MRFW SEP Lecture Notes

Introductory

• MR skepticism: "refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions in a particular but pervasive sense." range of skepticism.

• Critics argue that morality may hang in the balance if we abandon tradition conceptions of blame and retribution. But "Optimistic skeptics" think we would be better off morally and maybe practically.

• Desert based judgements: "resentment, indignation, moral anger, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment"

• Consequentialist vs. Desert-based -- forward looking vs. backward looking.

• Types of responsibility not affected by MR skepticism: (p. 5)

• Attributability -- we can still attribute actions to individuals based on consistency with their identity.
• Answerability - "According to this conception of responsibility,

someone is responsible for an action or attitude just in case it is connected to her capacity for evaluative judgment in a way that opens her up, in principle, to demands for justification from others"

• take charge responsibility or "Taking responsibility"

Arguments for MR Skepticism

1. Arguments connected to traditional FW positions

• Connection to Free Will discussion - For some, MR & FW are definitionally tied. So: No FW, no MR. (For others, there is no relationship!).
• Traditional hard det. approach: Determinism implies "you could not have done otherwise" (Dennett will challenge this.)
• Hard Incompatibalism -- whether reality is det. or indet. we lack basic desert MR. Also denies Libertarian indet. provides basis for desert MR. (more at p. 10)

• Hard Incompats work the analogy bt. determinism and "manipulation". Pereboom's famous "four case" argument p. 11.

2. Less directly FW focused arguments for MR Skepticism - "Ultimate Impossibility" arguments

• Strawson's "causa sui" argument (fr. Nietzsche). Also the "Basic Arguement" (p. 15)

3. Luck

• p. 18-25

4. Scientific Challenges

• Libet