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==23: NOV 17. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism==
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==24: NOV 17. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism==
  
 
===Assigned===
 
===Assigned===
  
:*Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will (580-613)  (Part One 580-600)
+
:*[https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/episodes/317421-blame Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility]
 
:*[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13554790903329182?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=nncs20 Article abstract, "Klüver–Bucy syndrome, hypersexuality, and the law"]
 
:*[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13554790903329182?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=nncs20 Article abstract, "Klüver–Bucy syndrome, hypersexuality, and the law"]
  
===Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law===
+
===In-class===
  
:*Basic Questions: 
+
:*Some basics of the moral responsibilty and free will discussion
::*1. Do we praise people for things that don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault? 
 
::*2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will and the brain?
 
::*3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"?  Start a list.  Causal, moral, both, neither.
 
::*4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach punishment with retributive intent?
 
  
:*Some concepts:
+
===Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law===
::*'''moral desert''' - normally, you deserve something because you did something to merit it, positively or negatively. As opposed to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights.  Normally, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance). 
 
::*'''moral responsibility and blame''' - normally, you deserve blame for commissions or omissions of moral duty if you are of sound mind and body.
 
  
::*More questions:  
+
:*'''Basic Questions:''' 
:::*Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that. Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
+
::*1. Do we praise people for things that they don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault?   
::::*Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstaclesAre you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
+
::*2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will, what we know about the brain, and the causes of crime?
::::*Your parents and their parents and the whole damn family come easily to good habits. None of you ever do anything wrong.  You notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad behavior.  Are you less deserving of your praise than this people from these families, equally, more?
+
::*3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"?  Start a list.  Causal, moral, both, neitherDo you find yourself referencing some idea of a "normally competent person"? When would you also hold someone responsible for becoming a normally competent person? What sorts of conditions make is more or less likely that you will become a normally competent person?
 +
::*4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach criminal punishment with retributive intent?  
  
:*Background -- guest editing assignmentbrother.
+
:*'''Some concepts for thinking about moral responsibility:'''
 +
::*'''Moral Responsibility''' - The idea that people deserve praise or blame for their actions.  In the standard view, praise and blame are based on "moral desert".
 +
::*'''Moral desert''' - Normally, you "morally deserve" something because you did (or failed to do) something to merit it, positively or negatively. (You worked a shift and deserve to be paid. You failed to observe the speed limit...)
 +
:::*Moral desert can be contrasted to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights. This is also called "'''moral standing'''".  Moral desert can also be contrasted with "morally arbitrary" (recall Rawls). So, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things that are "'''morally arbitrary'''":  things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance), things about you that were just your good fortune (good impulse control, a good noodle, athletic ability, at ease in social life...). Yet we clearly praise and blame people (and ourselves) for all of these things! 
 +
::*'''Accountability vs. Morally Responsibility''' -- Giving an account of someone as having done or failed to do things we normally expect of others can be done quite apart from holding someone blameworthy. This might be an important distinction if you become a skeptic about moral responsibilityYou don't lose accountability, necessarily.
 +
::*'''Free will and responsibility''' -- Most people would agree that if we cannot freely will our actions, we cannot be held responsible for them.  But what sort of free will is required? Is normal choosing (neurologically described) free will or do we have to break with the causal fabric of the universe! (Libertarian Free will).  If the world is deterministic, everything has been "decided" (Including basketball games!).  Does that mean there is no free will, or just that it might not be what we think it is?
  
:*A couple of interesting philosophical arguments:
+
===Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility===
  
::*From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
+
:*'''Segment 1:''' Story of Kevin and his wife, Janet. Kevin is arrested for child pornography.
:::*If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
 
  
::*Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
+
::*15 years earlier. Epilepsy seizures returned after surgery two years earlier. Can't drive so he meets Janet from work, who drives him to work. Romance... Still more seizures.  Another surgery. Music ability in tact. But then his food and sexual appetites grew, played songs on the piano for hours. Disturbing behavior. Really disturbing behavior.
:::*Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
 
:::*The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
 
  
:*How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about praise and blame?
+
::*Reporter tries to get at who it was who did it.  Kevin claims compulsion.  Downloads and deletes files.
  
===Sapolsky, Chapter 16: Biology, the Criminal Justice System, and (Oh, Why Not?) Free Will===
+
::*Orin Devinsky: Kevin’s neurologist. Testified in court that it wasn't Kevin's fault.
  
:*Discusses professional interaction between biologists and legal scholars that may have started “neurolaw”.   
+
::*Neurological dive: deep parts of our brain can generate weird thoughts, but we have a "censor".  Maybe Kevin lost that part of his brainObserved in post-surgery monkeys.
  
:*Radical claim: Current criminal justice system needs to be replaced(Not talking about policing, right?)
+
::*Lee Vartan, prosecutor -- Can't be impulse control.  Porn at home, but not at work.  He must have known that it was wrong.  But Tourette's can be circumstantially triggered even though it is clearly neurologicalPoignant exchange with Janet about staying in the relationship.  '''Could you have stayed in the relationship?'''  '''Kluwer-Bucy'''.  Months before sentencing.  Medication makes him normal, but eliminates his libido.  5 yrs. - home arrest.  Judge acknowledges prosecutor's point.  How does the legal system assign blame when you are sometimes “in control” and sometimes not? Adds: You could have asked for help. (Reflect on this a bit.)  24 months federal prison 25 months of house arrest.  2008-2010. '''Do you agree with prosecutor's Vartan's point? Why or why not? What would your sentence have been?''' (Short group discussion on questions in bold.)
  
:*Things outside his focus: science in courtroom, min IQ for death sentence, cognitive bias in jurors, cognitive privacy.
+
:*'''Segment 2:'''  Blame - person or brain. (26:30 mins)
  
:*583: historic example of scientific evidence disrupting criteria for guilt in witches trials, mid-16th centuryOlder women might not be able to cry.
+
::*[https://law.duke.edu/fac/farahany/ Nita Farahany] - neurolaw professor (law and philosophy!).  Might be lots of cases. One count: 1600 cases from 1% sampled.  (Counter-argument: Isn't this just like blaming everything else for what you do wrong?  Isn't it too easy?). Thought experiment: Imagine a deaf person, who can’t hear a child in burning building. You wouldn't hold the deaf person liable for the death of the child. "Emotional inability" would also be damage to a physical structure (as in the ear).
 +
 
 +
::*David Eagleman, Neuroscientist - Makes critical point: Neuroscience isn't so precise. Like looking at earth from spaceNew technologies may show us how experience is written in our brain.  (Back to Descartes: mind is the ghost in the machine.)  Slippery slope, the brain is always involved. Even healthy brain. Blameworthiness might be the wrong question.  Person vs. biology doesn't really make sense anymore.  The "choosey part” of the brain (the homunculus! - Explain: Sapolsky will make fun of this idea.) 36:00 minutes. Funny exchange. '''Self-modification''' comes up. The choosey part is also part of the brain. One system. Raises possibility that all decisions are determined.
  
:*Three Perspectives
+
::*Claim from Eagleman: Legal system should drop moral blame.  Adopt utilitarian approach.  Predict recidivismPoint system exists for sex offendersBetter than people’s "unguided judgement" (50% accurate). Point system and algorithm: 70%. Currently there is appearance bias for example from juries. [Mention controversies over sentencing algorithms [https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/01/21/137783/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai/].  
::*no one now disputes that we sometimes are not free (epilepsy example)Yet medieval europe tried animals for guilt.  (Sounds weirder than it is. Just imagine it's about the act, not criminal intent.)
 
  
:*Drawing Lines in the Sand 586
+
::*A point system might be very predictive, but it might involve convicting someone of a future crime.  Would it be? Would that be ok?
  
::*endorses a broad compatibilism and the idea of “moral failure”He develops the competing concept, “Mitigated free will,” but ultimately, Sapolsky will try to show that this view doesn’t hold up, in part because it depends up arbitrary use of a “homonculus” to explain things. But he's still a compatibilist on free will.
+
::*Nita Frahany - Blame might serve social function of articulating norms.   
  
::*1842: M’Naghten.  Rule at 587.  Mentally ill murderer.  Many objected to his not being found guilty.  John Hinckley.
+
:*'''Segment 3:''' Dear Hector / Dear Ivan
  
::*"mitigated free will" homonculus view: we all more or less think this way and then the problem of responsibility comes down to figuring out what to expect from the humunculus. What is it capable of or should have been capable of.
+
::*Bianca Giaever (radio producer who did the story on Hector) - Hector Black, 86.  Hector's backstory - WWII vet, Harvard, joins civil rights movement in Atlanta, moves South, adopts Patricia, a neglected child who lived nearby. Patricia's story (becomes a beautiful and productive person), college, adopts kids -- Patricia is murdered (strangled) and raped by Ivan Simpson. Hector feels retributive impulse. Ivan confesses. Hector considers whether he wishes the death penalty for him, decides no. Hector's statement at sentencing. Writes a letter of forgiveness to the murderer, which starts correspondence. Is it important that Ivan doesn’t forgive himself? Ivan's story - son of schizophrenic mom, adopted, horror.  Ivan abused.  Mom tries to drown Ivan and two other children.
  
:*Age, Maturity of Groups, Maturity of Indidividuals
+
::* Ivan tells the original story of Patricia's murder. Burglary. Drug use. Returns to Patricia’s house. Conversation with Patricia.  Didn’t originally intend to kill her.  Patricia give him food. Gets high on crack. Ivan hears a voice that sometimes comes to him. Commits the murder. Can't make sense of it. Wants death penalty.
  
::*2005 case Roper v. SimmonsAge limit of 18 on executions and life termsFollows debates on this. 590.   
+
::*Do we still blame Ivan Simpson the same way?  Hector tells his story. Many letters exchangedA strange bondHector has self-doubts about his behavior toward Ivan - sending care packages to Ivan???(Maybe he's just a weird guy or is he on to something?) '''How do you evaluate Hector’s approach to Ivan?'''
::*2010 and 2012 cases on rehab for juvies. '''age related bounds on free will''' (in the justice system).
 
  
::*”grossly impaired rationality”.  
+
::*'''Does Ivan's story change your view of the kind of threat he poses -- one from choosing evil/failing a responsibility vs. compulsion?’’’
  
::*Gazzaniga’s view: responsibility compatible with lack of free will.  Responsibility is a social level concern.  Time course of decision making. 
+
===Some complicating arguments and thought experiments on moral responsibilty===
  
::*disputes about the maturity of adolescents: APA has spoken both ways in court: not mature enough for criminal resp., but mature enough to make an abortion decision. 
+
:*A couple of interesting philosophical arguments to take into the thought experiment:  
  
:*Causation and Compulsion  -- not everything that causes us to act is a compulsion, but for some, it is.
+
::*From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
 +
:::*If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, '''one must be truly responsible for how one is''', morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
 +
:::*Strawson's argument suggests the "impossibility" of moral responsibility.
  
::*works through example of schizophrenic hearing voices. Not all cases would be compulsion. "If your friend suggests that you mug someone, the law expects you to resist, even if it's an imaginary friend in your head." “thus in this view even a sensible homunculus can lose it and agree to virtually anything, just to get the hellhounds and trombones to stop.” 593
+
::*Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
 
+
:::*Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
:*Starting a behavior vs. halting it. ("free won't")
+
:::*The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
::*Libet experiment, 1980s, EEG disclosure of “readiness potential” — activity measured before conscious awareness of will.5 second delay might just be artifact of experiment design.  Time it takes to interpret the clockLibet says maybe the lag time is the time you have to veto the action your body is preparing you for (“free won’t”)
+
:::*Mele's Intentional self-modification argument suggests that we can be held responsible for our actions because we have powers of self-modification.
 
+
:::*But! Now imagine Benji, also afraid of the basementHe doesn't try to conquer his fear or tries and failsHow would you know if Benji deserves to be blamed for his failure? 
::*Sapolsky’s view is that these debates reflect a consensus about the interaction of biology and free will, whatever that is.   
+
:::*Maybe Betty is a "chronic cognizer" and Benji is a "cognitive miser"Are these traits they for which they have "moral desert"? Some people are not persuaded by Mele's argument. How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about moral responsibility?
 
 
:*”You must be smart” vs. “You must have worked so hard”
 
  
::*research of Carol Dweck, 90s, saying that a kid worked hard to get a result increases motivation.   
+
:*'''Thought experiment on interpersonal praise and blame'''
 +
::*Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that.  Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
 +
:::*Condition 1: Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstacles.  Are you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
 +
:::*Condition 2: Suppose now that you look at your family and extended family and you notice that, compare to other families, yours seem to come to good habits easily.  None of you really ever do anything wrong, or much.  You notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad or dysfunctional behavior (drugs, alcohol, just being "bad", disruptions in employment)Are you less deserving of your praise than people from these families, equally, more?
  
::*596: we tend to assign aptitude to biology and effort and resisting impulse to free will.  Sapolsky seems very skeptical that we can justify assigning character (impulse control anyway) to non-biological factors (fairy dust).  Read at 598. 
+
===Small Group Discussion: '''Thought Experiment on Praise and Blame'''===
  
:*'''We'll break here for today'''
+
:*Work through the thought experiment above, sharing your responses to Conditions 1 and 2. Do these comparisons make you less certain about the basis of moral responsibility? When you are ready, fill out [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSe-bvqFH6VtCNfD1aMo2877ZEJks0liBCc6oUabmIyLge_eVw/viewform?usp=sf_link this google form] about the thought experiment:
 +
:*Try to think of some clear cases in which you would blame yourself (or blame someone else) for failing a specific moral responsibility.  Make a list with different levels of seriousness. Include a few cases of criminal conduct, but mostly stay with interpersonal responsibility contexts. (Example: I would blame myself if I failed to prepare for class because I got distracted reading magazines. -Alfino) In each case, try to think about what you "deserve" or "ought to have to do" in light of your failure.  Is it always a penalty (from nominal penalty to one proportion to failure)? Does it always involve "deserving blame"?  When does it?  Hopefully, this helps us think about praise and blame in actual contexts.  Please bring 1-3 items from your list back to the whole class.

Latest revision as of 21:02, 17 November 2022

24: NOV 17. Unit Six: Criminal Justice and Moral Responsibility Skepticism

Assigned

In-class

  • Some basics of the moral responsibilty and free will discussion

Introduction to philosophical problems with Moral Responsibility and the Law

  • Basic Questions:
  • 1. Do we praise people for things that they don't deserve credit for and blame people for things that are not their fault?
  • 2. Is our concept of moral responsibility (and all of the behaviors and institutions based on it) wrong somehow? Is it out of sync with ideas about free will, what we know about the brain, and the causes of crime?
  • 3. What exactly do we mean when we say, "You are responsible for that"? Start a list. Causal, moral, both, neither. Do you find yourself referencing some idea of a "normally competent person"? When would you also hold someone responsible for becoming a normally competent person? What sorts of conditions make is more or less likely that you will become a normally competent person?
  • 4. If we clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, will we still approach criminal punishment with retributive intent?
  • Some concepts for thinking about moral responsibility:
  • Moral Responsibility - The idea that people deserve praise or blame for their actions. In the standard view, praise and blame are based on "moral desert".
  • Moral desert - Normally, you "morally deserve" something because you did (or failed to do) something to merit it, positively or negatively. (You worked a shift and deserve to be paid. You failed to observe the speed limit...)
  • Moral desert can be contrasted to what you deserve just because of your status, as in rights. This is also called "moral standing". Moral desert can also be contrasted with "morally arbitrary" (recall Rawls). So, we would say you do not deserve praise or blame for things that are "morally arbitrary": things you did little or nothing to achieve (like an inheritance), things about you that were just your good fortune (good impulse control, a good noodle, athletic ability, at ease in social life...). Yet we clearly praise and blame people (and ourselves) for all of these things!
  • Accountability vs. Morally Responsibility -- Giving an account of someone as having done or failed to do things we normally expect of others can be done quite apart from holding someone blameworthy. This might be an important distinction if you become a skeptic about moral responsibility. You don't lose accountability, necessarily.
  • Free will and responsibility -- Most people would agree that if we cannot freely will our actions, we cannot be held responsible for them. But what sort of free will is required? Is normal choosing (neurologically described) free will or do we have to break with the causal fabric of the universe! (Libertarian Free will). If the world is deterministic, everything has been "decided" (Including basketball games!). Does that mean there is no free will, or just that it might not be what we think it is?

Radio Lab Episode on Blame and Moral Responsibility

  • Segment 1: Story of Kevin and his wife, Janet. Kevin is arrested for child pornography.
  • 15 years earlier. Epilepsy seizures returned after surgery two years earlier. Can't drive so he meets Janet from work, who drives him to work. Romance... Still more seizures. Another surgery. Music ability in tact. But then his food and sexual appetites grew, played songs on the piano for hours. Disturbing behavior. Really disturbing behavior.
  • Reporter tries to get at who it was who did it. Kevin claims compulsion. Downloads and deletes files.
  • Orin Devinsky: Kevin’s neurologist. Testified in court that it wasn't Kevin's fault.
  • Neurological dive: deep parts of our brain can generate weird thoughts, but we have a "censor". Maybe Kevin lost that part of his brain. Observed in post-surgery monkeys.
  • Lee Vartan, prosecutor -- Can't be impulse control. Porn at home, but not at work. He must have known that it was wrong. But Tourette's can be circumstantially triggered even though it is clearly neurological. Poignant exchange with Janet about staying in the relationship. Could you have stayed in the relationship? Kluwer-Bucy. Months before sentencing. Medication makes him normal, but eliminates his libido. 5 yrs. - home arrest. Judge acknowledges prosecutor's point. How does the legal system assign blame when you are sometimes “in control” and sometimes not? Adds: You could have asked for help. (Reflect on this a bit.) 24 months federal prison 25 months of house arrest. 2008-2010. Do you agree with prosecutor's Vartan's point? Why or why not? What would your sentence have been? (Short group discussion on questions in bold.)
  • Segment 2: Blame - person or brain. (26:30 mins)
  • Nita Farahany - neurolaw professor (law and philosophy!). Might be lots of cases. One count: 1600 cases from 1% sampled. (Counter-argument: Isn't this just like blaming everything else for what you do wrong? Isn't it too easy?). Thought experiment: Imagine a deaf person, who can’t hear a child in burning building. You wouldn't hold the deaf person liable for the death of the child. "Emotional inability" would also be damage to a physical structure (as in the ear).
  • David Eagleman, Neuroscientist - Makes critical point: Neuroscience isn't so precise. Like looking at earth from space. New technologies may show us how experience is written in our brain. (Back to Descartes: mind is the ghost in the machine.) Slippery slope, the brain is always involved. Even healthy brain. Blameworthiness might be the wrong question. Person vs. biology doesn't really make sense anymore. The "choosey part” of the brain (the homunculus! - Explain: Sapolsky will make fun of this idea.) 36:00 minutes. Funny exchange. Self-modification comes up. The choosey part is also part of the brain. One system. Raises possibility that all decisions are determined.
  • Claim from Eagleman: Legal system should drop moral blame. Adopt utilitarian approach. Predict recidivism. Point system exists for sex offenders. Better than people’s "unguided judgement" (50% accurate). Point system and algorithm: 70%. Currently there is appearance bias for example from juries. [Mention controversies over sentencing algorithms [1].
  • A point system might be very predictive, but it might involve convicting someone of a future crime. Would it be? Would that be ok?
  • Nita Frahany - Blame might serve social function of articulating norms.
  • Segment 3: Dear Hector / Dear Ivan
  • Bianca Giaever (radio producer who did the story on Hector) - Hector Black, 86. Hector's backstory - WWII vet, Harvard, joins civil rights movement in Atlanta, moves South, adopts Patricia, a neglected child who lived nearby. Patricia's story (becomes a beautiful and productive person), college, adopts kids -- Patricia is murdered (strangled) and raped by Ivan Simpson. Hector feels retributive impulse. Ivan confesses. Hector considers whether he wishes the death penalty for him, decides no. Hector's statement at sentencing. Writes a letter of forgiveness to the murderer, which starts correspondence. Is it important that Ivan doesn’t forgive himself? Ivan's story - son of schizophrenic mom, adopted, horror. Ivan abused. Mom tries to drown Ivan and two other children.
  • Ivan tells the original story of Patricia's murder. Burglary. Drug use. Returns to Patricia’s house. Conversation with Patricia. Didn’t originally intend to kill her. Patricia give him food. Gets high on crack. Ivan hears a voice that sometimes comes to him. Commits the murder. Can't make sense of it. Wants death penalty.
  • Do we still blame Ivan Simpson the same way? Hector tells his story. Many letters exchanged. A strange bond. Hector has self-doubts about his behavior toward Ivan - sending care packages to Ivan???. (Maybe he's just a weird guy or is he on to something?) How do you evaluate Hector’s approach to Ivan?
  • Does Ivan's story change your view of the kind of threat he poses -- one from choosing evil/failing a responsibility vs. compulsion?’’’

Some complicating arguments and thought experiments on moral responsibilty

  • A couple of interesting philosophical arguments to take into the thought experiment:
  • From Peter Strawson, summarized here in Waller, Against Responsibility:
  • If one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, morally speaking. To be truly responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be the way one is. But one cannot really be said to choose (in a conscious, reasoned fashion) the way one is unless one already has some principles of choice (preferences, values, ideals etc.) in the light of which one chooses how to be. But then, to be truly responsible for one’s having those principles of choice, one must have chosen them, in a reasoned conscious fashion. But that requires that one have principles of choice. And thus the regress. (pg. 29, Waller)
  • Strawson's argument suggests the "impossibility" of moral responsibility.
  • Mele’s Intentional Self-Modification Argument
  • Mele seems to accept the idea that in order to be responsible for how one acts, one must be responsible for how one is at the time of action. But he takes exception to Strawson’s claim that in order to be responsible for how one is, one must have chosen to be that way. He thinks there are cases of intentional self-modification that allow an agent to be responsible for what they do, without involving an infinite regress of choices. He makes his case by first developing the following thought experiment:
  • The Case of Betty: Betty is a six-year-old girl who is afraid of the basement in her house. She knows that no harm has come to anyone, including herself, who has entered the basement. But she is still afraid. Nevertheless, she recognizes that her fear is “babyish” and takes steps to overcome come it. She starts to make periodic visits to the basement, staying slightly longer each time until she no longer feels afraid. After following this method for a few months, she loses her irrational fear.
  • Mele's Intentional self-modification argument suggests that we can be held responsible for our actions because we have powers of self-modification.
  • But! Now imagine Benji, also afraid of the basement. He doesn't try to conquer his fear or tries and fails. How would you know if Benji deserves to be blamed for his failure?
  • Maybe Betty is a "chronic cognizer" and Benji is a "cognitive miser". Are these traits they for which they have "moral desert"? Some people are not persuaded by Mele's argument. How far can "self-modification" go to make up for doubts about moral responsibility?
  • Thought experiment on interpersonal praise and blame
  • Suppose you were raised in a good home and have acquired good habits. We would normally praise you for that. Now, would you reassess your deservedness of praise in light of the following conditions?
  • Condition 1: Compare yourself now to someone raise in a bad home, or no home, and who acquired good habits, having overcome many personal obstacles. Are you less deserving of your praise than this person, equally, more?
  • Condition 2: Suppose now that you look at your family and extended family and you notice that, compare to other families, yours seem to come to good habits easily. None of you really ever do anything wrong, or much. You notice that your friend's families have higher frequencies of bad or dysfunctional behavior (drugs, alcohol, just being "bad", disruptions in employment). Are you less deserving of your praise than people from these families, equally, more?

Small Group Discussion: Thought Experiment on Praise and Blame

  • Work through the thought experiment above, sharing your responses to Conditions 1 and 2. Do these comparisons make you less certain about the basis of moral responsibility? When you are ready, fill out this google form about the thought experiment:
  • Try to think of some clear cases in which you would blame yourself (or blame someone else) for failing a specific moral responsibility. Make a list with different levels of seriousness. Include a few cases of criminal conduct, but mostly stay with interpersonal responsibility contexts. (Example: I would blame myself if I failed to prepare for class because I got distracted reading magazines. -Alfino) In each case, try to think about what you "deserve" or "ought to have to do" in light of your failure. Is it always a penalty (from nominal penalty to one proportion to failure)? Does it always involve "deserving blame"? When does it? Hopefully, this helps us think about praise and blame in actual contexts. Please bring 1-3 items from your list back to the whole class.