Difference between revisions of "Nicole Kornblum's Proseminar Research"

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(Created page with ' == Annotated Bibliography: Personal Identity == The question is not so much "Who am I?" as much as it is "Who do I believe I am?" It is irrelevant whether there is an objective…')
 
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== Annotated Bibliography: Personal Identity ==
 
== Annotated Bibliography: Personal Identity ==
  
The question is not so much "Who am I?" as much as it is "Who do I believe I am?" It is irrelevant whether there is an objective self because all humans view the world subjectively. We have subjective thoughts, subjective sensations, and thus, subjective perceptions. That is not to say that there is no universality when it comes to consciousness or humankind. Uniqueness is implied in the topic: "personal identity." But what is it? How do we maintain it over time?  Could I have turned out to be someone else? I cannot say for sure, but I am researching individuals who claim to know.  
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The question is not so much "Who am I?" as much as it is "Who do I believe I am?" It is irrelevant whether there is an objective self because all humans view the world subjectively. We have subjective thoughts, subjective sensations, and thus, subjective perceptions. That is not to say that there is no universality when it comes to consciousness or humankind. Uniqueness is implied in the topic: "personal identity." But what is it? How do we maintain it over time?  Could I have turned out to be someone else? I do not claim to know, but I am researching individuals who do.
 
 
  
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Here is a list of a few sources I have gathered so far:  
 
Here is a list of a few sources I have gathered so far:  
  
Noonan, Harold. (1978). 'Locke on Personal Identity.' ''Philosophy'' 53: 343-351.
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*Noonan, Harold. (1978). 'Locke on Personal Identity.' ''Philosophy'' 53: 343-351.
  
Perry, J., (1972). ‘Can the Self Divide?’ ''Journal of Philosophy'' 69: 463–488
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*Perry, J., (1972). ‘Can the Self Divide?’ ''Journal of Philosophy'' 69: 463–488
  
Rorty, R. (1989). 'The Contingency of Selfhood' (23-43). ''Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity''. Cambridge University Press.
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*Rorty, R. (1989). 'The Contingency of Selfhood' (23-43). ''Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity''. Cambridge University Press.
  
Shoemaker, S. (1963). ''Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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*Shoemaker, S. (1963). ''Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  
Williams, B. (1956–7). ‘Personal Identity and Individuation,' ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 57; 229-252.
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*Williams, B. (1956–7). ‘Personal Identity and Individuation,' ''Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society'' 57; 229-252.

Revision as of 00:55, 10 November 2010

Annotated Bibliography: Personal Identity

The question is not so much "Who am I?" as much as it is "Who do I believe I am?" It is irrelevant whether there is an objective self because all humans view the world subjectively. We have subjective thoughts, subjective sensations, and thus, subjective perceptions. That is not to say that there is no universality when it comes to consciousness or humankind. Uniqueness is implied in the topic: "personal identity." But what is it? How do we maintain it over time? Could I have turned out to be someone else? I do not claim to know, but I am researching individuals who do.


) Here is a list of a few sources I have gathered so far:

  • Noonan, Harold. (1978). 'Locke on Personal Identity.' Philosophy 53: 343-351.
  • Perry, J., (1972). ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488
  • Rorty, R. (1989). 'The Contingency of Selfhood' (23-43). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge University Press.
  • Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  • Williams, B. (1956–7). ‘Personal Identity and Individuation,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57; 229-252.