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FEB 25

Problem of Free Will comes up throughout the chapter -- not directly our concern with wisdom, is it?
Expected value problems -- Getting $20 now or more in the future.
81-3: Problem of Valuation -- Decision making works on pre-existing value that we access in the event.
83: Glimcher 06-07 fMRI research on expected value decision making: Factors affecting test subjects' answers: time horizon and impulsivity.
Reinforcement Learning -- dopamine cycle
Rutledge's "fishing for crabs" research: dopamine shift from reward to anticipation. always diminishing doses.

"Success breeds habit and failure breeds learning" -- brain is reactive to unexpected results.

Glimcher claims predictive power in fishing for crabs game.
Problems comparing this research to wisdom problems: speed of decision, narrowness of the problem
Ap Dijksterhuis - on "deliberation without attention" - connects with discussion of training subjective states of mind for better decision making.
"Attentional blink" and "decisional paralysis" - Davidson research on meditation effect on these phen.
Decision paralysis -- Iyengar and Lepper gourment jelly studies 93-94 -- connection with Parkinson's

Bernouli's formula for expected value: odds of gain x value of gain
two kinds of mistakes: odd and value
Availability heuristic: works when estimating likelihood of seeing dogs vs. pigs on a leash, not when estimating odds of good or bad things happening.
Mistakes estimating value

comparisons to the past - price cuts vs. price increases; theatre tickets (mental accounting), retailing (comparison of wine by price), potato chip / chocolate / spam study, speaker comparison.
time frames matter. When both expected value calculations are in the future we do better (pay offs in 12 vs. 13 months)

Explanatory hypothesis: brain evolution not geared toward abstract caluculation of rational alternatives.

Interested in both implicit and explicit theories that bring out the relationship of wisdom, intelligence, and creativity. Follow his own studies and rubric. More based on implicit research.
Objectivity of wisdom: At p. 147, research finds external validation in correlation between wisdom prototype-resemblance and external measures of social intelligence and social judgement.
Behavioral ratings experiment (similar to MDS study in Clayton and Birren) [Interesting details on Philosophy and Business Professors!]
2nd and 3rd experiments confirm closer association of wisdon and intelligence vs. wisdom and creativity.
Follow Sternberg's explicit model and conclusion. Read p. 152.
Explicit research: discuss matrix at 152. note on automatization. mixing of characteristics of intelligence and creativity in wisdom.
Conclusion: read p. 157.

Reference to a literature on teaching of wisdom (good topic for further research).
notes that IQ tests don't typically track cognitive styles, thinking dispositions, and wisdom. 247
distinction between rationality of belief and rationality of action, 248. dictionary def of wisdom seems to include both.
Elster's distinction between thin and broad theories of rationality. mere instrumental reasoning is "thin" thin theories don't evaluate emotions much, but the difficulty of broad theories is that they require us to make a normative assessment of our desires.
Sternberg's view of rationality is broader still, since he includes balancing of perspectives of self and others. Notes other broad theories of rationality like Hargreaves Heap (!) who critiques instrumental theories as ignoring "expressive rationality" -- making sense of the self.
Note conclusion: the logic of teaching for wisdom: If teaching wisdom is about more than promoting intelligence, if it's also about changing thinking dispositions, then you have to justify it in terms of a broader notion of rationality than just intelligence. Normative conceptions of rationality could play a role in such a justification.