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| − | ==October 23 2013== | + | ==11: OCT 6== |
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| − | ===Sam Wyss=== | + | ===Assigned=== |
| − | I am having trouble buying into the argument that the self doesn’t exist. Perhaps it is because I wish to expel some sort of ownership over who I am, but to claim that there is no self is very hard to follow. As I read both pieces, I found myself very confused with the argument, so perhaps what I’m saying here could be simply answered with the text, but my hope is that I understood the mat==November 7th 2013==
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| − | ===Sam Wyss===
| + | :*Haidt, Chapter 5, "Beyond WEIRD Morality" (17) |
| − | Initially, I felt it necessary to apologize at the beginning of this post on the lack of my understanding on this material, but I decided to stray from that, because hopefully my questions, and desire for clarity, will help spark further discussion. Other than that, I have no opinion on the matter, simply questions. So here it goes. Modernity is obsessed with the idea of accuracy and precision of knowledge obtained by science and reason. In post-modernity, have we strayed from that idea in the sense that we believe knowledge can be derived from something other than science and philosophy? Or is more along the lines that we might say that meaning and clarity that we once thought were so obtainable are not nearly that simple? In my outside research on what postmodernism is concerned with, it appears that the way we look at the world, from the enlightenment on, is skewed, it is fraud. There are some truths that can be derived from the fruits of philosophy, but meaning is only a construct of our subjective consciousness. Is that right? If so, where does that place philosophers in the world? Do they have any value? How do we obtain knowledge in an objective way? Is that a possibility? Another piece that sparked my interest and my question was the quote that Alfino references, which is that of Derrida regarding differences and traces of things. If I understand that piece right, Derrida is saying that no “element” can stand by itself, because everything can be traced to something else. So, that would imply things are an illusion. In regards to that idea, is there every a chance of trusting something to be one-hundred percent true, or is this life a narrative that we create from our consciousness, and all we do is play a long in the narrative? (Truly, I hope I am not getting this wrong and creating questions that aren’t related to the subject matter.) If the presence of meaning is nothing more than an illusion, we can never place meaning in something, right? That seems a bit scary and disheartening. Okay, I don’t want to run on with a list of questions, especially if I do not understand the material fully. Thanks everyone!
| + | :*Writing exercise: How WEIRD is Morality? |
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| − | ===Alynna Nemes=== | + | ===Brief Survey on Student Engagement in Hybrid course delivery=== |
| − | In the Grenz reading, the post modernist philosopher, Rorty, clearly made philosophers less significant than his predecessors. In the Republic, Socrates describes the ideal state using philosophers as kings and rulers. Rorty would reject Socrates belief that philosophers should be placed on a high pedestal. He voices that philosophers are not that special and great after all; "The post modern philosopher can only decry the notion of having a view while avoiding a view about having views" (159). The significance and importance of philosophers has vanished because postmodernists like Rorty, abandon the philosophical goal of searching for a universal theory of knowledge in favor of an ongoing discussion ; philosophy goes from knowledge to interpretation- from epistemology to hermeneutics. In hermeneutics, there are countless ways to view and understand the world and how we should live life. All these ways to live life are in conflict with one another. There is no unity or coherence in how we view the world. Plato, Marx, Kant, and many other philosophers have conflicting views on meaning, morality, and living. Rorty goes further to say that philosophy "is not endowed with the ability to decide issues of ultimate significance for human life, that the philosopher is no super scientist" (160). The quest to find meaning and answers to life's biggest questions through philosophy has ended because all it can do in a postmodern world is have well informed opinions and debates.
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| − | One thing I find troubling about postmodern philosophy is that language becomes insignificant in the sense that that "a word has no intrinsic meaning, that it is merely a convention, the regular use of a mark or noise. Language, in turn is a tool- human beings using marks and noises to get what they want" (Grenz 154). If everyone believed that language is condensed and had no intrinsic meaning, there would be no articulate and meaningful civilization. This reminded me of George Orwell's 1984 novel where vocabulary is increasing becoming limited and shortened to the point where people in this society would be expected to speak in quacks and noises. Postmodernists really make what people use to express value and meaningfulness trivial and insignificant.
| + | :*Please take the following anonymous [https://gonzaga.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3I98g1ecsTe59ZP survey]. |
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| − | ===Peter Guthrie=== | + | ===Final Stage of Sapolsky Writing Assignment=== |
| − | Dr. Alfino describes Post Modernism as a methodological strategy and has post structuralist (culture understood in terms of abstract sets of opposition) views of meaning. Post Modernism holds that all effort and understanding comes from one's use of the contents of their own consciousness and that consciousness is only has meaning pre-linguistically (outside of language). When things change language is used to express and explain it. So it is not the words that have meaning. I think, what it being said is that words are only a convention, a way to point at, the meaning in our own consciousness. Post Modernism moves away from a system of language and meaning where one person codifies and sends the message and the other person decodes it. In Post Modernism, what makes something what it is is its place in a system and meaning is distributed within the system of signification. This is mostly what I got out of the lecture but Dr. Alfino also makes a distinction between a signified and a signifier. However, on this point and on a few others I could use a little more explanation before I try to write about them here.
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| − | ===Marshall Powell===
| + | :*'''Stage 4''': Back-evaluation: After you receive your peer comments and my evaluation, take a few minutes to fill out this quick "back evaluation" rating form: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdgKCYITDTSOOHcvC3TAVNK-EZDsP4jiiyPj-7jdpRoNUsLPA/viewform?usp=sf_link]. '''Fill out the form for each reviewer, but not Alfino.''' Up to 10 points, in Points. |
| − | I thought the Grenz article was very interesting. The short summaries of the origins of Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, and Jacques Derrida were informative and really helped to frame their ideas and philosophy. The most interesting of these ideas for me were those of Foucalt relating to knowledge. There is a very strong feeling in contemporary scientific communities of objectivity. Science is viewed as the highest form of human thought, and the discoveries made by science are considered the most accurate, and nearest to truth forms of knowledge. Foucault's claims about the biased and self serving nature of science and history are very controversial. In someways it is clear that science is always hampered by the subjective nature of our interest. In scientific studies, it is impossible to be completely exhaustive in your data collection, and similarly data is not collected at random. There is always some outside force directing the collection of data and information. This outside force is human focus and interest. Human focus and interest, however, is easily influenced by outside pressures of society, and the desire to better one's own personal position. In this way, I believe that Foucault is right in claiming that there is a weakness in science.
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| − | I find Derrida's claim that there is nothing beyond the text a bit difficult to grasp. I'd like to discuss this topic in class.
| + | ::*Back evaluations are due '''Thursday, October 8, 11:59pm'''. |
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| − | ===Riley Peschon=== | + | ===Some samples from Henrich's, "The Weirdest People on Earth"=== |
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| − | Having never been formally introduced to postmodernism, I found the idea of rejecting the autonomous self to be very intriguing. It feels as if much of the philosophy in Gonzaga’s core curriculum (at least in my experience) rarely touches on this denunciation, as we strive towards become holistic individuals.
| + | :*p. 25: "Who Am I?" task. Show charts |
| | + | :*p. 28: sociocentric vs. individualistic |
| | + | :*p. 34: guilt vs. shame |
| | + | :*p. 44: impersonal honesty research (recall Ariely). |
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| − | I was particularly interested in one section of Alfino’s presentation, where he stated that “postmodern thought as a form of cultural criticism… shows us insightful things about how we represent ourselves in a cultural sense” and the lack of access to the conscious outside of language. The communication between the conscious and the self seems pretty unanswerable at this point. Alfino’s notes correlated with Foucault’s perspective, as Grenz said that he would ask, “how has the concept of human nature functioned in our society?” rather than “what is human nature?” I have always had the idea that the human conscious was somewhat inherent. Postmodernism challenges this, as not only is the conscious shaped by culture (not too radical of an idea), but human nature is something that can be altered by culture as well.
| + | ===Haidt, Chapter 5, "Beyond WEIRD Morality"=== |
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| − | Grenz described that both Derrida and Foucault were certainly against our “logocentric quest for meaning” (150). This is genuinely new territory for my philosophical thought process and to be honest, it is pretty awesome. I look forward to discussing this more in class, as there seems to be a lot of stances in postmodernism worth talking about. Discussing in class will help my understanding of some of the thought processes involved, as I also struggled to fully grasp some of the ideas that Grenz went over.
| + | ====WEIRD Morality==== |
| | + | :*WEIRD morality is the morality of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic cultures |
| | + | ::*just as likely to be bothered by taboo violations, but more likely to set aside feelings of disgust and allow violations |
| | + | ::*only group with majority allowing chicken story violation. |
| | + | ::*"the weirder you are the more likely you are to see the world in terms of separate objects, rather than relationships" "sociocentric" moralities vs. individualistic moralities; Enlightenment moralities of Kant and Mill are rationalist, individualist, and universalist. |
| | + | ::*survey data on East/West differences in sentence completion: "I am..." |
| | + | ::*framed-line task 97 |
| | + | :*Kantian and Millian ethical thought is rationalist, rule based, and universalist. Just the ethical theory you would expect from the culture. |
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| | + | ====A 3 channel moral matrix==== |
| | + | :*Schweder's anthropology: ethics of autonomy, community, divinity 99-100 - gloss each... |
| | + | ::*claims Schweder's theory predicts responses on taboo violation tests, is descriptively accurate. |
| | + | ::*ethic of divinity: body as temple vs. playground |
| | + | ::*vertical dimension to values. explains reactions to flag desecration, piss Christ, thought exp: desecration of liberal icons. (Note connection to contemporary conflicts, such as the Charlie Hebdot massacre.) |
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| − | ===Evan Dobbs=== | + | ====Making Sense of Moral/Cultural Difference==== |
| | + | :*'''Haidt's Bhubaneswar experience''': diverse (intense) continua of moral values related to purity. (opposite of disgust). Confusing at first, but notice that he started to like his hosts (elephant) and then started to think about how their values might work. Stop and think about how a mind might create this. Detail about airline passenger. |
| | + | :*Theorizing with Paul Rozin on the right model for thinking about moral foundations: "Our theory, in brief" (103) |
| | + | :*American politics often about sense of "sacrilege", not just about defining rights (autonomy). Not just harm, but types of moral disgust. |
| | + | :*'''Stepping out of the Matrix''': H's metaphor for seeing his own cultural moral values as more "contingent" than before, when it felt like the natural advocacy of what seem true and right. Reports growing self awareness of liberal orientation of intellectual culture in relation to Shweder's view. Social conservatives made more sense to him after studying in India. |
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| − | I found the Badiou reading very challenging and confusing at times. He made very bold statements, but seemed to back them up with common critiques of society like "materialism, commercialism, etc." without clearly stating how these things have harmed the things he says it has harmed. Nevertheless I will try and sum up what I think he is trying to argue. I believe Badiou is taking issue with the fact that philosophy is somewhat giving up on the questions posed by early philosophers about knowledge and truth. He thinks contemporary philosophy is "too strongly committed to the equivocalness of meaning and the plurality of languages." I think the key word Badiou has a problem with is "equivocalness," which can be defined as open to two or more interpretations. Multiple interpretations does not sit well with him. Badiou wants to bring philosophy back to the days of competing ideas, where one or the other could be right, not both. The "desire" seems to be gone from philosophy since everyone seems to be content with differing opinions. Badiou goes on to suggest a new system of thinking. He denounces language as a tool to be used by philosophers, and agrees with Plato that it is the "things" we should be concerned with, not necessarily the language.
| + | ===Small Group Discussion=== |
| − | erial enough to craft this stance.
| + | :*Discussion questions: |
| − | Buddha argues that there is no self. No feelings, perceptions, volition or sense of consciousness can be determining factors in the self. I can agree that feelings and perceptions, although seemingly valuable in determining who we are, are not ways at which we define the self. And this ties into the idea that Marshall presented in the class last. If we were to subtract perceptions or feelings, then is there still a self? Well, we would most likely argue, that you know what, sure, there is still a self, because there are those who are physically limited but still have some sort of identity. But how is it that you can’t have a self that is dependent on volition or consciousness? Buddha argues that not only is perception and feelings, variables that I believe we can already rule out, are transitory but so is volition or consciousness. At that point, I would like to put my foot down and say, woah now, how is that possible? It appears to me that Buddha wants a consistency in life in order to identify a self, and because there is form of control or consistency in volition or consciousness you cant argue there is such a thing as a self. But how is that possible. Perhaps your body just simply responds to the environment. Your body can say, obtain food, obtain water, and so on, but a stream of consciousness, can’t be as easily dismissed as volition. Consciousness is the glue to identity. Although consciousness simply defined is being awake, you also have to be aware, and that is where I disagree with Buddha. Being aware asks someone to respond to the world around them. Not everyone will respond to the world around them the same way. That right there, has to be some sort of proof that there is a self. There is something inside us that will respond to a situation differently. The fact that people are asked to be aware of the world allows me to think that there must be a self.
| + | ::*Does it make sense to talk about "stepping out of a matrix"? Is this a temporary thing? What value might it have in your experience? |
| − | I’m not sure where you would locate the self, and I understand that argument, but let’s think of it this way. Although we can’t locate the self, which then makes my opinion weaker, what would we be if there was no self. We would simply be moving matter performing tasks of absolutely no importance what so ever. If there was no self, then that would imply that we are agents moving only by forces that compel our minds and body. Perhaps this is my cry for having a purpose in life, and perhaps it’s a fear, but it seems so far off to claim that we don’t have a self in this life, if we have people aware of what is happening and reacting to the world.
| + | ::*Do you have a parallel story to Haidt's? (Mention travel experiences.) |
| − | I feel compelled to say that people have different passions and dreams, all of which will differentiate themselves, thus implying a self, but those could be argued as products of the environment. So my question is this: who is shaping the environment, who is it being shaped? The world is being shaped by those who are aware of their surroundings, and acting on them in a way that will impact who they are, thus implying a self.
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| − | ===Peter Guthrie=== | |
| − | Buddhists believe that all sufferings comes from belief in a self and seeking to possess and desiring impermanent things. I agree with Sam that there is a self but I think the other part of the idea of suffering is really interesting. Denial of material goods or possessions seems to be a common theme in all religions so I could follow pretty well their understanding of suffering. Even though I do not think all suffering comes from the loss of a pleasure I thought it was really insightful when in chapter two it mentioned even after getting the thing one desires he or she fears losing it and so still suffers. Like when someone gets a brand new car and they wax it every weekend and try to take great care of it and they are horridly afraid of that first ding they can't fully enjoy the car because it is causing internal worry and suffering. But what the chapter didn't address well, I think, are the ideas of reincarnation and nirvana. I am still confused by these. If I am understanding the chapter right, what happens to a person in their next life is dependent upon their actions in their previous life. So the person one is now is creating the life and outcome for his next self? Would that make Buddhism sort of deterministic? Something else I don't think was addressed well is what happens after one reaches nirvana. One gets to nirvana through enlightenment which would happen through meditation and following Gautama's teachings. But how does a deeper understanding of suffering, meditation and believing there is no self all the sudden take someone out of a repetitive cycle of reincarnation to nirvana? For example, in Christian faiths one can only reach heaven through death; death is the end. Even after reaching enlightenment a person can still continue to live so how does this deeper understanding take one out of a cycle of birth, death, and reincarnation because, it seems to me, that the mind has no control over any part of that cycle. I don't think I quite understand what nirvana is either. The only answer given was that a person is not "utterly non-existent" and there is no more suffering. How does that cash out? Nirvana is, I think, a mindset so what happens when one dies but they are not utterly non-existent? But chapter three argues that there is nothing permanent or lasting about the self so how can there be anything after exiting the reincarnation cycle?
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| − | ===Evan Dobbs===
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| − | This reading reminds me of a quote I heard from the comedian Louis C.K.:
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| − | "It’s true, everything that makes you happy is going to end at some point, and nothing good ends well. It’s like, if you buy a puppy, you’re bringing it home to your family’s saying, hey, look, everyone, we’re all gonna cry soon. Look at what I brought home. I brought home us crying in a few years. Here we go. Countdown to sorrow with a puppy."
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| − | Though this is a comical quote, it does address a sad fact that is also brought up by the Buddhists: most of our happiness and pleasures we experience are impermanent. The Buddhists stress the deceptive nature of pleasure and happiness because we are made to believe that these states can endure. Only when we are deprived or separated from these states do we see the whole picture.
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| − | This reading also offers a clear description of the purpose of meditation: the act of stopping a vicious cycle of ignorance, by controlling the mind. This control helps us evaluate and inspect our own “mental processes” and change those processes that cause suffering and ignorance. For Buddhists, meditation is the way in which the vicious cycle of ignorance can be dealt with and overcome. However, meditation alone does not cure ignorance. Philosophical thought must also be present to complete the process. This seems very similar to the Socratic idea of self-examination that we have talked in great deal about in our Ancients class. One major difference, however, is that Buddhist chose to examine their lives through solitude and meditation, rather than open dialogue.
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| − | One question I would pose to the Buddhists is: what is the point of preparing for a better life, if all you are going to be doing in those better lives, is preparing for better lives? If all you are doing in all of your lives is prepare for better lives, then aren't all your lives the same? It seems to neglect the importance of the "here and now" or the present moment. It would be as if a student were to go to school his entire life to become a doctor, yet never became a doctor because he was to busy training to become the best doctor he could be. I think the importance of morality (without re-birth) is to understand the finite time we have on this planet, therefore forcing us to not prolong or forgo our enjoyment indefinitely.
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| − | ===Alynna Nemes===
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| − | The two readings had a difficult format to trace the arguments and points about Buddhism. I understood that the author demonstrates the teachings of Buddhism while interpreting them. I found that I had to keep asking myself whether this or that interpretation of certain aspects of Buddhism was going to be rejected in favor of something else. To me, he was not as clear as he could have been on identifying objections and opposition of conflicting interpretations. Besides the reading being slightly confusing, Chapter 2 explains how Buddhist wisdom follows a similar philosophical path that we are learning in our philosophy classes; "In the context of the Buddhist path, 'wisdom' means the practice of philosophy: analyzing concepts, investigating arguments, considering objections" (24). This is just an affirmation that philosophy can be practiced throughout many aspects of life.
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| − | When I read Chapter 3, there was some more clarity offered on the point of having no self. There is an argument presented in six points. Focusing on the sixth point, "If there were a self it would be permanent... just what do 'permanent' and 'impermanent' mean here?... 'permanent' would mean eternal, and 'impermanent' would mean anything less than eternal" (39). From the definition I quoted above, I could understand how we have no self because it does not last forever. But, that reasoning did not completely explain and convince me that there is no self. While reading the foot notes, there is a clarification point that would be extremely useful in understanding why the self does not exist from a Buddhist perspective; "Buddhists deny the existence of the mind. But they affirm the existence of mental events, such as feeling and perception, as things that are distinct of the physical" (45). After reading this little foot note, if the mind does not exist, then the self does not exist. This follows in the opposite direction of Descartes where he believes that our mind exists, we have self with the famous phrase, "I think, therefore I am." If the Buddhists believe that a person's mind does not exist, then a person's self cannot exist either.
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| − | ===Marshall Powell===
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| − | The existence of self is something that I spend a lot of my time thinking about. To some degree, I find it very difficult to shake the notion of a me. However, when I try to pinpoint what my self is, I have extreme difficulty. It certainly isn't my physical body, because, even to my perception, my physical body is very different now than it has been in the past. Beyond my perception, it is also clear that the physical aspect of what I call me is also not lasting. The atoms from my body are being constantly lost and replaced with new atoms. I am uncertain what percentage of my body, at my death, will have existed inside of me throughout my life, but it will certainly only be a percentage. If I existed as part of my body in some way, then am I only the parts of me that began as me? This is why I don't think I exist in any sort of physical way. As far as my mind is concerned, it also seems plagued with the same problem as the body. Everyday I behave in different ways, I see things in different ways, and I believe different things. I certainly am not my beliefs and behaviors because they are never the same. If my self were these things then my self is different from moment to moment. This would lead to an indefinite number of selves, all with differing interests in the world and existence, and all with extremely fleeting periods of existence. This is more difficult to accept than a lack of a real self. Finally, it doesn't seem that my self is my experiences, because beyond what is happening in the exact moment, my knowledge of my experiences is contingent on my memory. Various experiments have been done, though, that bring the accuracy of our memories into question. This means that if I am my experiences, I'm unable to know accurately myself. If I am not able to know myself accurately, then it would be difficult for me to even assert my sentience. Of course, it would be silly to say that because I can't figure out what my self is, my self doesn't exist. It does seem to be the case that the only evidence of my self, apparent to me right now, is my perception.
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| − | On the the paradox of desire and and the path to enlightenment, it seems to me that what would be necessary for enlightenment is something similar to what Plato describes in the republic as a true philosopher. The true philosopher is one who seeks out wisdom for the sake of wisdom, rather than for the sake of the philosopher's interest.
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| − | As far as the other ideas of Buddhist teaching, I believe there is a gap in their claims. I can grasp that there is certainly suffering, and that everything is unchanging, and, if I take an nontraditional approach, I can even start to accept some form of reincarnation, centered around the fact that the atoms and molecules in my body will likely end up an some other beings. What I do not understand is what leads the Buddhist to assert that there is only one path to enlightenment. It also seems odd that there could be a description of enlightenment. I don't think I grasp fully, however, what Buddhist teachers believe about these and the other ideas. I think that the short description in the passage probably oversimplifies the true ideas of Buddhist teachers and philosophers.
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| − | ===Riley Peschon===
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| − | “It is our false belief in a self that Buddhists identify as the core of our ignorance.” (Ch.2) Along with this, ignorance is believed to be the root of suffering. Thus, it is our false belief in a self that leads to suffering. Contemplating this argument, I have to say it is valid. My minor alteration would be that I have what appears to be an inherent belief in self. I am fully aware that my acceptance of a self stems much, if not all, of my suffering. The very idea of one’s self not existing causes unease and I believe it to be the root of existential suffering. This is where I find Buddha’s argument puzzling, as existential suffering stems from the uncertainty of self and importance, or frustration in impermanence. Let’s say we definitively discover that there truly is no self. What would be the repercussions? Certainly, suffering would ensue due to individual despair and a feeling of hopelessness. Suffering would also stem from a seemingly inherent belief unraveling.
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| − | The executive function says that the five skandhas make up an individual and control one another. Similar to the chariot example given, a causal series of these skandhas may lead to a false idea of an entity (aka the self). In The Question of King Milinda, Nagasena described his name as a “convenient designator”, while Milinda calls it a “mere empty sound” (52). Following this passage, I proceeded to sit and just stare at my computer for a few minutes. Applying this idea to the self, as stated earlier, would completely crush a belief that I find to be inherent in nature. A self is what (supposedly) makes me the person that I am. I am not just a combination of parts, instead there is something in me that transcends the idea of skandhas.
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| − | To go along with the confusion these chapters brought, I found the idea of “physicalism” to be an interesting notion (despite wanting to have a self). Everything existing is physical, with thoughts and emotions being complex brain events. The prospect of this might actually have some merit considering the insanely fascinating things that go on inside our brain.
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