Difference between revisions of "MAR 15"

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==15: MAR 15==
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==17: MAR 15==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
:*Dennett, Daniel. Chapter 3: "Thinking about Determinism" Freedom Evolves. (300) (63-97)
+
:*Haidt, Chapter 7, "The Moral Foundations of Politics" (34)
  
===Dennett, Daniel. Chapter 3: "Thinking about Determinism" Freedom Evolves===
+
===Haidt, Chapter 7, "The Moral Foundations of Politics"===
  
:*Chapter 3: Thinking about Determinism
+
:*Homo economicus vs. Homo sapiens -- column a b -- shows costs of sapiens psych. commitments "taste buds"
 +
:*Note on Innateness and Determinism: "first draft" metaphor; experience revises - pre-wired not hard-wired. innate without being universal.  (Note this is the same anti-determinism disclaimer we got from Hibbing & Co.)
 +
:*Notes on each foundation:
 +
::*'''Care/Harm''' -- evolutionary story of asymmetry between m/f interests/strategies in reproduction, attachment theory (read def). current triggers.  Baby Max and stuffed animals -- triggers. 
 +
:::*Implicit theory about "re-triggering" note red flag.  unexplained. Consider plausibility. 
 +
::*'''Fairness/Cheating''' -- We know we incur obligation when accepting favors. So,... Trivers and reciprocal altruism.  "tit for tat" ; equality vs. proportionality.  Original and current problem is to build coalitions (social networks) without being suckered (exploited).  Focus on your experience of cooperation, trust, and defection (which could just be declining cooperation).  Public goods game research also fits here.  Libs think of fairness more in terms of equality, conservatives more about proportionality.
 +
::*'''Loyalty/Betrayal''' -- Tribalism in story of Eagles/Rattlers.  liberals experience low emphasis here; note claim that this is gendered 139.  sports groupishness is a current trigger.  connected to capacity for violence.  Liberals can come across as disloyal when they think they are just being critical.  Note current culture conflicts over confederate symbols and statues fits here.
 +
::*'''Authority/Subversion''' -- Cab driver story.  Hierarchy in animal and human society; liberals experience this differently also; note cultural work accomplished by the "control role" -- suppression of violence that would occur without hierarchy.  Alan Fiske's work on "Authority Ranking" -- suggest legit recognition of difference and, importantly, not just submission.  Authority relationships are a two way street (maybe esp for conservs?).  Tendency to see UN and international agreements as vote dilution, loss of sov.  (Digressive topic: Should we mark authority relationships more?)
 +
::*'''Sanctity/Degradation''' -- Miewes-Brandes horror. Ev.story: omnivores challenge is to spot foul food and disease (pathogens, parasites).  (Being an omnivore is messy. One should not be surprised to find that vegetarians often appreciate the cleanliness of their diet.) Omnivores dilemma -- benefit from being able to eat wide range of foods, but need to distinguish risky from safe.  neophilia and neophobia.  Images of chastity in religion and public debate.  understanding culture wars.  The ability to “sanctify” something (bodies, environment, principles) is an important current trigger.
  
:*Three Errors in thinking about determinism:
+
===Small Group Exercise: Working with the Moral Foundations in Political Contexts===
::*1. We think determinism limits what is possible. (Austin's putt)
 
::*2. We assert that S(0) causes or explains S(t). This misses the way causal inquiry works. (Computer marathon / JFK)
 
::*3. Determinism rules out self-directed change, change in character or "life-hopes". (Closed/open futures)
 
  
:*Dennett believes his arguments in showing these errors apply to '''both''' det and indet worlds.
+
::*'''Bumper Sticker / Slogan reading'''
 +
::*Extending Haidt's examples of using bumper sticks and slogans to illustrate the moral foundations, please follow these links [http://www.cafepress.com/+political+bumper-stickers] [https://www.zazzle.com/political+bumper+stickers] and browse political bumper stickers together. Keep these questions in mind as you browse:
 +
:::*Can you identify specific moral foundations at work in some of the bumper stickers?
 +
:::*Do you notice that some are based exclusively in denigrating an opposing view vs. making an affirmation?
 +
:::*Why do so many people like to use bumper stickers?  Do you? Why or why not?
  
:*Defining possibility, necessity , and causation in terms of "possible worlds"
+
===Tools for working with "Matrix Differences"===
  
::*'''Necessity''' -- What is true in all possible worlds.
+
:*A big problem that Haidt's "Moral Foundations Theory" (MFT) leaves us with is, "How do we interact with people with different matrices and different experiences, especially concerning political value differences, when we hold our own views with conviction and sense of their truth? In other words, how do we deal with the '''Paradox of Moral Experience'''?
  
::*'''Possibility''' -- Whatever isn't "necessarily not" the case. Roughly, all of the possible differences one might imagine between worlds.  (Informal and identification predicates come in here.)
+
:*Why this is ''soo'' difficult...
 +
::*We often unintentionally (and, for some people, intentionally) create "cognitive dissonance" in a discussion, leading people to find ways to stop the pain, rather than listen to the issues. This can escalate.
 +
::*We don't always have reasons for our convictions, but, as we know from the dumbfounding research, we "confabulate". We confuse intuitions with reasoned conviction.  This can lead us to "pile on" arguments, thinking they are persuasive apart from the intuitions (moral matrix) that support them. But if you don't have those intuitions, the "pile on" can feel aggressive.
 +
::*We don't all react the same way when our views are criticized.  (Remember Socrates' attitude here. Noble but difficult to achieve.)
  
::*'''Determinism''' -- '''There is at any instant one possible future.''' In possible worlds talk, "A world is deterministic if it has the property such that, if it shares the same S(0) with any other world at time 0, it will share S (the same state description) at t." Determinism is about causal sufficiency, not necessity.
+
:*'''1. Three Basic Strategies:'''
 +
::*A. Explore differences gently. Monitor your vital signs and those of your interlocutors.
 +
::*B. Find common goals or things to affirm. (Example of landlord interaction last semester.)
 +
::*C. Model exploratory thought. (How do you do that, specifically?) See ''sympathetic interpretation'' below.
 +
::*These strategies obviously move you in different directions in a conversation, but they can all be used together to manage "dissonance" and tension in a discussion.
  
:*Causation - How do we assign causes? (Note: Laplace's demon knows state descriptions not causes!)
+
:*'''2. Practice Sympathetic Interpretation'''
 +
::*In general, sympathetic interpretation involves strategies that mix "identification" (peanuts for the elephant) with "critical engagement" (rational persuasion, expression of value differences)
 +
::*Try to understand where a view is "coming from".  Ask questions.
 +
::*Restate views, checking for fairness.
 +
::*Practice "strategic dissimulation" (controversial for some). "I'm still working out my views here..." when you really have pretty well worked out views, even one's you are proud of and think to be true (Paradox of Moral Experience)
 +
::*Practice "strategic self-deprecation" - Acknowledge knowledge deficits as a way of validating that the other person has a knowledge-base for their view, even if it's not likely to be persuasive to you.
 +
::*Use verbal cues that indicate (if possible) that views you disagree with are "reasonable" and/or "understandable".  That could mean:
 +
:::*1. The view is reasonable, even if you disagree. Preface your disagreement by acknowledging this. 
 +
::::*Example: "Reasonable and well-informed people disagree on this..."... "Well, your in good company..."
 +
:::*2. The view seems unreasonable, but you focus on some intuitions that support it, even if you don't share these intuitions.
 +
::::*Example: I can see how/why someone would feel this way..., but...
 +
:::*3. The view seems unreasonable and false to you, but it is one that many people hold.
 +
::::*Example: Acknowledging that the view is widely held without endorsing it.  You can also "deflect" to the complexity of the problem or human nature...
  
::*'''Causation''' -- Two logically distinct senses:
+
:*'''3. Other miscellaneous strategies''' (many contributed by students):  
:::*"Causal necessity" - without A, C would not happen.  Had Bill not tripped Arthur, he would not have fallen.  In all of the possible worlds in which Bill trips Arthur, he falls.
 
:::*"Causal sufficiency" -  A is sufficient to cause C, but other antecedents might as well. Arthur's fall is an inevitable outcome of being tripped. In ''any'' world in which Bill trips Arthur, Arthur falls.
 
  
::*Evaluating counterfactuals (as in the causal necessity example) requires establishing a "comparison set X" of worlds approximately similar to ours in which tripping Arthur leads to his falling.  The selection of the comparison set is crucial.
+
:*Acknowledge that an opposing view may be insightful for others, even if not for you.
 
+
:*Cultivate diverse relationships if possible.
::*In assigning causes, we also typically assume "independence" and "temporal priority".  But here are some cases to show how various considerations are used to assign causation in different contexts:
+
:*Avoid pejorative labels.
 
+
:*Views can change even if orientations don't.  Focus on views, not orientations.
::*The Sharpshooter Case -- The sharpshooter has a low probability of hitting the target, but does.  We favor 'causal necessity' over sufficiency in this case in saying he cause the death. 
+
:*Accept differences that won't change (validate them in others, as you would other differences), focus on pragmatics and cooperation.
 
+
:*Humor, if possibleSelf-effacing humor can set the stage.  
::*The King and the Mayor (overdetermination) - Both issue exile orders for someone.  Neither is necessary.  Pick one, maybe the king?
+
:*Acknowledge physio-politics in the discussionGive people "permission" or space to "out" themselves as libs and cons.  
 
+
:*Acknowledge your own orientation and expect it to be respected.
::*Billy and Susie - Billy's rock is sufficient to cause a bottle to break, but Susie's gets there first.  We favor temporal priority in assigning the cause. 
+
:*Don't "sugar coat" differences(Be true to yourself.)
 
 
::*French Foreign Legion case -- a series of "but for" causes, all of which are sufficient. Which is the cause?
 
 
 
:*Austin's Putt --
 
::*narrow method for choosing comparison set X - worlds identical to Austin's prior to his putt. If you choose the set this way, Austin could not have made the putt (looks like determinism eliminates the possible). But you could choose a slightly different comparison set and in some of those worlds, Austin makes the putt
 
::*It follows that even in det world it makes sense to say that he might have made the putt.
 
::*Austin seems to choose the narrow method, but equivocates about "further experiments" (which imply changing the antecedent conditions).
 
 
 
::*Conclusion (77): The truth or falsity of determinism should not affect our belief tha tcertain unrealized events were nevertheless "possible," in an everyday sense of that term.  [Well, possible worlds talk isn't exactly everyday. ]
 
 
 
:*Computer Marathon
 
::*random number generatorsTo generate variations in the play, we introduce slightly different conditions.
 
::*With this random variation, you find the A beats B a thousand times in a row.  It would not be ''explanatory'' to say A was caused to beat B.  You have to go up to the design or intentional level to explain A's behavior.
 
 
 
::*Could B have castled? You have to do the analysis.  Might look at related possible worlds and say it was a fluke B didn't.  Or you might find that B would have found the option if he's been coded a bit more efficiently.  Point: (82) Philosophers choose the narrow set (Could I have done something different in ''exactly the same universe as I am in''?) when thinking about determinism and free will, but no one seriously investigates possibility and causation that way.
 
 
 
:*83: read at: "The universe could be det on even days...."
 
 
 
:*Events without causes in a deterministic universe
 
 
 
::*Determinism is about causal sufficiency, not necessity.  The actual universe at S(0) was sufficient to lead to JFK's death, but we don't know if it was necessaryNote that we wouldn't say that S(0) caused JFK's death.
 
 
 
:*coin flips have "no cause" even though they occur in a deterministic universeNote details. Important thing is to create conditions that make prediction impossible.  In a sense the coin flip amplifies micro-variaitons and thereby reduces necessity.
 
 
 
:*Randomized Control Trials and Randomized Experiments.  Use "uncaused events" break the influence of patterns we want to exclude for purposes of the experiment (and to determine causation).
 
 
 
:*88: Why do we focus on necessity if it confuses us about free will?  Our rationality requires it.  Example of man falling down elevator shaft.  Landing is inevitable, maybe dying isn't.  We can change the future because evolution designed us that way.  We have search algorithms, we are "anticipator-avoiders" (who look for necessary relationships)The fatalists lose in the the evolutionary competition.
 
 
 
:*Third Error: Determinism rules out self-directed change, change in character or "life-hopes".
 
 
 
::*Whether the future is Open or Closed is independent of determinism / indeterminism.  Things can be "determined to change"  "In some deterministic universes there are things whose natures change over time, so determinism does not imply a fixed nature."
 

Latest revision as of 18:53, 15 March 2022

17: MAR 15

Assigned

  • Haidt, Chapter 7, "The Moral Foundations of Politics" (34)

Haidt, Chapter 7, "The Moral Foundations of Politics"

  • Homo economicus vs. Homo sapiens -- column a b -- shows costs of sapiens psych. commitments "taste buds"
  • Note on Innateness and Determinism: "first draft" metaphor; experience revises - pre-wired not hard-wired. innate without being universal. (Note this is the same anti-determinism disclaimer we got from Hibbing & Co.)
  • Notes on each foundation:
  • Care/Harm -- evolutionary story of asymmetry between m/f interests/strategies in reproduction, attachment theory (read def). current triggers. Baby Max and stuffed animals -- triggers.
  • Implicit theory about "re-triggering" note red flag. unexplained. Consider plausibility.
  • Fairness/Cheating -- We know we incur obligation when accepting favors. So,... Trivers and reciprocal altruism. "tit for tat" ; equality vs. proportionality. Original and current problem is to build coalitions (social networks) without being suckered (exploited). Focus on your experience of cooperation, trust, and defection (which could just be declining cooperation). Public goods game research also fits here. Libs think of fairness more in terms of equality, conservatives more about proportionality.
  • Loyalty/Betrayal -- Tribalism in story of Eagles/Rattlers. liberals experience low emphasis here; note claim that this is gendered 139. sports groupishness is a current trigger. connected to capacity for violence. Liberals can come across as disloyal when they think they are just being critical. Note current culture conflicts over confederate symbols and statues fits here.
  • Authority/Subversion -- Cab driver story. Hierarchy in animal and human society; liberals experience this differently also; note cultural work accomplished by the "control role" -- suppression of violence that would occur without hierarchy. Alan Fiske's work on "Authority Ranking" -- suggest legit recognition of difference and, importantly, not just submission. Authority relationships are a two way street (maybe esp for conservs?). Tendency to see UN and international agreements as vote dilution, loss of sov. (Digressive topic: Should we mark authority relationships more?)
  • Sanctity/Degradation -- Miewes-Brandes horror. Ev.story: omnivores challenge is to spot foul food and disease (pathogens, parasites). (Being an omnivore is messy. One should not be surprised to find that vegetarians often appreciate the cleanliness of their diet.) Omnivores dilemma -- benefit from being able to eat wide range of foods, but need to distinguish risky from safe. neophilia and neophobia. Images of chastity in religion and public debate. understanding culture wars. The ability to “sanctify” something (bodies, environment, principles) is an important current trigger.

Small Group Exercise: Working with the Moral Foundations in Political Contexts

  • Bumper Sticker / Slogan reading
  • Extending Haidt's examples of using bumper sticks and slogans to illustrate the moral foundations, please follow these links [1] [2] and browse political bumper stickers together. Keep these questions in mind as you browse:
  • Can you identify specific moral foundations at work in some of the bumper stickers?
  • Do you notice that some are based exclusively in denigrating an opposing view vs. making an affirmation?
  • Why do so many people like to use bumper stickers? Do you? Why or why not?

Tools for working with "Matrix Differences"

  • A big problem that Haidt's "Moral Foundations Theory" (MFT) leaves us with is, "How do we interact with people with different matrices and different experiences, especially concerning political value differences, when we hold our own views with conviction and sense of their truth? In other words, how do we deal with the Paradox of Moral Experience?
  • Why this is soo difficult...
  • We often unintentionally (and, for some people, intentionally) create "cognitive dissonance" in a discussion, leading people to find ways to stop the pain, rather than listen to the issues. This can escalate.
  • We don't always have reasons for our convictions, but, as we know from the dumbfounding research, we "confabulate". We confuse intuitions with reasoned conviction. This can lead us to "pile on" arguments, thinking they are persuasive apart from the intuitions (moral matrix) that support them. But if you don't have those intuitions, the "pile on" can feel aggressive.
  • We don't all react the same way when our views are criticized. (Remember Socrates' attitude here. Noble but difficult to achieve.)
  • 1. Three Basic Strategies:
  • A. Explore differences gently. Monitor your vital signs and those of your interlocutors.
  • B. Find common goals or things to affirm. (Example of landlord interaction last semester.)
  • C. Model exploratory thought. (How do you do that, specifically?) See sympathetic interpretation below.
  • These strategies obviously move you in different directions in a conversation, but they can all be used together to manage "dissonance" and tension in a discussion.
  • 2. Practice Sympathetic Interpretation
  • In general, sympathetic interpretation involves strategies that mix "identification" (peanuts for the elephant) with "critical engagement" (rational persuasion, expression of value differences)
  • Try to understand where a view is "coming from". Ask questions.
  • Restate views, checking for fairness.
  • Practice "strategic dissimulation" (controversial for some). "I'm still working out my views here..." when you really have pretty well worked out views, even one's you are proud of and think to be true (Paradox of Moral Experience)
  • Practice "strategic self-deprecation" - Acknowledge knowledge deficits as a way of validating that the other person has a knowledge-base for their view, even if it's not likely to be persuasive to you.
  • Use verbal cues that indicate (if possible) that views you disagree with are "reasonable" and/or "understandable". That could mean:
  • 1. The view is reasonable, even if you disagree. Preface your disagreement by acknowledging this.
  • Example: "Reasonable and well-informed people disagree on this..."... "Well, your in good company..."
  • 2. The view seems unreasonable, but you focus on some intuitions that support it, even if you don't share these intuitions.
  • Example: I can see how/why someone would feel this way..., but...
  • 3. The view seems unreasonable and false to you, but it is one that many people hold.
  • Example: Acknowledging that the view is widely held without endorsing it. You can also "deflect" to the complexity of the problem or human nature...
  • 3. Other miscellaneous strategies (many contributed by students):
  • Acknowledge that an opposing view may be insightful for others, even if not for you.
  • Cultivate diverse relationships if possible.
  • Avoid pejorative labels.
  • Views can change even if orientations don't. Focus on views, not orientations.
  • Accept differences that won't change (validate them in others, as you would other differences), focus on pragmatics and cooperation.
  • Humor, if possible. Self-effacing humor can set the stage.
  • Acknowledge physio-politics in the discussion. Give people "permission" or space to "out" themselves as libs and cons.
  • Acknowledge your own orientation and expect it to be respected.
  • Don't "sugar coat" differences. (Be true to yourself.)