Difference between revisions of "APR 8"

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==24: APR 8. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism==
+
==20. APR 8: Unit 5: Ethical Issues==
  
===Assigned===
+
===Assigned Work===
  
:*[https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/episodes/317421-blame Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility]
+
:*Milligan, Tony, Animal Ethics: Intro & The Basics, Chapter 1
:*[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13554790903329182?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=nncs20 Article abstract, "Klüver–Bucy syndrome, hypersexuality, and the law"]
 
  
===Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law===
+
===In-Class===
  
:*'''Basic Questions:''' 
+
:*Reports from documentary viewing.
::*1. Do we praise people for things that they don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault?   
+
:*Age of Slaughter
::*2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will and the brain?
+
:*Some Ethical Arguments about Food
::*3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"?  Start a list.  Causal, moral, both, neither.  Do you find yourself referencing some idea of a "normally competent person"?
+
:*Estabrook, "Hogonomics" ''Gastronomica''
::*4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach criminal punishment with retributive intent?
 
  
:*'''Some concepts for thinking about moral responsibility:'''
+
===Estabrook, "Hogonomics"===
::*'''Moral Responsibility''' - The idea that people deserve praise or blame for their actions.  In the standard view, praise and blame are based on "moral desert".
 
::*'''Moral desert''' - Normally, you "morally deserve" something because you did (or failed to do) something to merit it, positively or negatively. (You worked a shift and deserve to be paid. You failed to observe the speed limit...)
 
:::*Moral desert can be contrasted to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights. This is also called "'''moral standing'''".  Moral desert can also be contrasted with "morally arbitrary" (recall Rawls). So, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things that are "'''morally arbitrary'''":  things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance), things about you that were just your good fortune (good impulse control, a good noodle, athletic ability, at ease in social life...). Yet we clearly praise and blame people (and ourselves) for all of these things! 
 
::*'''Accountability vs. Morally Responsibility''' -- Giving an account of someone as having done or failed to do things we normally expect of others can be done quite apart from holding someone blameworthy. This might be an important distinction if you become a skeptic about moral responsibility.  You don't lose accountability, necessarily.
 
::*'''Free will and responsibility''' -- Most people would agree that if we cannot freely will our actions, we cannot be held responsible for them.  But what sort of free will is required? Is normal choosing (neurologically described) free will or do we have to break with the causal fabric of the universe! (Libertarian Free will).  If the world is deterministic, everything has been "decided" (Including basketball games!).  Does not mean there is no free will, or just that it might not be what we think it is?
 
  
:*'''Thought experiments on interpersonal praise and blame'''
+
:*[Flying pig farm sounds alot like the farm in "The Last Pig"]
::*Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that.   Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
+
:*Journalist on a quest to Flying Pigs Farm to discover diff bt $15.00 lb and $3.49 lb pork. comparison
:::*Condition 1: Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstaclesAre you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
+
::*FP farm: 750 pigs/yr, breeding rates (industrial sows 2.5 litters/year vs. FP: no crates, 20-25% fewer piglets, self-weaning,
:::*Condition 2: Suppose now that you look at your family and extended family and you notice that, compare to other families, yours seem to come to good habits easilyNone of you really ever do anything wrong, or muchYou notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad or dysfunctional behaviorAre you less deserving of your praise than people from these families, equally, more?
+
::*Heritage piglet: $120, industrial piglet $50.   
 +
::*FP pigs, free range (400 pigs on 20-30 acres), industrial pigs about 5-8 square feet per pig, always indoors
 +
::*FP pigs live 6-9 months instead of 6 months for industrial.
 +
::*Heritage pigs retain natural behaviors vs. industrial
 +
::*Food diffs p. 145. No automatic anti-biotics for FP pigs
 +
::*Labor diffs.  Industrial: 1 employee per 2,700 pigs.  FP: 1 employee per 170 pigs.
 +
::*Differences in slaughter and "kill fee".   
 +
::*Saline injected pink meat used to mask dry meat without flavorCosumers now trust only pink ham.   
  
:*A couple of interesting philosophical arguments to take into the thought experiment:
+
===Some of the standard arguments on the ethics of eating animals===
  
::*From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
+
:*'''Ecological Arguments'''
:::*If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, '''one must be truly responsible for how one is''', morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
 
:::*Strawson's argument suggests the "impossibility" of moral responsibility.
 
  
::*Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
+
::*Following the UN FAO study, "[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livestock%27s_Long_Shadow Livestock's Long Shadow]," industrial meat production is one of the biggest (and possible the biggest) contributors to climate change. It is also responsible for a wide range of adverse ecological impacts such as desertification, rain forest depletion, unsustainable water use, dislocation of small scale farmers, geo-political conflict, undermining sovereignty, sanitation issues (esp from pigs), algae blooms, dead zones, etc.
:::*Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
 
:::*The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
 
:::*Mele's Intentional self-modification argument suggests that we can be held responsible for our actions because we have powers of self-modification.
 
:::*But! Now imagine Benji, also afraid of the basement. He doesn't try to conquer his fear or tries and fails.  How would you know if Benji deserves to be blamed for his failure? 
 
:::*Maybe Betty is a "chronic cognizer" and Benji is a "cognitive miser".  Are these traits they for which they have "moral desert"? Some people are not persuaded by Mele's argument. How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about moral responsibility?
 
  
===Small Group Discussion: '''Thought Experiment Gym on Praise and Blame'''===
+
:*'''Arguments from suffering'''.  Utilitarian arguments.
 +
 
 +
::*Singer: Recall the "equal happiness" principle and Principle of Utility.  Moral concern about the '''suffering of animals,''' combined with the fact that their consumption is no longer necessary for us, should lead us to reduce or eliminate animal foods, at least from creatures that can suffer (some debate about clams and oysters, for example.  Plant "sentience" is a complicating factor as well)
  
:*Work through the thought experiment above, sharing your responses to Conditions 1 and 2. Do these comparisons make you less certain about the basis of moral responsibility?  
+
:*'''Rights based arguments'''.   
:*Try to think of some clear cases in which you would blame yourself (or blame someone else) for failing a specific moral responsibility.  Make a list. (I would blame myself if I failed to prepare for class. -Alfino) In each case, try to think about what you "deserve" or "ought to have to do" in light of your failure.  Is it always a penalty (from nominal to proportion to failure)? Does it always involve "deserving blame"?  When does it?  Hopefully, this helps us think about praise and blame in actual contexts.  Please bring 1-3 items from your list back to the whole class.
 
  
===Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility===
+
::*Regan: animals are "subjects of a life" - see also age of slaughter information.  We should extend rights from humans to animals because they share this important "rights justifying" trait. Even if animals are not "persons," they have an interest in "having a life" that cannot be overridden without argumentation.  This view can be combined with a speciesist claim that humans might prioritize human rights over animal rights in some circumstances such as medical research or subsistence agriculture or food insecurity.
  
:*'''Segment 1:''' Story of Kevin and his wife, Janet.  Kevin is arrested for child pornography. 
+
:*'''Agrarian arguments''' supporting limited meat production
::*15 years earlier. Epilepsy seizures returned after surgery two years earlier. Can't drive so he meets Janet from work, who drives him to work. Romance... Still more seizures.  Another surgery. Music ability in tact.  But then his food and sexual appetite grew, played songs on the piano for hours.  Disturbing behavior.  Really disturbing behavior.
 
  
::*Reporter tries to get at who it was who did itKevin claims compulsiondownloads and deletes files.
+
::*Agrarian arguments about "default animal production".  Treating animal foods like a luxury.  Other agrarians might advocate non-food use of animals or use of animals for food without killing them.  (Eggs, milk, etc. - Note practical issues here.
 +
::*Simon Fairlie's "default animal production" argument: We should think of meat as a luxuryLike many other luxury foodsNot sustainable at high levels of production. The relationship between meat production and environmental impact is not linear, according to Fairlie:
 +
[[Image:Meat_consumption_curve.png]]
 +
::*Fairlie's ad for his position. [https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-40636196]
  
::*Orin Devinsky: neurologist testified in court that it wasn't Kevin's fault.
+
:*'''Hunter's arguments''' -- There are some interesting arguments for treating "food hunting" differently from a moral perspective.  Hunter's arguably enter into a special kind of relationship with nature that some deep ecologists argue to be authentic.  The hunter, after all, could be prey.  Hunting, like other traditional forms of food gathering, could be seen as a way of life that justifies limited animal harvesting. Also, the hunter's prey is not being raised on animal food crops, so the climate and ecological burdens are not the same.  Still, it's no picnic for the wild animal!
  
::*Neurological dive: deep parts of our brain can generate weird thoughts, but we have a "censor".  Maybe Kevin lost that part of his brain.  Observed in post-surgery monkeys.
+
:*The "'''motivational problem'''" in animal ethics discussions
  
::*Lee Vartan -- Can't be impulse control. porn at home, but not at work. He must have known that it was wrongTourette's can be circumstantially triggered even though it is clearly neurological. Poignant exchange with Janet about staying in the relationship. '''Kluwer-Bucy'''.  Months before sentencing.  Medication makes him normal, but eliminates his libido.  5 yrs. - home arrest. Judge ackn. prosecutor's point. You could have asked for help. (Reflect on this a bit.) 26 months federal prison 25 months of house arrest.  2008-2010.    
+
::*As Tony Milligan points out, there is a "motivation problem" with these arguments. They do not motivative change in behavior. Rates of vegetarianism and veganism are very low (outside of cuisines that are intentionally vegetarian)Persistence in diet is also low. [https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/most-vegetarians-lapse-after-only-year-180953565/ Smithsonian Magazine], [https://animalcharityevaluators.org/research/reports/dietary-impacts/vegetarian-recidivism/ Animal Charity Evaluators], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_by_country Vegetarianism by country], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veganism Veganism by country]On the other hand, meat consumption has dropped significantly in countries like France and the Netherlands.
  
:*'''4 minute discussion questions''': Do you agree with prosecutor's Vartan's point? Why or why not? What would your sentence have been?
+
===Milligan, Tony. Animal Ethics: the basics. "Chapter 1"===
  
:*'''Segment 2:'''  Blame - person or brain. 
+
:*Main approaches:
::*Nita Frahany - neurolaw professor (law and philosophy!).  Might be lots of cases.  (argument: isn't this just like blame everything else for what you do wrong?  Isn't it too easy?).  Thought experiment: deaf person, child in burning building.  "emotional inability" would also be damage to a physical structure (as in the ear). 
+
::*Unifying - focus on key concepts like rights, suffering, sentience
::*David Eagleman, neuroscientist - makes critical point: neuroscience isn't so precise.  New technologies will show us how experience is written in our brain.  (Back to Descartes.  wrong.)  Slippery slope, the brain is always involved.  Blameworthiness might be the wrong question.  Person vs. biology doesn't really make sense anymore.  The "choosey" part of the brain (the homonculus!).  36:00 minutes.  Funny exchange.  Self-modification comes up. 
+
::*Relational - focus on historical practices
::*Claim: Legal system should drop moral blame.  Adopt utilitarian approach.  Predict recidivism.  Point system exists.  Better than people (50% accurate).  System 70%. Currently there is appearance bias for example. 
 
::*A point system might be very predictive, but you might not want to convict someone of a future crime.  Would it be?
 
::*Frahany - Blame might serve social function of articulating norms. 
 
  
:*'''4 minute discussion questions''': Frahany thinks there are lots of cases of the criminal justice system punishing unfairly.  Are you persuaded? If so, does a utilitarian approach (with or without the point system) make sense?
+
:*Unifying approaches
  
:*'''Segment 3:''' Dear Hector
+
:*Singer — "Focus on suffering ; Reagan - rights; being “subject of a life” ; Francione — sentience
::*Bianca Giaver (producer) - Hector Black.  Hector's backstory - joins civil rights movement, adopts Patricia, a neglected child.  Patricia's story (becomes a beautiful and productive person) -- Patricia is murdered.  Hector considers whether he wishes the death penalty for him. Hector's statement -- 48min. Writes a letter of forgiveness to the murderer. Ivan's story - son of schizophrenic mom, beat him, horror.  Do we still blame Ivan the same way.  Hector tells his story.  Many letters exchanged.  A strange bond.  Hector has self-doubts - sending care packages to Ivan???.  (Maybe he's just a weird guy.)
+
:*all three treat “being human” as irrelevant in the discussion of rights and obligations.   
::*Ivan tells the original story of Patricia's murderIvan hears a voice that sometime comes to him.  Commits the murder. Can't make sense of it.
 
  
:*'''4 minute discussion questions''': Does Ivan's story change your view of the kind of threat he poses -- one from choosing evil/failing a responsiblity vs. compulsion?
+
:*Some general objections to unifying approaches:  based on the parent theories for Singer and Reagan — utilitarianism and rights theory
 +
::*Complexity — these theories oversimplify experience by reducing decisions to a single criterion.  Suffering, for example, is not always morally problematic.  Rights and harms often go together.  Rights talk can be thought of as too restrictive.  Maybe we should love animals?  (12) '''You could say these theories are too binary and absolute.'''
 +
::*Separation of justification and motivation — in a live example of intervening to prevent cruelty to an animal, appeals to rights and suffering seem to be more about justifications, but don’t capture our motivations, which might be more direct.  13: problem of motivation in ethics.  [This shows up in the odd result that we should be concerned about the animal’s rights but not the animal itself] 
 +
::*Marginalizing our humanity — unifying theories seem not to track differences bt how we think about animals vs. humans.  “Speciesism”.
 +
 
 +
:*Relational approaches: Often discursive essays, these approaches explore the lines we draw in our relationships with animals from the care we give pets, how we treat pests and "vermin", to the unspeakably cruel things we do to animals (even primates) in medical research.
 +
:*Some examples of relational approaches:
 +
::*Work of Cora Diamond: exposing assumptions in categories like “vermin” “pet” “livestock” .  On the positive side, it is a great historical accomplishment to use terms like “human” and “humanity” to capture what we owe or what is due to others.  It seems wrong to Diamond to treat this as a negative form of “speciesism”.  She argues that we need to be human in a way that reduces harm to animals. 
 +
::*Derrida’s The Animal That I am.  - concept of humanity developed in contrast and relation to animals, not in isolation.  Not trying to efface the distinction (as unifiers do), but “multiply its figures”.  Asks how we are seen by the animal.
 +
 
 +
===Age of Slaughter vs. Natural Life Span===
 +
 
 +
:*In thinking about the research on animal awareness and consciousness, we are becoming more sensitive to the idea that animals are indeed aware of their lives, many form friendships, have strong individual preferences, and can understand more about what is going on around them than we used to think. This is '''sentience'''.  Many people have the intuition that there is greater moral harm in mistreating or ending the life of a sentient creature, and more harm the more sentient.  Some might say this is “speciesism” — an arbitrary preference for animals like us — but others would say that suffering is worse if you are self-aware and have complex emotions.  (Cf. Oysters and mussels.). So, to draw the practical conclusion, it might be morally worse to kill an animal at a young age who has an awareness of their lifespan.
 +
 
 +
:*Note that the more symmetrically you see animal and human interests, the more likely this information is to be problematic.
 +
 
 +
:*Pigs: Slaughtered at '''6 months old'''; Natural life span: '''6 to 10 years''' 
 +
:*Chickens: Slaughtered at '''6 weeks old'''; Natural life span: '''5 to 8 years''' for those birds bred as "egg layers" such as Rhode Island Reds; 1 to 4 years for factory layer breeds such as leghorns; and 1 to 3 years for "meat" breeds.
 +
:*Hens lay eggs up to '''6 to 7 years''', live '''2-3 years longer'''. 
 +
:*Turkeys: Slaughtered at '''5 to 6 months old'''; Natural life span: '''2 to 6 years'''
 +
:*Ducks/Geese: Slaughtered at '''7 to 8 weeks old'''; Natural life span: domestic ducks: '''6 to 8 years'''; geese from '''8 to 15''' years.
 +
:*Cattle: “Beef” cattle slaughtered at '''18 months old'''; Natural life span: '''15 to 20 years'''
 +
:*Dairy cows slaughtered at '''4 to 5 years old'''; Natural life span: '''18 to 25+ years'''
 +
:*Veal Calves: Slaughtered at '''16 weeks old'''; Natural life span: '''18 to 25+ years'''
 +
:*Goats: Slaughtered at '''3 to 5 months old'''; Natural life span: '''12 to 14 years'''
 +
:*Rabbits: Slaughtered at '''10 to 12 weeks old'''; Natural life span: '''8 to 12+ years'''
 +
:*Lambs: Slaughtered at '''6 to 8 weeks old''' for “young lamb” and under 1 year for all other; Natural life span: '''12 to 14 years'''
 +
:*Horses/Donkeys: Slaughter age varies. Horses from racing industry are culled young; Natural life span: '''30 to 40 years'''

Latest revision as of 20:34, 8 April 2024

20. APR 8: Unit 5: Ethical Issues

Assigned Work

  • Milligan, Tony, Animal Ethics: Intro & The Basics, Chapter 1

In-Class

  • Reports from documentary viewing.
  • Age of Slaughter
  • Some Ethical Arguments about Food
  • Estabrook, "Hogonomics" Gastronomica

Estabrook, "Hogonomics"

  • [Flying pig farm sounds alot like the farm in "The Last Pig"]
  • Journalist on a quest to Flying Pigs Farm to discover diff bt $15.00 lb and $3.49 lb pork. comparison
  • FP farm: 750 pigs/yr, breeding rates (industrial sows 2.5 litters/year vs. FP: no crates, 20-25% fewer piglets, self-weaning,
  • Heritage piglet: $120, industrial piglet $50.
  • FP pigs, free range (400 pigs on 20-30 acres), industrial pigs about 5-8 square feet per pig, always indoors
  • FP pigs live 6-9 months instead of 6 months for industrial.
  • Heritage pigs retain natural behaviors vs. industrial
  • Food diffs p. 145. No automatic anti-biotics for FP pigs
  • Labor diffs. Industrial: 1 employee per 2,700 pigs. FP: 1 employee per 170 pigs.
  • Differences in slaughter and "kill fee".
  • Saline injected pink meat used to mask dry meat without flavor. Cosumers now trust only pink ham.

Some of the standard arguments on the ethics of eating animals

  • Ecological Arguments
  • Following the UN FAO study, "Livestock's Long Shadow," industrial meat production is one of the biggest (and possible the biggest) contributors to climate change. It is also responsible for a wide range of adverse ecological impacts such as desertification, rain forest depletion, unsustainable water use, dislocation of small scale farmers, geo-political conflict, undermining sovereignty, sanitation issues (esp from pigs), algae blooms, dead zones, etc.
  • Arguments from suffering. Utilitarian arguments.
  • Singer: Recall the "equal happiness" principle and Principle of Utility. Moral concern about the suffering of animals, combined with the fact that their consumption is no longer necessary for us, should lead us to reduce or eliminate animal foods, at least from creatures that can suffer (some debate about clams and oysters, for example. Plant "sentience" is a complicating factor as well)
  • Rights based arguments.
  • Regan: animals are "subjects of a life" - see also age of slaughter information. We should extend rights from humans to animals because they share this important "rights justifying" trait. Even if animals are not "persons," they have an interest in "having a life" that cannot be overridden without argumentation. This view can be combined with a speciesist claim that humans might prioritize human rights over animal rights in some circumstances such as medical research or subsistence agriculture or food insecurity.
  • Agrarian arguments supporting limited meat production
  • Agrarian arguments about "default animal production". Treating animal foods like a luxury. Other agrarians might advocate non-food use of animals or use of animals for food without killing them. (Eggs, milk, etc. - Note practical issues here.
  • Simon Fairlie's "default animal production" argument: We should think of meat as a luxury. Like many other luxury foods. Not sustainable at high levels of production. The relationship between meat production and environmental impact is not linear, according to Fairlie:

Meat consumption curve.png

  • Fairlie's ad for his position. [1]
  • Hunter's arguments -- There are some interesting arguments for treating "food hunting" differently from a moral perspective. Hunter's arguably enter into a special kind of relationship with nature that some deep ecologists argue to be authentic. The hunter, after all, could be prey. Hunting, like other traditional forms of food gathering, could be seen as a way of life that justifies limited animal harvesting. Also, the hunter's prey is not being raised on animal food crops, so the climate and ecological burdens are not the same. Still, it's no picnic for the wild animal!
  • The "motivational problem" in animal ethics discussions
  • As Tony Milligan points out, there is a "motivation problem" with these arguments. They do not motivative change in behavior. Rates of vegetarianism and veganism are very low (outside of cuisines that are intentionally vegetarian). Persistence in diet is also low. Smithsonian Magazine, Animal Charity Evaluators, Vegetarianism by country, Veganism by country. On the other hand, meat consumption has dropped significantly in countries like France and the Netherlands.

Milligan, Tony. Animal Ethics: the basics. "Chapter 1"

  • Main approaches:
  • Unifying - focus on key concepts like rights, suffering, sentience
  • Relational - focus on historical practices
  • Unifying approaches
  • Singer — "Focus on suffering ; Reagan - rights; being “subject of a life” ; Francione — sentience
  • all three treat “being human” as irrelevant in the discussion of rights and obligations.
  • Some general objections to unifying approaches: based on the parent theories for Singer and Reagan — utilitarianism and rights theory
  • Complexity — these theories oversimplify experience by reducing decisions to a single criterion. Suffering, for example, is not always morally problematic. Rights and harms often go together. Rights talk can be thought of as too restrictive. Maybe we should love animals? (12) You could say these theories are too binary and absolute.
  • Separation of justification and motivation — in a live example of intervening to prevent cruelty to an animal, appeals to rights and suffering seem to be more about justifications, but don’t capture our motivations, which might be more direct. 13: problem of motivation in ethics. [This shows up in the odd result that we should be concerned about the animal’s rights but not the animal itself]
  • Marginalizing our humanity — unifying theories seem not to track differences bt how we think about animals vs. humans. “Speciesism”.
  • Relational approaches: Often discursive essays, these approaches explore the lines we draw in our relationships with animals from the care we give pets, how we treat pests and "vermin", to the unspeakably cruel things we do to animals (even primates) in medical research.
  • Some examples of relational approaches:
  • Work of Cora Diamond: exposing assumptions in categories like “vermin” “pet” “livestock” . On the positive side, it is a great historical accomplishment to use terms like “human” and “humanity” to capture what we owe or what is due to others. It seems wrong to Diamond to treat this as a negative form of “speciesism”. She argues that we need to be human in a way that reduces harm to animals.
  • Derrida’s The Animal That I am. - concept of humanity developed in contrast and relation to animals, not in isolation. Not trying to efface the distinction (as unifiers do), but “multiply its figures”. Asks how we are seen by the animal.

Age of Slaughter vs. Natural Life Span

  • In thinking about the research on animal awareness and consciousness, we are becoming more sensitive to the idea that animals are indeed aware of their lives, many form friendships, have strong individual preferences, and can understand more about what is going on around them than we used to think. This is sentience. Many people have the intuition that there is greater moral harm in mistreating or ending the life of a sentient creature, and more harm the more sentient. Some might say this is “speciesism” — an arbitrary preference for animals like us — but others would say that suffering is worse if you are self-aware and have complex emotions. (Cf. Oysters and mussels.). So, to draw the practical conclusion, it might be morally worse to kill an animal at a young age who has an awareness of their lifespan.
  • Note that the more symmetrically you see animal and human interests, the more likely this information is to be problematic.
  • Pigs: Slaughtered at 6 months old; Natural life span: 6 to 10 years
  • Chickens: Slaughtered at 6 weeks old; Natural life span: 5 to 8 years for those birds bred as "egg layers" such as Rhode Island Reds; 1 to 4 years for factory layer breeds such as leghorns; and 1 to 3 years for "meat" breeds.
  • Hens lay eggs up to 6 to 7 years, live 2-3 years longer.
  • Turkeys: Slaughtered at 5 to 6 months old; Natural life span: 2 to 6 years
  • Ducks/Geese: Slaughtered at 7 to 8 weeks old; Natural life span: domestic ducks: 6 to 8 years; geese from 8 to 15 years.
  • Cattle: “Beef” cattle slaughtered at 18 months old; Natural life span: 15 to 20 years
  • Dairy cows slaughtered at 4 to 5 years old; Natural life span: 18 to 25+ years
  • Veal Calves: Slaughtered at 16 weeks old; Natural life span: 18 to 25+ years
  • Goats: Slaughtered at 3 to 5 months old; Natural life span: 12 to 14 years
  • Rabbits: Slaughtered at 10 to 12 weeks old; Natural life span: 8 to 12+ years
  • Lambs: Slaughtered at 6 to 8 weeks old for “young lamb” and under 1 year for all other; Natural life span: 12 to 14 years
  • Horses/Donkeys: Slaughter age varies. Horses from racing industry are culled young; Natural life span: 30 to 40 years