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==22: APR 12: Proposals and Applications==
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==25: APR 12. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
:*Greene, Joshua and Jonathan Cohen. "For the Law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything" (20)
+
:*[https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/episodes/317421-blame Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility]
 +
:*[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13554790903329182?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=nncs20 Article abstract, "Klüver–Bucy syndrome, hypersexuality, and the law"]
  
===Greene, Joshua and Jonathan Cohen. "For the Law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything"===
+
===In-class===
  
:*'''1. Introduction'''
+
:*Some basics of the moral responsibilty and free will discussion
  
::*"Mens rea" - a guilty mind. 
+
===Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law===
::*Existing legal principles make no assumptions about the neural level, so can accommodate new science.  But, neuroscience '''does''' reveal "something fishy" about our conceptions of human action and responsibility.
 
::*Argument preview: 1776: Current legal doctrine is grounded in a "metaphysically overambitious" libertarian view of free will, which is threatened by new neuroscience and determinism.  Discrepancy will show up in the public's mind as they watch the CJ system operate.
 
::*The authors will "diagnose" the free will issue as a discrepancy bt folk psychology and folk physics.  The version of free will that folk psych gives us is an illusion. [But that doesn't exclude a non-illusionary account of FW.
 
  
:*'''2. Two Theories of Punishment'''
+
:*'''Basic Questions:'''
::*Background of skepticism about utilitarian punishment: could be Draconian, could punish the innocent. Critics respond that these scenarios would not satisfy utilitarian intuitions.
+
::*1. Do we praise people for things that they don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault?   
::*Retributivism does a better job of capturing our intuitions about punishmentDesert. "Internal wickedness"
+
::*2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will, what we know about the brain, and the causes of crime?
 +
::*3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"?  Start a listCausal, moral, both, neither. Do you find yourself referencing some idea of a "normally competent person"? When would you also hold someone responsible for becoming a normally competent person? What sorts of conditions make is more or less likely that you will become a normally competent person?
 +
::*4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach criminal punishment with retributive intent?
  
:*'''3. Free Will and Retributivism'''
+
:*'''Some concepts for thinking about moral responsibility:'''
::*reviews arguments of hard determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.
+
::*'''Moral Responsibility''' - The idea that people deserve praise or blame for their actions.  In the standard view, praise and blame are based on "moral desert".
::*Libertarians wind up believing things there is no evidence forUrges rejection of the "panicky metaphysics" of libertarianism.   
+
::*'''Moral desert''' - Normally, you "morally deserve" something because you did (or failed to do) something to merit it, positively or negatively. (You worked a shift and deserve to be paid. You failed to observe the speed limit...)
::*Compatibilists "normalize" free willRoughly rational, non-coerced action.
+
:::*Moral desert can be contrasted to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights. This is also called "'''moral standing'''"Moral desert can also be contrasted with "morally arbitrary" (recall Rawls). So, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things that are "'''morally arbitrary'''":  things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance), things about you that were just your good fortune (good impulse control, a good noodle, athletic ability, at ease in social life...). Yet we clearly praise and blame people (and ourselves) for all of these things! 
::*Retributivists must deny hard determinism, so, in absence of evidence for LibFW, they (and the retributive CJ system) are compatibilists.  (Hence, the law may accommodate other compatibilist frames.)
+
::*'''Accountability vs. Morally Responsibility''' -- Giving an account of someone as having done or failed to do things we normally expect of others can be done quite apart from holding someone blameworthy. This might be an important distinction if you become a skeptic about moral responsibilityYou don't lose accountability, necessarily.
 +
::*'''Free will and responsibility''' -- Most people would agree that if we cannot freely will our actions, we cannot be held responsible for them.  But what sort of free will is required? Is normal choosing (neurologically described) free will or do we have to break with the causal fabric of the universe! (Libertarian Free will).  If the world is deterministic, everything has been "decided" (Including basketball games!).  Does that mean there is no free will, or just that it might not be what we think it is?
  
:*'''4. Neuroscience Changes Nothing'''
+
===Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility===
::*Stephen Morse (from podcast, I think).  General idea of a rational person.  "The law doesn't care if people have "free will" in any deep metaphysical sense..."1778
 
::*Greene and Cohen's argument: Morse is right about neuroscience and the law, but it neuroscience changes people's intuitions about blame and punishment, then we have a problem of legitimacy of the law.
 
  
:*'''5. What really matters for MR?'''
+
:*'''Segment 1:''' Story of Kevin and his wife, JanetKevin is arrested for child pornography.   
::*The law is interested in "diminished rationality" but people are asking something deeper, "What it really him?"  vs. SES, genes, highly contingent circumstances.  We have dualist and libertarian folk psychology, not just religious folks. 
 
::*Cites "humuncular thinking" in CJ expert Pincus.  Other experts saying "some of the diffs"...?  Third example, Sternberg and Scott, write as if we needed neurological evidence rather than behavioral evidence.   
 
::*The public's fascination with neuroscience evidence is evidence that they are looking for something that the law isn't looking for.  "What it him?" 
 
::*"The Boys from Brazil" problem.  Mr. Puppet.  The law just wants to know if Mr. P was rational at the time.  But we "folk" feel that something is wrong about holding him MR.  But if det is true, we are all puppets.  People are led by their dualist/nonmaterial intuitions to reject determinism.  But maybe neuroscience will reschool those intuitions.
 
  
:*'''6. Neuroscience and the Transparent Bottleneck'''
+
::*15 years earlier. Epilepsy seizures returned after surgery two years earlier. Can't drive so he meets Janet from work, who drives him to work. Romance... Still more seizuresAnother surgery. Music ability in tactBut then his food and sexual appetites grew, played songs on the piano for hours. Disturbing behaviorReally disturbing behavior.
::*From "black box" to "transparent bottleneck"Predicts that we will have very granular real time observation of decision making processes.   
 
::*After enough new neuroscience, it will be pointless to ask, "What it him or ....?" In a sense, everyone is a "victim" of a "neuronal circumstance" (A phrase I might enjoy promoting.)
 
  
:*'''7. Folk Psychology and Fold Physics Collide'''
+
::*Reporter tries to get at who it was who did itKevin claims compulsionDownloads and deletes files.
::*Endorses Wegner's "Illusion of Conscious Will" (2002), which brought together research on how we deceive ourselves into believing we are in control.  (Still, relevant, more so than Libet's particular experiment.)
 
::*Additional considerations: Research suggesting that minds would naturally develop distinct module for animate an inanimate objects.  Hidder and Simmel's research on attribution of agency to shapes.  Andrea Heberlein's work on amygdala damaged subjects.  Didn't see agency.  "Intentional Stance / Theory of Mind" (distinguish).  Other research on people who do not see agency- autism spectrum folks.  Different ontologies. 
 
::*"Attributive Free Will" is the unavoidable tendency to attribute free will to others.   
 
::*bot. 1782: we are in a bindTwo standpoints.  "The problem of free will and determinism will never find an intuitively satisfying solution because it arises out of a conflict between two distinct cognitive subsystems that speak different cognitive 'languages' and that my ultimately be incapable of negotiation." 1783 col. 1.
 
  
:*'''8. Free will, Responsibility, and consequentialism'''
+
::*Orin Devinsky: Kevin’s neurologist. Testified in court that it wasn't Kevin's fault.
::*FW an illusion, but not MR.   
+
 
::*They do allow that consequentialism will generate a kind of account of FW, but this is "hard determinism".
+
::*Neurological dive: deep parts of our brain can generate weird thoughts, but we have a "censor".  Maybe Kevin lost that part of his brain.  Observed in post-surgery monkeys.
::*Interesting: Thinks we will be led to the French maxim, "to know all is to forgive all". universal compassion. (not so sure, myself).  
+
 
::*Objections to Consequentialist punishment.
+
::*Lee Vartan, prosecutor -- Can't be impulse control. Porn at home, but not at work.  He must have known that it was wrong.  But Tourette's can be circumstantially triggered even though it is clearly neurological.  Poignant exchange with Janet about staying in the relationship.  '''Could you have stayed in the relationship?'''  '''Kluwer-Bucy'''.  Months before sentencing.  Medication makes him normal, but eliminates his libido.  5 yrs. - home arrest.  Judge acknowledges prosecutor's point.  How does the legal system assign blame when you are sometimes “in control” and sometimes not? Adds: You could have asked for help. (Reflect on this a bit.)  24 months federal prison 25 months of house arrest.  2008-2010. '''Do you agree with prosecutor's Vartan's point? Why or why not? What would your sentence have been?''' (Short group discussion on questions in bold.)
:::*Could justify overpunishing.
+
 
:::*Could justify underpunishing[It is true that we will notice recidivism more if policy changes.]
+
:*'''Segment 2:'''  Blame - person or brain. (26:30 mins)
::*Objections to hard determinism and denial of FW.  
+
 
:::*1. Doesn't that fact that you can raise your hand show that you have FW?  No. Wegner.
+
::*[https://law.duke.edu/fac/farahany/ Nita Farahany] - neurolaw professor (law and philosophy!)Might be lots of cases. One count: 1600 cases from 1% sampled.  (Counter-argument: Isn't this just like blaming everything else for what you do wrong?  Isn't it too easy?). Thought experiment: Imagine a deaf person, who can’t hear a child in burning building. You wouldn't hold the deaf person liable for the death of the child. "Emotional inability" would also be damage to a physical structure (as in the ear).
:::*2. Isn't attribution of FW and MR practically inevitable?  Cites good early evidence (Henrich would be an update in the same tradition of Cultural evolutionary accounts) that we are adapted to FW and MR to meet challenges of social lifeResponse: Analogous to the diff between Euclidean and Curved spaceMay only need to overcome Euclidean intuitions when you launch a rocket into spaceLikewise (big concession) we may not overcome our FWMR intuitions in everyday life, but in CJ contexts we must.   
+
 
:::*3. Why do anything if hard determinism is trueSame answer as earlierTry it.  You're not built that way.
+
::*David Eagleman, Neuroscientist - Makes critical point: Neuroscience isn't so precise. Like looking at earth from space.  New technologies may show us how experience is written in our brain.  (Back to Descartes: mind is the ghost in the machine.)  Slippery slope, the brain is always involved. Even healthy brain. Blameworthiness might be the wrong question.  Person vs. biology doesn't really make sense anymore.  The "choosey part” of the brain (the homunculus! - Explain: Sapolsky will make fun of this idea.) 36:00 minutes. Funny exchange. '''Self-modification''' comes up. The choosey part is also part of the brain. One system. Raises possibility that all decisions are determined. 
 +
 
 +
::*Claim from Eagleman: Legal system should drop moral blame.  Adopt utilitarian approach.  Predict recidivism. Point system exists for sex offenders. Better than people’s "unguided judgement" (50% accurate). Point system and algorithm: 70%. Currently there is appearance bias for example from juries. [Mention controversies over sentencing algorithms [https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/01/21/137783/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai/].  
 +
 
 +
::*A point system might be very predictive, but it might involve convicting someone of a future crime. Would it be? Would that be ok?
 +
 
 +
::*Nita Frahany - Blame might serve social function of articulating norms.
 +
 
 +
:*'''Segment 3:''' Dear Hector / Dear Ivan
 +
 
 +
::*Bianca Giaever (radio producer who did the story on Hector) - Hector Black, 86Hector's backstory - WWII vet, Harvard, joins civil rights movement in Atlanta, moves South, adopts Patricia, a neglected child who lived nearby. Patricia's story (becomes a beautiful and productive person), college, adopts kids -- Patricia is murdered (strangled) and raped by Ivan Simpson. Hector feels retributive impulse. Ivan confesses. Hector considers whether he wishes the death penalty for him, decides no. Hector's statement at sentencing. Writes a letter of forgiveness to the murderer, which starts correspondence. Is it important that Ivan doesn’t forgive himself? Ivan's story - son of schizophrenic mom, adopted, horror.  Ivan abused.  Mom tries to drown Ivan and two other children.
 +
 
 +
::* Ivan tells the original story of Patricia's murder. Burglary. Drug use. Returns to Patricia’s house. Conversation with Patricia.  Didn’t originally intend to kill her.  Patricia give him food. Gets high on crack. Ivan hears a voice that sometimes comes to him. Commits the murder. Can't make sense of it. Wants death penalty.
 +
 
 +
::*Do we still blame Ivan Simpson the same way?  Hector tells his story.  Many letters exchanged.  A strange bond.  Hector has self-doubts about his behavior toward Ivan - sending care packages to Ivan???.  (Maybe he's just a weird guy or is he on to something?) '''How do you evaluate Hector’s approach to Ivan?'''
 +
 
 +
::*'''Does Ivan's story change your view of the kind of threat he poses -- one from choosing evil/failing a responsibility vs. compulsion?’’’
 +
 
 +
===Some complicating arguments and thought experiments on moral responsibilty===
 +
 
 +
:*A couple of interesting philosophical arguments to take into the thought experiment:
 +
 
 +
::*From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
 +
:::*If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, '''one must be truly responsible for how one is''', morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
 +
:::*Strawson's argument suggests the "impossibility" of moral responsibility.
 +
 
 +
::*Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
 +
:::*Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
 +
:::*The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
 +
:::*Mele's Intentional self-modification argument suggests that we can be held responsible for our actions because we have powers of self-modification.
 +
:::*But! Now imagine Benji, also afraid of the basementHe doesn't try to conquer his fear or tries and failsHow would you know if Benji deserves to be blamed for his failure? 
 +
:::*Maybe Betty is a "chronic cognizer" and Benji is a "cognitive miser"Are these traits they for which they have "moral desert"? Some people are not persuaded by Mele's argument. How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about moral responsibility?
 +
 
 +
:*'''Thought experiment on interpersonal praise and blame'''
 +
::*Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that.  Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
 +
:::*Condition 1: Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstaclesAre you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
 +
:::*Condition 2: Suppose now that you look at your family and extended family and you notice that, compare to other families, yours seem to come to good habits easily. None of you really ever do anything wrong, or much.  You notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad or dysfunctional behavior (drugs, alcohol, just being "bad", disruptions in employment).  Are you less deserving of your praise than people from these families, equally, more?
 +
 
 +
===Small Group Discussion: '''Thought Experiment on Praise and Blame'''===
 +
 
 +
:*Work through the thought experiment above, sharing your responses to Conditions 1 and 2. Do these comparisons make you less certain about the basis of moral responsibility? When you are ready, fill out [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSe-bvqFH6VtCNfD1aMo2877ZEJks0liBCc6oUabmIyLge_eVw/viewform?usp=sf_link this google form] about the thought experiment:
 +
:*Try to think of some clear cases in which you would blame yourself (or blame someone else) for failing a specific moral responsibility. Make a list with different levels of seriousness. Include a few cases of criminal conduct, but mostly stay with interpersonal responsibility contexts. (Example: I would blame myself if I failed to prepare for class because I got distracted reading magazines. -Alfino) In each case, try to think about what you "deserve" or "ought to have to do" in light of your failureIs it always a penalty (from nominal penalty to one proportion to failure)? Does it always involve "deserving blame"?  When does it?  Hopefully, this helps us think about praise and blame in actual contextsPlease bring 1-3 items from your list back to the whole class.

Latest revision as of 20:08, 12 April 2022

25: APR 12. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism

Assigned

In-class

  • Some basics of the moral responsibilty and free will discussion

Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law

  • Basic Questions:
  • 1. Do we praise people for things that they don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault?
  • 2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will, what we know about the brain, and the causes of crime?
  • 3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"? Start a list. Causal, moral, both, neither. Do you find yourself referencing some idea of a "normally competent person"? When would you also hold someone responsible for becoming a normally competent person? What sorts of conditions make is more or less likely that you will become a normally competent person?
  • 4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach criminal punishment with retributive intent?
  • Some concepts for thinking about moral responsibility:
  • Moral Responsibility - The idea that people deserve praise or blame for their actions. In the standard view, praise and blame are based on "moral desert".
  • Moral desert - Normally, you "morally deserve" something because you did (or failed to do) something to merit it, positively or negatively. (You worked a shift and deserve to be paid. You failed to observe the speed limit...)
  • Moral desert can be contrasted to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights. This is also called "moral standing". Moral desert can also be contrasted with "morally arbitrary" (recall Rawls). So, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things that are "morally arbitrary": things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance), things about you that were just your good fortune (good impulse control, a good noodle, athletic ability, at ease in social life...). Yet we clearly praise and blame people (and ourselves) for all of these things!
  • Accountability vs. Morally Responsibility -- Giving an account of someone as having done or failed to do things we normally expect of others can be done quite apart from holding someone blameworthy. This might be an important distinction if you become a skeptic about moral responsibility. You don't lose accountability, necessarily.
  • Free will and responsibility -- Most people would agree that if we cannot freely will our actions, we cannot be held responsible for them. But what sort of free will is required? Is normal choosing (neurologically described) free will or do we have to break with the causal fabric of the universe! (Libertarian Free will). If the world is deterministic, everything has been "decided" (Including basketball games!). Does that mean there is no free will, or just that it might not be what we think it is?

Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility

  • Segment 1: Story of Kevin and his wife, Janet. Kevin is arrested for child pornography.
  • 15 years earlier. Epilepsy seizures returned after surgery two years earlier. Can't drive so he meets Janet from work, who drives him to work. Romance... Still more seizures. Another surgery. Music ability in tact. But then his food and sexual appetites grew, played songs on the piano for hours. Disturbing behavior. Really disturbing behavior.
  • Reporter tries to get at who it was who did it. Kevin claims compulsion. Downloads and deletes files.
  • Orin Devinsky: Kevin’s neurologist. Testified in court that it wasn't Kevin's fault.
  • Neurological dive: deep parts of our brain can generate weird thoughts, but we have a "censor". Maybe Kevin lost that part of his brain. Observed in post-surgery monkeys.
  • Lee Vartan, prosecutor -- Can't be impulse control. Porn at home, but not at work. He must have known that it was wrong. But Tourette's can be circumstantially triggered even though it is clearly neurological. Poignant exchange with Janet about staying in the relationship. Could you have stayed in the relationship? Kluwer-Bucy. Months before sentencing. Medication makes him normal, but eliminates his libido. 5 yrs. - home arrest. Judge acknowledges prosecutor's point. How does the legal system assign blame when you are sometimes “in control” and sometimes not? Adds: You could have asked for help. (Reflect on this a bit.) 24 months federal prison 25 months of house arrest. 2008-2010. Do you agree with prosecutor's Vartan's point? Why or why not? What would your sentence have been? (Short group discussion on questions in bold.)
  • Segment 2: Blame - person or brain. (26:30 mins)
  • Nita Farahany - neurolaw professor (law and philosophy!). Might be lots of cases. One count: 1600 cases from 1% sampled. (Counter-argument: Isn't this just like blaming everything else for what you do wrong? Isn't it too easy?). Thought experiment: Imagine a deaf person, who can’t hear a child in burning building. You wouldn't hold the deaf person liable for the death of the child. "Emotional inability" would also be damage to a physical structure (as in the ear).
  • David Eagleman, Neuroscientist - Makes critical point: Neuroscience isn't so precise. Like looking at earth from space. New technologies may show us how experience is written in our brain. (Back to Descartes: mind is the ghost in the machine.) Slippery slope, the brain is always involved. Even healthy brain. Blameworthiness might be the wrong question. Person vs. biology doesn't really make sense anymore. The "choosey part” of the brain (the homunculus! - Explain: Sapolsky will make fun of this idea.) 36:00 minutes. Funny exchange. Self-modification comes up. The choosey part is also part of the brain. One system. Raises possibility that all decisions are determined.
  • Claim from Eagleman: Legal system should drop moral blame. Adopt utilitarian approach. Predict recidivism. Point system exists for sex offenders. Better than people’s "unguided judgement" (50% accurate). Point system and algorithm: 70%. Currently there is appearance bias for example from juries. [Mention controversies over sentencing algorithms [1].
  • A point system might be very predictive, but it might involve convicting someone of a future crime. Would it be? Would that be ok?
  • Nita Frahany - Blame might serve social function of articulating norms.
  • Segment 3: Dear Hector / Dear Ivan
  • Bianca Giaever (radio producer who did the story on Hector) - Hector Black, 86. Hector's backstory - WWII vet, Harvard, joins civil rights movement in Atlanta, moves South, adopts Patricia, a neglected child who lived nearby. Patricia's story (becomes a beautiful and productive person), college, adopts kids -- Patricia is murdered (strangled) and raped by Ivan Simpson. Hector feels retributive impulse. Ivan confesses. Hector considers whether he wishes the death penalty for him, decides no. Hector's statement at sentencing. Writes a letter of forgiveness to the murderer, which starts correspondence. Is it important that Ivan doesn’t forgive himself? Ivan's story - son of schizophrenic mom, adopted, horror. Ivan abused. Mom tries to drown Ivan and two other children.
  • Ivan tells the original story of Patricia's murder. Burglary. Drug use. Returns to Patricia’s house. Conversation with Patricia. Didn’t originally intend to kill her. Patricia give him food. Gets high on crack. Ivan hears a voice that sometimes comes to him. Commits the murder. Can't make sense of it. Wants death penalty.
  • Do we still blame Ivan Simpson the same way? Hector tells his story. Many letters exchanged. A strange bond. Hector has self-doubts about his behavior toward Ivan - sending care packages to Ivan???. (Maybe he's just a weird guy or is he on to something?) How do you evaluate Hector’s approach to Ivan?
  • Does Ivan's story change your view of the kind of threat he poses -- one from choosing evil/failing a responsibility vs. compulsion?’’’

Some complicating arguments and thought experiments on moral responsibilty

  • A couple of interesting philosophical arguments to take into the thought experiment:
  • From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
  • If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
  • Strawson's argument suggests the "impossibility" of moral responsibility.
  • Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
  • Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
  • The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
  • Mele's Intentional self-modification argument suggests that we can be held responsible for our actions because we have powers of self-modification.
  • But! Now imagine Benji, also afraid of the basement. He doesn't try to conquer his fear or tries and fails. How would you know if Benji deserves to be blamed for his failure?
  • Maybe Betty is a "chronic cognizer" and Benji is a "cognitive miser". Are these traits they for which they have "moral desert"? Some people are not persuaded by Mele's argument. How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about moral responsibility?
  • Thought experiment on interpersonal praise and blame
  • Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that. Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
  • Condition 1: Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstacles. Are you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
  • Condition 2: Suppose now that you look at your family and extended family and you notice that, compare to other families, yours seem to come to good habits easily. None of you really ever do anything wrong, or much. You notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad or dysfunctional behavior (drugs, alcohol, just being "bad", disruptions in employment). Are you less deserving of your praise than people from these families, equally, more?

Small Group Discussion: Thought Experiment on Praise and Blame

  • Work through the thought experiment above, sharing your responses to Conditions 1 and 2. Do these comparisons make you less certain about the basis of moral responsibility? When you are ready, fill out this google form about the thought experiment:
  • Try to think of some clear cases in which you would blame yourself (or blame someone else) for failing a specific moral responsibility. Make a list with different levels of seriousness. Include a few cases of criminal conduct, but mostly stay with interpersonal responsibility contexts. (Example: I would blame myself if I failed to prepare for class because I got distracted reading magazines. -Alfino) In each case, try to think about what you "deserve" or "ought to have to do" in light of your failure. Is it always a penalty (from nominal penalty to one proportion to failure)? Does it always involve "deserving blame"? When does it? Hopefully, this helps us think about praise and blame in actual contexts. Please bring 1-3 items from your list back to the whole class.