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2/23
2nd Thoughts on Last Week's Seminar
Looking back at the end of chapter 5 it seems apparent that it ended ambivalent at best. Reading it the first time I really thought The Flan-Man was defending the view that our natural platonic orientation must be in harmony in order to fully flourish. This would mean upholding true good and beautiful, rather than dropping true for good or beautiful or both. However, towards the end of the chapter he said the task for eudaimonics is find out what it is about people who live outside the shadow of positive illusions and discover to see what trade-offs if any there are for those individuals regarding subjective happiness (179.) This led to our closing discussion on the new and improved generous theory which would uphold false beliefs as being valuable to our SWB. I'm still skeptical of the view that this theory helps out the Flan-man. If eudaimonic science is to get us from the Goodman set to the harmonious platonic orientation we naturally tend towards, I don't see how holding false beliefs can be valuable to eudaimonia. I'm sure it could be great for SWB but I see dropping truth as detrimental to the eudaimonic project at the expense of SWB. Ehanson
A few thoughts on the other night
First off, I do believe in the Greater Happiness Hypothesis, and its assertion that an individual can change himself/herself through contemplative practices. For example, in Hinduism, believers think that by limiting one’s expectations one can achieve greater happiness. According to Hinduism, if we can create a mental habit of not expecting things, we will be less likely to be angry or disappointed if we don’t receive them, and thus we will generally be happier. While I don’t know if I agree with this principle, I do agree that we can create mental habits in order to bring about happiness. I believe that in many ways this is what virtue entails. For example, temperance, or moderation, is a habitual virtue that can be gained through reflective practices and actions. Consequently, the contemplative monk is less likely to “lose his cool” or be controlled by unnecessary desires, in which case, he is freer and maybe more happy. The point I’m trying to make is that as intellectual beings, we have the ability to alter how we perceive things based on our own mental state, which, in turn, if done correctly, can allow us to be happier in some instances. Secondly, I do think OF (generous) is a sounder philosophical stance because it doesn’t have the same problems that we have exposed in Flanagan’s actual theory. Like many said in class, I don’t think Flanagan would be willing to accept the OF (generous) point of view because, as a naturalists, he probably would be unwilling to accept certain positive illusions. This is why I think he refrains from saying anything at the end of chapter 5. He sees that studies have shown that positive illusions can be beneficial and bring about happiness, but, at the same time, he does not want to grant validity to certain illusions that he believes are “delusional”(154).Consequently, he is left at the end of the chapter with basically nothing to say. While I do think the OF (generous) theory is a better model for comparative dialogue, I really don’t know what it accomplishes in the end. I agree with Eric in that I think this almost destroys the eudaimonics project. Sure we could realize through this practice that various illusions and beliefs bring about happiness and meaning, but this system can never lead to a set of objective criteria for the practices that lead to human flourishing. Yes, we can realize that various beliefs and practices accomplish the same effects that lead to happiness or meaning. The problem is that people within these various practices, which most the time are religious, would most likely be unwilling to grant that their religion is just one among many that accesses the truth. Most religious believers hold that their religious beliefs are the Truth, and therefore the OF (generous) model fails in this respect. While various religions do agree on certain moral truths and practices, they are not going to accept that their beliefs are just subjective to their own religion and are not necessary and universal truths. For example, Unitarians and Catholics might agree in the benefits of prayer and the practice of certain virtues, but a Unitarian and a Catholic are not going to be willing to compromise on the morality of homosexuality. They both may agree on the virtues and beliefs that give meaning to life, but how these virtues and beliefs are implemented would be a point of disagreement. So, once again, this system could shed light on underlying virtues or beliefs that lead to happiness, but this system would fail to show how these virtues or beliefs are properly expressed in actions.Cfaller 18:18, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
False Beliefs
I am going to attempt to give reasoning/defend Flanagan’s reasoning for calling false beliefs a benefit in the pursuit of eudemonia. It will go like the opposite of a good night of philosophy at the bar: That is to say that it will end with a genuine philosophical question and start with a reference to an episode of The Simpsons.
In the 7th season of The Simpsons, an episode called “Lisa The Iconoclast” aired. I took the liberty of copying the plot line from wikipedia:
Plot
As Springfield celebrates its bicentennial, Lisa's class at Springfield Elementary School are assigned essays. Lisa goes to the historical society to research about Jebediah Springfield, the founder of Springfield. While trying to play Jebediah Springfield's fife, she makes the shocking discovery that the town's founder was actually a villainous pirate and enemy of George Washington who kept his dark past hidden. He had written his confession on the back side of a portrait of Washington and hidden it in his fife. Meanwhile, upon Lisa's suggestion, Homer is elected the town crier after he demonstrated that he was a better town crier than Ned Flanders. Lisa conducts further research about Jebediah Springfield, and finds out that he was actually a pirate named Hans Sprungfeld who, having lost his tongue, had replaced it with a prosthetic silver tongue. The town does not agree with Lisa's revelations, resulting in an "F" on a report about Springfield while Ms. Hoover deems her to be a "PC Thug." She also receives a ban from the Historical Society. Lisa tries to convince the town her claims are true, but the only person who believes her is Homer. However, she convinces the municipal government to disinter Mr. Springfield's body to search for evidence of a legendary silver tongue. Despite Lisa's suspicions, when they open the coffin, the skeleton possesses no silver tongue. Lisa is forced into admitting she was wrong and Mayor Quimby strips Homer of the role of town crier and reassigns it to Flanders.
That night, Lisa has a dream wherein the ghosts of Jebediah Springfield and George Washington appear. After seeing the incomplete portrait of George Washington in her classroom, Lisa soon figures out that the piece of paper upon which the confession is written is the bottom half of the portrait. She confronts town historian, Hollis Hurlbut, with this piece of evidence. Hurlbut confesses that he stole the tongue while the dust cleared seconds after the coffin was opened and hid it in a cowboy maquette in the museum. He explained that he had done so to protect his career and the myth of Jebediah Springfield. After realizing the mistake of celebrating a pirate, the two decide to go public with their discovery. Just as Lisa is about to expose the "real Jebediah" to the parading townspeople, she realizes that Jebediah Springfield's good image means too much to the town, and decides to keep the truth a secret, knowing that town will lose hope and morale if the truth is revealed to the public. She says she was mistaken in her research of Jebediah Springfield and that he was actually a great man. At the parade Homer takes the tri-cornered hat and bell from Flanders and replaces him, marching through the parade with Lisa on piggyback.
Here is a perfect application to deliberate whether positive false beliefs helped or harmed a culture’s pursuit towards Eudaimonics. One would easily say, as Lisa originally did, that a false belief, whether it caused positive or negative outcome, is still false. As a false belief, the pursuit of the platonic sense of the true is violated. I think that this violation is what Eric is getting at. To that, I would have to agree, but is Flanagan first and foremost a Platonist, or is he a believer of Platonism as a function of humanity? I think that if he were to be seeing it as the former, that positive false beliefs would be counterintuitive to his position. As a person pushing a material world that humans try to make sense of through spaces of meaning, however, the good the true and the beautiful to Flanagan are still all about perception.
So how can we talk about perception now? How about truth? Reality? As humans in a material world, we tried to draw what we can really know. By the time we hit the late 1800s, the notion that we could understand anything outside of our perceptions was virtually abandoned. Truth and perception, as it stands, are somewhat entangled. So to that, I ask, how different is a false belief from a true one? Time? We have held beliefs that we thought were true in the past that we found to be false. I guarantee that we all hold beliefs that, to the best of our knowledge are true, but will some day be proven false. Does that make their content and the good that comes from that belief incongruent with eudaimonics?
I once idolized a photographer by the name of Steve McCurry. To this day, he is an excellent portrait photographer. His imagery moved me to believe that there is far more to photography than vocation. Thus, his persona inspired me to think that I could make a difference through imagery, service, etc. I found out a couple of years ago through one of his interns that, although he is a world-renown photographer that does a lot of good, the rest of him is complete shambles. He lacks the ability to hold friendships, relationships and he manipulates people. In short, everything about him on a personal level is not the person that I idolized. When I learned that I had a false belief, but that false belief inspired me. That inspiration, no doubt, helped me to shape my identity and, I would like to think, to flourish.
From an evolutionary standpoint, positive false belief works. It wouldn’t be a huge stretch to say that having a positive, confident view of things, although inaccurate, yielded fruitful selection in the EEA.
In the grand scheme, I would have to think that the blindered (like a horse with blinders on, I know its not a real word) pursuit of truth would be the big counterproductive move. At its core, one could actually say that the pursuit of truth in a material world would undermine meaning entirely. As far as we know (according to OF), we are perceptive beings in a material reality that is run by science. This naked reality, I think that OF is trying to depict, is void of meaning for humans. Thus the ultimate pursuit of truth comes at the price of realizing that everything meaningful that we as humans construct (spaces of meaning) is ultimately meaningless.
Armed with that, I want to ask the genuine philosophical question:
Is positive false belief the source of meaning in a material world?
Cwhite 06:20, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
Sub-topics and references within Chapter 6
Well, I guess that's it. Interesting ending by Flanagan. We jump straight from Neurosciences in Chapter 5 to an autobiographical account of how O.F. became an atheist while going through the motions of a good Catholic boy in the late 50s and early 60s. His heart was apparently never in it, which is fine, but the transition phase as he describes it for our benefit in writing, is awkward and disjointed. I think he's trying to describe a mindless rebellion while finding himself in college, but seems to be more of a "you had to be there" type story, despite the readers having a similar undergraduate philosophy background.
One thing I liked about the sudden and unexpected look at O.F.'s life is that it is lighthearted and upbeat, a stark contrast to the sad, lonely, poorly written semi-autobiographical pieces by Robert Pirsig, especially "Lila". O.F. comes off as a likeable enough guy, someone you'd go to coffee with.
But after this chapter, I'm left feeling empty, hoping for a part two. We gain the six spaces of meaning -- art, science, technology, ethics, politics, religion; plus we began to unravel proper questions to ask in pursuit of eudaimonia. But in the end, little gets answered to satisfaction.
On page two hundred and two, he asks questions such as, "How shall I live?" but blatantly says he doesn't seek to share answers. All in all, this book comes off as meditative device using as I mentioned, tools to learn how to pursue questions, but doesn't toss up enough crumbs. Amen.
Vallandry 06:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)
Jesusism?
In chapter six, Flanagan nonchalantly coins the term “Jesusism” as a major world tradition that "correctly" follows the teachings of Jesus Christ. He claims that he doesn’t want to refer to it as Christianity because he does not think all Christian churches truly follow Christ’s message. His idea of “Jesusism” is basically his desire to use some of Christ’s teachings but not others. He obviously wants to only accept those teachings which fit into his naturalistic stance. Therefore, the “Golden rule” is a perfect teaching for Flanagan because it endorses unselfish love and at the same time doesn’t challenge his naturalistic agenda. I just find it interesting that Flanagan is using a biblical message to get his point across because, according to Flanagan, how could we verify that Christ ever gave this teaching. And, if we can establish that Christ said this, why not accept Christ’s others teachings; like when he declared that “The Son of Man will be raised (from the dead) on the third day (Matthew 20:18-19),” or when He says, “I am the bread that came down from heaven (John 6:41),” or how about His teaching that His disciples must “Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the holy spirit” (Matthew 26:19). Obviously, based on Flanagan’s previous comments in the book, he would view these other teachings as preposterous or delusional. However, if Flanagan is going to cite the Bible, as a responsible academic, he must accept it all. Sure, his idea of “Jesusism” is not necessary for his overall project, but his usage of this term just once again shows his continual tendency to trivialize and misunderstand religion. He goes on to say in the chapter that “Jesusism, or a.k.a a set of teachings of Christ that serve Owen Flanagan’s objective” does not need to be conceived theistically, or supernaturally. I really do not understand how this makes any sense considering once again that Christ claimed to be the Son of God from another world (John 8:21-30). So, how exactly can “the Son of God and another world” be conceived non-supernaturally. At the beginning of this chapter, he gives Christians the ability to believe in certain theological beliefs, but they must realize that these are only positive illusions and feel-good stories. However, these Christians can rightly hold true beliefs that serve Flanagan’s objective, like the commandment to love our neighbor. What Flanagan does not seem to realize is that religions contain a unified set of beliefs; one cannot just choose to accept some and not others. Because by choosing to accept some, one is indirectly giving their support to the others considering all the teachings come from the same source(the Bible in the case of Christianity). He finishes his “compassionate” treatment of religious beliefs by stating that they are akin to a belief in Santa Clause; they make us feel good and that’s about it. I am just disappointed that a prominent academic, like Mr. Flanagan, couldn’t have been more respectful and intellectually responsible in his treatment of religion. Cfaller 04:35, 21 February 2010 (UTC)
Chapter 6
Wow. Just wow. First of all, thanks for the biography Owen. Second of all, Ouch Mega Prime has been packed, shipped and delivered by overnight Ouch Express.
First of all though, I have to disagree with you Cameron. Specifically with the claim "If Flanagan is going to cite the Bible, as a responsible academic, he must accept it all." This quite simply is not true. This would only be the case for someone who believes, that the bible in it's entirety is true, which is to say this would be the case for those who treat it as doctrine. As a responsible academic, we most certainly take aspects, parts or concepts from philosophies, theologies, theories or any other collection of wisdom and treat them as accurate or true. Whether it is Newton's physics, Theory of General Relativity, Democracy from Republics, Lutheranism from Roman Catholicism, we at least hope to take what we see as true and good from an idea and hold on to it. This, is all Flanagan is doing. He sees overlap between Buddhism, Christianity and consequentialism by way of altruism. He is picking up on Altruism, not the religion itself, in the bible. With that being said, he does it in a way that is totally degrading Christianity... But that is a matter of how he is doing it, not a matter of whether or not what he does, in principle, is wrong headed or irresponsible. I actually think, at least abstractly, he is merely being consistent with his search for overlap between different worldviews, which gives plausibility to the accuracy of that overlap.
However, even given these overlapping ideas that he/we find, there are clearly ideas that do not necessarily overlap that are still beneficial to our flourishing. I can't agree more with Clint's post on false beliefs (except that I think the answer to his ending question is that they are not the only basis upon which flourishing happens, but they certainly are a part.) and with OF's account for that matter. Using his OWN naturalistic account, I think he makes a strong case for positive false beliefs as evolutionary advantages to human flourishing. I even understand what I think, given the space (Too much space for him I think) he gives to positive false beliefs and the overlap in ideas, OF's goal actually is. More or less, he is trying to stamp out dogmatism, evangelism and intolerance. Which sounds pretty good to me... except for this huge ouch of a list he gives on 195.
Flanagan might as well have this section titled, "All religious people please sit down on your kiddy stools, and put on your dunce hats." I want to say that OF-generous's mission is to make for a more common, inclusive space of meaning. Perhaps this is merely an issue in rhetoric, but I find it insightful into how these spaces of meaning are actually related in a naturalistically based philosophy. The list, the list is intolerant. Very much so intolerant, of the very same (I think they're the same, if not examples of the most successful positive false beliefs to human flourishing; false given the naturalistic point of view or requirement of evidence) positive false beliefs he has made room for... Honestly, I don't necessarily disagree with him, but he needs to change how he is saying this in order to be consistent with his own philosophy. You can't make space for these beliefs that have demonstrably beneficial affects and then follow up by saying you can't have them. On what basis? At the bare minimum, all you can say is that they aren't beliefs we can actually and objectively argue about; or objectively reach proofs, conclusions and hypotheses through empirical experience. In other words, yes, they can say those things Owen, and even believe them further than just as a warm fuzzy, they just shouldn't force them upon anyone as the undisputed truth. Promote tolerance with tolerance, not intolerance by way of an infantilizing and condescending list...Jus sayin. Byost 04:08, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
A Few Thoughts
1. Numerous times OF refers to theism (especially assertive theism), as well as fundamentalism as dangerous. Indeed, “The belief in authoritative texts that contain God’s word…is supported by an unsupportable, predictably dangerous, epistemology” (194). There is no doubt that religion has the great potential of being quite dangerous, especially in the fundamentalist extremist groups—groups found in the middle east, as well as our own country. There is potential danger in religion. I argue, and I don’t think that OF would deny, that if one were to take an uncorrupted look at what Jesus (for example) preaches there is room for great benefit across humanity. To say that theism is dangerous simply because it is epistemically unwarranted (according to the naturalistic-scientific outlook) is a major oversight...I also would like to argue that it isn't epistemically unwarranted but that's another discussion. There is and has been great benefit from religion, even if the dangers are still prominent by those corrupted individuals. Indeed, one can easily say that Science can lead to great tragedy and destruction, look to the Manhattan Project. That is not to say that science is bad, look to the great leaps and bounds we have taken in the medical world. It would just be nice to see OF realize the potential dangers that Science, or even Naturalism could have. Certainly there might (though I am quite positive OF isn’t) some very bad morally-misguided Naturalists. But they aren’t looking at the Naturalistic project in the right way, much like the Christian Fundamentalist holds a corrupted view of his religion.
2. To simplify religion to a “triplet of theories about creation, miracles, and the afterlife” (198) is a major oversimplification and a mistake. I think OF overlooks the real meat of Christianity, which is a religion preaching love to God and love to humanity. Christians show love to God through love of His creatures. I see great merit in this.
3. HADD is an interesting theory. I remember hearing about it briefly in Psychology class. It does make sense, since we do tend to anthropomorphize our experiences/surroundings/occurances. In my understanding of religious experience we indeed anthropomorphize things that we really shouldn’t be anthropomorphizing (to think of God as a person is a faulty idea to have, though I often slip into that bad habit). HADD could be the answer to this phenomenon.
What are we to make of Flanagan's Jesusism?
Flanagan in this chapter makes a lot of unfounded claims regarding Christianity. Cameron has already pointed out what Flanagan means by the term "Jesusism". Flanagan does not however, say why he is the judge and arbiter of what Christianity truly teaches. I think this is the crux Cameron was getting at. It is academically irresponsible to arbitrarily say what constitutes Christianity, throw everything else to the wind without further explanation and then take Bible quotes in isolation and incorporate that into your theory. It would be one thing if Flanagan was finding common ground with his "spiritual" naturalism and Christianity using altruism as a starting point for dialogue between the two world views but this isn't what he does. Instead, he flushes everything out he doesn't like from Christianity, calls it Jesusism and then finds the overlap of altruism with Buddhism and Consequentialism.
I think what Flanagan failed to do in his book is explain why Christianity is unreasonable. It seems as if he just assumes the readers will be sympathetic to his views and doesn't have to explain a whole lot. He talks about discovering the logical preposterousness of the cosmological argument at age 13 but doesn't go on to say what he means by that. He acts as if it is self-evident that Christian beliefs are unreasonable. Furthermore, he seems insistant that it must have some sort of Cartesian certainty... since it doesn't it must be absurd. His other arguments talk of the predictable danger of authoritative texts. Again, he didn't really elaborate on that either. It seemed he was just throwing jabs throughout and using them to defend his view of Jesusism that he could incorporate into the religious space of meaning.
I will end this post on a positive note. Throughout our time reading this book the tension between the religious and science space of meaning always seemed to be in tension. He would add religion as a space of meaning but at times was condescending of it. It seemed puzzling why he would include them and how he would reconcile the two. In this chapter he seemed to answer how he sees both to be included for meaning and flourishing. His reasons I think are shallow but it should make for an interesting discussion. Ehanson
Meaning and Moral Glue
I found Flanagan’s discussion of “moral glue” very interesting. He raises the question of what came first, ethics or theology. Not surprisingly Flanagan believes that ethics or morality came before theology. He states that because humans are selfish creatures, normative societies must have needed to place regulations for the good of the community. Flanagan states these rules were major items such as murder and only taking what is needed (e.g. conserving resources). In addition, he states that spirituality can provide explanations for a society, although Flanagan thinks these explanations are wrong. In fact he states that bind spirituality with morality can be very helpful for religious communities so it is easy to see why communities utilize it. However, Flanagan makes it extremely clear that he believes that theology can and should be isolated from morality. In fact he argues that “although it is common to use theistic supernatural glue, it is not necessary” (207).
While I think that this subject had hope for a fruitful discussion, Flanagan seemed to approach the topic with an agenda from the beginning. Obviously, I did not think that Flanagan would embrace the powerful impact of spiritual beliefs combined with morality, but I did hope that if religion/spirituality really is a space of meaning that Flanagan would assign it some significance. Instead, before even explaining his “superglue hypothesis” Flanagan reflects in his end notes that his real aim is to prove that morality is separable from theology. In addition, although some of his arguments held truth they were quickly undermined by his insensitive approach. For example, Flanagan sites how spiritual traditions moralize death through karmic eschatology or an afterlife (this encourages people to live a moral lives). However, on the next page he equates God to Santa. Insensitive comparisons such as this one cloud the reader from making an informed decision and only highlight Flanagan’s specific agenda. Cmitchell
Ch. 6: False Beliefs, Mythology, and the Ingredients of Meaningful Lives
We begin this chapter with a very charming biography, and end the chapter, and the book with the declaration “Amen.” I found both of these obnoxious, but Flanagan obviously thought that these touches were appropriate, and that they wrapped up the book suitably.
I did find useful his discussion of “assertive theism” and “expressive theism” The mythology of expressive theism knows its own limitations, unlike the problematic and authoritative mythology of assertive theism. Yet, expressive theism lends itself to the search for meaning beautifully, “in an artful, expressivist manner” (192). And the best thing about the helpful sort of mythology that Flanagan discusses is the humility in which the stories do express themselves. You are right, Brandon. Flanagan needs to follow his own rules for humility and tolerance. His attack against religion comes off as intolerant and packed with the bitterness he has felt towards it since his youth. But he wants to make clear why many who turned away from religion feel wronged by it. He explains the advantages of positive false beliefs and mythology, so that he may distinguish religious beliefs that are helpful from those that promote intolerance in certain religious organizations – things such as the “in-group/out-group structure” he discusses on page 205. Flanagan wants to create a space that is inclusive rather than exclusive, where all are welcome to critically discuss the ingredients that make up a fulfilling life under the one commonality of our human nature. He does have the one condition that we do not bring our mythologies along. We can, however, bring to the discussion what these other spaces of meaning have taught us about our nature. And that is why Flanagan wants to save the expressive mythology – because it does have something to say about our nature.
And, as Taylor said, it’s not the religion or the mythology that causes the problems; it is the people behind them. Science is not exempt. Any sphere of meaning could contain corruption and moral bankruptcy. This is why the inclusive space that gives room for evaluation is critical.
Flanagan’s project whether we think it worked or not, is to use universal love and compassion to “bind an expansive moral conception that is also naturalistic” (219). This is his natural spirituality – something that still includes the practice of prayer as an ingredient for a meaningful life. Hence the pretty little ending. --Jangello 18:11, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
