Difference between revisions of "OCT 22"
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− | == | + | ==17: OCT 22 Unit Four: Justice and Justified Partiality. == |
===Assigned=== | ===Assigned=== | ||
− | :* | + | :*[https://www.npr.org/2020/06/05/870352402/playing-favorites-when-kindness-toward-some-means-callousness-toward-others Hidden Brain, "Playing Favorites: When kindness toward some means callousness toward others"] |
+ | :*Rawls' Theory of Justice. Watch both: | ||
+ | ::*16 minute video focused on Rawls: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6k08C699zI&feature=youtu.be]. | ||
+ | ::*6 minute video, PBS series: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0CTHVCkm90&feature=youtu.be] | ||
− | === | + | ===In Class=== |
− | :* | + | :*Is there a limit to partiality to kin? |
− | + | :*Worksheet on last unit assigned | |
− | |||
− | + | ===Moral Psychology Unit Assessment=== | |
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | :* | + | :*Our Unit on Moral Psychology began on with learning on System 1 and 2, Churchland's chapter 4, "Norms and Values", and our study of empathy over two classes. Then we took a break for Dobbs and returned to the unit on February 29 with Churchland's Chapter 5, "I'm just that way." The unit finishes this week with Haidt's Moral Foundations theory (MFT), his MFQ research, and Hibbing's theory of Bedrock Social Dilemmas. |
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | :* | + | :*I will be updating last terms worksheet, so don't fill this one out. [https://forms.gle/JjuMsSrs2KtgNhT56 google form] this this assessment. It will be due on the '''TBD.''' |
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | : | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | :*" | + | |
− | ::* | + | ===Introduction to Justified Partiality (and Justice) Unit=== |
− | ::* | + | |
− | ::* | + | :*A typical question for thinking about social justice is, '''"What do I owe strangers?"'''. We've mentioned the social contract, or even the constitution, as a place where this set of values (expectations) is realized, but there are some other avenues to justice that we explore in this unit. |
− | ::* | + | |
+ | :*Some concepts: | ||
+ | ::*You owe strangers a '''duty of justice''' - something they can make a claim upon you for - (Examples) or | ||
+ | ::*You can also owe someone an informal or civil '''duty of interpersonal fairness/justice''' - you can't take me to court for not showing this sort of fairness or just treatment, but if you are on board with impersonal honesty, impersonal trust, and pro-sociality, you probably accept this duty at some level. (Examples) | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*You can think of our approach in this unit as an indirect way of addressing the question of these two sorts of justice duties by starting with a different question: | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*'''"What are the limits (if any) of partiality to family, intimates, friends?" (Your preference network)''' | ||
+ | ::*'''Personal Partiality''' - the legitimate preferences and treatment we show to friends, family, and intimates. | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*Today's class is focused on "personal partiality," the kind that shows up in our interpersonal social relationships. The next class will focus on '''"impersonal altruism"''', which shows up in our commitments, if any, to benefit strangers, especially strangers in our society, but in some cases, globally. | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*Three big questions: | ||
+ | ::*1. What are some the social functions of '''personal preferential treatment'''? (Draw in material from podcast) | ||
+ | ::*2. Could our networks of preferential treatment be the effect of and also promote injustice? | ||
+ | ::*3. What principles or considerations might lead to you recognize a '''duty of interpersonal justice'''? (that is, should you direct some resources (time, money, in-kind aid) outside your preference network? (We need additional resources for Question #3) | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===Hidden Brain, "Playing Favorites"=== | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*Intro | ||
+ | ::*Expectations for unique attention from one's beloved. We'd rather an inferior unique message than a message shared with others. '''We want partiality'''. (Think about cases in which someone shows you a simple preference -- offering to pay for coffee, give you a ride somewhere, just showing you attention. It's wonderful!) | ||
+ | ::*How does partiality fit with a desire for justice as equal treatment? Can partiality cause injustice? | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*'''Segment 1: Carla's Story''' | ||
+ | ::*Discrimination research: IAT - Implicit Association Test - Mahzarin Banaji (Harvard) one of the researchers on IAT. | ||
+ | ::*Mahzarin Banaji and Professor Carla Kaplan (Yale English at time of story). Also a quilter. Friends in the 80s, among the few women at Yale. Story of injury to Carla. She gets preferential treatment because she is a professor, rather than because she was a quilter. Class based. | ||
+ | ::*Is it discrimination if you are given a preference? [Imagine a system of preferences given to those we know. Could such a system support systemic injustice?] Someone decides to show you "special kindness" -- above and beyond the ordinary. Language of discrimination based on "commission". But what about omission? Hard to know if you didn't get preferential treatment. Yikes! Carla got to see both what it was like to be treated same and different. | ||
+ | ::*Most injustices of "omission" are invisible. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*Story by Mahzarin about interview from former student journalist from magazine the professor didn't respect. Suddenly, the in-group information about being a Yaley was enough to trigger a preference. Preference networks in Ivy leagues schools. But also Gonzaga!!! We actively cultivate a preferential network for you! Because we care about you! | ||
+ | ::*"Helping those with whom you have a group identity" is a form of modern discrimination, acc to Mahzarin. | ||
+ | ::*Interesting feature of favoritism -- You often don't find out that you didn't get preferential treatment. | ||
+ | ::*'''Favoritism doesn't get as much attention as discrimination.''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*Can you avoid favoritism? | ||
+ | ::*Could be based on "green beard effect" same school, etc. | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*'''Segment 2: Dillon the Altruist''' 16:00 minutes. | ||
+ | ::*What would it be like to try to overcome favoritism. | ||
+ | ::*Story of Dillon Matthews. Tries to avoid favoritism. Middle school story. Utilitarian primer: Singer's argument about helping others in need. Thought experiment: Saving a child from a pond ruins your suit. Utilitarian altruism. | ||
+ | ::*''Singer's Principle'': If you can do good without giving up something of equal moral significance, you should do it. | ||
+ | ::*"Give Well" - documented charity work. (One of many sources that can assure you that your money did something good. Other examples: Jimmy Carter's mission, Gates' missions. If you had contributed to such a cause, you would have been effective.) | ||
+ | ::*Hannah’s model: Value the person in front of you. Then move out to others. Courtship with Dillon involves debate over these two approaches: Partiality justified vs not justified. Debating moral philosophy on a first date! Wow! It doesn't get any better than that. | ||
+ | ::*'''Effective altruism movement'''. The most good you can do. Evidence based altruism. Vs. Hannah: Focused on family, friends, your neighborhood, city. Parental lesson. Dinner together. | ||
+ | ::*Utilitarian logic. Equal happiness principle. Dillon not focused on preference to people near him, but on effectiveness of altruism. (Feel the rationality, and maybe the unnaturalness of this.) | ||
+ | ::*Dillon donates a kidney to a stranger. Hmm. Not giving his kidney felt like hoarding something. Hannah felt her beloved was taking an unnecessary risk. "Being a stranger" made a difference to her. Audio of Dillon’s recovery. Hmm. Dillon honored by Kidney Association. | ||
+ | ::*The Trolley Problem again, this time from Joshua Greene himself!! Watch "The Good Place". | ||
+ | ::*What if the person you had to sacrifice was someone you loved, your child. Dillon might do it. Dillion would do it. "They are all the heroes of their own stories..." Dillon would sacrifice Hannah. Hannah might sacrifice Dillion just know that's what he would want that, but no. She wouldn't. Dillion jokes that he might kill himself after killing his child. | ||
+ | ::*Greene: She recognizes that what he would do is rational. He's willing to override it, but he might not be able to live with himself for doing that. (Elephant and rider.) | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*'''Segment 3: Neurobiology of Preference'''. 33:15 minutes. | ||
+ | ::*Naturalness of preference. Evolutionary background: Preference promotes cooperation. Suite of capacities. A package. Don't lie, cheat, steal... | ||
+ | ::*”Morality is fundamentally about cooperation” (Greene): Kin cooperation....Cooperation among friends... reciprocity...semi-strangers (same religion. friend of kin. friend of friend of kin. Friends! | ||
+ | ::*Moral concentric circles. How big is my "Us"? What is the range of humans I care about and to what degree? | ||
+ | ::*Greene's analogy of automatic and manual camera modes. (Two systems. Automatic (elephant) and Deliberate (rider).) Difficult decisions might require '''manual mode'''. | ||
+ | ::*Manual mode: dlPFC (activated in utilitarian thought) (high cog load). Automatic -- amygdala. Snakes in the grass. Thank your amygdala. Point: We need both systems. We need lying, cheating, and stealing to be pretty automatic NOs! | ||
+ | ::*List: Easy calls: sharing concert tickets with a friend. Buying dinner for an intimate partner. Giving a more valuable gift to one person than another. Harder: Figuring out whether to donate money to help people far away. How much? | ||
+ | ::*'''Crying baby scenario'''. Inevitable outcomes seem to matter here. Brain wrestles, as in experience. vmPFC (evaluates/weighs) | ||
+ | ::*Lack of Tribal identity might tilt us toward rule based ethics. Equal treatment. Automatic systems not designed for a world that could help strangers 10,000 miles away. | ||
+ | ::*Loyalty cases: men placing loyalty to men above other virtues. Assumptions about family relationship. Do families sometime impose on your loyalty (can be disfunctional)? [Recent example of the Jan 6 insurrectionist who threatened his family not to rat him out. They did.] The "worth being loyal to" part is sometimes unexamined. [recall the passenger dilemma] | ||
+ | ::*Example: Spending lots of money on a birthday party. | ||
+ | ::*Back to Dillon: Acknowledges limits. Liver story. Bits of liver. It grows back. Partners not so much. | ||
+ | ::*Mazarin’s story about giving to alleviate Japanese disaster. We can retriever. | ||
+ | ::*— Giving Well — you really can save lives. | ||
+ | ::*Closing point by Joshua Greene. If you ran into a burning building and saved someone, it would be a highpoint of your life. Why not consider the same outcome heroic even if it doesn't involve a burning building? | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===Rawls Theory of Justice === | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*16 minute video focused on Rawls: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6k08C699zI&feature=youtu.be]. | ||
+ | ::*6 minute video, PBS series: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0CTHVCkm90&feature=youtu.be] | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*PBS short video on Rawls | ||
+ | :*Justice as fairness - Ancient Greeks: harmony. Range of goals: liberty, caring for needs, etc. | ||
+ | :*Justice is about distribution of goods. “Distributive justice”. Examples: equality, needs, merit (getting what you deserve), Rawls- Justice is fairness. Response to natural inequalities. This is a form of needs based justice. Life is unfair, justice is a remedy for that. | ||
+ | :*Nozick (Libertarian) objects: Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment. Unjust to even out the playing field. As long as we don’t get our stuff by unjust means, we deserve our stuff. | ||
+ | :*Negative rights v positive rights. “Freedom from interference” v “Right to some goods” | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*”Then and Now” video | ||
+ | ::*Rawls’ Theory of Justice 1972 | ||
+ | ::*Responding to utilitarian views of justice. Criticism of utilitarianism. Might not protect rights sufficiently. Slavery example. | ||
+ | ::*Rawls want to mix a rights view with distributive justice. Rights are not directly utilitarian (though possibly indirectly) | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*Original Social Contract tradition. Another Enlightenment philosophical product! See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_contract Social Contract wiki]. | ||
+ | ::*Social contract tradition. Original position. '''What rules and principles would it be rational to choose?''' | ||
+ | :*Rawls' basic method: Principles of justice should be chosen by following a kind of thought experiment in which you imagine yourself not knowing specific things about your identity and social circumstances. Adopting this special stance is what Rawls calls the "veil of ignorance" (parallel in Social Contract tradition) | ||
+ | :*Original Position in Rawls' thought: Choosing principles of justice under a "veil of ignorance" (simple intuition about fairness: How do you divide the last piece of cake? | ||
+ | ::*Note how this realizes a basic condition of moral thought: neutrality, universalization, fairness. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*In the original position: | ||
+ | :::*You still know: human psychology, human history, economics, the general types of possible situations in which humans can find themselves. | ||
+ | :::*You don't know: your place in society, your class, social status, for tu in in natural assets and abilities, sex, race, physical handicaps, generation, social class of our parents, whether you are part of a discriminated group, etc. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ::*Note Rawls' argument for choosing things you don't know. He considers them "morally arbitrary." You don't deserve to be treated better or worse for your ethnicity, talents, health status, orientation, etc. Recall historically arbitrary differences like noble birth that we used to treat as morally significant. | ||
+ | ::*A conservative theorist might object. If a healthy person can earn more money and the freedom to earn money is a matter of moral consequence, then maybe health isn't morally arbitrary? On the other hand, you might be hard pressed to claim that you “deserve” more money because you had healthier genes. For Rawls, it might still be just for you to earn more, but you should also acknowledge that you are benefiting from “morally arbitrary” features of your existence while others are suffering from morally arbitrary deficits. | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*So, what principles would it be rational to choose? | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*Rawls claims we would choose the following two principles | ||
+ | ::*1) '''Principle of Equal Liberty''': Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all. | ||
+ | ::*Basic liberties 11:46. Play. Freedom from: right to vote, speech, assembly, freedom of thought, property, from arbitrary arrest, from discrimination. Positive: Opportunities, basic education. (Egalitarian about rights.) | ||
+ | ::*2) '''Difference Principle''': Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. (Welfare principle for distribution of goods.). “Maximin” strategy maximizing the minimum possible position. Based on a risk calculation. (Note: people have different risk tolerance. Could be a criticism.) | ||
+ | |||
+ | :*The core intuition behind Rawls' approach is that some things are "morally arbitrary". The veil is an attempt to exclude them. |
Latest revision as of 16:46, 22 October 2024
Contents
17: OCT 22 Unit Four: Justice and Justified Partiality.
Assigned
- Hidden Brain, "Playing Favorites: When kindness toward some means callousness toward others"
- Rawls' Theory of Justice. Watch both:
In Class
- Is there a limit to partiality to kin?
- Worksheet on last unit assigned
Moral Psychology Unit Assessment
- Our Unit on Moral Psychology began on with learning on System 1 and 2, Churchland's chapter 4, "Norms and Values", and our study of empathy over two classes. Then we took a break for Dobbs and returned to the unit on February 29 with Churchland's Chapter 5, "I'm just that way." The unit finishes this week with Haidt's Moral Foundations theory (MFT), his MFQ research, and Hibbing's theory of Bedrock Social Dilemmas.
- I will be updating last terms worksheet, so don't fill this one out. google form this this assessment. It will be due on the TBD.
Introduction to Justified Partiality (and Justice) Unit
- A typical question for thinking about social justice is, "What do I owe strangers?". We've mentioned the social contract, or even the constitution, as a place where this set of values (expectations) is realized, but there are some other avenues to justice that we explore in this unit.
- Some concepts:
- You owe strangers a duty of justice - something they can make a claim upon you for - (Examples) or
- You can also owe someone an informal or civil duty of interpersonal fairness/justice - you can't take me to court for not showing this sort of fairness or just treatment, but if you are on board with impersonal honesty, impersonal trust, and pro-sociality, you probably accept this duty at some level. (Examples)
- You can think of our approach in this unit as an indirect way of addressing the question of these two sorts of justice duties by starting with a different question:
- "What are the limits (if any) of partiality to family, intimates, friends?" (Your preference network)
- Personal Partiality - the legitimate preferences and treatment we show to friends, family, and intimates.
- Today's class is focused on "personal partiality," the kind that shows up in our interpersonal social relationships. The next class will focus on "impersonal altruism", which shows up in our commitments, if any, to benefit strangers, especially strangers in our society, but in some cases, globally.
- Three big questions:
- 1. What are some the social functions of personal preferential treatment? (Draw in material from podcast)
- 2. Could our networks of preferential treatment be the effect of and also promote injustice?
- 3. What principles or considerations might lead to you recognize a duty of interpersonal justice? (that is, should you direct some resources (time, money, in-kind aid) outside your preference network? (We need additional resources for Question #3)
Hidden Brain, "Playing Favorites"
- Intro
- Expectations for unique attention from one's beloved. We'd rather an inferior unique message than a message shared with others. We want partiality. (Think about cases in which someone shows you a simple preference -- offering to pay for coffee, give you a ride somewhere, just showing you attention. It's wonderful!)
- How does partiality fit with a desire for justice as equal treatment? Can partiality cause injustice?
- Segment 1: Carla's Story
- Discrimination research: IAT - Implicit Association Test - Mahzarin Banaji (Harvard) one of the researchers on IAT.
- Mahzarin Banaji and Professor Carla Kaplan (Yale English at time of story). Also a quilter. Friends in the 80s, among the few women at Yale. Story of injury to Carla. She gets preferential treatment because she is a professor, rather than because she was a quilter. Class based.
- Is it discrimination if you are given a preference? [Imagine a system of preferences given to those we know. Could such a system support systemic injustice?] Someone decides to show you "special kindness" -- above and beyond the ordinary. Language of discrimination based on "commission". But what about omission? Hard to know if you didn't get preferential treatment. Yikes! Carla got to see both what it was like to be treated same and different.
- Most injustices of "omission" are invisible.
- Story by Mahzarin about interview from former student journalist from magazine the professor didn't respect. Suddenly, the in-group information about being a Yaley was enough to trigger a preference. Preference networks in Ivy leagues schools. But also Gonzaga!!! We actively cultivate a preferential network for you! Because we care about you!
- "Helping those with whom you have a group identity" is a form of modern discrimination, acc to Mahzarin.
- Interesting feature of favoritism -- You often don't find out that you didn't get preferential treatment.
- Favoritism doesn't get as much attention as discrimination.
- Can you avoid favoritism?
- Could be based on "green beard effect" same school, etc.
- Segment 2: Dillon the Altruist 16:00 minutes.
- What would it be like to try to overcome favoritism.
- Story of Dillon Matthews. Tries to avoid favoritism. Middle school story. Utilitarian primer: Singer's argument about helping others in need. Thought experiment: Saving a child from a pond ruins your suit. Utilitarian altruism.
- Singer's Principle: If you can do good without giving up something of equal moral significance, you should do it.
- "Give Well" - documented charity work. (One of many sources that can assure you that your money did something good. Other examples: Jimmy Carter's mission, Gates' missions. If you had contributed to such a cause, you would have been effective.)
- Hannah’s model: Value the person in front of you. Then move out to others. Courtship with Dillon involves debate over these two approaches: Partiality justified vs not justified. Debating moral philosophy on a first date! Wow! It doesn't get any better than that.
- Effective altruism movement. The most good you can do. Evidence based altruism. Vs. Hannah: Focused on family, friends, your neighborhood, city. Parental lesson. Dinner together.
- Utilitarian logic. Equal happiness principle. Dillon not focused on preference to people near him, but on effectiveness of altruism. (Feel the rationality, and maybe the unnaturalness of this.)
- Dillon donates a kidney to a stranger. Hmm. Not giving his kidney felt like hoarding something. Hannah felt her beloved was taking an unnecessary risk. "Being a stranger" made a difference to her. Audio of Dillon’s recovery. Hmm. Dillon honored by Kidney Association.
- The Trolley Problem again, this time from Joshua Greene himself!! Watch "The Good Place".
- What if the person you had to sacrifice was someone you loved, your child. Dillon might do it. Dillion would do it. "They are all the heroes of their own stories..." Dillon would sacrifice Hannah. Hannah might sacrifice Dillion just know that's what he would want that, but no. She wouldn't. Dillion jokes that he might kill himself after killing his child.
- Greene: She recognizes that what he would do is rational. He's willing to override it, but he might not be able to live with himself for doing that. (Elephant and rider.)
- Segment 3: Neurobiology of Preference. 33:15 minutes.
- Naturalness of preference. Evolutionary background: Preference promotes cooperation. Suite of capacities. A package. Don't lie, cheat, steal...
- ”Morality is fundamentally about cooperation” (Greene): Kin cooperation....Cooperation among friends... reciprocity...semi-strangers (same religion. friend of kin. friend of friend of kin. Friends!
- Moral concentric circles. How big is my "Us"? What is the range of humans I care about and to what degree?
- Greene's analogy of automatic and manual camera modes. (Two systems. Automatic (elephant) and Deliberate (rider).) Difficult decisions might require manual mode.
- Manual mode: dlPFC (activated in utilitarian thought) (high cog load). Automatic -- amygdala. Snakes in the grass. Thank your amygdala. Point: We need both systems. We need lying, cheating, and stealing to be pretty automatic NOs!
- List: Easy calls: sharing concert tickets with a friend. Buying dinner for an intimate partner. Giving a more valuable gift to one person than another. Harder: Figuring out whether to donate money to help people far away. How much?
- Crying baby scenario. Inevitable outcomes seem to matter here. Brain wrestles, as in experience. vmPFC (evaluates/weighs)
- Lack of Tribal identity might tilt us toward rule based ethics. Equal treatment. Automatic systems not designed for a world that could help strangers 10,000 miles away.
- Loyalty cases: men placing loyalty to men above other virtues. Assumptions about family relationship. Do families sometime impose on your loyalty (can be disfunctional)? [Recent example of the Jan 6 insurrectionist who threatened his family not to rat him out. They did.] The "worth being loyal to" part is sometimes unexamined. [recall the passenger dilemma]
- Example: Spending lots of money on a birthday party.
- Back to Dillon: Acknowledges limits. Liver story. Bits of liver. It grows back. Partners not so much.
- Mazarin’s story about giving to alleviate Japanese disaster. We can retriever.
- — Giving Well — you really can save lives.
- Closing point by Joshua Greene. If you ran into a burning building and saved someone, it would be a highpoint of your life. Why not consider the same outcome heroic even if it doesn't involve a burning building?
Rawls Theory of Justice
- PBS short video on Rawls
- Justice as fairness - Ancient Greeks: harmony. Range of goals: liberty, caring for needs, etc.
- Justice is about distribution of goods. “Distributive justice”. Examples: equality, needs, merit (getting what you deserve), Rawls- Justice is fairness. Response to natural inequalities. This is a form of needs based justice. Life is unfair, justice is a remedy for that.
- Nozick (Libertarian) objects: Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment. Unjust to even out the playing field. As long as we don’t get our stuff by unjust means, we deserve our stuff.
- Negative rights v positive rights. “Freedom from interference” v “Right to some goods”
- ”Then and Now” video
- Rawls’ Theory of Justice 1972
- Responding to utilitarian views of justice. Criticism of utilitarianism. Might not protect rights sufficiently. Slavery example.
- Rawls want to mix a rights view with distributive justice. Rights are not directly utilitarian (though possibly indirectly)
- Original Social Contract tradition. Another Enlightenment philosophical product! See Social Contract wiki.
- Social contract tradition. Original position. What rules and principles would it be rational to choose?
- Rawls' basic method: Principles of justice should be chosen by following a kind of thought experiment in which you imagine yourself not knowing specific things about your identity and social circumstances. Adopting this special stance is what Rawls calls the "veil of ignorance" (parallel in Social Contract tradition)
- Original Position in Rawls' thought: Choosing principles of justice under a "veil of ignorance" (simple intuition about fairness: How do you divide the last piece of cake?
- Note how this realizes a basic condition of moral thought: neutrality, universalization, fairness.
- In the original position:
- You still know: human psychology, human history, economics, the general types of possible situations in which humans can find themselves.
- You don't know: your place in society, your class, social status, for tu in in natural assets and abilities, sex, race, physical handicaps, generation, social class of our parents, whether you are part of a discriminated group, etc.
- Note Rawls' argument for choosing things you don't know. He considers them "morally arbitrary." You don't deserve to be treated better or worse for your ethnicity, talents, health status, orientation, etc. Recall historically arbitrary differences like noble birth that we used to treat as morally significant.
- A conservative theorist might object. If a healthy person can earn more money and the freedom to earn money is a matter of moral consequence, then maybe health isn't morally arbitrary? On the other hand, you might be hard pressed to claim that you “deserve” more money because you had healthier genes. For Rawls, it might still be just for you to earn more, but you should also acknowledge that you are benefiting from “morally arbitrary” features of your existence while others are suffering from morally arbitrary deficits.
- So, what principles would it be rational to choose?
- Rawls claims we would choose the following two principles
- 1) Principle of Equal Liberty: Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all.
- Basic liberties 11:46. Play. Freedom from: right to vote, speech, assembly, freedom of thought, property, from arbitrary arrest, from discrimination. Positive: Opportunities, basic education. (Egalitarian about rights.)
- 2) Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity. (Welfare principle for distribution of goods.). “Maximin” strategy maximizing the minimum possible position. Based on a risk calculation. (Note: people have different risk tolerance. Could be a criticism.)
- The core intuition behind Rawls' approach is that some things are "morally arbitrary". The veil is an attempt to exclude them.