Difference between revisions of "FEB 17"

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(Created page with "==8: FEB 17== ===Assigned=== :*Strawson Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994) (23) ===Strawson Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994)...")
 
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==8: FEB 17==
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==12: FEB 17 (extra spring semester date #1)==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
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:*Strawson Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994) (23)
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:*Henrich, Joe. Prelude and Chapter 1, "WEIRD Psychology" from ''The WEIRDEST People in the World'' (37-57)
  
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===Strawson Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994)===
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===In-class===
  
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:*Imagines a scenario of choice between buying a cake and giving to Oxfam.  Seem up to you, but the Basic Argument says no.
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:*'''The Paradox of Moral Experience'''
  
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:*Section 1 - Three versions of the argument
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==='''Paradox of Moral Experience'''===
  
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:*Basic Argument Conclusion: "We can never be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions."
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::*The Paradox of Moral Experience involves a conflict between two "standpoints" for seeing values.  1 and 2 below:
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::*''Causa sui'' version: To be MR, you have to be ''causa sui''
 
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::*10 step version: adds in
 
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:::*"What one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking"
 
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:::*"To be truly MR, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is.."
 
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:::*"To be MR for the way one is, "in any respect at all", you must have "principles of choice" P1.  But one must have chosen P1, by P2, but then to be MR for P2, you need to have chosen P2 by some P3....
 
  
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::*3rd version - genetics and experience limit our ability to remake ourselves.
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::*1. We '''experience our morality''' as beliefs we hold true. They are compelling to us in a way that leads us to expect others to find them compelling. We can be surprised or frustrated that others do not see our reasons as compelling.  From this standpoint, our moral truths feel necessary rather than contingent. 
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:::*Examples: "What's wrong with those (lib/con)s, don't they see X/Y?" "How can anyone think it's ok to act like that?") 
  
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:*Section 2 - What is "true" or "ultimate" MR?
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::*2. But, when we '''study morality as a functional system''' that integrates people who see and interpret the world differently, it is less surprising that we often do not find each others' reasoning or choices compelling.  We can also see how groups of people might develop "values cultures" that diverge on entire sets of values (or, "cooperative toolkits") while still solving some of the same underlying problems that all human societies face.  From this standpoint, the functions of morality are universal, but the specific strategies that individuals and cultures take seem very contingent. But, knowing this, why don’t we experience our own values as contingent?
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:::*Examples: Sociocentric / Individualist cultures, Specific histories that groups experience (Us vs. Europe vs. ...)
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::*Roughly, 1 is normal experience, when you are "in your head".  2 reflects an attempt, through knowledge, to get a "third person" experience, to "get out of your head".
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::*Likely evolutionary basis: Belief commitment (believing that our beliefs are true) is advantageous, but we also need to be open to belief revision through social encounters.
  
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::*Defines MR in terms of possibility of fair punishment (without an pragmatic justification)
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:*Some implications:
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::*Clearly affirms (top of 44) the experience of free will.  we literally can't give up belief in true or ultimate MR.  (really?)
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::*We have a bias against seeing others' moral beliefs as functional.  Rather, we see them as caused, and often wrongheaded.  (Italians are more sociocentric because their culture makes them that way.  Rather than, sociocentric culture function to solve basic problems, just like individualistic ones.)
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::*"situations of choice" are the "experiential rock" on which belief in MR is built.
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::*Different moral "matrices" are connected to our personality and identity.  Areguing for the truth of your moral orientation (as opposed to focusing on issues) can be like telling someone they shouldn't be the people they are. (!)
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::*citation of authorities: Sartre, Kant, Kane, Koorsgaard
 
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::*at 45, he seems to say that if we identify with a trait, we are "in control" or "answerable" (2 diff things) for how we are.  (Really seems to tie the "inescapability of freedom and self-creation" to MR, even while arguing that it is impossible.)
 
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:*Section 3 - Another restatement of the Basic Argument
 
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::*gets at "certain mental aspects" "mentally speaking". Acknowledges that basic facts about us are not in our control.  Focus on intentionality.  You must be MR for your mental life, especially your intentionality.  Later, "you must have intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are." 47.   
 
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::*'''Premise 2''': "To be truly MR for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way you are - at least in certain mental respects."
 
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::*'''Premise 3''': "But you can't be truly resp. for the way your are so you can't be truly responsibile for what you do."
 
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::*Compatibilists reject 2. Libertarians reject 3.
 
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:*Section 4: Responses to the Basic Argument
 
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::*Compatibilists: Compatibilists consider an action under your control under normal circumstances and without compulsion, etc. So they reject Premise 2 since they are not looking for ultimate responsibility. (He makes it sound like a compatibilist can't be an MR skeptic, but that's not true. -Alfino)
 
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::*Libertarian/Incompatibilist: Kane's "undetermined self-forming actions" (SFAs).  But the old objection remains: How can 'indeterminism' help the libertarian.  Isn't that luck?
 
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::*Third response: p. 50.  You could appeal to a picture of the self, determined or not, which captures MR. Defines the CPM (character, personality, motivations) and then Self as "in  some way independent of one's CPM" (note this is the homunculus again).  S "incorporates a power of decision" (humuncular grit).  But Strawson rejects this response.  S is still responding to CPM.  Not enough to say we are "fully self-consciously aware of oneself as an agent facing choices".  Still working with material that you aren't MR for.
 
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===SEP Notes on Strawson's Argument, "Skepticism about MR" p. 16-18===
 
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:*Critics
 
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::*Some criticize the definition of "ultimate responsibility" (connecting it to fair punishment)
 
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::*Escape from the regress by offering a sufficient account of "self-creation"
 
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::*Attack the claim that our mental states have to be up to us for our actions to be. (break the connection)
 
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:*Defenders
 
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::*The Basic Argument still works with a weaker connection bt action and source:
 
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:::*doesn't rely on the premise that an agent can be MR for an action only if she is responsible for ''every'' factor contributing to the action.
 
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:::*contra critics who want to "break the connection", it is counterintuitive to say that an agent is MR for A when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent.
 

Latest revision as of 19:39, 17 February 2022

12: FEB 17 (extra spring semester date #1)

Assigned

  • Henrich, Joe. Prelude and Chapter 1, "WEIRD Psychology" from The WEIRDEST People in the World (37-57)

In-class

  • The Paradox of Moral Experience

Paradox of Moral Experience

  • The Paradox of Moral Experience involves a conflict between two "standpoints" for seeing values. 1 and 2 below:
  • 1. We experience our morality as beliefs we hold true. They are compelling to us in a way that leads us to expect others to find them compelling. We can be surprised or frustrated that others do not see our reasons as compelling. From this standpoint, our moral truths feel necessary rather than contingent.
  • Examples: "What's wrong with those (lib/con)s, don't they see X/Y?" "How can anyone think it's ok to act like that?")
  • 2. But, when we study morality as a functional system that integrates people who see and interpret the world differently, it is less surprising that we often do not find each others' reasoning or choices compelling. We can also see how groups of people might develop "values cultures" that diverge on entire sets of values (or, "cooperative toolkits") while still solving some of the same underlying problems that all human societies face. From this standpoint, the functions of morality are universal, but the specific strategies that individuals and cultures take seem very contingent. But, knowing this, why don’t we experience our own values as contingent?
  • Examples: Sociocentric / Individualist cultures, Specific histories that groups experience (Us vs. Europe vs. ...)
  • Roughly, 1 is normal experience, when you are "in your head". 2 reflects an attempt, through knowledge, to get a "third person" experience, to "get out of your head".
  • Likely evolutionary basis: Belief commitment (believing that our beliefs are true) is advantageous, but we also need to be open to belief revision through social encounters.
  • Some implications:
  • We have a bias against seeing others' moral beliefs as functional. Rather, we see them as caused, and often wrongheaded. (Italians are more sociocentric because their culture makes them that way. Rather than, sociocentric culture function to solve basic problems, just like individualistic ones.)
  • Different moral "matrices" are connected to our personality and identity. Areguing for the truth of your moral orientation (as opposed to focusing on issues) can be like telling someone they shouldn't be the people they are. (!)
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