Difference between revisions of "APR 22"

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==24. APR 22==
+
==26: APR 22. ==
  
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===Assigned Work===
+
===Assigned===
  
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:*Montgomery, David. Chapter 2: "Skin of the Earth" ''Dirt''(pp. 9-25); (16)
+
:*Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will (580-613) (Part Two 598-613)
−
:*Montgomery, David. Chapter 3: "Rivers of Life" (pp. 27-47) (20)
+
 
 +
:*Over the next few classes, try to watch some of these: [[PrisonVideo]].
  
 
===In-class===
 
===In-class===
  
−
:*Documentary reports:
+
:*Some limits on Ultimate Moral Responsibility: Trying not to be the inquisitor.
−
::*Island of the Whales
+
:*How can anyone be a compatibilist?
 +
:*How should we treat people who make mistakes?
 +
 
 +
===Some arguments against Ultimate Moral Responsibility===
 +
 
 +
:Lines of argument regarding individual moral responsibility:
 +
 
 +
:*1. Strawson's Impossibility Argument.
 +
::*We cannot be "ultimately" responsible for how we are.  What follows from his argument?
 +
 
 +
:*2. Mele's Self-modification argument and the "Benji" response.
 +
::*We can self-modify, but some of our ability to do that is not up to us.
 +
 
 +
:*3. Growth of Knowledge argument - Sapolsky (604-605)
 +
::*The more we learn about human behavior, the harder it is to make retributive punishment an "end in itself".
 +
 
 +
:Lines of argument at the social and cultural levels:
 +
 
 +
:*1. Knowledge of the social determinants of crime and dysfunctional behavior.
 +
::*The more we know (also a growth of knowledge argument) about SES and the "epidemiology of crime" the harder it is to blame people absolutely and, hence, retributively. 
 +
 
 +
:*2. Cultural evolution and the evolution of the idea of free will. 
 +
::*While we feel certain about free will, that certainty might also be a product of cultural psychology (Henrich).
 +
 
 +
===Some arguments supporting the idea that we are all equally responsible for our actions.  Or do they?===
  
−
===Montgomery, David. Chapter 2, "Skin of the Earth"===
+
:*1. We experience our own responsibility as comprehensive and applying to new circumstances.  If I'm responsibility for everything I do, you can be too.  (Even if there’s no hummunculus.)
  
−
::*Darwin's studies of worms.  Worms are moving a heck of a lot of dirt. 10-20 tons per acre per year. digestive juices.
+
::*It could be that an NCA is blameworthy in this way, but does the inference follow?
−
::*Note the recentness of our lack of knowledge of this.  Also why antiquities sink.
 
−
::*Darwin's calculations were off: underestimated the time scale for effects.  Didn't know about '''isostasy''' - a process which lifts rock as well.  But did understand soil formation as breakdown of minerals. 
 
−
::*15: overview of soil ecology relationships.  read.  even theories that soil formation was involved in first forms of organismic life. 
 
−
::*guanine and cytosine in clay-rich solutions. 
 
−
::*15-16: overview of plant colonization of cooling earth (350 mya).  earth plant life accelerated soil formation.  lots of other physical and chemical processes (17). Gophers, roots, termites, ants….
 
−
::*nitrogen fixation (18): note mechanism.  "nitrogen fixing plant" a misnomer. 
 
  
−
::*effects of agriculture:
+
:*2. Sure there are biological explanations for what we do, but you can always get help or decide not to do those things. We have many examples of people summoning more will power to solve their problems.  Morse: Just because there are causes for your action, it doesn’t mean you were compelled to do it.
−
:::*tilling releases nutrients, but also disrupts soil life, short-rotation farming reduces soil diversity, increases vulnerability to parasites,
 
  
−
:::*p. 20: Connection bt farming methods and soil erosion and soil health.
+
::*Effort does make a difference.  A problem is, how do you know? How do we know if was lack of effort v some other biological difference (less severe case of addiction, etc.) that explains the differences in outcomes?  One person goes to anger management class and never assaults again, while another does.
  
−
:*Note how starting your account of food (vs. “Agriculture as Human Innovation”) from soil gives you deeper sense of your trophic relationships.   
+
:*3. “Illusionism”. Even if we are not all equally responsible for our actions, we need to act that way for the good of society.   
  
−
::*You are what you eat. You are what you eat eats.
+
::*But then, imagine the conversation at the last medieval town to get rid of stockades and the pillory?  If we maintain an illusion that painful punishment is needed, then we are just causing unjust suffering.
  
−
===Montgomery, Dirt, Chapter 3, "Rivers of Life"===
+
===How Can Someone be a Compatibilist? Or, Agency Views of Free Will===
  
−
::*connection between humanity and soil in language: adama (earth) hava (living). We are living earth.  In Latin "homo" from "humus", living soil.
+
:*Agency as a source of causal powers for normally competent individuals
 +
::*Even if determinism is true, normal human beings have agency. Agency is a causal power. The ability to control ourselves and affect the world around us.
 +
::*Agency includes our ability to "do what we want"; even if we lack ultimate powers to determine what we want.
 +
::*Free will may be something like "doing what I want to do" and having wants and desires that are "mine."
 +
::*Agency is our capacity to control outcomes and take ownership of some of actions. 
 +
::*A normally competent agent (NCA) can learn the expectations of their society and conform to them.
  
−
::*suggest myth of the garden represents transition to agriculture, climate change.
+
:*Note: We often talk about an action being "ours" even when we say we are determined or influenced to do that action.  (See examples from below.) Perhaps physics is the wrong place to look for free will?
  
−
:*Long history
+
:*Problem: What sort of approach to punishment does this compatibilist picture support?
 +
::*One line: Well, if it's really your wants and desires that you're acting on, and you chose them, then you can be db-MR for failures.
 +
::*Another line: It's fine to say that your actions were "yours," and that's a good reason to knock on your door if you break the law, but that doesn't mean you chose.  You may have "taken ownership" of the causal forces that made you the way you are, but they still did make you this way and not some other way.
  
−
::*20,000 years ago - last major glaciation (though not a single event).  Europe freezes, Africa dries. 
+
===Ordinary Language and Free Will===
−
::*2 million years ago - earliest evidence of migration of homo erectus from Africa.  separation from Neanderthal (note some evidence that we ate 'em [https://www.theguardian.com/science/2009/may/17/neanderthals-cannibalism-anthropological-sciences-journal]),
 
−
::*300,000 year ago - first modern humans. 
 
−
::*45,000 years ago - another wave of migration from Africa (movement occurred in both directions).
 
−
::*30,000 years ago - sharp stone tools (much later than the handaxe .5 mya) and at 23,000 yrs bows and arrows
 
−
::*[https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9989-timeline-human-evolution/ Human Evolution Timeline]
 
  
−
::*modifications in skin color and other features a response to UV radiation and Vitamin D production, selection effect.   
+
:*Free will looks less mysterious if you focus on our "agential capacities," rather than determinism.  Consider these "ordinary language" statements.  How is "choosing" and "free will" being used differently in each case?  Is this way of talking "compatible" with determinism?:
  
−
:*Emergence of agriculture
+
::*I may choose to take up painting as a hobby.
 +
::*My grandmother had a big influence on me and that's why I chose to become a doctor.
 +
::*I cannot choose to become a concert violinists at this point in my life.
 +
::*I can choose whether or not I get ready for class.
 +
::*I have no choice, I have to turn you in to the police.
  
−
::*'''oasis and cultural evolution theories'''.
+
::*I can't choose not to love you, but I can't see you any more.
−
:::*oasis theory - post glacial drying in Middle East restricted food sources to wetter flood plains.  
+
::*I've decided I don't love you any more. (aww...)
−
:::*cultural evo thesis - agricultural innovation independent of environmental change.
 
−
::*problem with oasis theory - food variety in mid-east expanding at time of agriculture, esp from N. Africa - seeds.  
 
−
::*problem with cultural evolution theory -- not everyone adopted ag (though in other examples, like hand axes, everyone does adopt). 
 
  
−
::*3rd possibility: increasing population density -- '''agriculture a forced option'''.  Note climate of the Levant 13 - 11,000bc - major food abundance. could have supported population explosion.
+
::*Parent to child: You can do anything you put your mind to.  (Yeah, right.)
 +
::*Parent to child: You need to try harder.
 +
::*Parent to (older) child: You're doing fine. Just keep that up.
  
−
::*mini-glaciation at 10,000 bc called the Younger Dryas -- recovered pollen samples drop by 3/4 -- decrease precip.  forests recede.
+
===Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will (580-613) (Part Two 598-613)===
  
−
::*site evidence from Abu Hureyra, on Tigris -- evidence of cultivation of grains, drought tolerant ones (drought sensitive ones disappear from the record), for example. 
+
:*'''But does anything useful actually come of this?'''
  
−
::*more work to produce a calorie at start of agriculture --(recall crucial calculation here).  population grew to six thousand.  evidence of settlements chosen for ag condition.
+
::*Grounds for skepticism about using neuroscience in the courtroom:  Stephen Morse.  Neurolaw sceptic, ok with M’naugton, but thinks cases are rare.  Reviews valid criticisms he makes: 1. Juries might overvalue neuroscience images, 2. Descriptive vs. Normative.
  
−
::*note -- using evidence from burnt food remains, we can track the migration of food, independently of human migration.   
+
::*Morse supports a strong distinction between causation and compulsion.  Causation is not itself an excuse.  But Sapolsky argues that this still involves walling off a “homunculus” and that’s not plausible.   
  
−
::*agriculture developed in several places, but we missed this because in some places it developed before settled towns.  Mesoamerica, China.   
+
::*Acknowledges an apparent problem.  Neuroscience typically can’t predict individual behavior very much.  Fictional exchange with prosecutor.  600
  
−
:*'''Spread of Agriculture'''
+
::*Explaining lots and Predicting Little
  
−
::*spread through Levant and Turkey.  Growth allowed defeat of nearby hunter/gatherers in contest for territory.   
+
:*But is the lack of predictive power a problem in the argument?  S. works through some cases in which probability of prediction decreases, but no less likely that it could be a case of compulsion.  601
  
−
::*The dog - 20k. The cat 4K.  (Google “human evolution and dogs” for research on dog/human convolution.)
+
:*602: Important methodological point: There's no less biology in the leg fracture vs. the other disorders, but level of biological explanation is different.  Leg fractures are less connected to culture. Behavior is multifactorial and heavily cultural.  (Oh god, another Henrich digression. Free will has a history.) Example: how much does biology predict depression? Factors are diverse biological mechanisms, including cultural factors. (But, point is, someone can be disable by depression, just like the leg fracture.)
  
−
::*Domesticated livestock a huge leap - animal labor, fertilizer, and stored food — on the hoof.
+
:*Marvin Minsky, “Free will: internal forces I do not understand”. Sapolsky adds “yet”.
  
−
::*after agriculture, population doubles every 1,000 years.  200 million by 0 CE. 2,000 years later 6.5 billion.  
+
:*'''Growth of Knowledge argument:''' Neat charts showing historic trend to connect social behavior and biology in research journals. 604-605.  
  
−
:*'''Sumeria / Mesopatamia'''
+
:*If you still believe in mitigated free will:
 +
::*Case of Dramer and Springer and the spiritual explanation for epilepsy. Biblical version with Jesus. 
 +
::*Sapolsky imagines an Inquisitor (witch burner).  Must be puzzled occasionally by fact pattern. Mom has epilepsy. 
 +
::*Growth of knowledge argument 607-608.  read list.  '''How will they view us?: Most likely option is that our kids will look at us as idiots about moral responsibility and culpability.
 +
'''
 +
:*608: practical outcomes.  Not about letting violent criminals free.  On the biological view, punishment can’t be an end in itself (restoring balance). Retributive punishment is an end in itself. 
  
−
::*by 5,000 bc, evidence of overcultivation in Tigris valley, hillside erosion.  emergence of irrigation.  37
+
:*Brain imaging suggests culpability judgements activate the cool and cognitive dlPFC, but punishment judgements activate more emotional vmPFC.  “A frothy limbic state”. Makes sense that punishment is costly.  But we need to overcome our attachment to punishment.  It is involved in a lot of unjustified suffering.   
  
−
:*Also, early agricultural infrastructure and control by governing elites. Emergence of class, armies, fight for territory.
+
:*Recaps the transition we've made with epilepsy 610.
  
−
::*very interesting: Mesopotamian religious elite controlled food production and distribution.  (Later we'll see that Jewish authorities do the same in the Levant).  More population growth.
+
:*Car free will.  A kind of ''reductio'' argument.
  
−
::*Uruk grows to 50,000.  agriculture brings property, inequality, class, gov't administration, (philosophers). Writing 3,000 bc - (mention Field Museum in Chicago - a “must see”).
+
===Mistake/Accident Cases===
  
−
::*back to the environment -- Babylonian Empire emerges from Sumerian cities around 1800bc.  But irrigation led to salination of the soil, silting of rivers -- 39-40 evidence of lack of understanding of soil.  Babylon falls!  Pop peaks at 20 million. Temple records tell the story.  
+
:*Generally, we don't hold people equally blameworthy for mistakes and accidents as for intentional wrongdoing.  
  
−
:*'''Egypt'''
+
::*Kimberly Potter - police officer who mistook her taser and gun, killing a citizen.
 +
::*Amber Guyger - the police officer, off duty, who mistook her neighbor, Botham Jean, for an intruder and killed him.
 +
::*A man has a heart attack / epileptic attack while driving and kills a pedestrian.  (Consider variations that might create responsibility.)
 +
::*A man is working two jobs to support a family, nods off at the wheel and kills a pedestrian.
 +
::*A man knows his car is close to a dangerous malfunction.  When it occurs, he loses control and kills a pedestrian.
 +
::*The tragic case of the man who left his baby in a hot car.
  
−
:*story in Egypt - p. 40 on: short story, the Nile fed civilizations for 7,000 years in rough sustainability, ideal combination of new silt and humus (Blue Nile and While Nile).  Harvests increase over time. 
+
===Punishment v Penalty===
−
:*But, desire to '''grow grain for export''' led to year round irrigation. 1880's salination extreme.  Then Nasser damn.  (Thinking about the logic of export crops for maximizing revenue.  Very similar to situation of local over population leading to exploiting the soil.)
 
−
:*Irony of Nasser dam producing electricity to make synthetic fertilizers that are now needed because of the dam and poor soil management.  Read at 42.
 
  
−
:*'''China'''
+
:*Let's use "punishment" to describe a retributive response in which our goal is to cause pain proportional to a crime.  This goes along with desert-based moral responsibility theories, which justify retributive punishment, even as a requirement of justice.
  
−
::*story in China - interesting, administration of ag recognized many grades of soil.  Yellow River (name from mineral erosion upstream) damned and diverted starting 340 bc.  Process of raising levees around the river led to 30 foot levies by 1920s.  19th century floods killed millions.  Also .5 million in early 20th century.  
+
:*Let's use "penalty" to describe a response to a crime in which the society recognizes values such as deterrence or harm reduction (public safety).  This goes along with accountability responsibility, which justifies the state intervening in the life of a person who commits a crime for the purposes of self-protection of the society.  Unlike retributive punishment, penalties are the smallest needed to achieve their goal (think speeding fines) and interventions are not punitive but rehabilitative or preventative.
  
−
::*story of Walter Lowdermilk -- 1922 - working on famine prevention.  First to write about soil management and civilization.  Follows major river up stream documenting 400 miles of levies and evidence of ancient mismanagement of early ag sites. Erosion from farming steep grades. 
+
===Small Group Discussion===
  
−
::*'''thesis going forward''':  Civilizations are defined by their management of soil.  And, everyone has messed it up eventually, even the Egyptians.
+
:*Does a focus on "agency" do a better job of capturing our intuitions and evidence about free will?
 +
:*What view of moral responsibility does an agency model support?

Latest revision as of 18:11, 22 April 2025

26: APR 22.

Assigned

  • Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will (580-613) (Part Two 598-613)
  • Over the next few classes, try to watch some of these: PrisonVideo.

In-class

  • Some limits on Ultimate Moral Responsibility: Trying not to be the inquisitor.
  • How can anyone be a compatibilist?
  • How should we treat people who make mistakes?

Some arguments against Ultimate Moral Responsibility

Lines of argument regarding individual moral responsibility:
  • 1. Strawson's Impossibility Argument.
  • We cannot be "ultimately" responsible for how we are. What follows from his argument?
  • 2. Mele's Self-modification argument and the "Benji" response.
  • We can self-modify, but some of our ability to do that is not up to us.
  • 3. Growth of Knowledge argument - Sapolsky (604-605)
  • The more we learn about human behavior, the harder it is to make retributive punishment an "end in itself".
Lines of argument at the social and cultural levels:
  • 1. Knowledge of the social determinants of crime and dysfunctional behavior.
  • The more we know (also a growth of knowledge argument) about SES and the "epidemiology of crime" the harder it is to blame people absolutely and, hence, retributively.
  • 2. Cultural evolution and the evolution of the idea of free will.
  • While we feel certain about free will, that certainty might also be a product of cultural psychology (Henrich).

Some arguments supporting the idea that we are all equally responsible for our actions. Or do they?

  • 1. We experience our own responsibility as comprehensive and applying to new circumstances. If I'm responsibility for everything I do, you can be too. (Even if there’s no hummunculus.)
  • It could be that an NCA is blameworthy in this way, but does the inference follow?
  • 2. Sure there are biological explanations for what we do, but you can always get help or decide not to do those things. We have many examples of people summoning more will power to solve their problems. Morse: Just because there are causes for your action, it doesn’t mean you were compelled to do it.
  • Effort does make a difference. A problem is, how do you know? How do we know if was lack of effort v some other biological difference (less severe case of addiction, etc.) that explains the differences in outcomes? One person goes to anger management class and never assaults again, while another does.
  • 3. “Illusionism”. Even if we are not all equally responsible for our actions, we need to act that way for the good of society.
  • But then, imagine the conversation at the last medieval town to get rid of stockades and the pillory? If we maintain an illusion that painful punishment is needed, then we are just causing unjust suffering.

How Can Someone be a Compatibilist? Or, Agency Views of Free Will

  • Agency as a source of causal powers for normally competent individuals
  • Even if determinism is true, normal human beings have agency. Agency is a causal power. The ability to control ourselves and affect the world around us.
  • Agency includes our ability to "do what we want"; even if we lack ultimate powers to determine what we want.
  • Free will may be something like "doing what I want to do" and having wants and desires that are "mine."
  • Agency is our capacity to control outcomes and take ownership of some of actions.
  • A normally competent agent (NCA) can learn the expectations of their society and conform to them.
  • Note: We often talk about an action being "ours" even when we say we are determined or influenced to do that action. (See examples from below.) Perhaps physics is the wrong place to look for free will?
  • Problem: What sort of approach to punishment does this compatibilist picture support?
  • One line: Well, if it's really your wants and desires that you're acting on, and you chose them, then you can be db-MR for failures.
  • Another line: It's fine to say that your actions were "yours," and that's a good reason to knock on your door if you break the law, but that doesn't mean you chose. You may have "taken ownership" of the causal forces that made you the way you are, but they still did make you this way and not some other way.

Ordinary Language and Free Will

  • Free will looks less mysterious if you focus on our "agential capacities," rather than determinism. Consider these "ordinary language" statements. How is "choosing" and "free will" being used differently in each case? Is this way of talking "compatible" with determinism?:
  • I may choose to take up painting as a hobby.
  • My grandmother had a big influence on me and that's why I chose to become a doctor.
  • I cannot choose to become a concert violinists at this point in my life.
  • I can choose whether or not I get ready for class.
  • I have no choice, I have to turn you in to the police.
  • I can't choose not to love you, but I can't see you any more.
  • I've decided I don't love you any more. (aww...)
  • Parent to child: You can do anything you put your mind to. (Yeah, right.)
  • Parent to child: You need to try harder.
  • Parent to (older) child: You're doing fine. Just keep that up.

Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will (580-613) (Part Two 598-613)

  • But does anything useful actually come of this?
  • Grounds for skepticism about using neuroscience in the courtroom: Stephen Morse. Neurolaw sceptic, ok with M’naugton, but thinks cases are rare. Reviews valid criticisms he makes: 1. Juries might overvalue neuroscience images, 2. Descriptive vs. Normative.
  • Morse supports a strong distinction between causation and compulsion. Causation is not itself an excuse. But Sapolsky argues that this still involves walling off a “homunculus” and that’s not plausible.
  • Acknowledges an apparent problem. Neuroscience typically can’t predict individual behavior very much. Fictional exchange with prosecutor. 600
  • Explaining lots and Predicting Little
  • But is the lack of predictive power a problem in the argument? S. works through some cases in which probability of prediction decreases, but no less likely that it could be a case of compulsion. 601
  • 602: Important methodological point: There's no less biology in the leg fracture vs. the other disorders, but level of biological explanation is different. Leg fractures are less connected to culture. Behavior is multifactorial and heavily cultural. (Oh god, another Henrich digression. Free will has a history.) Example: how much does biology predict depression? Factors are diverse biological mechanisms, including cultural factors. (But, point is, someone can be disable by depression, just like the leg fracture.)
  • Marvin Minsky, “Free will: internal forces I do not understand”. Sapolsky adds “yet”.
  • Growth of Knowledge argument: Neat charts showing historic trend to connect social behavior and biology in research journals. 604-605.
  • If you still believe in mitigated free will:
  • Case of Dramer and Springer and the spiritual explanation for epilepsy. Biblical version with Jesus.
  • Sapolsky imagines an Inquisitor (witch burner). Must be puzzled occasionally by fact pattern. Mom has epilepsy.
  • Growth of knowledge argument 607-608. read list. How will they view us?: Most likely option is that our kids will look at us as idiots about moral responsibility and culpability.

  • 608: practical outcomes. Not about letting violent criminals free. On the biological view, punishment can’t be an end in itself (restoring balance). Retributive punishment is an end in itself.
  • Brain imaging suggests culpability judgements activate the cool and cognitive dlPFC, but punishment judgements activate more emotional vmPFC. “A frothy limbic state”. Makes sense that punishment is costly. But we need to overcome our attachment to punishment. It is involved in a lot of unjustified suffering.
  • Recaps the transition we've made with epilepsy 610.
  • Car free will. A kind of reductio argument.

Mistake/Accident Cases

  • Generally, we don't hold people equally blameworthy for mistakes and accidents as for intentional wrongdoing.
  • Kimberly Potter - police officer who mistook her taser and gun, killing a citizen.
  • Amber Guyger - the police officer, off duty, who mistook her neighbor, Botham Jean, for an intruder and killed him.
  • A man has a heart attack / epileptic attack while driving and kills a pedestrian. (Consider variations that might create responsibility.)
  • A man is working two jobs to support a family, nods off at the wheel and kills a pedestrian.
  • A man knows his car is close to a dangerous malfunction. When it occurs, he loses control and kills a pedestrian.
  • The tragic case of the man who left his baby in a hot car.

Punishment v Penalty

  • Let's use "punishment" to describe a retributive response in which our goal is to cause pain proportional to a crime. This goes along with desert-based moral responsibility theories, which justify retributive punishment, even as a requirement of justice.
  • Let's use "penalty" to describe a response to a crime in which the society recognizes values such as deterrence or harm reduction (public safety). This goes along with accountability responsibility, which justifies the state intervening in the life of a person who commits a crime for the purposes of self-protection of the society. Unlike retributive punishment, penalties are the smallest needed to achieve their goal (think speeding fines) and interventions are not punitive but rehabilitative or preventative.

Small Group Discussion

  • Does a focus on "agency" do a better job of capturing our intuitions and evidence about free will?
  • What view of moral responsibility does an agency model support?
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