Koby Warren's Proseminar Research

The Problem of Consciousness

Ok, so my area of research is in theory of mind. Specifically the problem of consciousness. The question that seems to be plaguing this area of philosophy right now is the divide between dualism and monism. Yes, i know this isn't a new issue. This division has existed for a long time. However, it seems as though the division is at a critical moment in the history of mind theory. This is because dualism seems to be on its last leg in the realm of philosophical discourse. The only viable form of dualism that remains today is property dualism, a position championed by David Chalmers. Leading the opposing team (physical monist) is Daniel Dennett.

Most of my research seemed to be centered on the arguments between these two philosophers. The most heated arguments seem to revolve around whether consciousness can be accounted for reductively (a problem adressed by numerous philosophers, including Nagel, etc). The most fascinating (and controversial) of these arguments is the Chalmers "Zombie Theory." This theory basically states that because zombies lacking qualia can be logically plausible, then consciousness cannot be completely reduced the material explanation. Basically, it challenges modern science to account for experience in their 3rd person reductive methods (a challenge that Chalmers believe is impossible to meet, while Dennett disagrees).

Here is an attachment of my annotated bibliography up to this point..... Koby's Annotated Bibliography

also, if anyone happens to have any thoughts on this subject, please feel free to post them here. Kobywarren 23:50, 6 November 2010 (UTC)