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| | Return to [[Human Nature]] | | Return to [[Human Nature]] |
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| − | ==Section 1: Reconstructions== | + | ==Section 1: Participation Journals== |
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| − | ==Euthyphro1== | + | ===Euthyphro 10=== |
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| − | When Socrates asks Euthyphro, “is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” he is questioning the basis of things. He wonders about the relationship between two things, especially those which are in effect of one another. The question brings to mind a circle with one idea spawning another and no clear beginning or end. However, Socrates seems to believe definitively that piety is loved by the gods or that the gods create piety through their love; one is an affect of the other. If piety is pleasing to the gods, then people would be more in control for if they swayed their actions to be pious they would attain the favor of the gods. However, if the gods create piety then they would hold more power for people would respond in respect and humbleness to the gods will.
| + | ====Student 1==== |
| − | Socrates would answer this question with a serious of questions regarding a similar topic, but one less complex. He would then relate the responses to these questions back to the original idea. For example, in Euthyphro, Socrates states that there is a difference between something carried and something carrying. He then goes on to ask if “the thing carried is a carried thing because it is carried, or for some other reason?” By addressing the idea from a simpler perspective, Socrates is able to achieve solid conclusions about issues that can be applied to a more complex situation.
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| − | Though his dialogue, Socrates decides that something changes or is created because it is affected by something else and did not change or come about of its own accord to produce a response. He deems that “it is not being loved by those who love it because it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is being loved.” However he also comes to the conclusion that something is being loved because it is pious (which would be an act to produce a response) and that something is god-loved because it is loved by the gods (a state of being that causes an action). For Socrates, these two ideas clash and he comes to the conclusion that piety and god-loved are not synonymous.
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| − | ==Euthyphro2==
| + | Throughout the entire dialogue, Socrates asks Euthyphro repeatedly what the definition of piety is. After each explanation given to him, Socrates finds the flaw and proves the definition to be false. Presumably, Socrates wants to know the answer to this question, because he is entering court on this day. He wants to be able to argue against the true definition of piety and, therefore, win the case against him. In Euthyphro’s third definition of piety, he basically says, “All that is loved by the gods is pious, and all that is hated by the gods is impious”. When Socrates says, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods”, he questions the definition. Ultimately, he completely eliminates Euthyphro’s previous definitions for piety. His first reason for not accepting this definitions is because, he proves that the piety came first, before the liking, through his “see/seeing and carry/carrying” analogies. Basically, Socrates means that “being liked” is a state of an object/idea already in existence. Therefore, that which is righteous is liked by the gods, because it is righteous, it isn’t righteous solely because the gods like it. Socrates offers a definition as well; "piety is a species of the genus 'justice'”. Soon enough, Socrates points out that his definition is also false. All that is pious is not necessarily just, as well as, not all that is just is necessarily pious. However, most human beings generally associate that which is pious, is also just, or considered “morally correct”. Finally, Socrates points out that there are many actions that cannot be sorted into both or either category. If you save your brother’s life by shooting a killer, it is not considered morally correct. But is it considered pious? |
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| − | Socrates is charged with impiety, but he does not even understand the real definition of piety. He goes and questions what the universally true meaning of piety is: whether it is loved by the gods because it is pious or if it is pious because it is loved by the gods. The stakes are determined by whether the gods are dependent on the issue or not. Plato’s presentation of morality is still a debate.
| + | ===Are we radically wrong about our knowledge of reality?=== |
| − | Plato uses Socrates’ circular reasoning in his argument to demonstrate the importance of addressing piety. In Socrates’ third definition, piety is loved by the gods because it is pious, piety is independent of gods. The gods, like all living creatures, are bound by the greater force of morality. Euthyphro only lists attributes and examples of piety instead of actually defining it, such as the universal approval of the gods or prosecuting his father. Although there pious actions such as bravery or caring for the gods or others are good, it still does not present a clear definition for piety.
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| − | In Socrates’ second premise of his definition, it is pious because it is loved by the gods, piety is dependent of the gods’ actions. What actions are “evil” such as murder and rape and what actions are “good” are decided by the gods. The problem with the definition depends on whether a person is religious or an atheist. Euthyphro is stumped by Socrates when asked what the outcome of piety is (17e).
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| − | In the end, Socrates still has no clear definition of piety. Euthyphro explains giving the gods gifts in order to be liked by them is pious, which brings him back to his previously failed definition of what gods like. Socrates would have no answer, but would clearly present both sides of the dilemma. The first premise may prove to be true if one believes all God’s commands are good, but may be proven false because He hypocritically incorporated unethical actions into the world. The answer is in the matter of personal values. Piety is what one believes to be just and is considered moral to his or her own conscience.
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| − | ==Euthyphro3== | + | ====Student 1 ==== |
| − | The dilemma in Euthyphro is asked by Socrates when stated, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” Socrates is trying to justify what piety is to help him in his court case where he is being charged for impiety. Through the dialogue, it seems as though circular reasoning keeps going on. Socrates will ask Euthyphro a question, Euthyphro will answer it, but right away Socrates questions his answer. Either way you answer this question, there is always a way to rebut it: that is what is at stake. Not all the gods agree on the same things to be pious or impious.
| + | ====Student 2 ==== |
| − | Euthyphro answers the question by saying the pious is what is loved by gods, but Socrates uses the reasoning that the gods could possibly disagree among themselves as to what is pious and just. With that, Euthyphro changes his answer to that pious is what is loved by all gods unanimously. Socrates answer to this question is that gods love what is pious because it is pious, not because it is loved by the gods.
| + | ====Student 3 ==== |
| − | This question is about where do morals come from. Do they all originate from the gods? How do we know what the true form of pious is unless we interact with the gods and know the true form of it? We do not know the actual form of piety, just the idea of it that has been passed on. Socrates tries to narrow down the definition of piety and what is pious, but there is no absolute answer, just the ones that we create.
| + | ====Student 4 ==== |
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| − | ==Euthyphro4== | |
| − | The question of piety and whether it is loved by the gods simply because it is pious or whether pious actions are pious because the gods love them basically comes down to a person’s individual beliefs. This is what is at stake in the question. For every argument made by either party in this argument, there was a completely legitimate counter argument that was made. This caused the argument to go in a large circle and basically come back to what a person believed about the characteristics of the gods back then. Now, with the spread of Western Christianity, the question changes because of a singular God versus a large number of gods since one of the major premises in Socrates’ argument is the gods being in constant conflict with one another, and the one Christian God cannot logically be in conflict with Itself.
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| − | I do not think that it is an accident that Plato had these two men meet to discuss this issue. Socrates is known for not conforming to the Greek standards when it came to believing in their gods, and Euthyphro is obviously a religious scholar who would never question the gods and their love of piety because it is pious. Socrates knows that the answer to this question concerning piety cannot simply be solved with logic and, I believe, that he just wanted to take this opportunity to make this religious scholar question himself a little bit. Although Socrates never directly gives his opinion in this argument, I believe he would answer the question by saying things are pious because they are loved by the gods. This is because he challenges Euthyphro’s argument in the first place, and is constantly offering counter arguments to his claims throughout the argument. Also, the fact that Socrates is being prosecuted for corrupting the youth by not teaching them about the gods according to the Athenian customs also points to Socrates belief of piety being based on what the gods love. This belief is scary because it would cause major issues in ethics and whether good is actually good and bad is actually bad, and these questions may have caused Socrates to strike up the argument with Euthyphro in the first place in hopes that the religious scholar could show him where his logic was flawed that he could believe such a thing. These are the reasons that I believe that Socrates felt that pious acts are pious because they are loved by the gods.
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| − | ==Euthyphro5== | |
| − | In the Euthyphro dilemma, Socrates and Euthyphro try to define the meaning of pious. Euthyphro makes several attempts at the definition but each attempt is subjected to Socrates and shortly there after, refuted.
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| − | In his first attempt to define piety, Euthyphro states that piety must be that which is loved by all gods. However, Socrates illustrates that the God’s are constantly at odds which each other and they’re always at least two viewpoints on a definition. He asks Euthyphro if the God’s would disagree on what is beautiful and what is ugly. This then forces Euthphyro to state that piety is what all gods love unanimously.
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| − | This definition leads to many more problems in the definition of piety. Socrates asks “is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” This generates a dilemma in which there can’t be an absolutely correct answer. “It cannot be said that the reason why the pious is pious is that the gods love it. For, as Socrates presumes and Euthyphro agrees, the gods love the pious because it is pious (both parties agree on this, the first horn of the dilemma). And it cannot be said that the gods love the pious because it is pious, and then add that the pious is pious because the gods love it, for this would be circular reasoning.”
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| − | This dilemma has been unanswerable ever since it was first proposed. In defining this question, we are searching for a definition of morality and which defines the other.
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| − | I’m not sure Socrates could answer this question. Because to give a exact answer to a question like this would force Socrates to make too many assumptions that he may not be willing to make. Already in the discussion Socrates agrees that piety is what all gods love unanimously. This was very difficult for Socrates to do however because it would be ignoring a fundamental point that there is always disagreement between what is right and wrong? Socrates would raise some very important questions however such as: “Do we care about the good because it is good, or do we just call good those things that we care about?” “Are truths necessary because we deem them to be so, or do we deem them to be so because they are necessary?”
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| − | ==Euthyphro 6== | |
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| − | Socrates and Euthyphro are having a discussion about whether Euthyphro should prosecute against his father because he murdered someone. Euthyphro wants to, but Socrates is questioning him and making him wonder if he really is doing it for the right reasons/purpose. Socrates questions if the person murdered was a relative or a stranger, and then goes on to question “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” Euthyphro was confused, but Socrates explains to him, so they come to a conclusion, but seem to contradict it later where Socrates then questions more.
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| − | After Socrates asks the previous question, he has to explain what he means because Euthyphro does not understand. He asks him many questions so that Euthyphro feels as though he is answering it and understands the difference between the two parts of the question that were asked. Socrates got Euthyphro to come up with the conclusion and then Socrates summarizes it by saying, “It is being loved then that is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved.”
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| − | They are able to reach this conclusion because Socrates asks many of the right questions which lead to more questioning which finally leads to the conclusion. He first makes sure that Euthyphro understands the difference between something that has something acting upon it and something acting/being the action. Then Socrates makes sure that Euthyphro understands the cause and effect that things have on each other. You might be able to say something one way and it makes sense, but saying it backwards would not make sense at all, so that being affected results in an affected thing, but no vice versa. Then Socrates asks Euthyphro “it is not being loved by those who love it because it is something love, but it is something loved because it is being loved by them?” and Euthyphro agrees. Socrates helps Euthyphro to define pious, so they come up with the conclusion “It is being loved then that is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved.”
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| − | ==Euthyphro 7== | |
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| − | In “Euthyphro” Socrates runs into Euthyphro near the court where they began to discuss each of their reasoning’s for being at the court. When Euthyphro explains how he believes his father murdered one of their own slaves and is taking him to court for it, even though many of his relatives believe Euthyphro is being impious. Off of that come a discussion as to what is pious and what is impious. The main question Socrates proposes is “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (10). Socrates, who thought that if he knew the definition of piety he could possibly help him self in is own case, is unsatisfied that together they do not come to a concrete definition.
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| − | Through discussion with Euthyphro, Socrates leads to a conclusion that “it is not being loved by those who love it because it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is loved by them.” He gets to this by showing how “if anything is being changed…it is not being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is being changed.” This means that we do not have the criteria for defining what makes something changed, just like how we do know have the criteria for showing if something is pious. That shows how the first part of his question is not the correct answer to it, and further on in their conversation he continues to go on showing that the second part of his question is no truer then the first part. Socrates then says that there are too many Gods who each love different things so that does not offer a common definition of what pious means. He tries to prove that by showing that because each of the different gods are at odds with each other because each of the “different gods considers different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad” (7e). Because each god has a different belief on certain things, some things would be “both god-loved and god-hated” (8) which would then make one thing “both pious and impious” (8) which can not be true. Therefore, Socrates concludes that something is not pious because it is loved by the gods.
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| − | With Socrates conversation with Euthyphro, he shows how neither option in his initial question, “is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (10), can possibly be true. He concludes that in order to come up with a clear definition they must discuss this further at a later point in time.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 8==
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| − | Socrates on the Meaning of Piety
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| − | Socrates asks the question, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” Socrates uses this question to emphasize the indefinable nature of the social structure, piety. What is at stake in the question is not so much a reflection of the actual meaning of piety, but rather the realization of the inferiority and limitations of human understanding. The answer to the question proves Euphrates generalization wrong, emphasizing humanity’s tendency to claim a better understanding of complex ideas than they actually possess. This strongly enforces the main mission of Socrates’ teachings, to humble the wise and inspire personal introspection as to the identity of ultimate truth and reality.
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| − | In the continuation of his discourse with Euthyphro Socrates uses logic and the scientific method to determine that piety is not determined by the love of the gods. Socrates does this by at first assuming the opposite, that pious actions are defined by how the gods as a unified collective feel towards all actions. Then using logic he attempts and succeeds in finding fault with the above hypothesis. Socrates uses examples to make his point that change or affect creates a state, and that a state cannot create change or affect. Rather, the new state is dependent on an initial action. By rejoining this aside to the primary question concerning piety, Socrates reveals Euthyphro’s circulatory argument. Exposing how he uses the conclusion, that piety is determined by gods love, as the premises as well. In other words, the argument lacks true evidence. For something to be loved, something/someone must first love the action. So, pious actions cannot be pious because they are loved. In laymen’s terms love is an action and must be initiated by a reason. If what the gods love is pious, that does not reveal the causation of their feelings. The basis of their feelings are the true determinant of piety, not the feelings themselves.
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| − | Therefore, Socrates would answer that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious. Yet, it is what makes an action pious that Socrates truly wished to comprehend. For this question though, he would admit that there is no distinct answer. Instead admitting to lacking a full understanding of the nature of pious actions. Socrates recognized piety as social abstract that not only has different meanings depending on the society, but differs from person to person as well. Thus, making it difficult to have a universal definition for piety that is assuredly accurate. During the discourse he continuously humbles himself, blatantly exposing his own ignorance. Although, Socrates is searching for the ultimate meaning of piety, he recognizes that truly for each person the definition will have a slightly different meaning.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 9== | |
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| − | In Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro, “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” This question is about the integrity of the people. If by nature one is pious and as a result is loved by the gods, it speaks more for the individual person. It means they naturally are good, respectful, and reverent. It is an inherent trait that they display only because it is a part of them. The latter part of the question, “Is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” has the opposite effect. It exposes the truth of the person. Due to the fact that the gods love the person, they exhibit piety. The love the gods have for the person is the cause of their good characteristics and without that love, the person would be without it; their integrity would be absent.
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| − | Socrates answers this question by attempting to help Euthyphro to understand the nature of it. He breaks it down into comparisons. He wants Euthyphro to see parts of it to be able to make the informed opinion. He says, “Tell me then whether the thing carried is a carried thing because it is being carried, or for some other reason?” Euthyphro agrees that this reason is why and thus Socrates’ answer to the original question is clear. He would say that some are pious because they are loved by gods. This is parallel with his beliefs and the reason he is being indicted. He is trying to show the people of Athens, their ignorance and hypocrisy. His teachings and speeches are an attempt for them to see that their integrity is lacking. Their traits and “good behavior” is an effect, not a cause. They love their gods simply because the gods love them. It has nothing to do with their teachings or beliefs that the gods are great. Socrates is exposing them.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 10== | |
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| − | This question needs to be answered very carefully and there is a lot at stake in trying to come up with a logical answer. Either side could be argued and if answered wrong piety will in turn be defined wrongly. Also one has to wonder what “loved by the gods” (10) means. Socrates has to be able to understand the answer and not be able to refute it. If not then piety will not be defined and the whole conversation will be pointless. Another aspect at stake is creating a circular answer. This would happen if one was to say that both answers were correct. This cannot be because they directly oppose each other. Although in the end Socrates still doesn’t completely understand, answering this question clearly with definitions that Socrates understands is very important.
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| − | Socrates would answer the question by saying that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious. One reason Socrates would say this is that if it was pious because it is loved by the gods then there could be no one definition of piety. This is because all of the gods disagree. Therefore if they were picking something and calling it pious then something could be pious to one god but not to another. On the other hand if certain actions are already considered pious then the gods will together love them but may still disagree to who is at fault. Another reason Socrates would believe that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious is that piety has a human and godly part to it. Its human part is the sacrifice and begging to the gods and the godly part is the gods accepting the sacrifice and answering the people’s prayers. If something is pious because it is loved by the gods then there would be no human part to it and no justice to which Socrates and Euthyphro speak. Lastly Socrates would answer this question this way because piety is something that is far beyond the gods. They do not say what is pious and what is not because they already know what is and isn’t pious. It is based on morality and what is good and bad in society. If not then the gods could just choose anything that they wanted to be pious including murder, stealing, etc. and just because they love their own ideas these things become pious.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 11== | |
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| − | The question Socrates poses to Euthyphro is: is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods? In the conversation between Socrates and Euthyphro, Socrates maintains the belief that piety is not caused by an external factor like the gods, but instead is piety for piety’s sake. However, Euthyphro thinks that piety is caused by the feelings of the gods (namely someone is pious because they are loved by the gods). During their discussion, Socrates asks Euthyphro many questions that are aimed at undermining his position that piety is caused by another factor (the gods). By the end of the conversation, Euthyphro has revoked his first claim and sees the logic that Socrates has spelled out for him. However, they do not even delve into the subject of what piety actually is; instead their whole conversation is simply about the cause of piety. Socrates offers many arguments to Euthyphro to prove his point that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious and not vice versa. He begins by pointing out that god-loved and piety are two different things. Socrates goes on to try to get Euthyphro to define what deeds the gods achieve, using concrete examples of animals and professions as a comparison. Through this questioning, he gets Euthyphro to narrow down his definition of what piety entails to the gods- to be pious is to beg and give to the gods. However, Euthyphro ends up at the realization that he is now saying that the pious is what is dear to the gods. So therefore, he has come to the conclusion that what is god-loved is pious (and is not pious because it is god-loved), which is precisely the opposite of what Euthyphro initially concluded. Throughout their conversation, Socrates manipulated Euthyphro to take back his first opinion through many different arguments which defined the terms they were using and critically examined what god-loved really entailed.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 12==
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| − | Socrates’ question about whether pious is being loved by the gods, or the gods love things that are pious is a question that reminds me of another classic question: what came first? The chicken or the egg? To me it seems of relevance what came first. One could argue, depending upon the religion at hand, that the gods were the ones that made the pious things. If pious things occurred before the existence of the gods, then I would have to believe that the gods love things that are pious. But the fact that most people would believe that the gods came first, then the gods created the pious things in which they loved. Therefore, I believe that pious things are pious because they are being loved by the gods instead of the pious thing being loved by the gods because it is pious.
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| − | I only came to this conclusion because, to me, the wording of the question leads me to believe that the order in which things occurred is of great importance. The part of the question that reads, “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious” makes it sound like the pious things were there before the gods started loving them. In many religions, this would be believed to be false, because the gods were the ultimate creators.
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| − | Socrates goes about a different way to answer this question. He starts by stating similar relationships such as, “It is not being seen because it is a thing seen but on the contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen.” This is a much easier relationship to grasp, but at the same time, it is remarkably similar to the question about piety. The issue behind the question about piety is the fact that the term “gods” is not something that is familiar. People believe in gods, but because they are not tangible, or visible, it’s more difficult to accurately describe the relationship between piety and being loved by the gods. Socrates tries to make this obstacle avoidable by breaking down the question to its individual features. Is something god-loved because it is loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because it is god-loved? Once the obvious relationship is established that things that are loved by the gods are god-loved, he would move on to fitting in the piety of the original question. In all of the question related to being seen, the order of events happening is important. The object isn’t being seen because it is seen, but rather it is seen because the object is being seen. The object needs to be seen before it can be considered an object seen. The same relationship applies to the piety question. The objects need to be god-loved before they are pious, instead of being pious then god-loved.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 13==
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| − | In the Euthyphro reading, Socrates and Euthyphro have a long discussion near the king-archon’s court about piety. Throughout this conversation, an answer to a question raised close to the beginning is sought after. Socrates proposes the question “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” to Euthyphro. This question leads to much contemplation and the attempt to define piety in order to grasp a better understanding of it.
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| − | This question allows for several other questions and interpretations to emerge. One of which is the question of whether something is good because God says it is, or if God says it is good because it actually is good. Essentially, Socrates and Euthyphro apply the overall question of piety to other ideas, like this one, in order to justify it’s meaning. Socrates and Euthyphro go back and forth with various definitions of piety in hopes of answering this question. Ultimately, five separate definitions are created throughout their in depth conversation by Euthyphro.
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| − | These five definitions developed as follows: what Euthyphro is doing presently, prosecuting his father for murder, is pious, piety is what is pleasing to the gods, what all the gods love is pious and what they hate is impious, where there is piety there is justice because piety is a part of justice, and giving gifts to the gods. All of these suggested meanings shed light on a different aspect and interpretation. This in turn allows a broader scope of opinion to form, which is significantly useful in determining the answer to the central question from the beginning.
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| − | Socrates would answer the question by saying it is “pious because it is being loved by the gods” (p. 12). This appears to be the most direct conclusion to the posed question out of all the inferences. Socrates arrived at this conclusion as a result of Euthyphro’s guidance after first thinking “it is being loved then because it is pious.” Euthyphro used the analogies of something carried, led, and seen to assist Socrates arrive at his answer. “The thing carried is a carried thing because it is being carried…And the thing led is so because it is being led, and the thing seen because it is being seen” (p. 12). It is then said that something is “loved because it is being loved” and “the god-loved…is so because it is being loved by the gods” (p.13). Being loved by the gods is pious, which therefore, makes it pious because it is being loved by the gods.
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| − | Thus, the reasoning behind his answer fits perfectly with the previous analogies and makes logical sense after going through a whole cycle of theories throughout the conversation. Even though Socrates is not fully satisfied at the end of their discussion, he is able to gain some knowledge from Euthyphro. For the time being, Socrates can collaborate all the ideas he has collected so far together to form a somewhat solid answer until Euthyphro and he can meet again. Until then, this is probably the best answer he can derive from the knowledge he has gained thus far that makes feasible sense.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 14==
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| − | In Socrates’ question to Euthyphro, “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” a great deal is at stake. Socrates is trying to get Euthyphro to explain piety and the pious definitively. As part of his response to Socrates, Euthyphro suggests that everything that is loved by the gods is pious. Socrates does not let him off very easily though. In an attempt to delve deeper and get to the bottom of it, Socrates brings up the notion of whether it is by being changed by something that changes it or it is by something’s being a changed thing that something else then changes it, and he presents this question to Euthyphro. If the former is true, then according to Socrates, Euthyphro has not given a sufficient explanation of piety. If the latter is true, then Euthyphro’s explanation is in fact adequate, and Socrates would, in theory, be satisfied.
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| − | Unfortunately, Euthyphro is confused by Socrates’ question. By presenting a few different examples as reasoning, Socrates makes it clear that his answer to the question is that “it is pious because it is being loved by the gods.” The first example he gives is that a thing carried is a carried thing because it is being carried. He then goes on to ensure that a thing led is so because it is being led and that a thing seen because it is being seen. Euthyphro agrees with these examples.
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| − | Socrates concludes that it is something changed because it is being changed, and it is something affected because it is being affected rather than being changed because it is something changed and being affected because it is something affected, respectively. Because this is so, Socrates returns to questioning Euthyphro about what is pious and what piety means, seeing as he came to the conclusion that the god-loved and the pious are not the same.
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| − | ==Euthyphro15==
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| − | In the Euthyphro reading, Socrates poses the question “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” to Euthyphro who he meets in near the law courts. The question is important because Socrates is under indictment for not believing in the Athenian gods and the answer to the question, what is pious, could help him be cleared and also strengthen the case of Euthyphro. In asking this question the nature of piety is at stake. Socrates says that an action must either be pious in its own right or be pious because the gods love that action. Socrates would agree with the first half of the question. Piety should be defined on its own and not by outside forces that influence the actions that are pious. The gods cannot love piety simply because they love it, they must love it for its own qualities. Socrates argues that this is not possible because the gods disagree on a great many important things that they love and if pious is important and worth loving then the gods must disagree on what actions are pious also. This proves that Euthyptro’s first statement that what is dear to the gods is pious, wrong, based on the fact that gods do not agree about what is dear to them. What Socrates really wants to hear are the reasons an action is pious and how that affects the gods and the humans who perform the action. The qualities and a description of pious actions are never given because Euthyphro is not able to come to logical conclusions about the nature of piety. Socrates is not able to come to conclusion about pious, but was able to prove Euthyptro wrong and examine some possible answers.
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| − | ==Euthyphro16==
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| − | When looking at the question posed by Socrates in the dialogue, “Euthyphro,” the answer is very hard to give in a way that could not be spun the other way around. Essentially, the question being posed is cyclical, in essence round. Due the fact that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, it must also be pious because it is loved by the gods and thus brings it back to the original question. Either way you look at the question, both answers lead back to the same question. There is really no way to prove one or the other. It has the same type of logic as the question, “Which came first, the chicken or the egg?” There is really no way to prove which came first because either of the answers lead to the same conclusion, that each answer leads to the same conclusion and thus begs the original question all over again. When looking at what is at stake with this question, it seems to me that by simply attempting to answer this question you have fallen into the trap of whomever posed the question to begin with because, as I stated earlier, no matter which answer you give it will lead you right back to the original question. This means that whomever poses this question will constantly be able to question your logic about how you’ve come to answer the question. I believe that if Socrates were to answer the question, he would give it, essentially, a two-fold answer. I think he would say that pious is loved by the gods because it is pious as well as it is pious because it is loved by the gods. For this he would give the reason that, you cannot have one without the other. Both parts of the question affirm the other. And if he weren’t to answer in this way, I believe that Socrates would answer with another question pertaining to whether or not piety is even relevant to what is loved by the gods. I think that this cryptic form of answer would lead to more discussion and, I believe, is a much more likely way for Socrates to answer.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 17==
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| − | The question “is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” is presented by Socrates because of the ambiguous nature of what the words “pious” and “gods.” Piety, argues Euthyphro, is a byproduct of pleasing the gods, but Socrates counters by saying that the gods are always in disagreement, thus creating a paradox in Euthyphro’s statement: not all gods will find the same deeds pious, and therefore such criteria is nonsense.
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| − | Socrates demonstrates this by using examples such as carrying and leading – essentially, a thing is not being carried because it is something carried, but rather, it is something carried because it is being carried. The action done is what brings the something into being.
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| − | Socrates goes on to say that piety is just a small aspect of “justice,” just as shame only encompasses a small part of the realm of “fear.” Eventually Euthyphro turns his idea of “justice” into “care” for the gods, but again Socrates counters this argument by announcing that slaveship to a master is not the same as, say, shipbuilders to ships. No one really knows the “fine things the gods achieve” and therefore the discipline of service to the gods cannot possibly be universal, because all gods are pleased by different things.
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| − | The conclusion as to a solid definition of piety is never found, rather, we are left with an idea of what piety is not – namely, something as simply as pleasing the gods. While Euthyphro associates piety with justice (whether a murderer acted justly or not), Socrates is unsure if such criteria really stands in all situations.
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| − | ==Euthyphro 18==
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| − | At “10”, Socrates is essentially asking Euthyphro if something is considered sacred by the gods because it is sacred, or if something is sacred because it is loved by the gods. Both philosophers have a different view when they approach this question. Euthyphro is committed to the belief that something gets approved by the gods only because it is holy. He also claims that something is approved by the gods because it gets approved of by the gods. Euthyphro’s last argument is that what is holy is what is approved by the gods.
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| − | Socrates opinion on this issue is slightly different; he believes that something is sacred because it is loved by the gods, and not the other way around. Or in other words, a deed will be in a state of approval because the gods make a decision to approve it, not solely the nature of the deed itself. This is a very interesting argument because it potentially suggests that morality is determined by the gods.
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| − | Socrates draws the distinction between being carried and getting carried as one of his main arguments. He states that something is being carried only because it gets carried. The difference is “being carried” is the state the object is physically in, and “getting carried” is the action preformed on the object. Another example he uses deals with “being approved” vs. “getting approved”. Something is being approved because it gets approved and not the other way around. Through these examples, he lays out three arguments about an individual deed. First that it is holy, second that it gets approved by the gods, and third that it is divinely approved.
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| − | ==Kant 1==
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| − | In “What is Enlightenment?” by Immanuel Kant, the causes of a lack of enlightenment and what is needed for people to enlighten themselves are discussed. Kant defines enlightenment as a “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity” (Rauhut p. 3). This immaturity is attributed to laziness, lack of resolve, and cowardice. Kant mentions how immature men see taking the step toward maturity as difficult and dangerous due to the fact that immaturity is natural to them. A way in which men can free themselves from immaturity and pursue a secure path is to cultivate their own minds and be willing take that step toward maturity despite the few falls they may endure along the way.
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| − | Kant reveals that one way for an immature person to overcome their immaturity is to gain freedom. “Nothing is required for this enlightenment…except ''freedom''; and this freedom in question is the least harmful of all…the freedom to use reason ''publicly'' in all matters” (Rauhut p. 4). Kant goes on to say “the public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may…often be narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the process of enlightenment” (Rauhut p. 4). Kant describes public use as being when scholars reason before the literate world and private use being when one reasons before a civic post that has been entrusted to them.
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| − | Throughout “What is Enlightenment?” Kant puts some focus on religion and asks if religious figures should commit themselves to an unalterable set of doctrines. He replies by saying taking such an oath would prevent any possibility of enlightenment in the future for mankind. Kant says how such a lifelong oath would prevent any public questioning for that duration and incur a disadvantage for succeeding generations “in man’s progress toward improvement” (Rauhut p. 6). Kant explains how one generation essentially ruining the chances of enlightenment for future generations would “violate and trample man’s divine rights underfoot” (Rauhut p. 6).
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| − | Essentially, Kant thought it would be better to give people the freedom to use their own intellect and take their own steps toward enlightenment instead of being regulated by church and state. I believe this to be the right position to take on the matter as well because man can emerge from self-imposed immaturity if they have freedom. This freedom necessary for maturity gain can only be present if there is no restriction “by an official post” (Rauhut p. 7). Kant makes several good points about enlightenment and how to move toward it. Most of all, his definition of enlightenment really strikes me. At first, it seems so complex and different, and makes you think about your own definition for it. However, after some thinking, you realize it is worded in a clever yet simple way that provokes contemplation, a broader perspective, and a better understanding of enlightenment.
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| − | In Kant’s last thoughts, he says how a greater degree of civil freedom is beneficial to one’s spiritual freedom and a lesser degree provides enough room for everyone to develop his or her abilities. In other words, hard cover that has been over free thinking will react to a mature mentality and increase the ability to act freely.
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