OCT 12

12: OCT 12

Assigned

• Dennett, Daniel. Review of "Against Moral Responsibility, Naturalism.org (10) (Erik/Angelo)
• Clark, Tom. "Exchange on Waller's 'Against Moral Responsibility"(12) (Hendrick/Dionicio)

• Dennett lecture from "Thinking Tools" [1]

Dennett Review

• Wallter tries to separate naturalism from MR, but he winds up excluding naturalist solutions from “counting” as possible substitutes for traditional MR. (Guilt-before the eyes of God MR).

• Method point: concept of MR “doesn’t just drop from the sky into your theory”

• D: Modern MR is a taming of desert MR. (Q: Why assumes that fines are punitive? Isn’t there another “taming” which reduces punishment?)

• D: “fair enough” - MR is “artifactual”. (Part of social world - Also the world that Henrich discusses as cultural evolutionist.)

• Critical Question: Is a “no blame” system unable to remove “flawed characters from their roles”?

• D: Punishment might be better than rehab.

• D: Proposes “Take charge responsibility” (TCR) as “non-retributive” punishment. Discuss . “A system that works”…

Old notes:

• Let's get clear on what the "original mistake" in Waller is, according to Dennett.

• Being against MR
• Equating MR with extreme retributivism.

• 2nd thoughts: Isn't is a big problem that we aren't talking about group responsibility alongside individual?

• Yes, these are related dynamically. How can you assess the driver's responsibility for a crash without reference to a standard for a safe road (something we are presumably collectively responsible for)?
• No, our list of expectations of a "normally competent person" can reflect the line bt ind/group R.

• The Dennett review helped me think more about the connections among: punishment and suffering (maybe punishment by definition involves suffering).

• What is the diff bt "retributive punishment" (retribution) and "punishment as penalties" (penalties/consequentialist)? Both involve "quid pro quo", but only retribution requires "eyes-before-God" ultimate moral responsibility (as in Waller, Strawson, and Nagel). Reasons for favoring one or the other?

• (Note that "punishment" in public goods games doesn't necessarily involve blame.)

• Some inferences:

• 1. All punishment requires desert.
• 2. Deserving retributive punishment additionally required "ultimate moral responsibility".
• 3. Deserving a penalty only requires a valid social contract and legitimacy of institutions (plausible consequentialist rationale).

• Proposals:

• Let's use Take Charge Responsibility (TCR) in connection with consequentialist punishment and Moral Responsibility (MR) for the kind of moral responsibility that would justify retributive punishment. This might only make sense if you agree that there are two senses of punishment to discuss, each requiring different accounts of responsibility. Feel free to push on that!