Difference between revisions of "DEC 1"

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==26: DEC 1==
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==24: DEC 1==
  
===Stage 4: Justified Partiality Writing: Back Evaluation===
+
===Assigned===
  
:*Original assignment under Nov 5.
+
:*Gilbert, "Why we Make Bad Decisions" (Ted talk) [https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_gilbert_why_we_make_bad_decisions?language=en]
 +
:*Gilbert, C4, “In the Blind Spot of the Mind’s Eye” (21)
 +
:*Gilbert, C6, “The Future is Now” (16)
  
:*Debriefing on student approaches to the topic.
+
===H&W Exercise===
  
:*'''Stage 4''': Back-evaluation: After you receive your peer comments and my evaluation, take a few minutes to fill out this quick "back evaluation" rating form: [https://forms.gle/KTSJLu11mi7ZHW8y7].  '''Fill out the form for each reviewer, but not Alfino.'''  Up to 10 points, in Q&W.
+
::*Things in your future that are clear, fuzzy, an opaque. [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScoCPWTmcSu9PE3e8uLgWosZO_BG_OsSh9TGM2vYEVqwY5avw/viewform?usp=sf_link]
  
::*Back evaluations are due '''December 3, 2020, 11:59pm'''.
+
===Daniel Gilbert, TED talk, "Why We Make Such Bad Decisions"===
  
===Final Essay: Moral Responsibility, blame, and punishment Position Paper (with Rough Draft Peer Review)===
+
:*Bernouli's formula for expected value: '''Expected value = odds of gain x value of gain'''.
  
:*'''Stage 1''': Please write an 1000 word maximum answer to the following question by '''December 7, 2020, class time.'''
+
:*two kinds of mistakes: estimating odds and value
  
::*Topic: Many contemporary thinkers and researchers (from philosophers to biologists and lawyers) have raised questions about whether our praising and blaming behaviors are really as well justified as we imagine.  In the first 3/4 of your essay, develop an organized discussion of this problem(C1), drawing primarily upon information and resources in this unit. Identify and try to answer the key questions you see at stake in the discussion (C2). Then, in the last 1/4 of your essay, try to assess the argument (C3), which some legal theorists are making, that we should move away from retributive punishment and toward a utilitarian approach. Be sure to demonstrate the connection between your analysis of the problem and your assessment of the future of retributive punishment.
+
:*'''Errors estimating odds''':
  
:*'''Advice about collaboration''': For this assignment, we need to modify our collaboration advice.  You will have access to all of the rough drafts (with all new animal pseudonyms) and you will have read and commented on three of them before finishing your own. You are welcome to cite any ideas from any of the papers. If you borrow ideas from another author, give credit to the author by citing the animal name in your text. This again is what we do in an academic research community.  
+
::*''Availability heuristic'': works when estimating likelihood of seeing dogs vs. pigs on a leash, not when estimating odds of good or bad things happening (4:30). Example of words with R is diff places, things that get on the news -- dying of asthma vs. drownings. Lottery winners distort our judgement.
  
:*Prepare your answer and submit it in the following way:
+
::*Already implications for wisdom if you think living well requires a rational approach to threats and gainsDo mostly fools play the lottery?
::# '''Do not put your name in the file or filename'''.  You may put your student id number in the file.  Put a word count in the file.
 
::# In Word, check "File" and "Options" to make sure your name does not appear as author.  You may want to change this to "anon" for this document.
 
::# Format your answer in double spaced text in a 12 point font, using normal margins. 
 
::# Save the file in the ".docx" file format using the file name "MoralResponsibility".
 
::# Log in to courses.alfino.orgUpload your file to the '''"'Final Essay' dropbox'''. 
 
  
:*'''Stage 2''': Rough Draft Review.  Please review '''three''' student answers and provide brief comments and a score. We will use our regular assignment rubric, but rather than producing a score for the paper I will ask you to evaluate three specific items in the prompt as you find them in the rough drafts you review.  Complete your evaluations by '''December 11, 2020, 11:59pm.''' 
+
::*Example of not buying a 10th lottery ticket because Leroy has the other nine.  
::*Use [this Google Form] to review '''four''' peer papers.  The papers will be in our shared folder, but please '''do not''' edit or add comments to the papers directly.  This will compromise your anonymity.
 
::*To determine the papers you need to peer review, I will send you a key with animal names in alphabetically order, along with saint names.  You will find your animal name and review the next four (4) animals' work. 
 
::*Some papers may arrive late.  If you are in line to review a missing paper, allow a day or two for it to show up.  If it does not show up, go ahead and review the next animal in the list until you have four reviews.  This assures that you will get enough "back evaluations" of your work to get a good average for your peer review credit.
 
  
:*'''Your final paper is due on December 16, 2020, by midnight'''
+
:*'''Mistakes estimating value'''
  
:*'''Stage 3''': Back-evaluation: After you receive your peer comments, take a few minutes to fill out this quick "back evaluation" rating form: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1kD1wkd1G0UuLIvtSPhEw4RUxZuJtLQJ31ZWkKA63WU4/edit].  '''Fill out the form for each reviewer, but not Alfino.'''  Up to 10 points, in Points.
+
::*Big Mac example - we compare to the past, instead of the possible; vacation package with price change; salaries that increase over salaries that decrease.  
  
::*Back evaluations are due '''TBD, 11:59pm'''.
+
::*Comparisons to the past - price cuts vs. price increases; salary preference for increases even if total salary is less, theatre tickets (mental accounting -- loss aversion affects our judgement. We imagine the play costs $40.)  (11:00), liberals relative affection for Bush1, retailing (comparison of wine by price), potato chip / chocolate / spam study (14:30) (Note possible application to wisdom for wealthy culture), saving $100 on a large amount is less attractive than on a smaller amount, speaker comparison.
  
===Review of Moral Responsiblity issue and discussion of topic prompt===
+
::*Expected value problems involving the future: (18:06): People have trouble with future value calculations(discounting): "now" is better and "more" is better, but we don't do well when those rules conflict. When both of the expected value calculations are in the future we do better (pay offs in 12 vs. 13 months).  Favors locating choices in the future when possible.
  
:*One more time on free will
+
::*Explanatory hypothesis: brain evolution not geared toward abstract calculation of rational alternatives.
::*Dennett, on Free will in ''Freedom Evolves'':
 
:::*Dennett's stance on free will is compatibilism with an evolutionary twist – the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions might be pre-determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Free will, seen this way, is about freedom to make decisions without duress (and so is a version of Kantian positive practical free will, i.e., Kantian autonomy), as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself. To clarify this distinction, he uses the term 'evitability' (the opposite of 'inevitability'), defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being deterministic. (from wiki page)
 
  
::*You could also think of free will as the specific cultural form that we use to think about agency
+
::*Implications for wisdom: 22 min: interesting comment about Bernouli in relation to evolutionary history  22:30 (and biases such as those underlying these expected value problems).
  
::*[https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/torts/torts-keyed-to-epstein/the-negligence-issue/the-t-j-hooper-3/ The T. J. Hooper Case]
+
::*What part of living well is comprised of expected value problems?  Isn't there also qualitative version of this problem?
  
::*Is the free will issue a distraction?  Hard to say. If we talked about free will in terms of capacities would we be denying free will?  Maybe liability and negligence standards would work better. The history of free will talk is much shorter than the history of capacities and agency talk.
+
===Gilbert, Chapter 4: In the Blind Spot of the Mind's Eye===
  
:*One more time on praise and blame "talk" vs. realities needed to back it upThe social utility of talk and the everyday cruelties it can cause(Digression on the happiness question lurking here.)
+
:*Comparisons of Adolph Fisher & George Eastman.  Point:  Need to 2nd guess how we impose seemingly objective criteria on others' lives.  
 +
::*Just because it's easier for us to imagine that a certain kind of future will bring happiness, and what we imagine might even be in line with objective research, it doesn't follow that other futures won't.
 +
:*Brain reweaves experience: study with cars and stop signs/yield signs.  Information acquired after the event alters memory of the event.
 +
:*Two highly confirmed results: Memory fills in.  We don't typically notice it happening.  Word list excercise.  80  -- literal and metaphorical blindspots.  experiments with interrupted sentencesWe fill in.
  
===Small Group Discussion====
+
:*Model of Mind (84)  Prior to 19th century:
 +
::"Philosophers had thought of the senses as conduits that allowed information about the properties of objects in the world to travel from the object and into the mind. The mind was like a movie screen in which the object was rebroadcast. The operation broke down on occasion, hence people occasionally saw things as they were not. But when the senses were working properly, they showed what was there. This theory of realism was described in 1690 by the philosopher John Locke: brains "believe" they don't "make believe" .
 +
 
 +
:*Model of Mind brought in with Kant at beginning of 1800's:
 +
::Kant's idealism:  "Kant's new theory of idealism claimed that our perceptions are not the result of a physiological process by which our eyes somehow transmit an image of the world into our brains but rather, they are the result of a psychological process that combines what our eyes see with what we already think, feel, know, want, and believe, and then uses this combination of sensory information and preexisting knowledge to construct our perception of reality. "
 +
:*false belief test -- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hLubgpY2_w] [As we develop, we acquire "theory of mind" and the capacity to enter the subjective space of others.  Interestingly, it's hard to enter our own (strangers to ourselves) and our future selves.
 +
 
 +
:*Still, we act like realists:  truck moving study-- we are first realists, but we learn to adopt an idealist perspective in social communication.
 +
:*We experience the world as if our interpretations were part of reality.  We do not realize we are seeing an interpretation. 
 +
:*We fill in details:  imagine a plate of spaghetti.  Very important for thinking about how we fill in the future.  We carry out the exercise of imagining, and even make estimates of satisfaction, but the result depends upon which of the family of experiences picked out by "plate of spaghetti" we have in mind. 
 +
:*point for happiness theories: p. 89.
 +
:*closes by giving you the narratives that make sense of the Fisher/Eastman comparison.
 +
 
 +
===Gilbert, Chapter 6, The Future is Now===
 +
 
 +
:*Being wrong about the future:  possibility of heavy planes flying.  112
 +
 
 +
:*"When brains plug holes in the conceptualizations of yesterday and tomorrow, they tend to use a material called ''today''"
 +
 
 +
:*113:  Long list of examples of current experience displacing past experience:  dating couples, worries about exams, ''memories of Perot supporters''.  We “cook” the past.
 +
 
 +
:*Examples of how we fail to predict how future selves will feel.  115:  Volunteers choosing candy bars or knowing answers.  Different preferences after the experience. 
 +
 +
:*We fail to account for the way future experience will change future preferences.
 +
 
 +
:*Sneak Prefeel -- evidence suggests brain can have emotional responses to imaginings of the future.  We simulate future events, we don't just experience them reflectively.  visual experience vs. imagination.
 +
 
 +
:*How to Select Posters:  In poster selection study, the "thinkers" are less  satisfied with their choices.  121  "Prefeeling allowed nonthinkers to predict their future satisfaction more accurately than thinkers did." 121
 +
 
 +
:*Limits of Pre-feeling:  "We can't see or feel two things at once, and the brain has strict priorities about what it will see, hear, and feel and what it will ignore.  ...  For instance, if we try to imagine a penguin while we are looking at an ostrich, the brain's policy won't allow it."122  2 other research studies on unconscious bias in future predictions.  123
 +
 
 +
:*Note from the gym/thirst study: ''emotional contagion'' from one experience to another.  The "availability heuristic" comes in here again.  Priming.  '''practical advice''': you can see how mindfulness might be part of the remedy here. 
 +
 
 +
:*Read cartoon on bottom of p. 125  "Imagination cannot easily transcend the boundaries of the present, and one reason for this is that it must borrow machinery that is owned by perception. The fact that these two processes must run on the same platform means that we are sometimes confused about which one is running. We assume that what we feel as we imagine the future is what we'll feel when we get there, but in fact, what we feel as we imagine the future is often response to what's happening in the present."
 +
 
 +
===Advice/Useful Questions for Happiness Problems Related to the Future===
 +
 
 +
:*We need humility about predicting the future.  (Examples at start of C6).
 +
 
 +
:*We are often anxious about things in the future that we can’t know how we will feel about but think we should. (Stoicism helps here.) Practice saying, “I don’t know how I will feel about that.”
 +
 
 +
:*How is my sense of future possibilities limited by what is easy for me to imagine? (Availability heuristic.)
 +
 
 +
:*Watch out for hyper-discounting of the future. (Bias toward more now.)
 +
 
 +
:*We mistake interpretation for reality.  Locke vs. Kant. (Get a second opinion.)
 +
 
 +
:*We may overvalue the uniqueness of our subjective experience. This leads us to discount the comparability of our experience with others.
 +
 
 +
:*Contingent future feeling. We often fail to predict how our future selves will feel.  (Candy bar quiz study)
 +
 
 +
:*Cognitive load and emotional contagion. Will the future feel different the day after graduation? (gym/thirst study). Suggests that having a quiet mind can be useful.
 +
 
 +
:*We are sensitive to the way comparisons are framed.  Watch out for others how offer to frame comparisons for us.  (Wine bottle marketing example, availability heuristic.) The further into the future you go, the less certain you should be about the comparison sets for your choices.

Latest revision as of 22:37, 1 December 2021

24: DEC 1

Assigned

  • Gilbert, "Why we Make Bad Decisions" (Ted talk) [1]
  • Gilbert, C4, “In the Blind Spot of the Mind’s Eye” (21)
  • Gilbert, C6, “The Future is Now” (16)

H&W Exercise

  • Things in your future that are clear, fuzzy, an opaque. [2]

Daniel Gilbert, TED talk, "Why We Make Such Bad Decisions"

  • Bernouli's formula for expected value: Expected value = odds of gain x value of gain.
  • two kinds of mistakes: estimating odds and value
  • Errors estimating odds:
  • Availability heuristic: works when estimating likelihood of seeing dogs vs. pigs on a leash, not when estimating odds of good or bad things happening (4:30). Example of words with R is diff places, things that get on the news -- dying of asthma vs. drownings. Lottery winners distort our judgement.
  • Already implications for wisdom if you think living well requires a rational approach to threats and gains. Do mostly fools play the lottery?
  • Example of not buying a 10th lottery ticket because Leroy has the other nine.
  • Mistakes estimating value
  • Big Mac example - we compare to the past, instead of the possible; vacation package with price change; salaries that increase over salaries that decrease.
  • Comparisons to the past - price cuts vs. price increases; salary preference for increases even if total salary is less, theatre tickets (mental accounting -- loss aversion affects our judgement. We imagine the play costs $40.) (11:00), liberals relative affection for Bush1, retailing (comparison of wine by price), potato chip / chocolate / spam study (14:30) (Note possible application to wisdom for wealthy culture), saving $100 on a large amount is less attractive than on a smaller amount, speaker comparison.
  • Expected value problems involving the future: (18:06): People have trouble with future value calculations(discounting): "now" is better and "more" is better, but we don't do well when those rules conflict. When both of the expected value calculations are in the future we do better (pay offs in 12 vs. 13 months). Favors locating choices in the future when possible.
  • Explanatory hypothesis: brain evolution not geared toward abstract calculation of rational alternatives.
  • Implications for wisdom: 22 min: interesting comment about Bernouli in relation to evolutionary history 22:30 (and biases such as those underlying these expected value problems).
  • What part of living well is comprised of expected value problems? Isn't there also qualitative version of this problem?

Gilbert, Chapter 4: In the Blind Spot of the Mind's Eye

  • Comparisons of Adolph Fisher & George Eastman. Point: Need to 2nd guess how we impose seemingly objective criteria on others' lives.
  • Just because it's easier for us to imagine that a certain kind of future will bring happiness, and what we imagine might even be in line with objective research, it doesn't follow that other futures won't.
  • Brain reweaves experience: study with cars and stop signs/yield signs. Information acquired after the event alters memory of the event.
  • Two highly confirmed results: Memory fills in. We don't typically notice it happening. Word list excercise. 80 -- literal and metaphorical blindspots. experiments with interrupted sentences. We fill in.
  • Model of Mind (84) Prior to 19th century:
"Philosophers had thought of the senses as conduits that allowed information about the properties of objects in the world to travel from the object and into the mind. The mind was like a movie screen in which the object was rebroadcast. The operation broke down on occasion, hence people occasionally saw things as they were not. But when the senses were working properly, they showed what was there. This theory of realism was described in 1690 by the philosopher John Locke: brains "believe" they don't "make believe" .
  • Model of Mind brought in with Kant at beginning of 1800's:
Kant's idealism: "Kant's new theory of idealism claimed that our perceptions are not the result of a physiological process by which our eyes somehow transmit an image of the world into our brains but rather, they are the result of a psychological process that combines what our eyes see with what we already think, feel, know, want, and believe, and then uses this combination of sensory information and preexisting knowledge to construct our perception of reality. "
  • false belief test -- [3] [As we develop, we acquire "theory of mind" and the capacity to enter the subjective space of others. Interestingly, it's hard to enter our own (strangers to ourselves) and our future selves.
  • Still, we act like realists: truck moving study-- we are first realists, but we learn to adopt an idealist perspective in social communication.
  • We experience the world as if our interpretations were part of reality. We do not realize we are seeing an interpretation.
  • We fill in details: imagine a plate of spaghetti. Very important for thinking about how we fill in the future. We carry out the exercise of imagining, and even make estimates of satisfaction, but the result depends upon which of the family of experiences picked out by "plate of spaghetti" we have in mind.
  • point for happiness theories: p. 89.
  • closes by giving you the narratives that make sense of the Fisher/Eastman comparison.

Gilbert, Chapter 6, The Future is Now

  • Being wrong about the future: possibility of heavy planes flying. 112
  • "When brains plug holes in the conceptualizations of yesterday and tomorrow, they tend to use a material called today"
  • 113: Long list of examples of current experience displacing past experience: dating couples, worries about exams, memories of Perot supporters. We “cook” the past.
  • Examples of how we fail to predict how future selves will feel. 115: Volunteers choosing candy bars or knowing answers. Different preferences after the experience.
  • We fail to account for the way future experience will change future preferences.
  • Sneak Prefeel -- evidence suggests brain can have emotional responses to imaginings of the future. We simulate future events, we don't just experience them reflectively. visual experience vs. imagination.
  • How to Select Posters: In poster selection study, the "thinkers" are less satisfied with their choices. 121 "Prefeeling allowed nonthinkers to predict their future satisfaction more accurately than thinkers did." 121
  • Limits of Pre-feeling: "We can't see or feel two things at once, and the brain has strict priorities about what it will see, hear, and feel and what it will ignore. ... For instance, if we try to imagine a penguin while we are looking at an ostrich, the brain's policy won't allow it."122 2 other research studies on unconscious bias in future predictions. 123
  • Note from the gym/thirst study: emotional contagion from one experience to another. The "availability heuristic" comes in here again. Priming. practical advice: you can see how mindfulness might be part of the remedy here.
  • Read cartoon on bottom of p. 125 "Imagination cannot easily transcend the boundaries of the present, and one reason for this is that it must borrow machinery that is owned by perception. The fact that these two processes must run on the same platform means that we are sometimes confused about which one is running. We assume that what we feel as we imagine the future is what we'll feel when we get there, but in fact, what we feel as we imagine the future is often response to what's happening in the present."

Advice/Useful Questions for Happiness Problems Related to the Future

  • We need humility about predicting the future. (Examples at start of C6).
  • We are often anxious about things in the future that we can’t know how we will feel about but think we should. (Stoicism helps here.) Practice saying, “I don’t know how I will feel about that.”
  • How is my sense of future possibilities limited by what is easy for me to imagine? (Availability heuristic.)
  • Watch out for hyper-discounting of the future. (Bias toward more now.)
  • We mistake interpretation for reality. Locke vs. Kant. (Get a second opinion.)
  • We may overvalue the uniqueness of our subjective experience. This leads us to discount the comparability of our experience with others.
  • Contingent future feeling. We often fail to predict how our future selves will feel. (Candy bar quiz study)
  • Cognitive load and emotional contagion. Will the future feel different the day after graduation? (gym/thirst study). Suggests that having a quiet mind can be useful.
  • We are sensitive to the way comparisons are framed. Watch out for others how offer to frame comparisons for us. (Wine bottle marketing example, availability heuristic.) The further into the future you go, the less certain you should be about the comparison sets for your choices.