Difference between revisions of "JAN 21"

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(Created page with "==2: JAN 21. Unit One: Primers and Background== ===Assigned=== :*Ariely, Why We Lie (6) :*Haidt, The Righteous Mind, Intro and Chapter 1 (24) :*Zimbardo Experiment -- view o...")
 
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==2: JAN 21. Unit One: Primers and Background==
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==3: JAN 21. ==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
−
:*Ariely, Why We Lie (6)
+
:*Sapolsky C10 – “The Evolution of Behavior,” (360-373; 13). Key concepts: multi-level selection theory (MLS).  Cultural selection pressures? 
−
:*Haidt, The Righteous Mind, Intro and Chapter 1 (24)
+
:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrvtOWEXDIQ Aristotle and Virtue Theory: PBS Crash Course in Philosophy #38] - Key concepts: The use of reason to school emotions.  Virtue as a mean between extremes.
−
:*Zimbardo Experiment -- view one of the youtube videos about the experiment.  read the wiki page.
 
  
−
===Method===
+
===In-Class===
  
−
:*Brief glance at [[Philosophical Methods]]
+
:*Details on how to submit your practice writing. 
 +
:*Everyday Ethics: Thinking about virtue ethics in your own experience.
 +
:*Mini-Lecture on Sapolsky 353-360 - Tournament Species as examples of evolved behavior.
 +
:*More on conscience -- Inferences we make among them.  Accepted variation/Contested variation.
  
−
:*Tips on How to report study findings
+
===Sapolsky, Chapter 10: The Evolution of Human Behavior 354-374===
  
−
:*Philosophy makes use of a wide range of evidence and knowledge.  In this course you will encounter alot of psychological, anthropological and cultural studies.  You have to practice the way you represent studies (as opposed to theories) and how you make inferences from their conclusions.   
+
:*'''How can cooperation get started and become stable?''' 353-
 +
::*In other words, how does "tit for tat" survive among defectors? Coalitions, green beard effects.
 +
::*Sometimes natural events cut a group off.  Inbreeding promotes stronger kin bonds. That group may outperform others once they out migrate.  (Give example from Henrich of Inuits with meat sharing behaviors.  A better "cooperative package".) 
 +
::*Effects of ind. selection, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism:
 +
:::*Tournament vs. Pair bonding  - lots of traits and behaviors follow from sexual dimorphism.  This also happens in degrees.
 +
:::*Parent-Offspring competition - in spite of kin selection, there are some "zero sum" situations bt parents and offspring.  parent-offspring weaning conflict and mother-fetus conflict. Over insulin. Dad even has a vote through paternal "imprinted genes," which promote fetal growth at expense of mom.  (Intersexual Genetic Conflict)
  
−
:*Some key elements to distinguish in reporting research:
+
:*'''Multilevel Selection MLS'''
−
::*observational, survey, experimental
+
::*Remember the "bad" group selection from the beginning of the chapter?  Group selection returns in the last few decades.  (Tell story of visits with Bio prof friends over the years.)
−
::*study setup: for observational: who were the test subjects, what were they asked to do; for survey: what instrument was used, to whom was it given?
+
::*Genotypic and Phenotypic levels of explanation - unibrows.
−
::*what conditions were tested?
+
::*Organism (expressed individual) is a vehicle of the genome, but the genome has alot to say about how the organism turns out.  .
−
::*what was the immediate result?
+
::*Big debate in Biology. Three positions: 1. Dawkins took the "selfish gene" view that the best level of explanation is individual genes. 2. Others say the genome - "a chicken is an egg's way of making another egg" (It's the whole genome travelling through evolutionary "space".); finally, 3. Others like Gould take the phenotype.  After all, it's visible to the world.  Selection could operate on a single phenotypic trait or the whole individual.  Dawkins cake metaphor. 362.  (So that's really four levels of selection.)
−
::*what was the significance or inference to be made from the results?
 
  
−
===Ariely, Why We Lie===
+
::*'''Four levels and counting'''. Theorists might favor one or more levels as relatively more important than others.  Each level involves possible selection pressure or adaptive value in meeting a pressure. The peacock’s plumage is both.
 +
:::*1. Genetic traits. Single selfish genes use us to get into the next gen.
 +
:::*2. Genome. The recipe is what’s passed on, so focus on that.
 +
:::*3. Phenotypic trait. Individual expressed traits (potential to make money) (Could also be sex selection - pheasant's plumage, big horns!).
 +
:::*4. Phenotype.  It’s the “whole package - whole person” that we choose.
  
−
:*Assumptions: we think honesty is an all or nothing trait.
+
:::*'''Fifth level''': Neo-group selection - the idea that some heritable traits are maladaptive for the individual, but increase the group's fitness (note difference from the bad old group selection).
−
:*Research on honesty with the "matrix task"
+
::::*Examples:
−
::*Shredder condition
+
:::::*Encouraging patriotism might lead you to enlist, taking a fitness risk that we benefit from.
−
::*Payment condition
+
:::::*Jailing someone for their reproductive life is a serious fitness hit, but we're better off with murderers locked up.
−
::*Probability of getting caught condition
+
:::::*  
−
::*Distance of payment condition
 
−
::*Presence of a cheater condition
 
−
:*Priming with 10 commandments or signature on top of form
 
−
:*Implications: for current and possible new approaches to limit cheating.
 
−
:*Philosophical Implications: What, if anything, does this tell us about the nature of ethics?
 
  
−
===Debrief on Zimbardo - Stanford Prison Experiment===
+
::*Neo-group selection happens when groups impose fitness costs or benefits on members or sub-groups.
 +
:::*Positive (fitness benefits): zags helping zags, (but is that totally positive?). 
 +
:::*Negative for some, positive for others(fitness costs): Slavery, racism, class bias, criminal punishment, patriotism, heroism, priests.
  
−
:*Let's practice our protocol for reporting research here.
+
:*Some scientists agree that neo-group selection can occur, but think it's rare. Sapolsky points out that it is not rare in humans, due to Green Beard effects.
−
:*What are the principle insights from this experiment?  How might they relate to recent events?
 
  
−
===Everyday Ethics: Thinking about Gossip===
+
:*Remember "Green Beard" effects from p. 341 -- a thought experiment in extending/recognizing kin.  With neo-group, we go further, and hypothesize that we can form groups around almost anything (sport teams in an imaginary baseball league).  Human mind does not limit partiality or commitment to kin or even social group. 
  
−
:*Defining gossip is difficult, but it typically involves sharing information about someone in a way that you would not want that person to discover.   
+
:*Where do we fit in? AND US?
 +
::*We're bit of chimp and a bit of bonobo.  Men 10% larger, 20% heavier than women.  Slight dimorphism. Not quite pair-bonding, not quite tournament
 +
::*'''US and Individual Selection''': Example of divorce: natural experiment when cultural taboos are lifted.  Note that increased divorce rates are confined to the same percentage of population.  Lift culture and you get to see who the "less pair-bonding" people are! (In other words, maybe it's not something to feel totally guilty about.) Likewise with historically powerful (and not very romantic) rulers.  Point: with absolute power, tyrants often adopt extreme reproductive behaviors with many hundreds of women, if possible.
 +
::*'''US and Kin selection''': Still very powerful, most feuds are clan based, but we can go to war against kin, and we give to strangers. We can be disgusted by people who betray their families: Story of Pavlik Morozov, 368.  368: study about preferring dog to x, y, z.  vmPFC involved. 
 +
::*Why do humans deviate from kin selection so much.  Biologists also want to find '''mechanisms'''.  Animals recognize kin by MHC or imprinted genes.  We do it cognitively. Much more flexibility.
  
−
:*Is gossip always bad or does it sometimes serve a legitimate purpose?  Imagine a continuum of positions on gossip, each justified by a particular principle.  Where are you on that continuum?  What principle would you use to justify your position. 
+
===Some Preliminaries about Objectivity in Ethics and Features of Ethical Discourse===
  
−
:*In small groups, share your general view of gossip.  Feel free to share old gossip stories, such when you discovered people gossiping about you, or were discovered gossiping.  Can you recall benefitting from someone sharing gossip with you, perhaps about someone?
+
:*'''Where should we look for "moral goodness"?'''
 +
::*Intentions (Kantian),  
 +
::*Person (a virtuous person) (Aristotle),  
 +
::*Consequences (Mill, Singer - Utilitarian)
  
−
:*Over the weekend, ask 2-3 people about their views on gossip.  Try some of our questions or just engage the conversation on its own terms.  Try to figure out how people are thinking about gossip. 
+
:*(The following is pretty standard, but was drawn from Peter Singer's classic, ''Practical Ethics'')
  
 +
:*'''What does it mean to say "values vary by culture"?  Is it always "bad relativism"?'''
  
−
===Haidt, The Righteous Mind, Intro and Chapter 1===
+
:*Singer's arguments against cultural relativism:
 +
::*Cultural Relativism (the old discussion): Ethics varies by culture.  Singer: This is true and false, same act under different conditions may have different value, but this is '''superficial relativism'''.  For example, existence of birth control led to a general change in sexual ethics. The moral principle in question here is: don't have kids that you're not ready to care for. That principle might remain the same and be objective, but the prohibition on casual sex might change.  (What dropped out was the idea that sex before marriage was sinful.) 
  
−
*Intro
+
::*Note: There is strong polling data on advisability of living together prior to marriage.  Now, yes; 60 years ago, no.  So cultural change itself doesn't tell you whether moral principles are changing. The consistent principle here?
−
:*Note: starts with problem of "getting along" -- problem of ethics is settling conflict (recall contrast with more traditional goal of finding a method or theory to discover moral truth).
 
−
:*The "righteous" mind is at once moral and judgemental.  It makes possible group cooperation, tribes, nations, and societies.
 
  
−
:*Majors claims of each section:
+
:*'''What kind of conversation is an ethical conversation'''
−
::*Intuitions come first, reasoning second. ''The mind is divided, like a rider on an elephant, and the rider's job is to serve the elephant.''
 
−
::*There's more to morality than harm and fairness
 
−
::*Morality binds and blinds -- We are 90 percent chimp, 10% bee.
 
  
−
:::*Keep notes that help you tie content back to these claims.
+
::*Subjectivist Relativism - This position may not be held by any thoughtful person, but it sounds like what some people say when they start studying values and becomes confused or cynical. 
 +
:::*The Position: "Wrong" means "I disapprove" or "my society disapproves")
 +
:::*The Problems:
 +
::::*If this sort of relativism is true, polls could determine ethics.  But they don't.
 +
::::*Deep subjectivism can't making sense of disagreement. Ethics is a kind of conversation.
 +
::::*There is just too much research suggesting that "I approve" isn't philosophical "rock bottom".
  
−
:*'''Method Note''': This is explanatory writing.  Not philosophy directly.  Digression on difference between explanatory and justifactory writing.
+
:*Singer: Ok to say the values aren't objective like physics (aren't facts about the world), but not sensible to deny the meaningfulness of moral disagreement and ethical reasoning.
  
−
:*Moral reasoning as a means of finding truth vs. furthering social agendas. '''Paradox of Moral Experience:''' We experience our morality the first way, but when we look objectively at groups, it's more like the second way.   
+
:*An evolutionist's twist: A society's ethical culture can produce positive, neutral, or negative outcomes for human flourishing.  In this sense, values have objective consequences in meeting selection pressures (both natural and cultural). (Vax values, for example.)
  
−
*Chapter 1
+
::*The sorts of reasons that count as ethical: '''universalizable''' ones. Can't just appeal to one person or group's interest.  Note: most standard ethical theories satisfy this requirement, yet yield different analysis and advice.  We will look at the specific form of universalization in each theory we discuss, but you could say this is a kind of defining feature of ethical discourse.
  
−
:*Harmless taboo violations: eating the dog / violating a dead chicken.
+
===Philosophical Moral Theories: Virtue Ethics===
  
−
:*Brief background on developmental & moral psychology: p. 5
+
:*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrvtOWEXDIQ PBS Aristotle and Virtue Theory: Crash Course Philosophy #38]
−
:::*nativists -- nature gives us capacities to distinguish right from wrong, possibly using moral emotions.
 
−
:::*empiricists -- we learn the difference between right and wrong from experience. tabula rasa.
 
−
:::*rationalists -- circa '87 Piaget's alternative to nature/nurture -- there is both a natural developmental requirement and empirical requirement for understanding the world in the way we consider "rational" (folk physics, folk psychology). 
 
−
::*Piaget's rationalism: kids figure things out for themselves if they have normal brains and the right experiences. stages: example of conservation of volume of water (6)  "self-constructed" - alt to nature/nurture.  7: We grow into our rationality like caterpillars into butterflies.
 
  
−
::*Kohlberg's "Heinz story" - pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_Kohlberg%27s_stages_of_moral_development#/media/File:Kohlberg_Model_of_Moral_Development.svg]
+
:*concepts from video...
−
:::*note problems, p. 9. seems to support a liberal secular world view.  Egalitarianism, role playing, disinterestedness....  Is it obvious or suspicious that that's what rationalism leads to?  Haidt suspects something's been left out.
 
  
−
:::*Additional criticisms of Kohlberg (also at Haidt 9): seemed to diminish the importance of loyalty, authority, and tradition as less developed levels of moral response.
+
::*Virtue — general idea of being an excellent person.  Also, specific lists of virtues (vary by time and culture)
  
−
::*Turiel: note different method. Probing to find contingencies in kids' thinking about rules.  kids don't treat all moral rules the same: very young kids distinguish "harms" from "social conventions".  Harm is "first on the scene" in the dev. of our moral foundations.  (Note: Still following the idea that moral development is a universal, culturally neutral process.)  (Note on method: we have, in Turiel's research, a '''discovery of an unsupported assumption'''.)
+
:*A bit of Aristotle’s theory of virtue and human nature:  fixed nature, species eternal, '''proper function (telos),''' distinctive aspect of function: being rational and political.  (Note that modern virtue theorists aren't committed to some of A's false ideas.)
  
−
:*Haidt's puzzle about Turiel: other dimensions of moral experience, like "purity" and "pollution" seem operative at young ages and deep in culture (witches -- how do human minds create witches in similar ways in different places?). 11-13 examples. Found answers in Schweder's work.
+
::*Virtue is natural to us.  Like an acorn becoming a tree. Being virtuous is being the best of the kind of thing you are.  A deep intuition supports this developmental approach. (Pause to consider personal examples of the reality of moral development.)
  
−
:*In what ways is the concept of the self culturally variable?
+
::*Theory of the Golden Mean: Virtue as mean between extremes of emotion:  Ex. Courage (story of stopping the mugger), Honesty, Generosity. (Let's give our own examples.)  Virtue as training of emotional response in relation to knowledge of circumstances and the good.
  
−
::*Schweder: sociocentric vs. individualistic cultures.  Interview subjects in sociocentric societies don't make the moral/conventional distinction the same way we (westerns) do. (Schweder is "saying" to Kohlberg and Turiel: your model is culturally specific.)  For example in the comparison of moral violations between Indians from Orissa and Americans from Chicago, it is important that these groups don't make the convention/harm distinction Turiel's theory would predict.  That's a distinction individualist cultures make.
+
::*How do you acquire virtue? Experience. Practical Wisdom cultivated through habituation.  Follow a moral exemplar (virtue coach). Good parenting and shaping by healthy family.  It's a training program in becoming the best human you can be based on your "telos".  
−
 
−
:*Haidt's research:  Wrote vignettes to ask test subjects, including Turiel's uniform / swing pushing incident.  focus on vignettes is "harmless taboo violation" (no victim /no harm), which pits intuitions about norms and conventions against intuitions about the morality of harm.  Study in three cities with two socio-economic groups.  Showed that Schweder was right.  ''The morality/convention distinction was itself culturally variable.'' 
 
−
::*Americans make big dist. between morality and convention.  upper-class Brazilians like Americans.  lower class groups tended to see smaller morality/convention difference. All morality. 
 
−
:*Turiel is right about how our culture makes the harm/convention distinction, but his theory doesn't travel well. Roughly, more sociocentric cultures put the morality(wrong even if no rule)/convention (wrong because there is a rule) marker more to the morality side.  almost no trace of social conventionalism in Orissa.
 
  
−
:*Identify, if possible, some practices and beliefs from either your personal views, your family, or your ethnic or cultural background which show a particular way of making the moral/conventional distinction.  (Example: For some families removing shoes at the door is right thing to do, whereas for others it is just experienced as a convention.  Would you eat a burrito in a public bathroom? Tell story of dinner out with a vegan friend.)
+
::*What if we don’t want to become virtuous?  What is the motivation to virtue?  The pursuit of a happy life that “goes well”.  Eudaimonia.  Human flourishing.  Challenge and development of talents. Should be attractive. Connection between virtue and happiness not guaranteed for Aristotle, but could be tighter in other versions.
 +
 
 +
:*Additional points:
 +
 
 +
::*centrality of virtues and practical wisdom.  Is practical wisdom real? 
 +
::*historic variability and list of virtues. Curiosity was a vice in Medieval Europe.  Check out virtue lists on [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue Virtue Wiki].
 +
 
 +
===Everyday Ethics: Thinking about Virtue in your own experience===
 +
 
 +
:*Scroll through the Virtue wiki page [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue Virtue Wiki]. Notice the various list of virtues.  Write down 5 that are important to you in your life right now and that you would say you are working on.  Report your results with [https://forms.gle/AfYEv7wQhQUA1BwL9 this form]
 +
 
 +
:*Then, in your group discussion, identify virtues that you have made alot of progress on and ones that you are still working on. Record some of each to report back to the class.

Revision as of 19:38, 21 January 2025

3: JAN 21.

Assigned

In-Class

  • Details on how to submit your practice writing.
  • Everyday Ethics: Thinking about virtue ethics in your own experience.
  • Mini-Lecture on Sapolsky 353-360 - Tournament Species as examples of evolved behavior.
  • More on conscience -- Inferences we make among them. Accepted variation/Contested variation.

Sapolsky, Chapter 10: The Evolution of Human Behavior 354-374

  • How can cooperation get started and become stable? 353-
  • In other words, how does "tit for tat" survive among defectors? Coalitions, green beard effects.
  • Sometimes natural events cut a group off. Inbreeding promotes stronger kin bonds. That group may outperform others once they out migrate. (Give example from Henrich of Inuits with meat sharing behaviors. A better "cooperative package".)
  • Effects of ind. selection, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism:
  • Tournament vs. Pair bonding - lots of traits and behaviors follow from sexual dimorphism. This also happens in degrees.
  • Parent-Offspring competition - in spite of kin selection, there are some "zero sum" situations bt parents and offspring. parent-offspring weaning conflict and mother-fetus conflict. Over insulin. Dad even has a vote through paternal "imprinted genes," which promote fetal growth at expense of mom. (Intersexual Genetic Conflict)
  • Multilevel Selection MLS
  • Remember the "bad" group selection from the beginning of the chapter? Group selection returns in the last few decades. (Tell story of visits with Bio prof friends over the years.)
  • Genotypic and Phenotypic levels of explanation - unibrows.
  • Organism (expressed individual) is a vehicle of the genome, but the genome has alot to say about how the organism turns out. .
  • Big debate in Biology. Three positions: 1. Dawkins took the "selfish gene" view that the best level of explanation is individual genes. 2. Others say the genome - "a chicken is an egg's way of making another egg" (It's the whole genome travelling through evolutionary "space".); finally, 3. Others like Gould take the phenotype. After all, it's visible to the world. Selection could operate on a single phenotypic trait or the whole individual. Dawkins cake metaphor. 362. (So that's really four levels of selection.)
  • Four levels and counting. Theorists might favor one or more levels as relatively more important than others. Each level involves possible selection pressure or adaptive value in meeting a pressure. The peacock’s plumage is both.
  • 1. Genetic traits. Single selfish genes use us to get into the next gen.
  • 2. Genome. The recipe is what’s passed on, so focus on that.
  • 3. Phenotypic trait. Individual expressed traits (potential to make money) (Could also be sex selection - pheasant's plumage, big horns!).
  • 4. Phenotype. It’s the “whole package - whole person” that we choose.
  • Fifth level: Neo-group selection - the idea that some heritable traits are maladaptive for the individual, but increase the group's fitness (note difference from the bad old group selection).
  • Examples:
  • Encouraging patriotism might lead you to enlist, taking a fitness risk that we benefit from.
  • Jailing someone for their reproductive life is a serious fitness hit, but we're better off with murderers locked up.
  • Neo-group selection happens when groups impose fitness costs or benefits on members or sub-groups.
  • Positive (fitness benefits): zags helping zags, (but is that totally positive?).
  • Negative for some, positive for others(fitness costs): Slavery, racism, class bias, criminal punishment, patriotism, heroism, priests.
  • Some scientists agree that neo-group selection can occur, but think it's rare. Sapolsky points out that it is not rare in humans, due to Green Beard effects.
  • Remember "Green Beard" effects from p. 341 -- a thought experiment in extending/recognizing kin. With neo-group, we go further, and hypothesize that we can form groups around almost anything (sport teams in an imaginary baseball league). Human mind does not limit partiality or commitment to kin or even social group.
  • Where do we fit in? AND US?
  • We're bit of chimp and a bit of bonobo. Men 10% larger, 20% heavier than women. Slight dimorphism. Not quite pair-bonding, not quite tournament
  • US and Individual Selection: Example of divorce: natural experiment when cultural taboos are lifted. Note that increased divorce rates are confined to the same percentage of population. Lift culture and you get to see who the "less pair-bonding" people are! (In other words, maybe it's not something to feel totally guilty about.) Likewise with historically powerful (and not very romantic) rulers. Point: with absolute power, tyrants often adopt extreme reproductive behaviors with many hundreds of women, if possible.
  • US and Kin selection: Still very powerful, most feuds are clan based, but we can go to war against kin, and we give to strangers. We can be disgusted by people who betray their families: Story of Pavlik Morozov, 368. 368: study about preferring dog to x, y, z. vmPFC involved.
  • Why do humans deviate from kin selection so much. Biologists also want to find mechanisms. Animals recognize kin by MHC or imprinted genes. We do it cognitively. Much more flexibility.

Some Preliminaries about Objectivity in Ethics and Features of Ethical Discourse

  • Where should we look for "moral goodness"?
  • Intentions (Kantian),
  • Person (a virtuous person) (Aristotle),
  • Consequences (Mill, Singer - Utilitarian)
  • (The following is pretty standard, but was drawn from Peter Singer's classic, Practical Ethics)
  • What does it mean to say "values vary by culture"? Is it always "bad relativism"?
  • Singer's arguments against cultural relativism:
  • Cultural Relativism (the old discussion): Ethics varies by culture. Singer: This is true and false, same act under different conditions may have different value, but this is superficial relativism. For example, existence of birth control led to a general change in sexual ethics. The moral principle in question here is: don't have kids that you're not ready to care for. That principle might remain the same and be objective, but the prohibition on casual sex might change. (What dropped out was the idea that sex before marriage was sinful.)
  • Note: There is strong polling data on advisability of living together prior to marriage. Now, yes; 60 years ago, no. So cultural change itself doesn't tell you whether moral principles are changing. The consistent principle here?
  • What kind of conversation is an ethical conversation
  • Subjectivist Relativism - This position may not be held by any thoughtful person, but it sounds like what some people say when they start studying values and becomes confused or cynical.
  • The Position: "Wrong" means "I disapprove" or "my society disapproves")
  • The Problems:
  • If this sort of relativism is true, polls could determine ethics. But they don't.
  • Deep subjectivism can't making sense of disagreement. Ethics is a kind of conversation.
  • There is just too much research suggesting that "I approve" isn't philosophical "rock bottom".
  • Singer: Ok to say the values aren't objective like physics (aren't facts about the world), but not sensible to deny the meaningfulness of moral disagreement and ethical reasoning.
  • An evolutionist's twist: A society's ethical culture can produce positive, neutral, or negative outcomes for human flourishing. In this sense, values have objective consequences in meeting selection pressures (both natural and cultural). (Vax values, for example.)
  • The sorts of reasons that count as ethical: universalizable ones. Can't just appeal to one person or group's interest. Note: most standard ethical theories satisfy this requirement, yet yield different analysis and advice. We will look at the specific form of universalization in each theory we discuss, but you could say this is a kind of defining feature of ethical discourse.

Philosophical Moral Theories: Virtue Ethics

  • concepts from video...
  • Virtue — general idea of being an excellent person. Also, specific lists of virtues (vary by time and culture)
  • A bit of Aristotle’s theory of virtue and human nature: fixed nature, species eternal, proper function (telos), distinctive aspect of function: being rational and political. (Note that modern virtue theorists aren't committed to some of A's false ideas.)
  • Virtue is natural to us. Like an acorn becoming a tree. Being virtuous is being the best of the kind of thing you are. A deep intuition supports this developmental approach. (Pause to consider personal examples of the reality of moral development.)
  • Theory of the Golden Mean: Virtue as mean between extremes of emotion: Ex. Courage (story of stopping the mugger), Honesty, Generosity. (Let's give our own examples.) Virtue as training of emotional response in relation to knowledge of circumstances and the good.
  • How do you acquire virtue? Experience. Practical Wisdom cultivated through habituation. Follow a moral exemplar (virtue coach). Good parenting and shaping by healthy family. It's a training program in becoming the best human you can be based on your "telos".
  • What if we don’t want to become virtuous? What is the motivation to virtue? The pursuit of a happy life that “goes well”. Eudaimonia. Human flourishing. Challenge and development of talents. Should be attractive. Connection between virtue and happiness not guaranteed for Aristotle, but could be tighter in other versions.
  • Additional points:
  • centrality of virtues and practical wisdom. Is practical wisdom real?
  • historic variability and list of virtues. Curiosity was a vice in Medieval Europe. Check out virtue lists on Virtue Wiki.

Everyday Ethics: Thinking about Virtue in your own experience

  • Scroll through the Virtue wiki page Virtue Wiki. Notice the various list of virtues. Write down 5 that are important to you in your life right now and that you would say you are working on. Report your results with this form
  • Then, in your group discussion, identify virtues that you have made alot of progress on and ones that you are still working on. Record some of each to report back to the class.
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