Difference between revisions of "JAN 28"

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==4: JAN 28==
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==5: JAN 28. ==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
:*Sapolsky, Chapter 10: The Evolution of Human Behavior 328-387 (59). For this class read only pages 328-354.  Use notes below also for part two of this chapter.
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:*Wrangham C10 – “The Evolution of Right and Wrong” – 1st half (198-212; 14Key concepts: Good Samaritan Problem, emotions as moral guides, interference, baby prosociality, Ultimatum Game, reverse dominance hierarchies, self-protection, conformity, obedience, shame, guilt, and embarrassment.
  
===Reading Quiz===
+
===In Class===
  
:*Please take this quiz.  You may take your time with the questions, but you are meant to work from memory for this quiz. '''Do not''' try to look things up or "speed read" to find answers. This will delay the class, reduce the fairness of the grading, and, of course, deny you the information the quiz is intended to provide.
+
:*Writing Workshop on Practice Writing
:*Link:
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:*Wrangham's broader argument in "The Goodness Paradox"
  
===In-class content===
+
===Wrangham's broader argument in "The Goodness Paradox"===
  
:*Philosophical Method: Ethics as a kind of language game, or conversational constraints on moral discourse. Today, before turning to Sapolsky, we'll do a short workshop on how ethical conversations work. 
+
:*Here are a couple of topics from earlier chapters that it will be helpful for you to know about:
 +
::*Claims about aggression in humans.
 +
::*A bit of history on the self-domestication hypothesis.
 +
::*Bonobos!
 +
::*The Tyrant Problem
 +
::*Capital Punishment as a solution
  
:*Preliminary discussion of writing on gossip.
+
===Wrangham C10 – “The Evolution of Right and Wrong” ===
  
===Ethics as a "language game"===
+
:*C10 - Self-dom is a broad gene/culture theory, but also shaped morality.  Coalitionary aggression could also police conformity to expectations.  Values!  Proactive aggression is a source of social control. 
  
:*Well, not really a game. The term comes from a famous philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was interested in how language is similar to a games. For example, there are lots of rules to using language, not just grammar, etc., but social rules.  Like the rules for conversations.  You can know a language and still not be very sophisticated in having a conversation!
+
:*Kullabak story.
  
:*So what are some of the unwritten, but widely acknowledged rules for having an ethical conversation? What are the legitimate "moves" you can make in an ethical conversation?  What moves would earn you a yellow or red card.   
+
:*Humans very groupish.  90%chimp 10% bee.  But group benefits aren’t the only motivation for morality. Also, perhaps, self-interest in avoiding negative judgements from a dominant groups or value consensus.  “We evolved to fear the killing power of the men in the group” 200.   
  
:*illegitimate moves:
+
:*Note mention of Tomasello and Henrich. Different but compatible theories Evo. Psych and Cultural Evolution.
::*appealing to only one person's interests,
 
::*denying the standing (need for consideration) of a person or group arbitrarily.
 
::*most illicit appeals in informal logic (fallacies)
 
  
::*legitimate moves:
+
:*part of the “goodness paradox” is that people who commit genocide are often conventionally moral in other areas of their lives.  “Most violence is motivated by moral emotions.”  202.  
::*appealing to broadly held values about human life and human dignity.
 
::*appealing to cultural and local norms that may be considered well justified
 
  
:*constraints we might recommend to improve moral or political discourse
+
:*Three problems:  
::*observe norms of civil discourse:  
+
::*1. Why are we so prosocial.  Good Samaritan problem 
:::*avoid calling people liars,
+
::*2. Emotions as moral guides - how do we classify actions as “right” and “wrong”?
:::*present others' views in ways that show empathetic understanding,
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::*3. Interfering with others
:::*recognize common ground,
 
:::*recognize that cultural and local norms may themselves be called into question.
 
  
:*We will be developing this idea later in the term. For example, there are implication for the ethics language game if we conclude that political orientation is an enduring personality trait.
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:*'''1st Problem'''. Good Sam problem - '''Why have we evolution to be nicer to one another than other mammals?''' Maybe “Veneer Theory”, 203-204, but toddlers are spontaneously helpful and babies are deeply prosocial (watch video on babies).  '''3yr olds will disobey commands that involve harm'''.  (Digression on baby prosociality and theory of mind.  Helper and hinderer puppet shows:  [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anCaGBsBOxM Yale Theory of Mind & Baby prosociality]  [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7JbLSIirXI Basic Puppet set up for prosociality studies on babies].   )
  
===EE1: Gossip Writing - Debrief and Discuss===
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::*Ultimatum Game (205)- also demonstrates that we are not strictly rational about sharing.  Donor’s offer about 1/2, anticipating Decider’s sense of fairness.  (Culturally variable.).  The Ultimatum Game gives us a way of measuring deviation from "neutral" rationality (rationality without considering social expectations).
  
:*[[Assignment Rubric]]
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::*Group selection theory might help solve the Good Sam problem, but group selection might not benefit the whole group.  Example of control of women in some Hunter-gatherer society.  “We need other mechanisms to explain how self-sacrificing behavior evolved (the Good Sam problem)
  
:*We'll look at some pieces togetherI will start to show how you should look for rubric values in the writing you will eventually reviewThen I will ask you to briefly practice this in small groups.
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:*'''2nd Problem'''How do we classify actions as right or wrong?  208: We are both utilitarian and deontological (duty to a principle).  Trolley problem v. Organ donor(Digression to show "The Trolley Problem" [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6WB3Q5EF4Sg The Trolley Problem])
  
===Sapolsky, Chapter 10: The Evolution of Human Behavior===
+
::*Three biases that help explain how we classify actions right or wrong: 
 +
:::*Inaction bias - we favor omission over commission.
 +
:::*Side Effect bias - we favor avoiding intentional harm.
 +
:::*Noncontact bias - we have a bias against physical contact with someone being harmed.
  
:*Evolution 101 — 3 steps
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::*research: thought to be connected to nonmoral cognitive bias.  Others add that they may confer benefits. 
  
::*not so much about survival as reproductionAntagonistic pleiotropy — sperm early, cancer later.
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:*'''3rd Problem'''. Interfering with othersWe are we so committed to values that we engage in 3rd party punishment in some situations and avoid interference in others.
  
::*other misconceptions — living better adapted than the extinct, not just a “theory”
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::*Chimps - Passion and Pom, and Prof.  young mother Gilka. Passion charges her and kills her baby, Otta.  Not atypical for chimps.  Sudden violent behavior toward a chimp without obvious provocation.  Thought to be a strategy (show of violence) for securing food.  Point: males police some of this behavior, but not much.  Very little 3rd party punishment. 
  
::*sexual selection and natural selection.  Example of peacocks — trade offs between two forms of selection.   
+
::*By contrast, humans punish (differently) and are more generous.   
  
::*sociobiology — evolutionary psychology introduced. Premise: Evolution optimizes social behavior (for fitness) and psychological traits just as it optimizes bodies. 
+
:*'''1st half of reading ends here.'''
  
::*Marlin Perkins and Mutal of Omaha’s Wild Kingdom.  Bad ideas about evolution of altruistic species behavior.  Group selection doesn’t work that way. 
+
:*Theories that help with these three theoretical problems:
  
:*Individual Selection — 334: competitive infanticide: why langur monkeys kill babiesHow females develop a false estrus to fight back.   (Working against mountain gorillas these days.)
+
:*Boehm’s theory - reverse dominance hierarchy - is that Homo sapiens used coalitionary proactive aggression to control alpha malesThis would produce a selection pressure against alpha male reactive aggression.  Then, with the discover of “coalitionary power”, males use that power to enforce expectations on pain of execution.  Read at bot 213: in hunter-gather groups (and human societies prior to about 200 years ago) you can be killed for LOTS of things. (Note this also gives an account of patriarchy.).  “Once men dominate the society through their control of death, their word becomes law.” “Some three hundred thousand years ago, males discovered absolute power.” 215.
  
:*Kin Selection — 336:  Basic idea: your nearest kin has most of your genes.  Haldane, “I’d gladly lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins.”  Allomothering.  Grooming behaviors reflect closeness.  337: vervet monkey study.  Playback studies.  These studies show in various ways how warning behaviors track kinship relationships in social primates.
+
:*'''Reverse dominance hierarchy''' - a social hierarchy based on reversing power of the dominant members by use of a coalition of proactively aggressive males or females.
  
::*problem for kin selection — avoiding inbreeding.  Many species mate with 1-3rd cousins.  Sperm aggregation.  Malagasy giant jumping rat. 340 - smell studies — women prefer smell of near relatives over unrelated.
+
:*216-221: Wrangham’s “solutions” to the three puzzles.
  
:*How do animal recognize kin?  Major histocompatibility complex (MHC) gives many animals olfactory recognition of kin. Other mechanisms: songs, vaginal fluid smell, milk.
+
:*1.  Prosociality - Good Samaritan problem - Following Boehm, W argues that coalitions of militant egalitarians would cut down bullies.  Two further possibilities: they might do it from judgements about the good of the group (enforcing cooperation) or from self-interest of the coalition of males. Either way prosocial behavior would be rewarded.
  
:*How do we do kin selectionPseudo-kin selection or “green beard” effectsWe are not limited to actual kin, any conspicuous feature (like a green beard)Humans show green beard effectsRelated to parochialism and xenophobia.
+
:*2. Emotions as moral guides - how do we classify actions as “right” and “wrong”The three biases seem like defenses against a possible accusation"I did nothing" "That wasn't my goal" "I never touched them".    Makes sense in a linguistic world of gossip and reputation, especially if there is a proactively aggressive coalition of men policing thingsCould be origin of "inner voice" of conscienceHelps us steer clear of moral mobs.  
  
:*Reciprocal Altruism.
+
:*3. Interfering with othersWhy do we monitor each other's behavior and intervene sometimesW claims this reflects a bias toward conformity, that is, not wanting to be seen as a nonconformist (or the moral mob will get you).  Shame, embarassment, guilt, pain from being ostracized, all only human responsesread about embarassment 219Cyberball research 220.
 
 
::*don't just think about evolution as promoting competition toward extinction.  equilibriums are important. 
 
 
 
::*reciprocal altruism is a third way that evolution shapes human behavior.  Unrelated individuals cooperate across nature (fish in schools, birds in formation, herds).  Also unrelated primates. Important 1971 paper by Trivers (344) on reciprocal altruism.  how organisms incur a fitness cost to benefit another individual with expectation of reciprocation.   
 
 
 
::*cheating and freeriding can create a "Red Queen" situation. 
 
 
 
:*Two big questions: when is cooperation optimal, how can altruism start?
 
 
 
:*What strategy for cooperating is optimal?
 
 
 
::*background to Game Theory - John von Neumann.  Prisoner's Dilemma connected biologists to game theorists.  [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Lo2fgxWHw Prisoner's dilemma video]
 
 
 
::*basics of a Prisoner's Dilemma payoff:  A&B cooperate: 1 year: A cooperates, B defects: B walks and A gets three years. Cooperation is best, but each individual calculation leads to defection.  Quite a little dilemma.
 
 
 
::*defection is optimal for single round PD, but what about 3 rounds.  Still best to defect. What about "iterated" (uncertain number of rounds)?
 
 
 
::*Axelrod's challenge:  Optimal strategy for iterated PD.  Winner: Anatol Rapoport:  Cooperation on 1st round and then match opponent's previous behavior.  "Tit for Tat"  Always works toward a draw, or slight negative outcome.  Not that Tit for Tat tilts toward cooperation, but avoids being a sucker and punishes defectors.  famous paper in 1981 by Axelrod and Hamilton. 
 
 
 
::*"signal errors" can reduce Tit for Tat payoffs.  Remedies: "Contrite tit for tat (retaliate after two defections) and Forgiving (forgive 1/3 of defections).  Both address the signal error problem, but have other vulnerabilities. 
 
 
 
::*Mixed (genetic) strategies:  You could start out with one strategy and then change to another.  How do you go from punitive Tit for Tat to one incorporating forgivenessTrust.  350-351: describes a changing environment a events signal to individuals to change strategies.  Kind of a model of real life. 
 
 
 
:::*Black Hamlet fish
 
 
 
:::*Stickleback fish
 
 
 
::*But sceptical that tit for tat has been found outside humans. 
 
 
 
:How can cooperation ever start? 353
 
 
 
::*one Tit for Tatter in a population is doomed, two might find each other, Green beard effects might help grow a circle of cooperators.  If the cooperating trait included search behaviors for cooperators it would help.  Cooperation could also radiate from isolated groups that wind up inbreeding.  If reintroduced to a large population, they might influence cooperative payoffs. 
 
 
 
::*'''Note: Reading assignment part 1 ends here.'''
 
 
 
:*Standing on Three legs -- Some examples of different ways that these three forces (ind. selection, kind selection, and reciprocal altruism) can work together in animals.
 
 
 
::*vampire bat
 
 
 
::*pair bonding (A) vs. tournament species (B) -- what follows: B-males are more violent, A-males need less muscle, in B species a few males do all the reproducing, B-males more likely to have sex with anything, A-males more likely to share responsibilities.  B-species puts more emphasis on sexual selection.  360.
 
 
 
::*Parent-Offspring Conflict  -- conflict based on lack of complete gene sharing bt parent and offspring. weaning conflict.  other biological conflicts between fetus and mother. slightly diff evo agendas. 
 
 
 
::*Intersexual Genetic Conflict -- In species with low paternal investment, a father's interest might be with the child and against the mother.  "imprinted genes" part of the mechanism for intersexual conflict.  If they come from Dad, it favours more nutrition for the kid. Tournament species have more imprinted genes than pairbonding (as you would expect).
 
 
 
:*Multilevel Selection Theory
 
 
 
::*genotype vs. phenotype:  phenotype is the expressed individual with its specific traits based on the genotype, which is specific genetic makeup of the individual
 
 
 
::*Why it matters -- explanations can be sought at either level.  unibrow example.  Note humorous hypothesizing at 361. 
 
 
 
::*Reviews debate in biology: Dawkins, extreme gene centered - individual genes vs. genome, less radical view, genome centered.  Seems to disparge single gene selection somewhat.  Gould and Mayr: phenotype trumps genotype.  ''Selection acts on expressed individuals''.  Dawkins analogy of cake recipe vs. taste of cake.  Could be the baker or the recipe if the cakes don't taste right.
 
 
 
::*Levels: single gene, genome, single pheotypic trait, collection of traits.  These are among the levels in Multi-level Selection.
 
 
 
::*Resurrection of Group Selection:  Culture (the result of advertising, ideology about cakes, etc.) can also act as a selection force. 
 
::*neo-group selection: some heritable traits can be maladaptive for the individual but adaptive for a group.  As in the Prisoners' Dilemma, to get the optimal total outcome, you have be willing to forego the best individual outcome.  Still controversial.  Some biologist might agree that it is possible, but that it is rare.  However, among humans it seems to occur alot.  Cites "parochial altruism" and role of intergroup conflict in promoting intra-group cooperation.
 
 
 
::*example of increasing egg production.  Can't just choose individuals if egg production has a social dimension. 
 
 
 
::*credits David Sloan Wilson and E.O Wilson.  Quite an "encomeum" there!  more reading.  famous paper "Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology"
 
 
 
:*AND US?  How do humans fit into these four modes of selection? 
 
 
 
::*Individual Selection operates on us, but we do not have the same profile as our ancestors.  We are neither clearly pair-bonding nor tournament species (pick your favorite comparative anatomy detail). 
 
 
 
::*Maybe we are reproductive maximizers?  Famous examples of super reproducers in History: Pharaoh Rames II to Genghis Khan.  But then we have the Shakers.
 
 
 
::*Some evidence of competitive infanticide in abuse and killing by a step parent.  (These findings have been challenged, though.)
 
 
 
::*Kin Selection:  Strong evidence of practices tracking and favoring kin.  (Note for later question of "justified partiality".)  368: feuds, bendettas, bequests, dynastic rule, protection against adverse testimony.  Humans with damage to vmPFC choose strangers over family.  (creepy) Story of the Russian who chose country over family and Stalin's reaction.
 
 
 
::*So, lots of evidence, but we also fight wars against people we are highly related tofamilies fight over succession, patricide, fratricide, we also give to strangers.
 
 
 
::*370: explanation for why we deviate so much from straight kin selection:  we don't do it with MHC or imprinted genes, but we are cognitive (which includes feeling) about it.  Evidence from kibutz about turning off sexual interest we see as "family".  46% would save ''their'' dog over a stranger.  We can also be manipulated into feeling positive or negative toward others. 
 
 
 
::*we used to think hunter gatherer bands were highly related, but only about 40%.  already reciprocal altruism on the scene there.  Conclusion: human do deviate from strict mechanisms of evolution found in other species(Alfino: We've evolved complex and mixed strategies and can use language and reflection to rethink our behaviors and attitudes.)
 
 
 
::*Some challenges: hard to identify heritability for traits related to group selection.  Just seems like the most parsimonious explanation.   
 
 
 
::*Second challenge, Is evolution gradual? [This is optional reading.]
 
 
 
:*Is everything adaptive? [THis is optional reading.]
 

Latest revision as of 18:56, 28 January 2025

5: JAN 28.

Assigned

  • Wrangham C10 – “The Evolution of Right and Wrong” – 1st half (198-212; 14) Key concepts: Good Samaritan Problem, emotions as moral guides, interference, baby prosociality, Ultimatum Game, reverse dominance hierarchies, self-protection, conformity, obedience, shame, guilt, and embarrassment.

In Class

  • Writing Workshop on Practice Writing
  • Wrangham's broader argument in "The Goodness Paradox"

Wrangham's broader argument in "The Goodness Paradox"

  • Here are a couple of topics from earlier chapters that it will be helpful for you to know about:
  • Claims about aggression in humans.
  • A bit of history on the self-domestication hypothesis.
  • Bonobos!
  • The Tyrant Problem
  • Capital Punishment as a solution

Wrangham C10 – “The Evolution of Right and Wrong”

  • C10 - Self-dom is a broad gene/culture theory, but also shaped morality. Coalitionary aggression could also police conformity to expectations. Values! Proactive aggression is a source of social control.
  • Kullabak story.
  • Humans very groupish. 90%chimp 10% bee. But group benefits aren’t the only motivation for morality. Also, perhaps, self-interest in avoiding negative judgements from a dominant groups or value consensus. “We evolved to fear the killing power of the men in the group” 200.
  • Note mention of Tomasello and Henrich. Different but compatible theories Evo. Psych and Cultural Evolution.
  • part of the “goodness paradox” is that people who commit genocide are often conventionally moral in other areas of their lives. “Most violence is motivated by moral emotions.” 202.
  • Three problems:
  • 1. Why are we so prosocial. Good Samaritan problem
  • 2. Emotions as moral guides - how do we classify actions as “right” and “wrong”?
  • 3. Interfering with others
  • 1st Problem. Good Sam problem - Why have we evolution to be nicer to one another than other mammals? Maybe “Veneer Theory”, 203-204, but toddlers are spontaneously helpful and babies are deeply prosocial (watch video on babies). 3yr olds will disobey commands that involve harm. (Digression on baby prosociality and theory of mind. Helper and hinderer puppet shows: Yale Theory of Mind & Baby prosociality Basic Puppet set up for prosociality studies on babies. )
  • Ultimatum Game (205)- also demonstrates that we are not strictly rational about sharing. Donor’s offer about 1/2, anticipating Decider’s sense of fairness. (Culturally variable.). The Ultimatum Game gives us a way of measuring deviation from "neutral" rationality (rationality without considering social expectations).
  • Group selection theory might help solve the Good Sam problem, but group selection might not benefit the whole group. Example of control of women in some Hunter-gatherer society. “We need other mechanisms to explain how self-sacrificing behavior evolved (the Good Sam problem)
  • 2nd Problem. How do we classify actions as right or wrong? 208: We are both utilitarian and deontological (duty to a principle). Trolley problem v. Organ donor. (Digression to show "The Trolley Problem" The Trolley Problem)
  • Three biases that help explain how we classify actions right or wrong:
  • Inaction bias - we favor omission over commission.
  • Side Effect bias - we favor avoiding intentional harm.
  • Noncontact bias - we have a bias against physical contact with someone being harmed.
  • research: thought to be connected to nonmoral cognitive bias. Others add that they may confer benefits.
  • 3rd Problem. Interfering with others. We are we so committed to values that we engage in 3rd party punishment in some situations and avoid interference in others.
  • Chimps - Passion and Pom, and Prof. young mother Gilka. Passion charges her and kills her baby, Otta. Not atypical for chimps. Sudden violent behavior toward a chimp without obvious provocation. Thought to be a strategy (show of violence) for securing food. Point: males police some of this behavior, but not much. Very little 3rd party punishment.
  • By contrast, humans punish (differently) and are more generous.
  • 1st half of reading ends here.
  • Theories that help with these three theoretical problems:
  • Boehm’s theory - reverse dominance hierarchy - is that Homo sapiens used coalitionary proactive aggression to control alpha males. This would produce a selection pressure against alpha male reactive aggression. Then, with the discover of “coalitionary power”, males use that power to enforce expectations on pain of execution. Read at bot 213: in hunter-gather groups (and human societies prior to about 200 years ago) you can be killed for LOTS of things. (Note this also gives an account of patriarchy.). “Once men dominate the society through their control of death, their word becomes law.” “Some three hundred thousand years ago, males discovered absolute power.” 215.
  • Reverse dominance hierarchy - a social hierarchy based on reversing power of the dominant members by use of a coalition of proactively aggressive males or females.
  • 216-221: Wrangham’s “solutions” to the three puzzles.
  • 1. Prosociality - Good Samaritan problem - Following Boehm, W argues that coalitions of militant egalitarians would cut down bullies. Two further possibilities: they might do it from judgements about the good of the group (enforcing cooperation) or from self-interest of the coalition of males. Either way prosocial behavior would be rewarded.
  • 2. Emotions as moral guides - how do we classify actions as “right” and “wrong”? The three biases seem like defenses against a possible accusation. "I did nothing" "That wasn't my goal" "I never touched them". Makes sense in a linguistic world of gossip and reputation, especially if there is a proactively aggressive coalition of men policing things. Could be origin of "inner voice" of conscience. Helps us steer clear of moral mobs.
  • 3. Interfering with others. Why do we monitor each other's behavior and intervene sometimes? W claims this reflects a bias toward conformity, that is, not wanting to be seen as a nonconformist (or the moral mob will get you). Shame, embarassment, guilt, pain from being ostracized, all only human responses. read about embarassment 219. Cyberball research 220.