View source for Grad Seminar Class Notes



==AUG 30==

Course Introduction

==SEP 6==

'''Work on Method'''

:*Haug, "Introduction" 
::*armchair methods vs. empirical knowledge
::*the background of linguistic philosophy in methodology
::*constructive naturalism vs. deflationary naturalism p. 9
::*(We should read something on "experimental philosophy")

:*Haug, "Williamson / Rosenberg pieces"

:*Jones, "Phenomenology"
::*we'll try to gloss key terms to develop a common reference and understanding of H's phenomenology
::*natural standpoint, bracketing, epoch, experience of "essences"
::*phenomenology's critiques of science.  
::*absolute subjectivity as a basis for absolute objectivity. 
::*phenomenology as solution to a crisis in the culture.   

:*Nagel - Dennett on being a bat

:*Wiki Pages on Method
::*Philosophical Methodology [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_methodology]
::*Socratic Method [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_method]

:*Here's something I took from the SEP article on phenomenology that I thought was clear:

::*To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first person:

::*I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific.

::*I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital.

::*I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology.

::*I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week.

::*I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare.

::*I intend to finish my writing by noon.

::*I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk.

::*I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin.

::*I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation.

::*Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. The subject term “I” indicates the first-person structure of the experience: the intentionality proceeds from the subject. The verb indicates the type of intentional activity described: perception, thought, imagination, etc. Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented or intended in our experiences, especially, the way we see or conceive or think about objects. The direct-object expression (“that fishing boat off the coast”) articulates the mode of presentation of the object in the experience: the content or meaning of the experience, the core of what Husserl called noema. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described, that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality in the experience: subject-act-content-object.

::*Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et al., will far outrun such simple phenomenological descriptions as above. But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of intentionality. As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience.

::*In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often language, with its special place in human affairs.

:*Quinean Naturalism:  Read at least section 2.1 from this SEP article [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/#QuiNatImp]


'''Method at Work'''

:*Alfino, "Sourcing Values in Food Philosophy"  - discussion of topic and consideration of methods and directions for project.

==SEP 13==

'''Work on Method'''

:*Jeffrey W. Roland, "On Naturalism in the Quinean Tradition" (from Haug) 43-61.  (Ryan)

::*'''Alfino's take''':  I treated this more as a learning (or refreher) experience.  The author makes good use of Quine's responses to the logical empiricists to help understand his theory and what is (was) radical about it at the time.  Wholism, diffusion, inheritance, anti-supernaturalism, non-reductive causal realism, deference to science.  But also philosophy as "continuous" with science.  Does this exclude phenomenological description?  Does science constrain metaphysics?  Is "consilience" a useful term here?

:*Lynne Rudder Baker, "The First-person perspective and its relation to natural science" (Tof)

::*'''Alfino's take:''' I really like the argument here up to a point.  I think she's right about the distinction, and frankly she gives us a nice demonstration of analytic/linguistic method here.  Reference and truth conditions help us justify the distinction.  But then she seems to associate the first person perspective with action-guiding and the analytic move on p. 323 appears illicit to me.  Her mischaracterization of what the natural sciences might tell us is terrible.  From there, I thought things deteriorated.  Why not try out variants of her thesis:  Do the natural sciences tell us _____ about the first person perspective?  Where the blank could be: anything, something but not much useful, important things that part of a dynamic relationship between science and phenomenal experience, everything important.

::*'''Annie's take:''' I enjoyed Baker's introduction that included an explicit definition of naturalism, and thought that it set up her argument with a stable foundation. Readers can agree or disagree with her that that is what naturalism is, but she clearly labels her target. Reading an analytic style about preserving first-person perspective felt a little clunky (perhaps even, for me, less effective), especially in the heart of the argument on pages 321-324. I did enjoy her perhaps clearer logic (perhaps to ensure readers are on board) referring to modus ponens and modus tollens (pg. 328). My favorite section of the entire article was the "Methodological consequences". I rather enjoyed the lines, "when philosophical reasoning leads to rejection of something without which we cannot make sense of the world--e.g. when philosophical reasoning leads to the conclusion that nobody has an interior life--I repudiate the conclusion" (329). 

::*'''Tof's Attempt at a Reconstruction:'''

Baker’s conclusion is that naturalism –as she defines it– is false, and therefore must be rejected. Her reason for this conclusion hinges on what she calls ‘the robust first-person perspective,” and the natural sciences apparent inability to account for this ‘datum.’ The natural sciences take a strictly ‘third-person perspective,’ attempting to explain reality only through this lens; inevitably, this would lead a ‘naturalist’ to either try to eliminate the first-person perspective altogether –i.e. showing that it has no bearing on ‘reality’–, or show that it can be accounted for in a strictly third-personal perspective. Baker’s argument is that both attempts –to either eliminate or reduce the first person perspective– are inadequate to account for the distinction (D) –difference between conceiving of oneself and conceiving of oneself as oneself–, i.e. the datum that ‘slips through the net of the natural sciences.’ With regard to cognitive science, Baker argues that it lacks even the ability to recognize the distinction (D), let alone attempt –or succeed– to reduce it to non first-personal terms. 
The consequence of her argument –if it is correct–, she contends, has important consequences for philosophical methodology. The most notable of which is that the distinctive methods of science –in particular, experimentation– do not suffice for ‘doing’ philosophy –at least not in its entirety–. At which point, we are left to seek out other methods, wherein she suggests the use –and importance– of ‘Armchair philosophy’. Her inevitable suggestion with regard to methodology is to ‘let your goal be your guide.’  Given that her goal is “to make sense of the shared world that we all live in and interact with,” this influences –if not altogether leads to– her chosen methodology for reaching this end, as she exclaims, “when philosophical reasoning leads to rejection of something without which we cannot make sense of the world––e.g. when philosophical reasoning leads to the conclusion that nobody has an interior life–– I repudiate the conclusion…” (p.329).  At bottom, she provides a ‘methodological query:’ Our ability to conceive of ourselves as ourselves is a personal-level capacity. Why does it resist being reduced to or replaced by subpersonal phenomena? If I am right about the robust first person perspective, then we have an answer to this methodological question: the personal level of reality–– the level on which we live and love–– is neither eliminable nor reducible to subpersonal levels that supply the mechanisms that make it possible for us to live and live” (p. 331). 

Questions for consideration…
1.	Why is a unified, cohesive and complete explanation of reality the goal? Is this even possible? If not, should it continue to be the ‘goal?’
2.	Who exactly is the ‘self’ that is doing the conceiving of itself? That is to say, is there a difference between the ‘thinker’ and its ‘thoughts’? Put yet another way, is the thinker not just a thought itself? What would it mean it that was the case?


:*Daniel Dennett, "Intuition Pumps and Other Thinking Tools" 1-28 (Tamara & Daniel)

::*'''Annie's take:''' It's an interesting philosophical methodology to make your readers follow your thought ''process'', rather than argue for something. I really enjoyed the idea of "reverse engineer[ing]" thought experiments to see how they function, to determine which parts are functioning in a vital way, as well as to tweak the contents of the experiment for differing results (pg. 7). This is a process that would be fun to practice in class with a couple of thought experiments! I also found the thought that words serve as thinking tools as interesting, because it connotes words with stimulating cognitive acts to greater or lesser usefulness (pg. 10). How might we understand words as tools? What might be measurements for utility of words as cognitive boosters? Are there times when other thinker's words are edited to not instigate thought?... I quite enjoyed the idea that mistakes are a necessary process for creating novel ideas (pg. 21). 

::*'''Tof's take:''' I really enjoyed this reading. I share Annie's affinity to the idea of 'reverse engineering' our thought experiments, twisting and turning the 'dials' in an attempt to tease out the different implications. Also, I find the idea of using thought experiments to 'get at' other thought experiments rather interesting as well. Furthermore, it was intriguing how Dennett used an analogy to illuminate his point with regard to 'staging' our thought experiments and other thinking tools (p. 4). My favorite portion of this reading, however, was the chapter on making mistakes. In particular, I find the idea of not just understanding that we will inevitably make them, but actually going out and trying to make them incredibly fascinating. I often find myself petrified with anxiety while trying to read or write, worrying, "what if I misunderstand the argument; what if there is a better way to phrase this; what if there is a better method to use in approaching this topic," at bottom, "what if I make a mistake?" Such a line of thinking is –at the least– rather unhelpful, and makes the process rather consternating when all you think and worry about is not making a mistake. It is for those reasons that the following passage really resonated with me, "The chief trick to making good mistakes is not to hide them–– especially not from yourself. Instead of turning away in denial when you make a mistake, you should become a connoisseur of your own mistakes, turning them over in your mind as if they were works of art, which in a way they are" (p.22). 

::*'''Danny's take:''' I found these first two sections to be a great introduction to what might be to come. There were some interesting ideas that have stuck with me including his emphasis on making philosophy accessible to more than just philosophers. I find this to be one of philosophies greatest weaknesses as it tends to be a very exclusive "club". But if the mission of philosophy is to explore life's most important questions, than shouldn't it be something that we can all take part in? To this I am interested to see where he takes his view of the role that philosophy plays in society, and how that bias might color the rest of the book.

'''Method at Work'''

:*Annalee Ring, "The Power of Words and the Appearance of Lived Space in Navajo Culture"

::*'''Danny's take:''' I have had the privilege of discussing this topic on many occasions with Annalee, and have found many of her points very moving. Namely the power of language to shape the way in which we live. One topic that we have had particularly good discussions on are some of the implications of privileging the experiences of some over others. It is no doubt that throughout history the WASP experience has been the driving force, but my question is that to what degree should we relegate this experience of the world for others? Should it be thrown out entirely or is there a role it can play in expanding the narrative? ie does the view of the sacred mountain as a resource for human entertainment provide any insight into the truth of the mountain?

==SEP 20==

:'''Work on Method'''

:*David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenological Methods in Philosophy of Mind," 335-352.  (     )
::*'''Alfino's take''': I'll be curious to see if this approach, by a really accomplished phenomenologist [http://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=2508] clarifies phenomenological method for both those of you with alot of reading in phenomenology and those without.  


:*Matthew Ratcliffe, "Some Husserlian Reflections on the contents of experience," 353-378.
::presenter needed on "The Experiential World"  ( Annalee can present on either of these, if needed!    )
::presenter needed on ""Disturbances of the World" (     )

::*'''Annie's take:''': I really enjoyed Ratcliffe's focus on the pre-conscious, possibilities, and anticipation. His emphasis on the effect of the pre-conscious/pre-intentional (on pages 365-369) highlights one reason phenomenology is a vital method to pair with disciplines like psychology. I also enjoyed his brief section on his own methodology, one of "phenomenal contrast"which pairs two distinct experiences together in order to illuminate a certain aspect about one or both. I am drawn to this methodology (especially after reading through some of Gadamer's ideas on prejudices needing to be provoked to be understood) but often am curious about the ability of phenomenology to do so... This is because if phenomenology (as Smith points out) is supposed to be from a first-person perspective, we only have one of those, and as such are our comparisons impaired?...

:'''Writing & Style in Philosophy'''

::*Pinker, The Sense of Style, Intro and Chapter 1  

:'''Project Work''' 

::*Ryan Thompson presenting on Paul Feyerabend, ''Against Method'', 5-23


:*Paul Feyerabend, ''Against Method'', 5-23. (Ryan)

::*'''Ryan's Take''': If Feyerabend's critique of a rationalist view of universal scientific method is correct, then this poses problems for Naturalism. On the minimal commitment where Naturalism means doing philosophy 'in the spirit of science' or being consilient with science, it becomes unclear exactly what philosophy is suppose to be. Maybe it should look similar to Feyerabend's anarchistic science that proceeds counter inductively. But rather than restricting the scope of philosophy, this would radically increase it to include all manner of supernatural and absurd theorizing in the name of fruitful progress. On the other hand, we might interpret Naturalism as claiming that, although science has no universal method, the method used by molecular biologists in the 21st century to create CRISPR genome editing technology should be adopted by philosophy (or any other such single historical method). This respects the intuition that in some sense philosophy should be anti-supernatural, but it forces philosophy to be stuck in a historical mode that, if Feyerabend is correct, might be left behind by the very science that philosophy is suppose to look towards.

::*'''Annie's take:''' Feyerabend's provocative writing style and content was such an enjoyable ride. It echoed Paulo Freire's "Pedagogy of Oppression" at points for me; especially on page 16 with the lines, "Even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and to use propaganda and coercion, not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid, but because the psychological conditions which make them effective, and capable of influencing others, have disappeared;" and also on page 11, when he speaks on the restraining nature of scientific education, with the inability to bring one's "religion... or his metaphysics, or his sense of humour" along with him into their scientific life. I'd be curious to read more of his work to get where he's going with democratizing scientific studies (as mentioned in the prefaces).

==SEP 27==
==OCT 4==
==OCT 11==
==OCT 18==
==OCT 27==
==OCT 18==
==OCT 25==
==NOV 1==
==NOV 8==
==NOV 15==
==NOV 22== t day pre
==NOV 29==
==DEC 6==
==DEC 13== last week of semester