Difference between revisions of "Spring 2010 Senior Seminar Course Notes"

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===2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar===
 
===2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar===
  
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When spaces of meaning conflict
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After our discussion last night, I was left with a question regarding the spaces of meaning. Flanagan’s goal in this book is to show how human flourishing can be accomplished through various combinations of the six spaces of meaning. I think we established last night that Flanagan obviously privileges science as a source of knowledge over the five other spaces of meaning. My question is in regards to how Flanagan handles the occasion when separate spaces of meaning disagree concerning human flourishing.  For example, in the case brought up in class about the legislation in England, it is apparent that Catholicism and politics are disagreeing in regards to accomplishing human flourishing. There are also several other examples in which people’s religious beliefs apparently do or may conflict with aspects derived from the other spaces of meaning. So when spaces of meaning conflict, does Flanagan believe that both sides are right because people on both sides are finding meaning in their particular space of meaning or would Flanagan use some criteria in order to judge which space was more “in tuned” with human flourishing? Since he gives science a priority among the spaces of meaning, maybe he would use scientific investigation as his criteria. I guess the greater question though is whether Flanagan believes that there is an objective and universal standard for evaluating human flourishing or whether as long as someone is finding meaning in some combination of the six spaces then human flourishing is accomplished. If Flanagan wants to choose the first option, which I assume he does, there must be some way of discerning the truth when spaces of meaning conflict. Flanagan may want to use science, but I feel like this would undermine his project if he were to give one of the spaces of meaning priority in validating claims of the other spaces. [[User:Cfaller|Cfaller]] 03:53, 4 February 2010 (UTC)
  
 
===Sub-topics and references within Chapter 4===
 
===Sub-topics and references within Chapter 4===

Revision as of 03:53, 4 February 2010

I'd like to use this as a shared space for links to content you find or generate for particular classes.

Contents

1/12

1/19

Sub-topics and references within Chapter 1

How does one ask the question of the meaningfulness of life?

What is eudaimonism? Cameron Faller

“Eudaimonia” comes from the Greek word meaning “flourishing,” and therefore Owen Flanagan proposes that “eudaimonics” is the “systematic theorizing about the nature, causes, and constituents of human flourishing”. This search can be done within or outside of a naturalistic framework, but it is obvious from the first few pages of this book that the author attempts to define human flourishing only within the context of a naturalistic world view. Flanagan believes that this project is accomplished through understanding that people find meaning through six different spaces of meaning: art, technology, spirituality, science, politics, and ethics. Flanagan asserts that while people may find their meaning through various combinations of these six spaces, people are drawn to these spaces for meaning because all people desire the true, the good, and the beautiful. While Flanagan seems to make a valid point about the way we obtain meaning in the world, why doesn’t he ask the question of why people desire the true, the good, and the beautiful? He acknowledges that these are the foundation for the six spaces of meaning, but why are people drawn to these three aspects of reality to begin with. It seems as though Flanagan only wants to ask questions to the point where he can still comfortably maintain his presupposed naturalistic world view. Also, Flanagan mentions that each individual finds their own individual meaning and personal flourishing through their own combination of the six spaces of meaning. Some many find meaning in science and technology while another may find meaning through ethics and politics. However, if we all share the same nature as rational animals shouldn’t there be some fundamental “space” through which all find meaning. Sure, we might differentiate when it comes to the six spaces of meaning, but on a more basic level there must be some basic thing that leads to human flourishing. I think Aristotle attempts to partially answer this question in his Nicomachean Ethics when he declares that living a virtuous life is the fundamental space through which all rational animals find meaning. Flanagan acknowledges a singular source to meaning when he declares that all humans strive after the true, the good, and the beautiful. But what is the source of the true, the good, and the beautiful and why do we strive after it? Cfaller 02:05, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

Eudaimonism and Spaces of Meaning Brandon Yost

I think Cameron raises some excellent questions regarding Eudaimonism, which I think lend themselves to Flanagan's six spaces of meaning. The issue seems very difficult to even talk about, for it is very metaphysical to ask what the foundation upon which the pursuit of "the good" rests. However, there does seem to be something odd, to say the least, about Flanagan's launching point. There is a key presupposition here, a value statement about "flourishing" that his Naturalism depends on. Cameron is essentially getting at, what does the "flourishing" for which Eudaimonism seeks, even mean? In what context do fully material beings flourish by understanding what more or less satisfies...something?--whatever meaning satisfies. This isn't to suggest a Cartesian dualism is correct, or that there must be a non-material aspect to self-hood in order to account for meaning in the world. It's more to say that Flanagan doesn't seem to address a very old and central question in relation to meaning or the good, that is, Whether or not one can merely give examples of the good, the meaningful, or actually say what meaning is and how it is. To an extent, if the six spaces of meaning are basically examples of ways in which we express ourselves in a "meaningful" way, the materialist could easily account for that meaning or satisfaction, that isn't meaningful. JL Mackie once made a point, basically saying that spirituality has a very material result, that is to say chemically we as organic beings, react a certain way to spiritual activity. Isolating this psychological phenomena, couldn't one lead the fulfilling life, the meaningful life as Flanagan puts it, by simply popping a happy pill? Eudaimonism seems to rely on the notion that this flourishing is a good thing, which seems to be a statement or space of meaning in itself, which is to say that philosophy in a "foundational" sense, seems to be yet another space that Flanagan privileges or treats as superseding art, science, technology, ethics, politics and spirituality. I'm not at all sure it makes sense to talk about these avenues in this way, since it would seem that the source of meaning and flourishing is yet still prior to these spaces. It's difficult to say what exactly that foundational space is, but there is something odd about Flanagan's orientation given his materialism. Flourishing as a value to material beings and the spaces of meaning seem to be somewhat unclear, if they are meant to be foundational "spaces" of meaning. Byost 22:11, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

What are the differences among the original, manifest, and scientific images of man? Eric H.

Original Image The original image of man is to imagine a time in history when our cognitive schemes were only rich enough to enable us to achieve biological fitness. Biological fitness is achieved by skills such as building tools for tasks, when and where to forage and hunt and other shared skills. We imagine that our language and other cognitive skills were immature so questions such as "who are we?" and "how are we situated in the cosmos"? most likely were not asked or theorized. Rule-governed ways of getting around and interacting constituted the original image of us and the world.

Manifest Image As the original image develops and becomes more complex, we become more articulate at conceiving our nature and place in the world. The original image, through collective memory and narrative becomes shaped and conveyed through art, poetry, religion, and music etc. This is what is known as the manifest image. It is important to note here, according to Flanagan, becoming more complex does not mean becoming more truthful. The manifest image is a work in progress. Flanagan says when we talk about how "people see things" we are usually referring to the manifest image.

Scientific Image According to Flanagan, early on in the development of the manifest image, scientific thinking enters and it is either absorbed(medicine and anatomy) or smashed because it is a threat to how the human being is imagined (Galileo and Darwin.) Eventually the scientific image develops autonomy from the manifest image and a high degree of independent authority. Thus, there seems to be serious competition between these two images.

Flanagan, quoting Sellars, states "the refinement of the original image into the manifest image is the gradual depersonalization of objects other than persons." This is evident by how we now describe Thunder today (the sound of air exploding as lightening heats it up) compared to how it was conceived in ancient times (Zeus being angry.) However, according to Flanagan, critics say the scientific image is depersonalizing persons themselves. Flanagan denies this, by pointing out that the scientific image, like the manifest image both treats the concept of "person" as fundamental and ineliminable. The difference is the manifest image holds views the person through Cartesian lenses. That is, persons as composite beings made of up of an independent mind and body. Again quoting Sellars, Flanagan points out the essential dualism isn't the mind/body dualism, but rather "two radically different ways the human individual is related to the world." The scientific image then is not a denial of persons, but a denial of dualism.



I find myself in partial agreement with Flanagan on this subject. With regards to the "original image” we have seen that ancient cultures tended to anthropomorphize phenomenon that they couldn't explain. I also agree with his rejection of the mind/body dualism of the "manifest image." I particularly liked Flanagan’s description (actually Sellars) of the manifest image dualism being described as two radically different ways the human individual is related to the world. I think that nicely illustrates the problem with viewing the concept of persons through a Cartesian lens. However, what I am picking up from this (and I may be wrong) is that Flanagan sees this progression of the original through the scientific images as a progression where we start with anthropomorphic gods as explanations (Original), move to Monotheism (Manifest) and finally we are now at a point where we are progressing past supernatural explanations and everything can be explained through Naturalism (Scientific.) It seems that Flanagan views this tension between manifest and scientific image not just as a tension between an idea of personhood but as part of the conflict between science and religion as well. If this is the case, then I find myself at odds with the narrative Flanagan has put forth.




Does it make sense to talk about "spaces of meaning"? Clint White

After laying out the importance of eudaimonics in the naturalist position, Flannigan sets out to explain just how to achieve this. In his own words, he is setting out to build, “an empirical framework for thinking about human flourishing.” (3) Borrowing from Wilfrid Sellars, Flannigan asserts that it is the goal of the philosopher to understand things (namely humanity) in terms of the whole. To do this, he proposes that philosophers need to see humanity in terms of the “original”, “manifest” and “scientific” images of man-in-the world.

The original image is simply the starting-point of humanity; Flannigan notes that as humanity grew, it developed more complex, manifest view of the world. The manifest image seems to be a fancy way of naming a snapshot of “how people see things” at a given time for a human being. The scientific image of man-in-the-world is centrally connected to scientific progress. Sometimes, this progress is warmly welcomed, as in cases like medicine. Other times, the manifest image has a hard time accepting progress, as in cases like understanding evolution. Flannigan again quotes Sellars by saying that when the manifest and scientific images seem to be incompatible, it is the philosopher’s job to understand and explain the relationship between these two views.

So here is where spaces of meaning come in: Flannigan accepts Sellar’s notion that philosophers need to understand the relationship between the manifest and scientific views in order to understand meaning and humanity, but he believes that in order to do so, these two views need un-packing. Flannigan un-packs these into six “spaces of meaning”: art, science, technology, ethics, politics and spirituality. He believes that, “in order to understand how any group or individual self-conceives, what their practices of self-location, self-understanding, and their ideals for human development are, and how they work, one must give concrete values to these six variables” (7)

Flannigan gives three main reasons for expanding these spaces from two to six:

(1) “The places in which people find dis-ease among the spaces of meaning involve more than just science and religion” (2) “When we humans conceptualize who we are and how we are doing, we do so in terms of narrative structures that have their homes in more than just two expansive spaces named by religion and science.” (3) “we humans show persistent signs of relishing the adventure of trying to track down what is good, what is true and what is beautiful. My six spaces of meaning connect up with these three forms in telling ways.”

So, then, to get back to the question of whether it makes sense or not to talk about “spaces of meaning”, I found myself having mixed feelings. On the one hand, I can really see where Flannigan is coming from. In the search for finding meaning one will likely get the closest (concretely) if they look at humanity through lenses of issues that most people find important. On the other hand, I feel an overwhelming draw to the thought experiment that we discussed last week about the megasoft guy that shot his sperm into space. The search for meaning seems fundamentally a fruitless one when facing the naturalist position because of the lack of a fundamental starting point. That large point aside, I would also like to provide an additional idea in the form of a question to the class:


(1) Are Flannigan’s six spaces of meaning too specific to use as a tool for developing a wide enough framework to understand meaning for humanity?

I say yes: It seems to me that Flannigan’s introduction of specific spaces of meaning came with a fundamental issue: in choosing six specific lenses by which to measure meaning and humanity, doesn’t that admit to the sheer amount of variables that can possibly exist throughout the whole of humanity? Note, that nearly every time Flannigan refers to Space of meaning, he attaches “21st century” as a sort of asterisk to point out that meaning, and thus, that these six spaces are, by nature, a variable. In recognizing that these six views are specific to a certain kind of culture (he points out in pg 12 that 20% of the world is unable to participate in these six views fully due to poverty) in a specific time (he also points out on pg 12 that at certain times in history, views such as science were missing), it seems to me that these six spaces of meaning are far too specific. Rather than calling these spaces a tool for measuring meaning, it seems more of a broad answer to the question of what is meaningful to some people living within the 21st century. The spaces are simply too specific and timely to offer an adequate account of meaning in humanity Thus, I am in favor of taking a step back to the more broad analysis between the manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. Cwhite 04:32, 19 January 2010 (UTC)


Connection: p. 11 Nelson Goodman, Ways of World Making
What is the philosophical concept of the Lebenswelt?

What is scientism? A. Vallandry

[Wiki entry in progress on Scientism]


What is neurophysicalism?

Neurophysicalism is the view that for every experience there is an objective explanation that assumes a subjective experience, but it completely explainable in physical terms. Thus, the difference between the objective event and the subjective event it merely where it is viewed from – for the objective view is from the third-person and the subjective from the first-person. The first-person view experiences the event as something such as, “I see red,” while the third-person view gets the physical explanation of the person being in state Þ, which is producing the subjective experience of “I see red” in the person who is in state Þ. Objective realism is a term Flanagan (from now on refereed to as “TheFlanMan”) to describe this type of description of nuerophysicalism.

TheFlanMan points out a distinction between “Token” and “Type” Nuerophysicalism. “Token” insists that each mental event is some physical event, while “Type” holds that each type or kind of experience is realized in pretty much the same way for each member of the same species that has the same experience (this sentence is almost verbatim from page 26). It seems that “Type” therefore allows a bit more play than does “Token” - it is less reductive, allowing for similar/same experiences to be physically different , but pretty much the same. This allows for more variety and cohesiveness in experiences – two of us can relate our experiences being on the same roller coaster as having pretty much the same subjective effect, while they are actually different (but similar) events.--DTuckerman

What is OF's preliminary position on free will?

Owen Flanagan’s position is what is called “compatibilism” which is the idea that both free will and determinism are compatible with one another. Flanagan is very much against the idea of libertarianism, which is the view that humans posses a free will in the sense that our egos are unmoved movers in the same sense that a Thomist conceives of God. There is a very deep problem with libertarianism, and Flanagan is keen to recognize its irreconcilable flaws. Surely it is a foolish position to hold that we are agents that cause things but we are uncaused ourselves. After all, if I choose to attack somebody after they have physically threatened me my consequent actions cannot be said to be uncaused. Compatibilism, however, is also hard to defend in application. Often compatibilists, as Flanagan points out, make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary choices. If we are constrained physically or out of ignorance we are not able to make a free choice, and if on the other hand we are not constrained in the aforementioned ways we are able to exercise our free will. Notice that this kind of free will is not the same sort of freedom that the libertarian will defend. I think this new way of framing free will (as involuntary or voluntary actions) is the general position that Owen Flanagan wishes to defend and he goes through Dewey’s how people operate in choice-making processes (p. 34). It seems that “Following Peirce’s belief-doubt-inquiry continuum, opposed tendencies create a tension, evoking an affective phase in which emotions come to the fore. The tension spurs deliberation…” so on and so on (p. 34). So when we are making a choice there seems to be a degree of chaos or “tension” that we experience and it is this moment we deliberate and use our agency force to cause something to happen. I find this theory appealing since it can allow for a libertarian freedom. But if you are a compatibilist (like I think Flanagan is) you still must accept determinism. This means that the moment before, and during the moment of tension is causally determined and therefore the moment after is necessarily causally determined. So the compatibilst’s desire to fuse determinism and free will to preserve responsibility fails as far as I see it. There still would be no moral responsibility. There is a way to remedy this, and it is the brainchild of the Philosopher Robert Kane. Surprisingly it is the same sort of thing that Flanagan chose as his position (originally by Dewey and Peirce), but with one difference: in that moment of tension Kane proposes that a true libertarian free will can be said to exist free of a deterministic causal chain. Yet it is true that it is determined in a sense that a chain of events brought you up to that position of tension, but where agency occurs is devoid of any causation except of the self-causing sort. I wrote a paper on determinism and Kane’s theory (which I have learned just now that should also include Dewey and Peirce at least to some degree). The link to that paper is provided below. Twilkinson 07:18, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

Link to paper

Respond critically to anything in the chapter. Use a section divider for your material or link it to another page. For example, you could keep a page for your material and create a link to it.

1/26

2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar

I wasn't going to post this, since I was obviously so out of it last week and this chapter so quickly took up my question, but since it still kinda bugs me:

Considering the flux with which it seems TheFlanMan's 'spaces of meaning' have over time, space, and even definition, I left the discussion last Tuesday wondering if the concept of eudaimonea has any meaning at all. Certainly these 'spaces of meaning' have a of relation to human flourishing, but what is human flourishing? From what we have read it may seem that it would be 'having meaning.' However, I was also left wondering what is “having meaning?” Is having meaning just some kind of feeling? TheFlanMan seems to be saying that it is more than that, but it seems to me that any kind of definition that we can make (so far) out of 'flourishing' is: whatever makes a certain person flourish in their particular circumstances. But the very word in question (or a synonym) seems necessary in the definition, making for a circular relation.

I suppose my question was this: How can we have any clue what it is we are talking about without some sort of concrete definition of what flourishing is?

This is of course what he focused on in this chapter. However, while he covered a wide breadth of topics that contribute towards flourishing, the substance beneath seemed to keep coming back to Darwinism. While I understand that as a naturalist he is committed to mainly scientific explanations of things, it lends a sinister feel to the whole argument – like a reminder that at the end of the day it's still just about the propagation of the species. It's not that I disagree with evolution/natural selection, but even with his work to try and make it plausible, it just doesn't seem to be able to capture the complexity of human life to try and reduce everything (beauty, truth, and goodness) to fitness/propigation. --DTuckerman

A Closer Look at Compatibilism Katie Infantine

I know we already talked about this in class last time, but since I couldn't post it before, here is is:

Upon finishing class on Tuesday night I was incredibly unsatisfied and unconvinced with the compatibilist viewpoint. I simply could not see how the compatibilist would even begin to tie together these seemingly contradictory notions into a cohesive concept. Hence, I turned to the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a better description of Classical Compatibilism.

It is helpful, first to have a definition of both ‘free will’ and ‘determinism’ which the SEP defines as follows:

“free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility.”

“Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time.”

So how do Classical Compatibilists make free will and determinism work together?

There were a couple of examples, but I will offer just one for now. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it depends on “a strikingly austere account of freedom.”

“Classical compatibilism is often associated with the thesis that the word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not will.”

According to the Classical compatibilists, “Free will is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants.” Note how different this is from the original notion of free will that was given above. There is no mention here of persons exercising control, per se, or moral responsibility. It is much closer to a Hobbesian notion of free will. According to this definition of free will, “It is plausible to assume that free will, so understood, is compatible with determinism since the truth of determinism does not entail that no agents ever do what they wish to do unencumbered.” The objection raised in the article comes from an opposing notion of free will: “A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. No doubt, for one to be an ultimate source of her action, no explanation for her action can trace back to factors prior to her. This the compatibilist cannot have since it requires the falsity of determinism. But according to the classical compatibilist account of free will, so long as one's action arises from one's unencumbered desires, she is a genuine source of her action.” Ultimately, I am still confused to a large extent about compatibilism. Perhaps I have just missed the point or failed to connect ideas, but it seems to me that it is really only through word-tricks and flimsy definitions that compatibilists are able to hold on to this theory in a way that sounds cohesive. For a much more extensive explanation of both Classical Compatibilism and other forms of compatibilism, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/


Sub-topics and references within Chapter 2

Background on the is - ought distinction. Cameron Faller

In the 16th century, David Hume famously made the distinction between “is” and “ought” propositions. He declared that “is” propositions are descriptive statements while “ought” propositions are normative, or value, statements. Based on this distinction, Hume argued against moral rationalism, which invalidly, according to Hume, deduces normative conclusions from descriptive premises. So, basically, Hume was declaring that it is not possible to derive moral conclusions from factual premises. Hume believed that this deduction, which all previous systems of moral philosophy have made, is a logical fallacy. Consequently, according to Hume, moral conclusions based on this system should be ignored and are practically meaningless, and thus morality should be tied much more closely with subjective emotions than with objective reason.

G.E Moore proposed a very similar argument in the 20th century with his “open question argument.” In this argument, Moore basically declared that a value term cannot be described by or reduced to natural properties. Therefore, the question, “what is good,” is an “open question” because no natural property can be used to completely define the value term ‘good.’ Therefore, ethical theories that propose to know “what the good is” are invalid, and are committing the naturalistic fallacy.

In this chapter, Flanagan acknowledges that some of his commentaries may feel that he is falling into the naturalistic fallacy. Flanagan is trying to make normative statements about the essence of “human flourishing,” which is to say “what is the human good” or “what is of value to humans.” However, Flanagan is also a naturalist, so it appears at first that he is simply committing the naturalistic fallacy by trying to define value terms through natural facts. However, Flanagan believes he is avoiding a logical fallacy because he believes that one can validly assert normative conclusions based on empirical evidence. He believes that through philosophical investigation of human beings, we can discover what things have and will lead humans to obtain eudemonia. However, I think David Hume would argue that sure one can look at past empirical evidence, but does this in turn allow one to make objective and normative statements for all of humanity.Cfaller 00:32, 27 January 2010 (UTC)

What is "platonic space" and how does OF use it in his argument?

Flanagan uses "platonic spaces" to further articulate what he means by Spaces of Meaning and I think I understand what he means by this, though I may be wrong. I think he makes a vital distinction, one any of us should have immediately thought of the second he used the term. He makes clear that by "platonic spaces," he means natural categories and not transcendental forms. This is to say that the "good, true and beautiful" all exist naturally, which I think is akin to Aristotelian thought (that forms exist in things rather than above them). I think one possible way to understand what Flanagan is trying to do, is to acknowledge that he means these categories are what we naturally orient ourselves towards if we are to flourish universally. I think this may be similar to Kant's a priori cognitive structures in the categories[If you need a refresh just read section 1 or 2.3[1]]. Basically that humans universally access these same natural categories, even if we do it in different ways; that these categories are part of the human psyche. When he says we "judge" (40) our lives as well lived, I think this is what he means. Not that we relativistically judge our lives in approval, but rather that we measure whether or not we have accessed these natural categories, or forms of good, beauty and truth. The means by which we can make that judgment, at least I think he argues, are natural and empirically based. He gives examples of physical symmetry(beauty) ensuring health, or sunrises(also beauty) ensuring more work or livelihood. Flanagan also makes important note that the intersection of the categories is what actually yields eudaimonia. He goes even further to say that each of those categories are related directly to a Darwinian human quality, which is to say that they all contribute to our being humans effectively in our environment. It's possible that there's more Aristotle here, in that it sounds similar to formal and final causes and the actualization of a thing's nature. The way Flanagan ultimately uses "platonic spaces," I think results in the treatment of the "good, true and beautiful" as being just as much a part of being human as any other aspect of our anatomy.

I'm not sure this is exactly what he is saying, especially since he uses the term "worldmaking." It makes me think the way these natural categories function is more constructed than I interpreted and would perhaps fall prey to the same kind of conclusion that Kant's separation between the phenomena and the noumena does. But Flanagan clearly states the complication that he refutes, that society's "good" is based purely on prudence and agreement between people...so this troubles me. Byost 04:52, 25 January 2010 (UTC)

How does Darwin represent a compromise between the Humean and Hobbesian pictures of man?

In explaining how Darwin represents a compromise between the Humean and Hobbesian pictures of man it is best to first distinguish between the Humean and Hobbseian human picture. Hobbes' picture of man is one which portrays man as selfish who acts predominately out of self-interest. For example, in his "Social Contract Theory" man enters into a social contract because it is the only way in which a world of egoistic humans motivated by self-interest can live peacefully. Nature is a state of war in which humans wish to consume all resources for themselves. However, in the interest of self-preservation they must agree to enter into a society governed by a social contract.

Hume on the other hand being a hard-nosed empiricist points out there is no proof whatsoever that such a state of nature exists. According to Flanagan Hume holds Homo sapiens display "fellow-feeling" in addition to our selfish feeling. Hume gives a "plastic" view of human nature. Whatever side grows depends on things like material scarcity or lack thereof. Whereas Hobbes gives a rigid, egoistic view of man Hume, gives a more fluid or plastic view of man in which he displays "fellow-feeling" as well. For Hume, moral reasoning is essentially tied to the emotions. Hobbes, on the other hand seems to have morality tied more closely with reason.

The compromise Darwin (who is a Humean) represents is what Flanagan refers to as a "mixed bag" view. We have egoistic traits and social virtue traits such as benevolence, sympathy and compassion. These social virtues, as well as experience, and reason all play into our moral sense. The supporting evidence to this is the research consensus in psychology that finds people who lack emotions interacting with reason are deficient at moral thinking, feeling, and action. Rather than choosing between the Hobbsian and Humean view we can have both, explained by a gradual evolution by natural selection. For example a virtue such as altruism can be described by evolutionary biology as pertaining to fitness, but because of the plasticity of the mind/brain and transforming effects of culture altruism and other social virtues can be explained.

Flanagan here is giving a naturalistic explanatory account of human nature through biological evolution, psychology and neuroscience. It seems to me while he is working on the eudemonic project he is giving naturalistic accounts of human nature as well as using neuro-physicalism in explaining the "Scientific Man" in relation to the world. One of the observations Flanagan makes in this "Darwinian Compromise" is how we have cognitive-affective conative economy passed on from our ancestors with moral dispositions from the start. He notes that insects organize themselves without feelings but most mammals and all primates organize themselves through feelings of selfishness and well-being. With these examples of insects, primates and mammals it shows animals by sense perception organize into social groups for fitness reasons, but how this cognitive-affective conative economy goes from sense perception to self-understanding is still a question left to be asked. I would guess Flanagan would say it happened in an extremely long, drawn out, incremental evolutionary process. However, exactly what happened within that process to give Homo sapiens self-realization is still something we don't know. My point here is that it seems this account renders our morality arbitrary and dictated by human convention giving us a sort of Sophism. If I am correct on this assumption I find it quite ironic that Flanagan would be pushing a kind of Sophism while at the same time referring to Plato and Aristotle in finding meaning. Eric Hanson

Reconstruct and evaluate the view of altruism at/around p. 47. A. Vallandry

I am still working through this, but thought I should start off with the normal or broad definition of altruism as it is simple/to the point, and drill down from there. Per Random House, "The principle or practice of unselfish concern for, or devotion to the welfare of others, as opposed to egoism.

Flanagan, naturally seeks to delve deeper into meaning and fully explore the concepts behind altruism and why rational beings (that would be us) react the way we do. He describes altruism as a sort of "hard problem", in the same vein as the problem of conciousness and its causes that hang over the entire work. There does not appear to be any reason for giving unto another, without directly benefitting oneself. Think of return on investment in the business sense, why spend foolishly, without knowing if any positive gains will come rolling back in? Here altruism is a uniquely compassionate human endeavour, with little rhyme or reason on the surface.

Flanagan argues that the known "truths" of genuine psychological altruism -- that is, doing good for goodness sake, no repayment, and gene-based altruism (helping your sibling) are rather false from an evolutionary perspective. Rather, both are the result of societal pressures and implied guidelines, not from the brain firing off and coming up with this of it's own accord.

I find that I am still having a little trouble with Flanagan's description of the brain as "plastic". I want to believe that I sort of get what he's saying, but cannot say with certainty that I do, any feedback here would be greatly appreciated before I move in the wrong direction.

I suppose altruism is a gamble that ideally all should partake in, not for the gamble itself, but out of love, though it has no basis in evolutionary design whatsoever. But note that each culture approaches this differently. Here is a micro example -- my neighborhood is rather friendly. The guys on my block think nothing of calling on a Saturday for help unloading a large item and moving it down a rickety flight of stairs. Usually hot, hard, dangerous work in which I might score a free beer. Consequently, I have lived in neighborhoods where after three years, I still did not know my next door neighbor's name or even a hint of their occupation. We lacked the altruistic urge in that sense and blatantly ignored one another. All of this I want to explore further as I examine the author's points and counterpoints and the root basis for this design. Vallandry 05:21, 22 January 2010 (UTC)


How does positive psychology bear on eudaimonics?

Positive psychology, in a way is the study of eudaimonics. Just as TheFlanMan is working to develop a picture of naturalistic flourishing by examining what it is that people do and say that makes them flourish, positive psychology “is the scientific study of the strengths and virtues that enable individuals and communities to thrive” (as defined by the Positive Psychology Center at Penn State [2]). Thus, positive psychology is researching what exactly eudaimonia is.

TheFlanMan specifically in this chapter uses a study to show that the agreements between cross-cultural wisdom literature from the last 3000 years track quite closely to his “own list of universal virtues” (51). These virtues (justice, humanness, temperance, wisdom, and courage) seem to be oriented toward the “good, true, and beautiful.”

It of course bears comment that he spends quite a bit of effort to reject “transcendence” from the list of virtues in the Peterson and Seligman. I can only assume that he includes the 'transcendence' in his list merely to forestall any arguments that may arise from those that know the study - otherwise, why include it in the first place? As TheFlanMan points out his reasons for excluding transcendence (because it is not a virtue), it remains a mystery why in fact Peterson and Seligman would include such an ambiguous, 'implicit' idea in what is supposed to be a list of “normative” ideas. Because of the universal nature of this idea, it would seem to me to bear more investigation[3]. Perhaps the orientation of these virtues towards the transcendent will prevent this otherwise naturalistic account from doing what W.V. Quine's attempts to naturalize epistemology did - reduce the question of “why” to “what” and expects it to be a sufficient answer to the original “why” question. By doing this, Quine was jettisoning the higher-order epistemic questions, which are the reason we do epistemology (in my opinion).

I would indeed argue that questions of meaning do not usually start with “what must I do or think to have meaning in my life?” but rather, “why am I here?” Although this may be followed up with a “what” question such as , “what am I made for?” ultimately this just a permutation of the original “why” question: “why am I here?” By answering the why question, we get not only insight into the “what” question, but a deeper understanding of the answer to the “what” questions when we receive the “what” questions' answers. Just such a failure to answer the original “why” question is, I believe, why epistemology has not gone away, replaced by nuero-psychology (as Quine called for) – we want to know why we think we know things!

So far it seems that TheFlanMan doesn't want to go into the “why” question – everything that has even hinted at answering such a question has gotten a parenthetical quote in the text about how it has never actually existed. I am interested to see how everything fits together – will he try and remove the need for the “why” question, making any answer (which cannot be scientific for him) one that is simply a choice of optional spheres of meaning? --DTuckerman

Background on Damasio and Nussbaum in connection with this chapter. Carmen Mitchell

Antonio Damasio is an American behavioral neurologist and neuroscientist that teaches at USC and leads USC’s creative brain institute. He has written several bestselling books such as Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, and Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and Feeling Brain. Specifically, Damasio is interested in the relationship between emotions and decision-making. His theory about this relationship (the somatic-marker hypothesis) states that people who suffered a specific kind of brain damage (for example a brain tumor or stroke) in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex experience a disturbance of emotion, but still contain the rest of their intellect. Damasio’s research shows that this emotional disturbance severely impacts decision-making skills. For example, Damasio describes an instance in which a patient is asked to choose a restaurant to eat at. The patient continually struggles over the decision, listing reason after reason why he should or should not go to one specific restaurant. Damasio explains that his inability to associate emotions with a decision prevents him from making seamlessly inconsequential decisions. The significant experiment that helped develop this theory was the “gambling task.” Here is an interesting interview of Damasio in which he not only describes emotions, how they affect decision-making, but also the gambling task experiment. [4]

Martha Nussbaum is an American philosopher who specializes in Ancient Greek philosophy. Some of her considerable works include The Fragility of Goodness, Cultivating Humanity, Sex and Social Justice, and Hiding from Humanity. In one of her major works, The Fragility of Goodness, Nussbaum argues that human goodness is a fragile thing. She explores factors that contribute to a “well lived life” and how uncontrollable factors may actually work against human flourishing. She argues against Platonic views, stating that human goodness cannot protect a human from threats or danger.

Both Damasio and Nussbaum suggest a new view of how we observe human nature. Damasio’s research suggests that emotions are much more fundamental than previously thought. Subconsciously, emotions control and dictate a significant part of human life and the human experience. Flanagan mentions Damasio to scientifically backup his claim that humans are “fully embodied thinking feeling animals” (61). Similarly, Flanagan refers to Nussbaum, because she also supports one of his arguments. She argues that human flourishing is vulnerable to external factors that are out of their control. Flanagan states that humans act free, however we do not poses a free-will that defies “natural law” (61). Overall, Flanagan uses both of these revolutionary thinkers to support is answer to the question of the chapter: Is there anything substantive that can be said about how best to find meaning and to live a purposefully?


As always, post critical responses on any topic that comes up in connection with your thinking about this work.

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2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar

Clint White's 2nd thoughts

I know that it is fairly misleading to propose an analogy for a philosophical discussion, but I can not help doing so: When we got onto the topic of knowledge with a big K versus a little k in last nights discussion, I was reminded of what it is like looking at a website. Though we commonly do it, we rarely remind ourselves that websites, and for that matter, computers, work in a practical way, but do so through code. When I am browsing, say, the news online or shopping for camera equipment on eBay, I am rarely thinking about, but am actively participating in a sort of dual perspective. On the one hand, I am clicking on icons or images and reading descriptions on a practical level of interface. On the other hand, I am scientifically aware that when I am looking at an image or reading a description, I am not looking directly at the object, I am reading a representation of computer jargon linked to some server where there is code that represents an image that represents an actual object. Thus, I know scientifically that I am looking at something that is very far removed from what it is representing, but I am still surfing the internet. I am still living in the practical world despite the scientific background of what I am doing.

Similarly, I want to say that OF regards scientific reality and practical reality in a similar way. Meaning is something that may be hard to find amongst the technical jargon that we call science in the same way that I would find it hard to find meaning if I read the code that depicted the image of a child being pulled from the rubble in Haiti. In that sense, I can recognize that we need these practical, phenomenal constructions in order to find meaning.

On the flipside, however, I think that OF deserves defense for saying something like “Hey, don’t forget that your practical, phenomenal constructions that provide meaning are still rooted in the science that runs the physical”.

It doesn’t help to find meaning if we think of love from a purely scientific sense, but I am somewhat convinced by empirical induction that we are dependant upon the scientific jargon (code) in order to find meaning. To OF’s credit, I think that it is important do develop this distinction of dualist perspectives of the same reality in order to get at the core of meaning in a material world. Cwhite 20:27, 27 January 2010 (UTC)


Do we need to back up and talk about Human Nature? Katie Infantine

Regarding our discussion about Chapter 2, I though it maybe helpful to bring up a, possibly obvious, but vital and foundational starting point for talking about eudaimonia and human flourishing - namely the fact that in order to decide what constitutes eudaimonia or what true flourishing is, we must first be grounded in an agreement about human nature. The danger here is that if we disagree about the very nature of what it means to be human, especially whether or not teleology is involved, it seems that we cannot agree upon how to talk about human flourishing.

This thought was sparked by OF’s comment, “This [Menicus’s sprout analogy] suggests to me two interpretive possibilities. One is that Menicus thinks there are some not-so-good sprouts in our nature and just fails to make this clear. The other is that he thinks that bad seeds can blow in from the outside and take root in us. This would require an explanation for how, say, a corrupt culture could germinate seeds that are not in the natures of the individuals it comprises.” (pg. 49)

The basic question is: are humans inherently good or inherently bad?

One teleological problem, which I thought was a great addition to our class discussion about human flourishing, goes something like this: What are we to make of the Christian philosophy that advocates that to be poor, or suffering, is more consistent with living a meaningful life than almost any other philosophy about human flourishing would allow?

Question two, then, is: Do humans have a higher purpose, and if so, what is that purpose?

Hence, it seems that OF, and we in our class discussions, are already getting ahead of ourselves, in a sense, when we attempt to discover the meaning of eudaimonia or human flourishing before we agree upon the very nature of human beings - who will need drastically different things to flourish, depending upon both the nature of human beings and what they are designed for (or whether they are designed for anything at all). --Kinfantine 00:46, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

Sub-topics and references within Chapter 3

What's wrong with epiphenomenalism?

Epiphenomenonalism is the idea that the mind has no causal efficacy of the physical, but rather is only some kind of byproduct of the physical processes of the brain. This means that our desires and intentions are not the causes of our actions, but rather are merely like the whistle on a steam engine – indicators of other processes.

The problem with this, is that the mind seems to become irrelevant – reasons are no longer to be seen as determinants of our actions (or even to have any effect on them). For a type-neurophysicalist like Flanagan, this would mean that neural states are actually just indicators of causal events, thus rendering any kind of search for meaning irrelevant – we are just along for the ride, firmly attached to the externally caused tracks of the roller coaster of consciousness. It seems that Flanagan claims that all mental states are physical are in fact so that mental states can have causal efficacy.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes a good point, however: “If mental events cause their effects only in virtue of their physical properties, then their being mental events is causally irrelevant and mental properties are, in a certain sense, epiphenomena” [5] This would seem to apply to Flanagan's neurophysicalist view, so perhaps while trying to avoid epiphenomenalism by definition, he has already stepped into it de facto. --DTuckerman

You are on to something, but I do not think that the mental events are always causally "irrelevant". Suppose the universe is mildly but not completely deterministic -- it is already planned that I will buy a car on a certain date without my pre-knowledge that this is definitely the case. But the color or tire size of the vehicle is in limbo and entirely random allowing for a bit of completely free will, the small picture choice lies with me while the big picture has led to this event. Thus the mental event has a mild dash of "accidental" thrown in for too many small variables are present. From here it follows that the mind creates a picture and the physical may or may not act upon it, if so the byproduct would be knowledge at worst and understanding at best. Rather than indicators, the byproduct becomes an entirely new being, born of the root search for meaning.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia, "Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings." Vallandry 07:06, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

What's the difference between tame and untame scientific materialism? Evaluate

Evolution and Buddhism

The term “sentient being” is a Buddhist term to refer to creatures with the ability to have subjective experiences. Many disagree as to what kind of creatures can have subjective experiences, but the emergence of the laws of “karmic causality” is concerned with those sentient beings that have evolved with the ability to act intentionally. Flanagan argues that his own brand of “tame” karmic causality” is a natural process and uncontroversial to natural philosophers.

The Dalai Lama explains the points at which Buddhism and the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution would agree about the forces that cause life in the universe to change over time. Both, of course, would first and foremost agree on the observable data of changes in species, and both would agree that this observable data that the theory of evolution would point out can be explained through natural causation. The Dalai Lama then points out another emergence of these natural laws, and that is karma: “When the universe has evolved to a stage where it can support the life of sentient beings, its fate becomes entangled with the karma of the beings who will inhabit it” (74). Even though karmic causality is not consistent with the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, it is still natural. As Flanagan points out, from inorganic arose organic. From the intentional acts of sentient beings arose karmic causation. The tame karmic causation that Flanagan argues for is a natural process in which creatures that are conscious of their actions (physical, verbal, and mental) have effects on their environment. The human sciences emerged in order to understand the intentions of human beings and the effects that they have on the other sentient beings and objects around them.

The ultimate controversy here comes into play when Flanagan talks about the “untamed” karmic causation, interestingly named for the problems it throws in the way of naturalists. Of course, sentience must have evolved from non-sentience, but how and why are the important questions. Neo-Darwinians would suggest that is was from a being, maybe a species of bacteria, a “bacteria for whom ‘there was nothing it is/ was like to be them…’” (76), which I think, sounds ironically poetic. The Dalai Lama would suggest that there is maybe a mysterious and perhaps teleological explanation. A naturalist would, indeed find this problematic.

Neuronal Correlates of Consciouness View (NCC)

Appendix 1: Buddhism and rebirth

Appendix 2: Evolution and Catholicism

Cameron Faller

At the end of the chapter three, Owen Flanagan asserts that Roman Catholics cannot both believe in the teachings of the Church and at the same time believe in evolution. Flanagan believes that the Church’s teaching on God and the human soul both directly contradict the theory of evolution. He believes that “divine intervention, immaterial entities, and incoherent views on mental causation” all contradict the theory of evolution (100). More than anything else, Flanagan’s biggest problem is with how an immaterial being can interact with a physical world. He believes that a devout Catholic evolutionist is basically an oxymoron, and the only way to reconcile the two opposing view points is to choose one view other the other.

However, I believe that if evolution is understood in the strict sense, where as it is understood as a theory that proposes the development of the human body and Homo sapiens species, then there is no contradiction between Catholicism and evolution. The contradiction occurs when scientists attempt to make theological or metaphysical claims which are outside of their field. Flanagan first asserts that Catholicism’s idea of Adam and Eve is the first issue that may be a contradiction. However, Flanagan himself admits that “as regards the evolution of sentience, we are pretty much, at this time, left with “just so” stories,” and they same could easily be said with the evolution of the human intellect. Therefore, the story of Adam and Eve is just a story among many. Scientists cannot deny that there may have been only two “pre-humans” that first became humans. At some point, humans became “intellectual creatures,” so who’s to say there wasn’t just two at first.

Flanagan also sees the direct implementation of a soul in humans by God as being contrary to evolution. However, the theory of evolution deals specifically with the development of the physical body. And therefore, there is no contradiction by saying that God implants a soul into each human being. Flanagan doesn’t understand how a immaterial being could be a cause in a physical world but just because we don’t currently understand how this is a possibility doesn’t mean it is automatically false. Many devout Catholics have held that evolution and Catholicism can be reconciled. What they don’t think Catholics can hold is the neo-Darwinist approach to evolution which is what Cardinal Schondorn is arguing against in his article mentioned in chapter three. The neo-Darwinist belief that evolution is completely unguided and unplanned is what is contradictory to Catholicism. However, this belief is not synonymous with evolution in general. By making this claim, a neo-Darwinist is stepping outside of science by making a metaphysical claim about the nature of the world. However, if scientists are only concerned with the physical then it is inappropriate for them to make these types of claims. As previously mentioned, the biggest issue for Flanagan seems to be how an immaterial being can interact with a physical world. However, it seems as though Flanagan is conceiving of God as like an immaterial human being that interacts with the physical world when in reality God would have to interact with the world in a radically different way. How can we possibly understand how an immaterial being which exists outside of time interacts in a physical world that exists in time? Sure you’re free to believe that this is not possible or that this belief is irrational, but no scientific or evolutionary theory could possibly prove that this is not possible. Therefore, even though Flanagan may not like it, Catholics are logically free to believe in an evolutionary theory that stays within the bounds of science.

Cardinal Schonborn's full article [6] Cardinal Schonborn’s response to criticism [7]

Steven Barr’s article regarding the proper relationship between Darwinism and Catholicism [8]

Cfaller 01:52, 1 February 2010 (UTC)


Response to Cameron

Katie Infantine

To add to your comments Cameron, I think that OF would have to agree with your statements that, “Scientists cannot deny that there may have been only two “pre-humans” that first became humans,” namely Adam and Eve, or that, “Flanagan doesn’t understand how a immaterial being could be a cause in a physical world but just because we don’t currently understand how this is a possibility doesn’t mean it is automatically false.”

In fact, OF brings up several times Jinpa’s (“the Dalai Lama’s close collaborator and English interpreter”) statement that there should be a distinction between “what is negated through scientific method and what has not been observed through such a method. In other words, he reminds us not to conflate the two processes of not finding something and finding its nonexistence.”

I am, however, concerned with your claim that scientists, or evolutionists to be specific, are concerned only with the evolution of the physical body. I believe they are concerned with the evolution of the totality of species, which is why OF spends so much time in Chapter 2 attempting to understand and explain the evolution of altruism and claims it as a based primarily in the biological evolution of the human species as a whole. Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that evolutionists are concerned with explaining the evolution and the long-term history of what we find now, which includes seemingly unphysical phenomena, like altruism and souls.

--Kinfantine 01:06, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

Religious Scripture and Scientific Texts

The Dalai Lama asserts that the biggest difference between Science and Buddhism is their respective texts. I found this tid bit of argumentation on page 70 interesting. Flanagan claims that the Dalai Lama underestimates “the status and the frequency of appeals to authoritative ‘scriptures’ in science” (70). Perhaps I am being nitpicky, but I find myself agreeing with the Dalai Lama that religious scriptures are really not as related to scientific authorities as Flanagan wants them to be; albeit I am not very familiar with Buddhist texts. The difference, I think, is that religious scripture tends to be fundamentally unchanged (I would avoid the term stagnant) throughout time—though the interpretations might change from time to time or person to person. A scientific paper, however, sets out to expand, explain, or eradicate earlier held theories. In other words, there really is no unchanged text that Science appeals to. For example, many people of the scientific community before Watson and Crick's discovery held that protein was the vehicle for heredity; since 20 amino acids has a greater degree of structural diversity than the 4 nucleic acid bases of DNA; but we all know that it was DNA that won out. Indeed Flanagan recognizes this when he rightly states that “Science requires that the accumulated wisdom of its own past be intersubjectively re-testable” (71). But, I do not believe that religious scripture is falsifiable and testable in the same way that scientific literature is. Perhaps the closest thing that Science has to religious scripture is the scientific method itself; after all that is quite unchangeable to the Scientist. Twilkinson

2/9

2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar

When spaces of meaning conflict

After our discussion last night, I was left with a question regarding the spaces of meaning. Flanagan’s goal in this book is to show how human flourishing can be accomplished through various combinations of the six spaces of meaning. I think we established last night that Flanagan obviously privileges science as a source of knowledge over the five other spaces of meaning. My question is in regards to how Flanagan handles the occasion when separate spaces of meaning disagree concerning human flourishing. For example, in the case brought up in class about the legislation in England, it is apparent that Catholicism and politics are disagreeing in regards to accomplishing human flourishing. There are also several other examples in which people’s religious beliefs apparently do or may conflict with aspects derived from the other spaces of meaning. So when spaces of meaning conflict, does Flanagan believe that both sides are right because people on both sides are finding meaning in their particular space of meaning or would Flanagan use some criteria in order to judge which space was more “in tuned” with human flourishing? Since he gives science a priority among the spaces of meaning, maybe he would use scientific investigation as his criteria. I guess the greater question though is whether Flanagan believes that there is an objective and universal standard for evaluating human flourishing or whether as long as someone is finding meaning in some combination of the six spaces then human flourishing is accomplished. If Flanagan wants to choose the first option, which I assume he does, there must be some way of discerning the truth when spaces of meaning conflict. Flanagan may want to use science, but I feel like this would undermine his project if he were to give one of the spaces of meaning priority in validating claims of the other spaces. Cfaller 03:53, 4 February 2010 (UTC)

Sub-topics and references within Chapter 4

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2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar

Sub-topics and references within Chapter 5

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2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar

Sub-topics and references within Chapter 6

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