Difference between revisions of "Spring 2011 101 Reconstruction graded"
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) | |||
Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
His second rationale points out that we all cannot ignore how technology makes communication possible by anyone and everyone. “Diffuse networks of groups can now collaborate and communicate in ways that are not controlled by any single ideology or regime.” As is widely discussed in the media today, Store is making a connection between the expansion of social networking through technology and the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Anyone using this form of communication can contact virtually anyone else who uses it. He makes a point here that “political solutions” need to take place at a “popular level” and not just among the elites because there is now unlimited power in the ability for people to mobilize around communication. Therefore, shouldn’t world powers take advantage of joining the discussions as well? | His second rationale points out that we all cannot ignore how technology makes communication possible by anyone and everyone. “Diffuse networks of groups can now collaborate and communicate in ways that are not controlled by any single ideology or regime.” As is widely discussed in the media today, Store is making a connection between the expansion of social networking through technology and the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Anyone using this form of communication can contact virtually anyone else who uses it. He makes a point here that “political solutions” need to take place at a “popular level” and not just among the elites because there is now unlimited power in the ability for people to mobilize around communication. Therefore, shouldn’t world powers take advantage of joining the discussions as well? | ||
In response to those who may doubt him, Store also makes clear that, “some maintain that the willingness to negotiate and compromise will be interpreted as a sign of moral and military weakness.” Though left unstated, Store would like to discourage death and destruction brought on by war in favor of talking to the “adversary” to “try to persuade the world to follow you by speaking your values.” This is a trait he poses as admirable, even courageous. An entity that is able to negotiate with words instead of bombs is an entity that he can respect much more. | In response to those who may doubt him, Store also makes clear that, “some maintain that the willingness to negotiate and compromise will be interpreted as a sign of moral and military weakness.” Though left unstated, Store would like to discourage death and destruction brought on by war in favor of talking to the “adversary” to “try to persuade the world to follow you by speaking your values.” This is a trait he poses as admirable, even courageous. An entity that is able to negotiate with words instead of bombs is an entity that he can respect much more. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ---- | ||
+ | The April 7th, 2011 article “Why We Must Talk” by Jonas Gahr Store argues that it is courageous and essential in a diplomatic world to keep talking and listening to all groups at the international level to try to solve international disputes instead of relying mainly on military action. Store starts the article with three counter arguments, one argument, one explanation, and follows up with three more arguments. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The conclusion to the first counter argument is that military power has a defining place in foreign policy. His first premise to support this conclusion is that most of today’s countries belong to NATO. His second premise is that many countries have their own military system in place. He next proceeds to his second counter argument. The conclusion for this argument is that diplomatic discussions cannot replace all military action. His premise for this is that he refers to the military pressure that had to be applied during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The conclusion for his third counter argument is that countries cannot talk to all groups under every circumstance. His premise/intermediate conclusion for this argument is that all countries have a “red line” that cannot be crossed. A premise for this intermediate conclusion is that if the line is crossed, the countries will react in a violent manner. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The first argument (intermediate conclusion) to support the general conclusion is that all countries must be willing to talk to any group, even if the group’s morals or ideology is considered “dangerous” or different from their own. The first premise is more of a concession. The premise is that countries need to be willing to make a judgment call for when it’s appropriate to safely negotiate. The intermediate conclusion that follows is that the U.S. was safely able to negotiate with the Hamas who occupy Gaza. The premise to explain the previous intermediate conclusion is that through talking, the Hamas have been open to recognizing a long hated enemy of Israel. The second premise/intermediate conclusion to support the first argument is that the U.S. successfully blocked negotiations with Palestine. The premise to support the intermediate conclusion is that Palestine ended up becoming divided and not peaceful. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The first explanation (intermediate conclusion) for the article has the intermediate conclusion that engaging in dialogue with another group is not the same as legitimizing the groups’ goals and ideology. The first premise it that many times negotiations will moderate radical groups’ behaviors. The intermediate conclusion that follows is that the U.S. was afraid to talk with Egypt when the revolution broke out this year. The premise to support the intermediate conclusion is that the U.S. falsely believed that talking with Egypt meant they were helping to create a radical Islamic revolution. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The second argument (intermediate conclusion) of the article is that real diplomatic change can only occur if we talk with all groups from the local culture, not just military puppets and older elites. The first premise to support this is that real change will only take place if local authorities are involved. The second premise is that many younger members of the population have begun to make a huge impact on the power of starting revolutions. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The article’s third argument (intermediate conclusion) is that people who oppose dialoguing with foreign countries must not be living in reality. The first premise is people want to unrealistically impose their belief system/morals on all people who don’t believe in what they believe in. The second premise is that some people will try to protect themselves from all opposing beliefs by “building a wall” around them to keep out all other countries or people who disagree with them “away and out”. | ||
+ | The article’s last argument (intermediate conclusion) is that communicating is a sign of weakness. A premise to support this claim is that it takes courage to talk to the opposition about what you really believe. |
Latest revision as of 04:41, 13 April 2011
In his article entitled “Why We Must Talk,” Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store argues that conducting diplomatic dialogue, especially with the Middle East, should be the first choice that the international community should take in regards to ongoing or potential conflict. Store supports his main argument with three sub-arguments, which are each supported by three premises. Store’s first sub-argument is that diplomatic dialogue wouldn’t replace military action, but would rather help us go beyond using military action fueled by fear and misunderstanding. In support of this argument, Store states that when “used correctly, dialogue is the essential diplomatic tool that allows us to pursue our common interests in an increasingly complex and fast-moving world.” Also, Store mentions that “military force alone is ill-suited for dealing with a growing number of situations that currently shape international and interstate relations.” As mentioned, Store doesn’t believe that diplomatic dialogue should replace military action, nor would the international community be willing to talk with everyone. However, Store adds that, “I believe it is important to resist the temptation to disavow on moral grounds dialogue with any group or state whose ideology and aims we view as dubious or dangerous.”
For the second sub-argument, Store supports his main argument by arguing that diplomatic dialogue could have potentially improved certain situations in the Middle East. Store supports this sub-argument with three premises, the first being that because of a lack of negotiations with “the Palestinian unity government in 2007, a government that included all Palestinian factions…the unity government was ignored, young people were radicalized, [etc.]” all of which made prospects for peace even more difficult. If there had been attempts at negotiations, Store states that, “it would thus have [been] recognized that the Palestinian factions had made a historic effort to unite.” As a second premise, Store mentions that the past events in Egypt have shown that many in the West have fears of radical Islam taking part and this “has dissuaded policymakers from supporting democratic changes and engaging in dialogue with various civil society groups in ways that we regularly do in many other parts of the world.” As a third premise to this second sub-argument, Store admits that “we cannot, of course, be sure that diplomatic talks and contact would have been more successful,” but he believes that it is “unlikely that they would have been less successful.”
As Store’s third sub-argument, he argues that diplomatic dialogue would allow us to see the necessity for learning to communicate with people different from us. As his first premise, Store explains that “we need to recognize that we can no longer concentrate so heavily on negotiations with elites,” but rather through diplomatic dialogue, “we need to support political solutions that will take effect at the popular level.” As his second premise, Store states that “in a world in which information technology gives the voices of diffuse groups much more potential influence, we have no choice but to engage them [through diplomatic dialogue].” Furthermore, Store concludes that, “without a political process of dialogue that encompasses all representative groups, governance will remain flawed and fragile.”
As the title of Jonas Gahr Store’s article would suggest, he is addressing reasons why people should be talking—specifically why governments should at least listen to, and usually speak to terrorist organizations, or governments we disagree with, in the name of diplomacy. He addresses this question, “why we must talk?” with three major rationales: excluding groups from dialogue based on one country deeming them terrorists, facing the reality that technology makes communication possible among the masses and not just the elites when it comes to negotiation, and negating the fear that using diplomacy is a sign of military weakness. Before addressing his rationales, Store works to establish credibility. He describes his experiences in Kabul and Geneva as the foreign minister of Norway. He witnessed a bombing while in Afghanistan and how while President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech may have been highly offensive, points out that, “more than twenty delegates from the EU walked out” during it and the United States and Israel had already refused to attend the conference he had spoke at. Store points out that it is impossible to ignore individuals or entire groups in dialogue just because one or several countries may not agree with them. He uses the example of Hamas and states what “in Norway we condemn Hamas’ attack on innocent civilians, and strongly oppose its ideology.” But later adds that, “Hamas represents a significant part of Palestinian society.” Because Hamas has power, Store is inferring that other great powers have no choice but to at least consider negotiations. He understands that certain circumstances require exceptions, but in general, all organizations with political sway must be addressed. His second rationale points out that we all cannot ignore how technology makes communication possible by anyone and everyone. “Diffuse networks of groups can now collaborate and communicate in ways that are not controlled by any single ideology or regime.” As is widely discussed in the media today, Store is making a connection between the expansion of social networking through technology and the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Anyone using this form of communication can contact virtually anyone else who uses it. He makes a point here that “political solutions” need to take place at a “popular level” and not just among the elites because there is now unlimited power in the ability for people to mobilize around communication. Therefore, shouldn’t world powers take advantage of joining the discussions as well? In response to those who may doubt him, Store also makes clear that, “some maintain that the willingness to negotiate and compromise will be interpreted as a sign of moral and military weakness.” Though left unstated, Store would like to discourage death and destruction brought on by war in favor of talking to the “adversary” to “try to persuade the world to follow you by speaking your values.” This is a trait he poses as admirable, even courageous. An entity that is able to negotiate with words instead of bombs is an entity that he can respect much more.
The April 7th, 2011 article “Why We Must Talk” by Jonas Gahr Store argues that it is courageous and essential in a diplomatic world to keep talking and listening to all groups at the international level to try to solve international disputes instead of relying mainly on military action. Store starts the article with three counter arguments, one argument, one explanation, and follows up with three more arguments.
The conclusion to the first counter argument is that military power has a defining place in foreign policy. His first premise to support this conclusion is that most of today’s countries belong to NATO. His second premise is that many countries have their own military system in place. He next proceeds to his second counter argument. The conclusion for this argument is that diplomatic discussions cannot replace all military action. His premise for this is that he refers to the military pressure that had to be applied during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The conclusion for his third counter argument is that countries cannot talk to all groups under every circumstance. His premise/intermediate conclusion for this argument is that all countries have a “red line” that cannot be crossed. A premise for this intermediate conclusion is that if the line is crossed, the countries will react in a violent manner.
The first argument (intermediate conclusion) to support the general conclusion is that all countries must be willing to talk to any group, even if the group’s morals or ideology is considered “dangerous” or different from their own. The first premise is more of a concession. The premise is that countries need to be willing to make a judgment call for when it’s appropriate to safely negotiate. The intermediate conclusion that follows is that the U.S. was safely able to negotiate with the Hamas who occupy Gaza. The premise to explain the previous intermediate conclusion is that through talking, the Hamas have been open to recognizing a long hated enemy of Israel. The second premise/intermediate conclusion to support the first argument is that the U.S. successfully blocked negotiations with Palestine. The premise to support the intermediate conclusion is that Palestine ended up becoming divided and not peaceful.
The first explanation (intermediate conclusion) for the article has the intermediate conclusion that engaging in dialogue with another group is not the same as legitimizing the groups’ goals and ideology. The first premise it that many times negotiations will moderate radical groups’ behaviors. The intermediate conclusion that follows is that the U.S. was afraid to talk with Egypt when the revolution broke out this year. The premise to support the intermediate conclusion is that the U.S. falsely believed that talking with Egypt meant they were helping to create a radical Islamic revolution.
The second argument (intermediate conclusion) of the article is that real diplomatic change can only occur if we talk with all groups from the local culture, not just military puppets and older elites. The first premise to support this is that real change will only take place if local authorities are involved. The second premise is that many younger members of the population have begun to make a huge impact on the power of starting revolutions.
The article’s third argument (intermediate conclusion) is that people who oppose dialoguing with foreign countries must not be living in reality. The first premise is people want to unrealistically impose their belief system/morals on all people who don’t believe in what they believe in. The second premise is that some people will try to protect themselves from all opposing beliefs by “building a wall” around them to keep out all other countries or people who disagree with them “away and out”. The article’s last argument (intermediate conclusion) is that communicating is a sign of weakness. A premise to support this claim is that it takes courage to talk to the opposition about what you really believe.