2009 Fall Proseminar Class Notes

I will post some notes on our readings to this page and I invite you to contribute text, questions, and comments about the issues under discussion. You can either enter text or links directly into the Class notes page or use the "discussion" tab, which is also set up by class date.

Alfino 15:16, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

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9/1

This was our introductory class. We made introductions, went over the course goals, the course website, and wiki. We brought up a wide range of topics for use in class.

9/22

Dennett's general argument in Ch. 2:

IC/P. Darwin's theory of natural selection establishes a process by which variation and species can be explained as a result of incremental change.

IC/P. The features of the process of natural selection are also the features of algorithms (substrate neutrality, mindlessness, guaranteed results).

C. Natural selection may an instance of a broader algorithmic process which explains the emergence of order in natural systems.

Dennett's general argument in Ch. 3:

The following claims are argued for, but also occur as premises in the larger argument of the book.

IC/P. Darwin's algorithm allows for explanations of order without reference to telos.

IC/P. Explanations of order without reference to telos undermine traditional views of the role of mind in order.

IC/P. The algorithm of selection can be thought of as operating within a "design space." A good trick, such as "reinforcement learning" may give an organism a way of creating order in its phenotype, not just accumulating design in its genotype.

IC/P. Using the algorithm of selection in this way involves an acceptable reduction.

Alfino 17:14, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

9/29

Some notes on readings:

Foucault:

124: "Foucault is often classified as a cultural historian, but he preferred the designation "archaeologist of knowledge."

127: "Of the universals that reason claims to know, none is more crucial in the modern era than what we call "human nature." In his analysis of this concept, Foucault avoids such abstract questions as "What is human nature?" and "Does human nature exist?" Instead he asks, "How has the concept of human nature functioned in our society?" Framing the question in this manner opens the way for his program of undermining the Enlightenment self. "

128: "All of this is to say that Foucault moves us beyond structuralism to "post-structuralism." He moves us over the boundary between modernism from postmodernism (although he himself does not use the term).25 Postmoderns like Foucault no longer engage in a quest for an independent self, a given reaUty governed by lawlike regvdarities. They tend to be engaged in something more like interpreting texts. And in this endeavor, they assume not that every text has a single unifying Structure but, to the contrary, that texts are almost infinitely complex. In short, the postmodern paradigm, as exemplified by Foucault, celebrates complexity?-^ "

132: "Knowledge inescapably linked to power."

Derrida:

139: "He was coming to what seemed to him the inescapable conclusion that philosophy is a literary genre. "

140: "In a sense, Derrida begins where Kant leaves off. He raises the question "What foundation can we offer for our use of reason?"2 But he questions the modern trust in reason chiefly by undertaking a ruthless exploration of the nature of language and its relation to the world. In this enterprise, Derrida offers a critique of the so-called "realist" understanding of language — the view that our statements are representations of the world as it actually is apart" from human activity. Derrida denies that language has a fixed meaning connected to a fixed ality or that it unveils definitive truth. He wants to divest us of thi modern concept and open us up to the "hermeneutical" possibilities of the written word, the possibilities that arise as we engage in an ongoing conversation with texts.7"

142: [Important to appreciate Husserl's position: "Husserl renews the perennial modern attempt to provide an indisputable foundation for reason and language. Reminiscent of Descartes, he sets out to discover the primordial structures of thought and perception. He is convinced that this is facilitated by elevating knowledge that arises from authentic "self-presence" above knowledge based on memory, anticipation, or traces of an absent experience. This differentiation, in turn, requires a demarcation between the "now," where the subject is located, and the receding horizons of past and future. "

144: "Derrida concludes that in the end language is merely "selfreferential. ... But how do we account for our experience of existing as a self in the "now"? Derrida suggests that the experience of a singular, objective present" is an illusion. What we experience in the present is actually the result of a complex web of meanings that is constantly changing. Through language and concepts, we impose the sense of objective meaning on the flux of experience."

148: "Derrida's primary goal is to divest us of logocentrism by showing the impossibility of dravmig a clear line between reality and our linguistic representations. His chief focus, of course, is written language texts. He wants to wean us from too quickly assuming that we can discover the meaning inherent in a text, and he does this by demonstrating the difficulties of any theory that defines meaning in a univocal way, whether by appeal to what the author intends, what literary conventions determine, or even what a reader experiences. 102 Afi 102 After aU our theorizing, there still remains "the free play of meaning," which is the result of what Derrida calls "the play of the world." The text always provides further connections, correlations, and contexts and hence always has the potential to yield further meanings. "

Rorty:

151: "The<Pragmatist Outlook At the heart of the pragmatist tradition pragmatism is the abandonment nf-x iA^^ 4-u^+ v,ac reianed in philosophy pragmatism is the abandonment of a idea that has reigned in philosophy since the Enlightenment — namely, that the mind is the "mirror of nature."

152: "The pragmatist view of truth is nonrealist rather than realist. ist. The alist works from the assumption that we have direct access to the world independent of language and that our language follows from our observations of this objective, given worid.... The nonrealist, in contrast, begins with the assumption that our iccess to the world is mediated by language. "

153 "Because it is nonrealist, nonessentialist, and nonrepresentationalist, the pragmatist view of truth elevates coherence rather than correspondence. The modem epistemological project is grounded m the correspondence theory of truth. Rorty characterizes the goal of this theory as penetrating the veil of appearances in order to glimpse things as they are in themselves. Measured by the correspondence criterion, statements always have a clear truth value: they are either true or false. And we can discover the veracity of an assertion by checking whether or not it corresponds to the reality it purports to describe. ... Rorty credits Dewey for pointing us in a morrhelpful direction. In place of the assumption that beliefs represent reality, Dewey substitutes the idea that beliefs are tools for dealing with reality; they are maxims that dictate the behavior of the one that holds them."

156 "First, Rorty joins the postmodern assault on the modern concept of the self. He rejects Descartes's view of the self as an autonomous thinking substance, characterizing it instead as a centerless and everchanging web of beliefs and desires that produces action. 134

157: "But rather than bemoaning the loss of a transcendental vantage point, Rorty welcomes the new situation. It is beneficial, he says, because it builds our sense of community."

Alfino 17:04, 29 September 2009 (UTC)