil), which stretches the air like a cone in accordance with the assault on the ambient air, whenever the air should be homogeneous. The fiery rays pour out from the organ of sight, not black and cloudy. Hence darkness is visible.”³¹

The language of rays (*aktines*) used here by Aetius sounds suspiciously akin to the terminology of emission theory. A similar “contamination” is evident in other Roman imperial sources, in which Stoic theories of vision tend to be likewise interpreted with reference to rays emitted by the eyes. In the second century CE, for example, Aulus Gellius writes that “[t]he Stoics say that the causes of seeing are the emission of rays from the eyes onto visible objects and at the same time the intention of the air” (*NA* 5.16.2).³² A century earlier, Seneca purported to be summarizing Aristotle’s views when he wrote that “eyesight reflects its own rays from every smooth surface” and related once again the story of the man who saw his own mirror-image in front of himself: his weak vision could not penetrate the air in front of him (*Q Nat.* 1.3.7).³³ In a further example of the general valence of emissive theories of vision, Cicero too would endorse extramission theory. In his view, that we see clearly when we look through a narrow aperture works against the idea of intromission, since film of *eidola* coming off any object on the other side would be damaged if such an explanation of vision were true (*Att.* 2.3.2).³⁴ And we have already seen the ambiguous language of Seneca’s contemporary, Hero, whose Euclidean perspective is nonetheless shot through with the tactile language of ocular emissions. Even Galen, with whom we began, would try to reconcile Stoic *pneuma* with the Aristotelian view in his own work—a syncretism typical of the period.³⁵

30. Ingenkamp (1971) explores some of the complications here.

31. Aetius, *Plac.* IV.15.3 (Diels 1965, p. 406, 4). For similar testimonia, see Galen, *Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 7 (*SVF* 2.865); Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.157 (*SVF* 2.867); Alex. Aphr., *De an. Libri mant.* 131.30 Bruns (*SVF* 2.868).

32. “Stoici causas esse uident dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae uideri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul intentionem.”

33. “Ab omni, inquit, leuitate acies radios suos replicat.”

34. On this passage, see Keyser 1993.

35. Ingenkamp (1971) would argue that later understandings of Stoic teachings on vision are due to a misunderstanding on the part of Aetius and others who speak in terms similar to emis-

It bears repeating that the idea of an emission from the eyes as the source of vision, or, slightly less often, the idea that the eye is impinged upon by films of *simulacra* coming off the visible object, seems to have been far more influential in this period than the nontactile theories of Aristotle, however great his later impact within the history of optics. We have already seen Galen's simplification in *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 7.5. Also in the first century CE, Apuleius sums up all the options in his discussion of mirror-images in the *Apology* 15 without deeming Aristotle worth a mention. Nor is he mentioned in Aulus Gellius' (second century CE) summary of the various theories of seeing, which ends by dismissing the finer points as not worth fussing over anyhow—a view for which my reader will have considerable sympathy at this point (*NA* 5.16). And when Seneca similarly theorized about the cause of the specular image, these three alternatives were reduced to two: extramission or intromission, rays emitted from the eyes or *simulacra* emitted from the body (*Q Nat.* 1.5.1).

EROS AND THE EYE

It might seem a far stretch to move from the tactility of ancient vision, and from theories of intromission or extramission in particular, to an eroticized notion of how sight works—even more so if one were to claim that such notions were a widespread element of ancient cultural attitudes toward sight. Yet several of our ancient sources are unequivocal in their association of sight with erotic penetration and even sexual arousal. It is not just that vision is reduced to a species of touch, as we have seen with theories of extramission and intromission alike, nor just that theorists of intromission offer some ground for believing that the eyes are physically penetrated by the *simulacra* emitted from the objects of sight. Nor does this connection between the gaze and arousal rely on merely metaphorical connections, or on the idea that eros itself is sparked by the sight of beauty, although this was a common notion in antiquity.³⁶ As Andrew Walker

sion theorists. This is coincident with my suggestion that the fine points of the different schools seem blurred in their reception in the early imperial period.

36. For the erotic impact of the sight of the beautiful in general, see the sources in Halperin 1986, 63n5; and Hubbard 2002, 267n32; along with MacLachlan 1993, 65–67; Pearson 1909, 255–57; Rohde 1876, 149n2; and, e.g., Hes., *Sc.* 7–8; Hom., *Il.* 14.294; Pind., *Nem.* 8.1–2; Pl., *Chrm.* 155d–e and *Phdr.* 251c. For the glance as erotic projectile (ray, spear, arrow), see Carson 1986, 20; Hubbard 2002, 266–71; and, e.g., Pind., fr. 123 S.-M. Some accounts of the erotic eye focus on the effect of interocular fire upon the victim; see Hubbard 2002, 269. For the scopophilic gaze elicited by ancient