View source for Summer2 2013 Ethics Course Lecture Notes A

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These are the notes you will see displayed in class.  They can be correlated to study questions for each class day.

==May 24==

===First Class Topics===

:*Course, Materials (books, pdfs, and clicker), and Goals
:*Course Methods and web sites - view course research questions
::*Course website -- for reading schedule, grading scheme, email, pdfs, audio from class, audio comments on assignments
::*Course wiki -- for basic course information, lecture notes, study questions.
:*A typical prep cycle for the course: read, engage, review, prep SQs. 
:*Time commitment: 6 hours per week as a baseline.
:*Grading Schemes: overview.
:*Ereserves - pdfs for course reading not in book form.

==May 25==

===Ariely, Why We Lie===

:*Research on honesty with the "matrix task"
::*Shredder condition
::*Payment condition
::*Probability of getting caught condition
::*Distance of payment condition
::*Presence of a cheater condition
:*Priming with 10 commandments or signature on top of form
:*Implications

===Haidt, The Righteous Mind, Intro and Chapter 1===

:*Moral reasoning as a means of finding truth vs. furthering social agendas.
:*Harmless taboo violations: eating the dog / violating a dead chicken.
:*Brief background on developmental & moral psychology: nativists, empiricists, rationalists
::*Piaget's rationalism: kids figure things out for themselves if they have normal brains and the right experiences.
::*Kohlberg's "Heinz story," 
::*Turiel: kids don't treat all moral rules the same: very young kids distinguish "harms" from "social conventions"
:Haidt's puzzle about Turiel: other dimensions of moral experience, like "purity" and "pollution" seem operative at young ages and deep in culture (witches).
:Point of harmless taboo violations: pit intuitions about norms and conventions against intuitions about the morality of harm.  Showed that Schweder was right.  The morality/convention distinction was culturally variable.


===Singer, Chapter 1, "About Ethics," from ''Practical Ethics''===

:*Ethics and religion
:*Ethics and relativism -- different versions of relativism:
::*Ethics varies by culture: true and false, same act under different conditions may have different value.  Examples?
::*Marxist relativism and non-relativism
::*Problems for relativists: consistency across time, polls could determine ethics
::*Problems for the subjectivist: making sense of disagreement
:*Singer: Ok to say the values aren't objective like physics, but not sensible to deny the meaningfulness of moral disagreement.  Ethical reasoning.
:*Singer's view (one of several major positions): p. 10
:*The sorts of reasons that count as ethical: universalizable ones.
:*"Interests" in utilitarian thought

==May 27==

===Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1===

:*Politics as the master science: it's end, happiness
:*Defects of the life of pleasure, honor, even virtue as the meaning of happiness.  Defect of money-making.
:*Section 7: argument for happiness as the final end of life.
:*But what is it?  Search for the function of man to find the answer.  
::*Nutrition and growth?
::*Perception?
::*Activity of the soul in accordance with virtue?
:*Other characteristics needed: complete life, active life.
:*Section 13: Aristotle's tripartite division of the soul: 
::*Rational
::*Apetitive (desiring) (partly rational)
::*Vegetative

===Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book II===

:*Virtue not possessed by nature, but potential.
:*Role of habit (ethos --> ethike)  compare to other things we need training for.
:*Section 4: Differences between virtue and the arts.  Virture requires:
::*Act chosen in knowledge
::*Chosen by the agent
::*For its own sake
::*Proceeding from character.
:*Virtue in the soul: passsions, faculties or states of character.
:*Virtue makes its object excellent.
:*Virtue as a mean that is also an excellence
::*Courage as the mean between fear and foolhardiness
::*Generosity (liberality)
::*Temperance
::*Proper pride
::*Anger (?)
::*Wittiness (vs. Buffoonery and Boorishness)
:*Assessing Aristotle's view


==June 1==

===Haidt, Chapter 2, "The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail"===

:*Philosophy's "rationalist delusion"
:*30: Plato, Hume, and Jefferson
:*moralism (Anti-nativism): reactions against bad nativism, like Social Darwinism, 60s ideology suggesting that we can liberate ourselves from our biology and traditional morality (as contraception appeared to).
:*Nativism (natural selection gives us minds "preloaded" with moral emotions) in the 90s: Wilson, de Waal, Damasio
:*Evolutionary Psychology in moral psychology
::*Roach-juice
::*Soul selling
::*Harmless Taboo violations: Incest story; Cadaver nibbling; compare to Kohlberg's Heinz stories (reasoning vs. confounding) -- evidence that the elephant is talking.
:*Ev. psych. research outside moral psychology
::*Wasson card selection test: seeing that vs. seeing why
:*Rider and Elephant
::*Important to see Elephant as making judgements (processing info), not just "feeling"
::*45: Elephant and Rider defined
:*Social Intuitionist Model

===Haidt, Chapter Three, "Elephants Rule"===

:*Personal Anecdote: your inner lawyer
:*Priming studies:
::*"take" "often"  -- working with neutral stories also
:*Research supporting "intuitions come first"
::*Zajonc on "affective primacy"-- applies to made up language
:*Social and Political judgements intuitive
::*flashing word pairs with dissonance: "flower - happiness" vs. "hate - sunshine"
::*Implicit Association Test
::*flashing word pairs with political terms.  
::*Todorov's work extending "attractiveness" advantage to snap judgements of competence. 
:*Bodies guides judgements 
::*Fart Spray exaggerates moral judgements (!)
::*Zhong: hand washing before and after moral judgements.
::*Helzer and Pizarro: standing near a sanitizer strengthens conservatism.
:*Psychopaths: reason but don't feel
:*Babies: feel but don't reason
::*helper and hinderer puppet shows
::*reaching for helper puppets
:*Affective reactions in the brain
::*Josh Greene's fMRI studies of Trolley type problems
:*When does the elephant listen to reason?
::*Friends...

===Haidt, Chapter 4, "Vote for Me (Here's Why)"===

:*Ring of Gyges
:*Tetlock: accountability research
::*Exploratory vs. Confirmatory thought
::*Conditions promoting exploratory thought 1) knowing ahead of time that you'll be called to account; 2) not knowing what the audience thinks; 3) believing that the audience is well informed and interested in truth or accuracy.
:*Leary's research on self-esteem importance
:*Confirmation bias
::*Wasson again -- number series
::*Deann Kuhn -- 
::*David Perkins research on reason giving
:*Can I believe it?  vs. Must I believe it?
:*Application to political beliefs: Drew Westen's fMRI research.
:*Good thinking as an emergent property.

===Implications of Haidt's viewpoint for thinking about values===

==June 5==

===de Waal, intro & p. 5-21===

:*Veneer Theory - 
:*Theory of Mind - (xvi)
:*Clue from intro about how commentators will respond: not as veneer theorists, but to question continuity between moral emotions and "being moral".

:*Homo homini lupus
:*Thesis: No asocial history to humans.
:*Distinction between:  1) seeing morality as a "choice" humans made; and 2) morality as "outgrowth" of social instincts.
:*T. H. Huxley: gardener metaphor. (contra Darwin, who includes morality in evolution.)
:*Freud: civilization as reunciation of instinct.
:*Dawkins: genes are selfish, but in the end we can break with them.
:*Veneer Theory: "Scratch and altruist and watch a hypocrite bleed"
:*Robert Wright (contemp. evolutionist): morality as mask for selfishness.
:*Evolutionary "selfishness" vs. moral "selfishness" -- role of intention.  Seem opposed, but major thesis for de Waal is that they are not:  a "selfish" evolutionary process can produce altruism as a strategy.
:*Darwin influenced by Adam Smith
:*Westermark: observation of camel's revenge. 
:*Chimps punish and seek revenge also.
:*"reciprocal altruism"
:*"moral emotions" p. 20


===de Waal, "Morally Evolved," 21-42===

:*Empathy -- posits more complex forms (moral emotions) from simpler (ex. emotional contagion)
:*Evidence in primates of simple emotions: comforting, response to distress (25). Rhesus monkeys won't shock each other (29)  
:*Anecdotes:
::*How does Ladygina-Kohts get her monkey off the roof?
::*Kuni and the starling
::*Krom's helping behavior with the tires
::*Binit Jua, zoo gorilla, rescues child.
:*de Waal study on post aggression comforting contacts (34)
:*Consolation behavior in apes (chimps and apes and gorillas)
::*de Waal study on post aggression comforting contacts (34)
::*Why not monkeys?  Self-awareness level -- mirror self-recognition in apes.  Correlates with children.
:*de Waal's "Russian Doll" metaphor: from emotional contagion to cognitive empathy.
::*mirror neurons, muscle contractions, 
:*note defintion of empathy (finally!) at 39 and 41.

===de Waal, Morally Evolved, Part 3===

:*Reciprocity and Fairness
::*testing hypotheses about food sharing in chimps "spontaneous services" (inc. grooming)
:::*competing hypotheses:  good mood sharing vs. partner-specific reciprocity (favoring those who previously cooperated)
:::*evidence favored latter hyp.
::*studying fairness in terms of reward expectation or "inequity aversion"
::*limits to monkey fairness:  no sharing between rich and poor.
:*Mencious and "reciprocity"
:*Community Concern
::*Dark side of morality. Groupish behavior.
:*The Beethoven Error

===Singer, "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals," p. 140-151===

:*de Waal too harsh with Veneer Theory
::*Roots of ethics in social/evolved nature, but not all ethics is derived from evolved nature as social animals
::*Darwin quote from Descent of Man
::*De Waal passage on "disinterestedness," impartial spectator, universalization
::*when de Waal notes the groupish aspect of our morality (the yin/yang aspect) and the "fragility" of impartiality, he's not so far from veneer talk.
::*It's reason that lets us make the leap to impartiality.  Reason comes from nature and evolution, but it's not specifically tied to sociality. 145
::*146: follow talk about reason, takes us to places not related to survival/fitness
::*Singer's reading of the J.D. Greene fMRI research on Trolley problem:  shows that getting the right answer in the second condition (pushing the big dude) requires overcoming emotion.  149: "automatic emotional responses" (not judgements)
::*Kant - reason over emotion

==June 8==

===Rachels, Chapter 6, The Social Contract Theory===

:*Hobbes: morality as solution to practical problem
::*Life in the state of nature: nasty, brutish and short
::*Why? equal need, scarcity, equality of power, limited altruism
::*Solution to the problem of self-interest: the social contract (def p. 85)

:*Prisoner's Dilemma

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! !! Prisoner B: Smith stays silent(''cooperates'') !! Prisoner B: Smith betrays (''defects'')
|-
! Prisoner A (you) stays silent (''cooperates'')
| Each serves 1 year|| Prisoner A (you): 3 years<br/>Prisoner B: Smith: goes free
|-
! Prisoner A (you) betrays (''defects'')
| Prisoner A (you): goes free<br/>Prisoner B: Smith: 3 years || Each serves 2 years
|}

:*Pay off matrix for any outcome: 
::*Smith stays silent (cooperate), you betray (defects): 3, 0 (Smith's a sucker)
::*Smith betrays (defects), you stay silent (cooperate): 0,3 (You're a sucker)
::*Both betray (defect): 2 years each (Game theoretic outcome)
::*Both (cooperate): 1 year each (Optimal outcome for combined interests/utility - allegedly only achievable with an enforceable social contract - even one enforced by bad guys!)

:*Why should you defect no matter what Smith does?
::*Analyze both possibilities for Smith 
::*He stays silent (cooperates) 
::*He betrays you (defects)

:*Note on iterated prisoner's dilemma

:*Strengths/weakness of Social Contract theory
::*Justifies enforcement of rules and punishment
::*Rationality of rules based on mutual self-interest ("sustainable strategy")
::*Problem: Did we really make an agreement?  Does it matter?  Virtual agreement
:*The Case of Civil Disobedience

:*Critical Discussion: Assessing the adequacy and scope of social contract theory.



===Haidt, Chapter 5, "Beyond WEIRD Morality"===

:*WEIRD morality is the morality of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic cultures
::*just as likely to be bothered by taboo violations, but more likely to set aside feelings of disgust and allow violations
::*only group with majority allowing chicken story violation.
::*"the weirder you are the more likely you are to see the world in terms of separate objects, rather than relationships"
::*framed-line task 97

:*Shweder's anthropology: ethics of autonomy, community, divinity 99-100
::*claims schweder's theory predicts responses on taboo violation tests
::*ethic of divinity: body as temple vs. playground
::*vertical dimension to values.  explains reactions to flag desecration, piss Christ, thought exp: desecration of liberal icons.

Discussion question:  Are WEIRD moral cultures more rational and therefore "better" (embodying a most distinctively human morality, for example, following Singer & Koorsgaard?)

===Haidt, Chapter 6, "Taste Buds of the Righteous Mind"===

:*explaining moral diversity.  argument against the reductive project of philosophical ethics 
:*"the righteous mind is like a tongue with six taste receptors"
:*Enlightenment thought, two sources of transcendence: God & Reason
:*Hume represents a third enlightenment option: Nature
:*Austism, Bentham (utlitarianism), Kant (deontology)
:*Avoiding bad evolutionary theory or evolutionary psychology: "just so stories"
:*Modularity in evolutionary psychology: original vs. current triggers
:*See chart, p. 125


==June 11==

===Haidt, Chapter 7, "The Moral Foundations of Politics"===

:*Review of each of the five "foundations" with attention to liberal vs. conservative triggers
:*Some discussion of the implications of this perspective

===Rachels, Ch. 9, "Are There Absolute Moral Rules?"===

:*Truman decision on dropping the atomic bomb
::*Anscombe's objection
::*Comparison to drone killings
:*Kant's categorical imperative
::*hypothetical imperatives
::*categorical imperatives
::*articulating and evaluating a "maxim" to assess one's duty
:*Kant's arguments on lying
::*the basic argument
::*Anscombe's objection:  you could will a "tailored" version of the maxim
::*The Case of the Inquiring Murderer
:::*uncertainty about consequences
:::*Problems with Kant's defense
::::*Can we really never know consequences?
::::*Why think that we're responsible for consequences of lying but not of telling the truth?
::::*There really are dilemmas: Dutch captain's hiding Jews in WWII

:*Discussion Question:  Are there moral absolutes?  If so, is Kant's analysis compelling?  If not, why not?  
:*Generate cases and principles....


==June 15==

===Rachels Ch 7===

===Hinman, Ch 8, "Justice: From Rawls to Plato"===

:Plato on Justice
::*seems you need to know the good to know what's just (that's why it can't just be a matter of keeping agreements)
::*Justice as harmony and integration of function in the support of pursuit of truth about the good life.

:Rawls
::*Original Position: Choosing principles of justice under a veil of ignorance
:::*Note how this is a revision of social contract tradition
:::*Note how this realizes a basic condition of moral thought: neutrality, universalization.
::*What are you're ignorant of under the "veil" (p. 247)  So, what would it be rational to choose?
::*1st Principle: Basic Rights
::*2nd Principle: Difference Principle (includes two parts: equal opportunity and "just differences")

:Taking Rawls out for a test drive
::*Which differences matter?
::*Resources differences for kids
::*Income and wealth inequality
::*Compensation for loss
::*Carbon emissions goals in climate change abatement
::*Oppression? (Marion Young's critique)

:*Other models of distributive justice:
::*Welfare (utility)
::*Egalitarian
::*Libertarian



===Singer, Chapter 2, "Equality and Its Implications," 16-28===

:*Singer's analysis of egalitarianism
:*What does it mean to treat people equally?
::*Equality as the possession of some characteristic that we all have, if only in a "range"
::*Problem: 
::*Equality as "equal consideration of interests"
:::*excludes considerations like ability, race, gender, intelligence.
:::*might allow unequal investment in individuals.
:::*Earthquake example: 
::::*Case 1: egals. might give different amounts of goods to make people more equal: might justify more morphine for one victim than another, to bring them to more equal levels of suffering.
::::*accounting for marginal utility: might favor more food for starving person
::::*declining marginal utility: A and B: Eq. consideration of interests might lead to greater inequality of outcome.

::*Main Point: An egalitarianism based on equal consideration of interests may involve distributing different amounts of some good and may, in some cases, leave people more "unequal" than before the distribution, yet might satisfy moral intuitions better.



==June 18==

===Haidt, Ch 10, "The Hive Switch"===

:*Humans are "conditional" hive creatures
::*Muscular bonding
::*Hive switch in celebration and dance: Durkheim's "collective effervescence"; sacred / profane
::*Awe in nature
::*Entheogens
::*Oxytocin
::*Mirror Neurons
::*Leadership studies

==June 22==

===Singer, "Rich and Poor"===

:*absolute and relative poverty
:*absolute wealth
::*donation rates among wealth countries: more recent data

:*Is allowing the absolutely poor to die the moral equivalent of murder?
:*Five differences between spending money on luxuries and deliberately shooting people:
::*1. Intention
::*2. Difficulty of following a rule to save others vs. a rule to refrain from killing
::*3. Greater certainty of outcome in shooting. (counter example of the speeding motorist)
::*4. Identifiability of the victim. (counter example of the tinned food salesman)
::*5. Responsibility for the deed. (there is still a causal relationship, though the rights argument seems stronger than Singer allows (p. 226))

:Note conclusion at 228: not aiding is not as bad as killing, but the difference may not be as great as one thinks.

:*General Argument for the Obligation to Assist

:*Principle: If it is in our power to prevent somehting very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it.  
:*core argument on 230


:*Objections and Replies to the Argument

:*Taking care of our own.
:*Property rights.
:*Population ethics.
:*Leaving it to government.
:*Too high a standard?

===Haidt, Ch. 11, "Religion is a Team Sport"===

:UVA traditions
::*collective effervescence
::*muscular bonding

:*Sport / Religion analogy
::*Does it flip the hive switch?
::*Does it elevate us from the profane to the sacred?
::*Does it have positive group effects? (selection effects, community building)
::*Does it, like morality, "bind and blind"?

:*The post-9/11 culture wars
::*New Atheism: Harris, Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens.  All focus on belief in supernatural agents.  (Believing-->Doing)
::*Durkheimian Model: (Believing -- Belonging -- Doing) Atran and Henrich.

:*Explaining Religion -- evolutionary benefits or by products?
::*Hypersensitive agency detection, low standards for belief in children, re-purposing of bonding, natural dualism.  
:*Are these the components of a harmful meme that has survived in humans or the machinery of a hive switch that has benefited humans?  New Atheists vs. Haidt, Atran and Henrich (and anthropologist of religion generally)
::*Evidence for the latter, more positive, view of religion:
::*Evolution of concepts of god along with religions.  Toward moral gods.  
::*Evidence on cheating behavior.  Posting "watching eyes," priming (recall Ariely), 
::*Sosis on communes (and shekel game); costly sacrifices matter.  (257)

:*Anthropologist favor "cultural group evolution" but you could also develop this theory through genetic group selection (David Sloan Wilson).  (Pretty controversial in biology.)
::*Example of Balinese Rice farmers' water deities.
::*God and maypoles.


==June 26==

===Haidt, Ch 12, "Can't We All Disagree More Constructively?"===

:*evidence of polarization in American politics (cf. to Italy)
:*"right" and "left", historical origins, basis in heritable traits
::*1: Genes make brains
::*2: Dispositional traits lead to different experiences, which lead to "characteristic adaptations"
::*3: Life narratives; Moral Foundations Theory found in stories people tell about religious experience.  Political narratives of Republicans and Democrats.

:*Research note: Liberals worse at predicting conservatives responses.

:*Moral and Social Capital
::*Liberal blindspots and wisdom: 1) regulating superorganisms; 2)solving soluable problems.
::*Libertarian wisdom: 1) markets are powerful
::*Social Conservative wisdom: understanding threats to social capital (can't destroy the hive)

==June 30==

You'll be working on final papers and essays between June 30 and July 3.