OCT 10

14: OCT 10. Unit Two (Part two): Models of morality from moral psychology

Assigned

• Churchland C5 – “I’m just that way” – (110-126; 16) – neurology and moral personality, political attitudes.

In-Class

• The Paradox of Moral Experience.
• Issue Commitment v Political Orientation
• Conversational Strategies for Engaging Political Difference

Paradox of Moral Experience

• The Paradox of Moral Experience involves a conflict between two "standpoints" for seeing values. Roughly, we experience our moral positions as our "truths", but when we study morality using social science methods (objective, 3rd person), our positions look "caused".

The two standpoints:

• 1. We experience our morality as beliefs we hold true. They are compelling to us in a way that leads us to expect others to find them compelling. We can be surprised or frustrated that others do not see our reasons as compelling. From this standpoint, our moral truths feel necessary rather than contingent.

• Examples: "What's wrong with those (lib/con)s, don't they see X/Y?" "How can anyone think it's ok to act like that?")

• 2. But, when we study morality objectively, as a functional system that integrates people who see and interpret the world differently, it is less surprising that we often do not find each others' reasoning or choices compelling. We can also see how groups of people might develop "values cultures" that diverge on entire sets of values (or, "cooperative toolkits") while still solving some of the same underlying problems that all human societies face. From this standpoint, the functions of morality are universal, but the specific strategies that individuals and cultures take seem very contingent. But, knowing this, why don’t we experience our own values as contingent?

• Examples: Sociocentric / Individualist cultures, Specific histories that groups experience (Us vs. Europe vs. ...)

• Some implications:

• We have a bias against seeing others' moral beliefs as functional. Rather, we see them as caused, and often wrongheaded. (Italians are more sociocentric because their culture makes them that way. Rather than, sociocentric culture functions to solve basic problems, just like individualistic ones in more ind cultures.)
• Different moral "matrices" are connected to our personality and identity. Areguing for the truth of your moral orientation (as opposed to focusing on issues) can be like telling someone they shouldn't be the people they are. (!)

Churchland C5 – “I’m just that way” – (110-126; 16)

• Do personality traits partially determine how we decide something is right or wrong?
• Is political orientation partially determined by personality?
• Is personality partiality determined by genes?
• If the answers are yes, yes, and yes, what are the implications?

• 111: Neuorological response to negative stimuli, such as rotting carcases or someone eating live worms correlates significantly with political orienation (as measured by Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory).

• 2014 study by Woo-Young Ahn - even response to one image is enough for better than chance prediction of political orientation. Interestingly little correlation with reported (Sys 2) rating of images. It's Sys 1 that betrays us...

• Work of Hibbing (see especially Chapters 5 and 6 from previous course readings). Physio-politics: Attentaional studies, Electrodermal studies (EDM or skin conductivity)

• Gaze cueing studies - liberals more influenced by gaze cues.
• Eye tracking - conservatives lock on to negative or threatening faces faster, longer dwell time.
• Cognitive tests - soft categorizers v hard categorizers, Beanfest!
• From Churchland also, p. 116.

• Heritability of moral personality and political attitudes.

• MZ (identical) and DZ (fraternal) twin studies show this for traits such as personality traits like aggressiveness, traditionalism, obedience to authority.
• Also for political attitudes.
• Extroversion, openness to new experience, emotional stability (neuroticism), agreeableness. Note: These are results in personality theory and research broadly. [1]

• How do heritable personality traits related to political orientation?

• Caveat: Traits are on a spectrum. You can be conservative about some things and liberal about others. But:
• 120: Openness predicts less traditional, more liberal.
• Conservatives relatively neophobic, liberals neophilic.

• Skepticism about the theory that "instinctive pathogen stress response" underlies outgroup behavior. This might modify our theorizing about the fart spray experiment (and related results).

• The things we get most worked up about: sexuality, intimacy, treatment of outgroups, might be the parts of our conscience and psychology that are most shaped by evolution. (Note the issues these core challenges map onto: abortion, gay marriage, immigration, war, discrimination.)

Some ways that our moral personalities show up in everyday life.

• In intimate partnerships, we often look for “differences”. But there are at least 3 things we look for sameness on in partner choice: religion, political orientation, and drinking behavior.

• Trump fridges v. Biden fridges [2]

• Cons and Libs like: different kinds of sermons, jokes, stories, decor. Cons favor Porsches, Libs Volvos

Issue Commitment v Political Orientation

• To make practical use of this research, we need to introduce a distinction between "issue commitments" (roughly our position on the political questions of the day) vs "political orientation" (our enduring (after age 22-25) cognitive and emotional responses that predict liberal - moderate - conservative).
• Textbook examples:

• Pearl Harbor
• Americans with Disabilities Act
• Immigration - Bush republicans vs. Trump republicans

• Theory Contrast:

• Old school thinking -- We decide to be liberal or conservative (under the tutelage of our dear professors). (Enlightenment connection. Reason is independent of culture. We reason our way to our political orientation.)
• (Possible) New thinking. Political orientation is:

• part of our identity, connected to personality, gels around age 25.
• orientation doesn't change, but issue commitments can.

• Implications:

• It may be bigotry to think less of someone because they have a different political orientation than you.

Implications from this research for how we interact with others on moral and political values questions - Small Group Discussion

• In your groups, consider some of the following questions:

• Should we be more careful about how we interact over political orientation (compare to other identity issues)?
• Is it bigotry to tell someone or imply to someone that they shouldn't be conservative or liberal?
• Should we consider new conversational strategies (and values) to accomodate the new research?
• In light of this research, what is the best way to get someone with a different political orientation than you to agree on your issue commitment?

Conversational Strategies for Engaging Political Difference

• A big problem that this unit leaves us with is, "How do we interact with people with different matrices and different experiences, especially concerning political value differences, when we hold our own views with conviction and sense of their truth? In other words, how do we deal with the Paradox of Moral Experience?

• Why this is so difficult...

• We often unintentionally (and, for some people, intentionally) create "cognitive dissonance" in a discussion, leading people to find ways to stop the pain, rather than listen to the issues. This can escalate.
• We don't always have reasons for our convictions, but, as we know from the dumbfounding research, we "confabulate". We confuse intuitions with reasoned conviction. This can lead us to "pile on" arguments, thinking they are persuasive apart from the intuitions (moral matrix) that support them. But if you don't have those intuitions, the "pile on" can feel aggressive.
• We don't all react the same way when our views are criticized. (Remember Socrates' attitude here. Noble but difficult to achieve.)

• 1. Three Basic Strategies:

• A. Explore differences gently. Monitor your vital signs and those of your interlocutors.
• B. Find common goals or things to affirm. (Example of landlord interaction last semester.)
• C. Model exploratory thought. (How do you do that, specifically?) See sympathetic interpretation below.
• These strategies obviously move you in different directions in a conversation, but they can all be used together to manage "dissonance" and tension in a discussion.

• 2. Practice Sympathetic Interpretation

• In general, sympathetic interpretation involves strategies that mix "identification" (peanuts for the elephant) with "critical engagement" (rational persuasion, expression of value differences)
• Try to understand where a view is "coming from". Ask questions.
• Restate views, checking for fairness.

• 3. Other miscellaneous strategies (many contributed by students):

• Cultivate diverse relationships if possible.
• Avoid pejorative labels.
• Views can change even if orientations don't. Focus on views, not orientations.
• Accept differences that won't change (validate them in others, as you would other differences), focus on pragmatics and cooperation.
• Humor, if possible. Self-effacing humor can set the stage.
• Acknowledge physio-politics in the discussion. Give people "permission" or space to "out" themselves as libs and cons.
• Acknowledge your own orientation and expect it to be respected.
• Don't "sugar coat" differences. (Be true to yourself.)

Argumentative and Rhetorical Strategies for Engaging Political Difference

• Acknowledge partial truths in opposing views, and weaknesses in your own view.
• Present your issue commitment as something that should appeal to someone with a different political orientation.

  • Practice "strategic dissimulation" (controversial for some). "I'm still working out my views here..." when you really have pretty well worked out views, even one's you are proud of and think to be true (Paradox of Moral Experience)

• Practice "strategic self-deprecation" - Acknowledge knowledge deficits or evidentiary weaknesses in your view as a way of inviting a more critical discussion.
• Use verbal cues that indicate (if possible) that views you disagree with are "reasonable" and/or "understandable". That could mean:

• 1. The view is reasonable, even if you disagree. Preface your disagreement by acknowledging this.

• Example: "Reasonable and well-informed people disagree on this..."... "Well, your in good company..."

• 2. The view seems unreasonable, but you focus on some intuitions that support it, even if you don't share these intuitions.

• Example: I can see how/why someone would feel this way..., but...

• 3. The view seems unreasonable and false to you, but it is one that many people hold.

• Example: Acknowledging that the view is widely held without endorsing it. You can also "deflect" to the complexity of the problem or human nature...